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TO ALICE M. HART 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) in the Assessment of Chemical 
Warfare Activities 
 
his study contributes to the theory and practice of how chemical weapons 
programmes and activity can be evaluated in the context of the 
international prohibition against their development, production, 
stockpiling, transfer and use as reflected in the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention. It presents an application of a hybrid and qualitative variation of 
Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) directed towards arms 
control verification and intelligence practice using three case studies: the Soviet 
Union, Iraq and suspected al-Qaeda affiliates. The study is comprehensive and 
multidisciplinary in approach, rather than reductionist. It draws on a large array 
of data as they relate to the technical, military and politico-strategic 
characteristics of chemical warfare, linking a large number of historical detail 
with conceptual insight into the nature of chemical warfare and chemical 
weapons arms control. 
T 
The work also places intelligence operational art on a more secure 
theoretical academic foundation in the chemical weapons-related context, partly 
by providing a useful basis for the understanding of the operational- and 
strategic-level analysis of chemical weapons threat assessments and appropriate 
policy responses. It shifts ACH practice closer to theoretical international 
relations models with respect to higher-level strategic and defence analysis, and 
international relations theory as it relates to WMD-related international peace 
and security questions. It does so partly by suggesting that a corollary exists 
between the role played by national intelligence requirements, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, that played by arms control verification. In particular, the 
information taskings for both weapons-specific arms control verification and 
national intelligence overlap to a great extent. 
However, the priorities and perceived political acceptability for arms 
control verification and intelligence assessments are distinct and, in many 
respects, opposed to each other. For example, an arms control assessment carried 
out within a multilateral legal regime tends to possess greater overall 
international credibility and weight so long as it is done in a professional 
technical manner whose findings then inform the subsequent political and legal 
considerations. National based intelligence assessments are, as a rule, necessarily 
kept secret to protect sources and methods and are also more likely to be 
questioned on the grounds that the conclusions support national policy. 
Nevertheless, the information taskings should, on the basis of their respective 
technical requirements, yield similar outcomes. While in practice this does not 
necessarily occur, the gap can perhaps be narrowed on the basis of better 
operational-level understanding of how such assessments should ideally be 
carried out. National intelligence-driven processes, procedures and purposes can 
perhaps be better described at the strategic level by realism international relations 
theory, while those for arms control verification can perhaps be better described 
by neoliberal institutionalism. 
 
 Those in academia, government and the public can usefully refer to this 
study for a baseline of authoritative information with which to evaluate the 
derivation and use of information relevant to verification processes and 
requirements and their broader relevance for security and defence studies. Such 
evaluations can assist the consideration of what verification data actually mean 
and how technical and scientific findings relate to the question of treaty 
compliance by states and the resulting implications for the strength of the rule-of-
law at the inter- and intra-state levels, as well as for strategic and defence studies 
in general. 
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SIPRI  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SMA  Strategic Multi-Layer program (United States) 
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure 
SPRU  Science Policy Research Unit 
SSR  Security Sector Reform 
S&T  Science and Technology 
TDG  Thiodiglycol 
TEA  Triethanolamine 
TIC  Toxic Industrial Chemical 
TLC  Thin Layer Chromatography 
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UBL Usama bin Ladin 
UD Udarnoe deistvie [impact fuze] 
UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission 
UNODA  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
UNSCOM  United Nations Special Commission on Iraq 
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UXO  Unexploded Ordnance 
VTUZ Vysshee Tekhnicheskoe Uchebnoe Zavedenie [Technical 
College] 
VUZ Vysshie Uchebnoe Zavedenie [Institution of Higher 
Learning] 
VERIFIN  Verification Institute 
VERTIC  Verification Research, Training and Information Centre 
WHO  World Heath Organization 
WI  Work Instruction 
WINPAC Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control 
WMD  Weapon of Mass Destruction 
WYSIATI  What you see is all there is 
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And thus do we of wisdom and of reach, 
With windlasses and with assays of bias, 
By indiscretions find directions out. 
  (Hamlet, Polonius, Act 2, Scene 1, William Shakespeare) 
 
The great advantages of simulation and dissimulation are three. First, to lay asleep 
opposition, and to surprise. For where a man’s intentions are published, it is an alarum 
to call up all who are against them. The second is, to reserve to a man’s self a fair 
retreat. For if a man engage himself by a manifest declaration, he must go through or 
take a fall. The third is, the better to discover the mind of another. For to him that 
opens himself men will hardly shew themselves adverse; but will (fair) let him go on, 
and turn their freedom of speech to freedom of thought. And therefore it is a good 
shrewd proverb of the Spaniard, ‘Tell a lie and find the truth.’ As if there were no way 
of discovery but by simulation. There be also three disadvantages, to set it even. The 
first, that simulation and dissimulation commonly carry with them a shew of 
fearfulness, which in any business doth spoil the feathers of round flying up to the mark. 
The second, that it puzzleth and perplexeth the conceits of many, that perhaps would 
otherwise co-operate with him; and makes a man walk almost alone to his own ends. 
The third and greatest, is, that it depriveth a man of one of the most principal 
instruments for action; which is trust and belief. The best composition and temperature 
is to have openness in fame and opinion; secrecy in habit; dissimulation in seasonable 
use; and a power to feign, if there be no remedy.    
  (The Essays or Counsels, Civil and Moral (1625), Francis Bacon)1 
 
‘If nature abhors a vacuum, politics abhors complexity’.  
(James Carville, 2009)2 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
he purpose of this study is to develop and test a methodology to evaluate 
whether a fundamental violation of the international prohibition of 
chemical warfare, as defined by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), might have occurred.3 Such a violation is understood to mean the 
development, production, stockpiling, transfer or use of chemical weapons. As 
general background, human understanding and perception of the external world 
T 
                                                 
1 Francis Bacon, The Major Works, Including New Atlantis and the Essays (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2008), annotated by Brian Vickers, p. 351. 
2 James Carville, ‘Daddy, Tell Me, What Exactly is a Derivative?’, Financial Times, 26 Mar. 
2009, p. 9. 
3 This is irrespective of whether the analysis, including the case studies, covers activity before 
the CWC’s entry-into-force (e.g., for Iraq or the Soviet Union). The application of the 
methodology is also meant to be future-oriented (e.g., relevant for non-state actor threats). This 
risks introducing a form of hindsight bias (‘presentism’) whereby the knowledge and resources 
currently available is applied to problems encountered in the past. See James M. Nyce, 
‘Hindsight Bias, Scientism and Certitude: Some Problems in the Intelligence Literature’, Kungl. 
Krigsvetenskaps Akademiens Handlinger och Tidskrift [The Royal Swedish Academy of War 
Sciences Proceedings and Journal], no. 2 (summer 2011), p. 116 (in English). To reiterate, the 
application of a contemporary definition of a chemical weapon prohibition is meant as a 
simplifying assumption in order to better structure and focus the analytical methodology. 
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are briefly considered within a political science and intelligence studies context. 
This includes the introduction of the concept of the intelligence cycle. The 
analytical framework is an adaptation of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses 
(ACH) methodology developed by Richards J. Heuer, Jr. It is also informed by 
the work of Kristan J. Wheaton and Diane E. Chido who have sought to refine 
the methodology, which they term the Structured Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses (SACH).4 Heuer worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
for some 45 years and published the ACH methodology in Psychology of 
Intelligence Analysis (1999). In 2010 Heuer, together with Randolph H. Pherson 
(also a former CIA employee), revised and further developed the methodology in 
Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis (2011). Both works are 
standard training texts for many intelligence practitioners. The application of 
didactive intelligence training methods to academic curricula has become 
increasingly common in the United States since 2001.5 It has also often been 
observed that intelligence analysis is both an art and science.6 
It is hypothesized that the application of a hybrid, qualitative and CW-
focused formulation of ACH directed to arms control verification and 
intelligence techniques will yield sufficient operational-level dichotomies that 
can then be used to inform a strategic analysis of neoliberal institutionalism and 
realist International Relations (IR) theoretical models. By employing a variation 
of established training methodologies for intelligence purposes, such distinctions 
(i.e., operational-level dichotomies) can help to explain and further develop these 
schools’ modeling of WMD deterrence theory, both in a traditional Cold War 
state-to-state context and a contemporary non-state actor context. In so doing, the 
gap between intelligence art and academic IR theory can be partially reconciled. 
This study also integrates arms control CW verification and compliance 
literature into a variation of ACH that is linked to a form of ‘argument mapping’ 
developed by the author. This is done partly in order to facilitate more general 
qualitative strategic analysis on the role of CW assessments in the arms control, 
and security and defence fields. ACH is an appropriate analytical technique for 
inter alia: (a) assessing the possibility of deception, (b) challenging one’s mental 
model and (c) managing conflicting mental models or opinions.7 ACH should be 
used in cases where it is difficult to decide between alternate explanations, where 
                                                 
4 Kristan J. Wheaton and Diane E. Chido, ‘Structured Analysis of Competing Hypotheses: 
Improving a Tested Intelligence Methodology’, Competitive Intelligence Magazine, vol. 9, no. 6 
(Nov.–Dec. 2006), pp. 12–15. 
5 Carl Jensen, the Director of the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies at the 
University of Mississippi states that Heuer’s and Pherson’s Structured Analytic Techniques for 
Intelligence Practitioners (2011) is ‘destined to become a classic’ and that he will integrate the 
volume into his centre’s intelligence and security curriculum ‘at the earliest opportunity’. 
Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence 
Analysis (CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2011), back cover. See also Scott Gold, ‘9/11 Spawned 
Big Changes on Campus’, Los Angeles Times, 31 Aug. 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2011/aug/31/nation/la-na-911-homeland-security-colleges-20110901>, (accessed 14 June 
2013). The wiki entry on ACH seems to have appeared in 2013. The entry did not exist when 
the author began this study. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analysis_of_competing_ 
hypotheses>, (accessed 5 Aug. 2013). 
6 Klaus Knorr, Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences, Research Monograph no. 17 
(Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Center of International Studies): 
Princeton, 1 June 1964), pp. 36–37. 
7 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), pp. 36–37. 
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one requires a systematic approach to help uncover unsuspected outcomes, in 
cases where it is useful to leave behind an ‘audit trail’ that indicates how 
evidence was understood and used in order to permit other analysts to reach 
alternate conclusions, and where a ‘robust flow of data’ must be absorbed and 
evaluated.8 Heuer and Pherson note that ACH is ‘well-suited for addressing 
questions about technical issues in the chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear arena’.9 
The literature on ACH has not been sufficiently developed on the basis of 
specific intelligence problems and case studies.10 There appears to have been no 
attempt to apply ACH to chemical weapons in the published literature (such 
application to biological and nuclear weapon assessments appear lacking as 
well).11 Therefore, a chemical weapons context for the ACH has been developed. 
It is informed by the stages of proliferation as defined by the fundamental study 
published by the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (1993).12 The structure 
is also informed by Milton Leitenberg’s work to elucidate the distinction 
between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ biological warfare indicators, most of which 
is also relevant to the chemical side. The extent to which ACH can or should be 
termed a ‘cycle’ is also considered.13 
Three case studies are then considered: (a) a large state programme 
(Soviet Union), (b) a medium state programme (Iraq) and (c) non-state actors (al-
Qaeda affiliates).14 A technical dimension is indispensable to a proper 
understanding of this topic. Data acquisition issues (e.g., data mining and ‘deep 
packet inspection’) and sampling and analysis of possible CW agents (including 
toxic industrial chemicals, TICs) and their degradation products are discussed. In 
addition, the results of sampling and analysis can determine the extent to which a 
                                                 
8 Heuer Jr. Pherson (note 5), pp. 160–161. 
9 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 161. 
10 For a more general application of case studies approach, see Sarah Miller Beebe and 
Randolph H. Pherson, Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytical Techniques in 
Action (CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2011). 
11 The author cannot exclude that such work has been done, but is classified and thus 
unavailable. Heuer and Pherson state, however, that ‘structured analysis’ (of which ACH is one 
component) is ‘the new kid on the block’. Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 23. 
12 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, Dec. 
1993), p. 20. 
13 Analysts sometimes present ACH as an alternative to the intelligence management cycle. 
However, ACH shares the broad objective of how to organize the derivation and use of 
information which, arguably, is a ‘cycle’. David Omand presents an alternative structure to the 
traditional ‘cycle’. See David Omand, Securing the State (Hurst and Company: London, 2010), 
p. 119. These questions will be analyzed below. 
14 The CWC provisions are applicable to individuals and groups through the adoption and 
effective implementation of relevant legislation and laws by the member states. The OPCW 
carries out some consultation, fact-finding and capacity building to address non-state actor 
threats, including through the holding of meetings and training exercises, with inter alia customs 
and licensing officials and representatives of various other international bodies. In 2013 the US 
Supreme Court considered a case as to whether the US Government should prosecute domestic 
poisoning cases (e.g., Carol Anne Bond) using the Chemical Weapons Convention statutes. In 
2014 it rejected the applicability of the US CWC statute in this case. For the CWC definition of 
a chemical weapon, see Annexe A. 
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hypothesis can be validated or a fact can be said to be ‘knowable’ or sufficiently 
definite to support decisionmaking processes. Sampling and analysis are 
nevertheless distinct from the processes of political and legal interpretation of 
hypotheses and facts. These points were highlighted by the work of United 
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) (and its successor the United 
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC) in 
terms of how their findings were subsequently interpreted by governments and 
other interested actors in a manner to support politically-preferred outcomes. 
Perhaps the most important overarching international security question in the 
context of this study was whether the work of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
provided a sufficient technical basis for supporting the decision by the United 
States to attack Iraq in April 2003.15 The relevance of such factors has been 
highlighted again by the establishment of a fact-finding mission by the UN 
Secretary-General in 2013 to investigate CW use in Syria and subsequently by 
the OPCW. 
A progressively broader view is provided in the analysis and conclusions 
in which points raised in the general background section are revisited. This 
broader analysis includes possible motivations for CW acquisition or standby 
capacities and the future prospects (policy and technical) for ensuring that the 
international prohibition against chemical warfare is effectively maintained, 
despite fundamental changes in science and technology (S&T) and evolving 
political and international security interests. A strategic theoretical application of 
ACH is also considered in an IR theory context. 
 
Scope and Focus 
 
A number of simplifying assumptions have been taken in order to improve the 
study’s focus. The framework is on the analytical process only. It therefore 
focuses on what a single, well-informed analyst (e.g., government employee or 
international civil servant) or small analytical unit might produce if asked 
whether the prohibition against chemical warfare—as defined by the CWC—has 
occurred (i.e., to determine whether chemical weapons have been developed, 
produced, stockpiled, transferred or used). It should be noted that, while 
structured analytical techniques (SATs)16 can be employed by individuals, they 
are often applied to facilitate (inter- and intra) group collaboration.17 ACH also 
often involves sorting through varied and numerous data points. This often 
occurs through the use of specially developed software.18 The approach taken in 
this study is to use ACH to inform site-specific estimates and their implications 
for strategic and defence analysis. An attempt is made to bridge the gap between 
scholarly analysis and the functional utility of an established intelligence 
                                                 
15 ‘Sufficient’ is necessarily subjective. 
16 Randy Pherson’s wife, Kathy, has been credited with originating the term SAT, which 
builds on the earlier US intelligence term ‘alternative analysis’. In June 2005, SATs entered 
official US intelligence terminology when updated training materials were approved. Heuer Jr. 
and Pherson (note 5), pp. 8 & 10. 
17 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 23.  
18 See Pherson Associates, <www.pherson.org>, (accessed 26 May 2013); and Palo Alto 
Research Center, ‘ACH2.0.5 Download Page’, <www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html> 
(accessed 26 May 2013). 
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technique when directed towards a particular weapon system. It should be noted, 
however, that intelligence products have generally taken the form of an analytical 
synthesis that addresses a given set of points (i.e., taskings). Policymakers, for 
example, do not generally wish to read extra text that describes the underlying 
structured analytical technique or a mass of disparate and conflicting data. To do 
so, would also risk (from the intelligence agency’s perspective) opening up the 
report’s conclusions to criticism and skepticism which, in turn, should generally 
be done at other stages of the intelligence cycle, including in a consultative/peer 
review context. 
Some universities may consider much of the activity of intelligence 
analysts’ work as insufficiently ‘academic’ or ‘scholarly’.19 Thus, Dr Allan E. 
Goodman, the President and CEO of the nonprofit Institute of International 
Education and formerly the academic dean of the School of Foreign Service at 
Georgetown University, has observed: 
‘Information about such things as radar parameters, weapons systems 
performance characteristics, C3I (command, control, communication, and 
intelligence) hardening, and the state of readiness of certain military and 
paramilitary forces is central to national security planning and decisionmaking. 
These are not the usual subjects of inquiry for dissertation writers or contributors 
to academic journals, nor is the press very skilled at (or interested in) conducting 
detailed military assessments and maintaining the databases to do so’.20 
This study attempts to reconcile partially this dichotomy between 
academic analysis and operational utility. It does so partly by presenting an 
analytical process that can then be subjected to checks concerning the validity (or 
applicability) of procedure and underlying assumptions. 
Another simplification in the analysis is to focus on the question of 
production and/or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Development and transfer of 
chemical weapons are considered only insofar as they inform the analysis of 
stockpiling or use of such weapons. This has been done partly in order to avoid 
‘proliferation sensitive speculation’. In addition, only gas chromatography/mass 
spectrometry (GC/MS) is considered in any detail.21 The use of handheld 
GC/MS detectors, in particular, is more straightforward to describe and use in the 
field, as opposed to the wide and varied capabilities and techniques employed by 
various national defence and research laboratories. A further simplification is to 
focus on three of the principal chemical warfare agents that have been 
traditionally stockpiled in past military programmes: the blister agent sulphur 
mustard and the organophosphorus nerve agents sarin and VX.22 Anti-material, 
                                                 
 
19 On the gap between intelligence scholarship and practice, see Stephen Marrin, Improving 
Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap Between Scholarship and Practice (Routledge: London, 
2011); and Knorr (note 6). A functional training guide for intelligence practioners is Heuer Jr. 
and Pherson (note 5). 
20 Allan E. Goodman, ‘Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era’, p. 59 in Allan E. Goodman, 
Gregory F. Treverton and Philip Zelikow, In From the Cold: the Report of the Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on the Future of US Intelligence (Twentieth Century Fund Press: 
New York City, 1996). 
21 Instrumentation and associated analytical techniques for CW evaluation purposes are 
extensive and intricate topics in their own right. 
22 Since Nov. 2009 the OPCW has been carrying out confidence-building exercises for the 
laboratory testing of biomedical samples for biomarkers of CW agents. M. Koller, ‘Participation 
in the Second Confidence Building Exercise on Biomedical Sample Analysis’, p. L-25 in 
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anti-animal and anti-crop programmes are also excluded from this study.23 Only 
selected sub-aspects of the totality of the activity in the case studies are analysed. 
Incomplete or ambiguous information is generally the norm in intelligence 
anlays
t directly inform the question of 
whethe
perceptions of other states do not 
necess
                                                                                                                                              
is. 
In addition, many broader issues raised in the intelligence studies field 
have been excluded or touched on only in passing. These include bureaucratic 
imperatives, budgetary oversight and intelligence taskings to support combat 
operations.24 This is because such factors do no
r a CWC-defined violation has occurred. 
The field of intelligence studies is, alternatively, heavily historical, or 
focused on general principles of human understanding and policy processes25 
(e.g., from a ‘rational actor’ or organizational theory perspective), or concerned 
with ways to automate the collection, sifting and analysis of data. Such 
automation is often done to discover meaning (or ‘significance’) and to avoid 
‘cognitive traps’ (arising from mental biases or illogical thought patterns). The 
analytical approaches generally taken by military and civilian intelligence units 
and among states may also differ. Mentalities and priorities also vary according 
to the language, culture and implicit assumptions concerning state interests and 
state power.26 Finally, much of the literature is in English and draws heavily on 
US publications.27 The interests and 
arily coincide with those of the United States. 
The question posed in each of the case studies is whether the actors 
involved are or might be carrying out programmes or activities that violate the 
CWC prohibition against chemical warfare (i.e., production or stockpiling). The 
 
Proceedings of the 14th Medical Chemical Defence Conference 2013, Bundeswehr Institute of 
Pharmacology and Toxicology; 23–25 Apr. 2013, Munich (unclassified). 
23 The prohibitions of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention and the 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention also cover anti-animal and anti-crop agents if used as a method of 
warfare or for hostile purposes. 
24 For a review of theoretical and conceptual bases for intelligence analysis to support 
contemporary military operations, see Wayne Michael Hall and Gary Citrenbaum, Intelligence 
Analysis: How to Think in Complex Environments (ABC-CLIO: Denver, 2010). 
25 E.g., Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and US Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform 
(Columbia University Press: New York City, 2011); and Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: 
Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford Security Studies, Stanford University 
Press: Stanford, California, 2011). 
26 Charles A. Duelfer remarked on this when describing his involvement in attempting to 
uncover NBC weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles in Iraq following the US-UK led 
invasion of the country in 2003. E.g., he observes ‘In retrospect, it is obvious that analysts had 
too little direct contact or experience…Except for some former military recruits, most new 
analysts have no personal experience with any of the conflicts or emotions of much of the 
world…Edging closer to insanity seemed sometimes to bring some greater understanding. Cool 
analysis does not always produce truth. The Internet does not transmit those insights. There are 
atavistic instincts that drive events that are not obvious when the world is experienced through a 
computer screen’. Charles Duelfer, Hide and Seek: the Search for the Truth in Iraq 
(PublicAffairs: New York City, 2009), p. xv. 
Daniel Kahneman, a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics Sciences, has researched 
judgement and decision making, including cognitive biases. See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, 
Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York City, 2011). His work is a useful 
complement to Heuer’s 1999 study. 
27 E.g., Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5); and National Intelligence University, ‘Welcome to the 
National Intelligence Press!’, <http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/press.html> (accessed 20 May 2013). 
xxii   HART  
evidence for the two main hypotheses and select key sub-themes are then 
compared against the evidence in a structured and systematic manner. The 
hypotheses are then further refined, and examined for sensitivity and consistency. 
The focus of the case studies is further refined according to a limited number of 
topics which are defined in the section introducing Heuer’s 8 steps and the CW-
specifi
sive’ indicators, as 
has bee
d academia more generally) to intelligence practice has also 
been q
                                                
c matrices (developed by the present author). 
As far as the author is aware, no such structured theoretical analysis based 
on case studies has been carried out (or at least been published).28 Some 
governments have undoubtedly issued training guidance for intelligence analysts 
that is specific to chemical weapons. General frameworks developed for 
assessing traditional state programmes in the literature include: (a) chemical 
weapon systems models, (b) chemical weapon system test models and (c) 
chemical weapon development organisation models.29 The 1993 OTA report 
provides a model depicting chemical weapon acquisition pathways.30 Another 
methodology for assessing possible offensive chemical weapon-related activity is 
to categorize information according to ‘defensive’ and ‘offen
n done by Milton Leitenberg in the biological field.31 
Such models act as organizing principles with which to analyse 
information, including for case studies. However, national intelligence estimates 
(NIEs), the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) (or equivalent), and ‘status-
of-proliferation’ reports are not, as a rule, theoretically structured.32 Their 
structure rather reflects functional or practical difficulties associated with 
defining intelligence problems and linking them to policy options and other state 
requirements. This leaves them open to the criticism of merely presenting 
‘informed opinion’, rather than being products that are based on, for example, the 
latest findings in social science research.33 Conversely, the relevance of social 
science research (an
uestioned.34 
Thus declassified intelligence assessments (either in part or in their 
entirety) offer insight into how the analytical problems are understood and 
analysed. Some are functionally or operationally-oriented. Some reporting is 
meant to convey information as a factual narrative instead of using predictive or 
analytical language. The format for inspection reports prepared by the 
 
28 The US defence contractor Mitre published a case study based on ACH to assess the 
relative likelihood of three hypotheses explaining why an April 1989 explosion on the battleship 
USS Iowa occurred. The study found that confirmation bias (i.e., information that tends to 
confirm a person’s beliefs) was less evident among those not trained in ACH. Nevertheless, 
ACH requires analysts to develop their own hypotheses, while those who participated as the 
subject of this study were presented with ready-made hypotheses. Brant A. Cheikes, Mark J. 
Brown, Paul E. Lehner and Leonard Adelman, Confirmation Bias in Complex Analyses (Mitre: 
Bedford Massachusetts, Oct. 2004) (unclassified). 
29 Based on Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Analysis: a Target-Centric Approach, 3rd edtn. 
(CQ Press: Washington, DC, 2010), pp. 44–45. 
30 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (note 12), p. 20. 
31 E.g., Milton Leitenberg, ‘Biological Weapons Arms Control’, Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 17, no. 1 (Apr. 1996), pp. 57–58. 
32 See, for e.g., Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence 
Estimate: Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, SNIE 4-1-74 (CIA: 1974). 
33 See Marrin (note 19). 
34 Marrin (note 19). 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES    xxiii  
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the body that 
implements the CWC, and the procedures under which teams sent to investigate 
alleged chemical or biological weapon use under the United Nations Secretary-
General also offer models for how assessments of compliance of specific CW 
cases c
esis that encompasses 
both br
competing hypotheses. Four overarching strategic security questions 
., the relevance of the relationship between capabilities and 
sent study fit into the theory and practice of strategic and 
ical challenges 
ment in the fields of arms control verification 
and intelligence analysis? 
 
results and areas for further research are provided in the 
conclusions. 
 
                                                
an be structured.35 
It is hoped that this study can assist in providing context to past and future 
verification of the non-production and use of chemical weapons. It is also hoped 
that it can indicate useful political and technical options to support the 
prohibition against chemical warfare and contribute to the study of intelligence 
methodologies. The study also attempts to present a specific application (or 
‘puzzle’), which is later analysed in terms of strategic and defence studies 
paradigms. Finally, it is hoped that this study provides useful cross-cutting 
analysis that breaks down some of the specialisation that characterizes many 
contemporary academic endeavours thus presenting a synth
oad policy questions and focused technical issues.36 
An objective of this study is to develop and to test a CW structured 
analysis of 
are posed: 
1. What are the motivations for actors to pursue CW programmes and 
activities (e.g
intentions)? 
2. How does the pre
defence studies? 
3. How might an ACH on CW be integrated into current arms control and 
disarmament regimes where the derivation and use of information for CW 
verification purposes presents systemic political and techn
(both in terms of general process and for particular cases)? 
4. What are the major elements of a strategic theoretical application of ACH 
with regard to CW assess
Study 
 
 
35 On the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical 
and biological weapons, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), ‘Index 
to the appendices’, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/ 
appendices/>, (accessed 14 June 2013). The OPCW forms, while not marked restricted, are 
nevertheless not readily available outside the organization. See also ‘United Nations Mission to 
Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report 
on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 
2013’, Note by the UN Secretary-General, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/ 
Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf>, accessed 4 Nov. 2013. 
36 E.g., Chris M. Golde and Hanna Alix Gallagher, ‘The Challenges of Conducting 
Interdisciplinary Research in Traditional Doctoral Programs’, Ecosystems, no. 2 (1999), pp. 
281–285. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
tates continually seek to identify and mitigate threats to their national 
security. This includes determining force levels and the structure necessary 
to meet perceived threats over the near- to longer-term. The formulation of 
national security policy is partly informed by determining which weapon systems 
actual or potential adversaries wish to develop in order to devise strategies to 
counter them through various military or political means, including through 
participation in regional and international security arrangements. This is a study 
of a methodology for the determination of the existence and nature of work 
associated with a weapon system that is among the most difficult to evaluate in 
the absence of access to internal, often classified, policy documentation or 
information from defectors: chemical weapons. National estimates concerning 
chemical weapons are often ambiguous and provide—to varying degrees—
provisional or tentative conclusions. This is because most of the materials, 
equipment and technology associated with such programmes are dual purpose—
having both peaceful and non-peaceful applications.37 Information is also often 
incomplete and ambiguous and some of the historical information and important 
context have been lost. Political and ideological factors can purposely or 
inadvertently promote ambiguity.38 Doctrine for use of a given weapon system 
should also not be overlooked. If a state agrees to forego a weapon system 
through its adherence to a legally-binding agreement or if the weapon system is 
prohibited under customary international law, it must still consider the security 
risks associated with the weapon system through possible clandestine 
programmes or similar activities by both state and non-state actors (i.e., 
individuals and sub-national groups).39 
S 
National estimates on possible chemical weapon activities traditionally 
fall within the purview of military establishments which generally have 
established procedures for determining their own weapon-system requirements.40 
                                                 
 
37 Such materials, technology and equipment may also be used to support non-military 
activity or be an element of national protection programmes against CW. 
38 In the lead up to the April 2003 invasion of Iraq, for e.g., there was strong political support 
in some quarters to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Any intelligence indicating that Hussein had 
continued to develop chemical weapons or wished to retain a chemical warfare capability would 
strengthen the political argument in favour of his overthrow. For further discussion on this, see 
Chapter 4. 
39 For a review of customary international humanitarian law that encompasses chemical and 
biological warfare, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: a Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in 
Armed Conflict, vol. 87, no. 857 (ICRC: Geneva, Mar. 2005). 
40 For a consideration of political pressure to promote, retain or terminate two US 
conventional weapon systems, see Christopher M. Jones and Kevin P. Marsh, ‘The Politics of 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES   3      
Where a weapon system is prohibited under international law, as chemical 
weapons are by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the state’s 
evaluation dynamic is different. In this case, the weapon assessment becomes 
more a question of treaty verification and, perhaps, the substitution of a military 
capacity that has been given up in favour of another weapon system.41 
Vulnerabilities that result from foregoing a given weapon system can also be 
mitigated when states participate in various bilateral, regional and international 
security arrangements. Security cost-benefit calculations are consequently more 
complex and likely to be disputed.42 Thus the evaluation process of a given 
                                                                                                                                               
Weapons Procurement: Why Some Programs Survive and Others Die’, Defence & Security 
Analysis, vol. 27, no. 4 (2011), pp. 359–373. 
41 In the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty), Finland met its 
perceived security gap (i.e., to protect a long, thinly populated border with Russia) by enhancing 
its mobile anti-armour capabilities. During the Vietnam War, the United States used riot control 
agents (RCAs) to flush out opposing forces from tunnels in order to capture or to kill them. The 
United States also used defoliants to deny opponents foilage for concealment. However, the 
CWC prohibits the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors when used as a ‘method of 
warfare’. White phosphorus is not prohibited by the CWC as long as it is used as a tracer round, 
rather than to cause death or harm through its toxic properties. Thus parties to the CWC who 
possess military doctrines that call for the use in combat of defoliants or RCAs during combat 
operations, must revise their doctrines. This has been partly done by redefining certain types of 
fighting as ‘law enforcement’ or ‘counter-terrorism’ operations. In such cases, the treaty norm 
against chemical warfare is potentially undermined. Some observers continue to periodically 
question whether a given use of RCAs or white phosphorus is consistent with CWC obligations. 
E.g., see United Nations, Human Rights Council, ‘Human Rights in Palestine and Other 
Occupied Arab Territories’, Report of the United Nations Fact-finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict (Goldstone Report), A/HRC/12/48, 25 Sep. 2009, p. 16. For US doctrine for using the 
CN and adamsite for domestic riot control prior to the contemporary arms control context, see 
War Department, Domestic Disturbances, Field Manual 19-15, declassified (US Government 
Printing Office: Washington, DC, July 1945). It should also be noted that Protocols I and II to 
the Geneva Conventions prohibit the use of inhumane weapons in armed conflict. White 
phosphorus has secondary incendiary effects that appear not to fall under the Protocol on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Geneva, 10 Oct. 
1980, article I. 
Julian Perry Robinson and Jean Pascal Zanders have considered the integration of chemical 
weapons into military doctrine and the substitution of ‘functionally equivalent’ weapons or 
capabilities as compensation for a state’s foregoing chemical weapons. Eric Arnett provides a 
useful analysis on the relation between military capacity for war and the integration of weapons 
by military establishments of states. Thus a state’s capacity for war is determined by various 
factors in addition to the possession of a given weapon system including: command and control, 
and integration of a weapon system into military doctrine and training. See Julian P. Perry 
Robinson, ‘Supply, Demand and Assimilation in Chemical-warfare Armament’, pp. 112–123 in 
Ed. Hans Günther Brauch, Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament: ABC 
Weapons, Military Use of Nuclear Energy and of Outer Space and Implications for 
International Law (Macmillan Press: Basingstoke, 1989); and Ed. Eric Arnett, Military 
Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford 1997). 
42 For insight into how national security is affected by participation in an arms control regime 
using a software-based cost-benefit analysis, see John A. H. Futterman, Charles H. Hall, Francis 
A. Handler, Robert V. Homsy, Michael J. Lippitz and Alan Sicherman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Proposed Confidence-Building Measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 
Report no. UCRL-ID-119414, unclassified (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security Directorate: California, 31 Oct. 
1994). 
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weapon system, traditionally the responsibility of intelligence or military 
analysts, can profoundly affect the rather complicated and uncertain policy 
mechanisms underpinning international peace and security. Strategic studies may 
be said to encompass threat assessments and the development and 
implementation of military and other defensive measures to counter identified 
threats, including through the employment of arms control verification and 
intelligence analysis.43 
Much remains unclear (within and outside governments) with regard to 
how the various types of expertise and knowledge can be utilised to evaluate 
possible chemical warfare programmes. This is partly because such evaluations 
are multi-disciplinary and include epistemology (i.e., theory of knowledge), 
history, information management, political analysis and science and technology 
(S&T). An academic synthesis of these fields with respect to chemical weapons 
(CW) evaluation appears lacking. This study attempts to explore major areas of 
expertise associated with the derivation and use of CW-related information from 
a strategic studies perspective and to elucidate how the various fields of inquiry 
can—taken as a whole—promote improved operational relevance and strategic 
theoretical understanding (including methodological). A framework for the 
analysis of allegations of CW programmes and activities, which is based on a 
variation of Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), is therefore 
developed and tested. 
One threat to international security is that weak states can, on their own or 
by promoting violence through non-state actors, threaten civil society or 
undermine even great powers. Partly for this reason, it is important for those 
interested in chemical and biological warfare (CBW) allegations (including those 
professionally responsible for evaluating them) to have a sufficient conceptual 
understanding of the basic S&T of sampling and analysis; the physiological 
effects of toxic chemicals and infectious biological agents; and the theory and 
practice of information acquisition and use for the evaluation of suspected illegal 
activities and programmes.44 
Media allegations of the use of CW continue to be made where conflicts 
occur and government ‘status of proliferation’ statements generally accuse some 
states and non-state actors of attempting to acquire, develop, stockpile or use 
CW.45 This is despite the fact that chemical and biological warfare (including the 
misuse of toxins and a broad range of physiologically active compounds) is 
prohibited under international law and no state (with the notable 2003 exception 
of Libya and the 2013 exception of Syria) openly admits to the possession with 
                                                 
43 See Annexe A. Definitions and Terms. 
44 There is overlap between international prohibitions against chemical and biological 
warfare. Partly for this reason, some aspects of biological warfare will also be considered, 
including toxins. 
45 E.g., SIPRI has published allegations of CBW development or use annually since 1968. 
See SIPRI Yearbook on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. See also Daniel 
Steinvorth and Yassin Musharbash, ‘Turkey Accused of Using Chemical Weapons Against 
PKK’, Der Spiegel, 12 Aug. 2010, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
0,1518,711536,00.html>, (accessed 23 July 2013). Such reports may be the result of 
disinformation, ignorance or lack of analytical clarity. For a recent status of proliferation report, 
see Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament 
Agreements and Commitments (US Department of State: Washington, DC, 2012), 
<http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/197085.htm>, (accessed 23 July 2013). 
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the option of using of such weapons.46 The CWC prohibits the use of toxic 
chemicals and their precursors as a ‘method of warfare’, while the 1972 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits the use of 
biological materials for ‘hostile’ or other prohibited purposes.47 
Uncertainties regarding the legality of activities and purposes for which 
bio-chemical substances are produced and stockpiled remain.48 Non-lethal or 
less-than-lethal weapons or incapacitants meant for counter-terrorism, law 
enforcement or peacekeeping operations may effectively undermine prohibitions 
against CW.49 States may also undertake to maintain standby offensive CW 
capacities, while non-state actors may seek such capabilities with possible state 
involvement. These problems are inherent to all future consideration of how best 
to maintain and strengthen the international prohibition against CBW. Analysts 
must, as a practical matter, consider such factors periodically in the context of 
specific activity and individual cases that trigger concern.50 
                                                 
 
46 Some allusions to the stockpiling of chemical or biological weapons are sometimes 
publicly stated for possible political purposes. For example, some states in the Middle East do 
not wish to join the CWC until or unless Israel joins the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In a 
2009 interview with Der Spiegel, Syrian President Assad made a statement that some observers 
have understood to be an allusion to a Syrian CW stockpile. When asked ‘So you have no 
ambitions to produce weapons of mass destruction, not even chemical weapons?’, Assad 
responded ‘Chemical weapons, that’s another thing. But you don’t seriously expect me to 
present our weapons program to you here? We are in a state of war’. ‘SPIEGEL Interview with 
Syrian President Bashar Assad, “Peace without Syria is unthinkable”’, Der Spiegel, 19 January 
2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,602110-2,00.html>, (accessed 14 June 
2013). 
More dramatically, on 23 July 2012 a Syrian MFA spokesman strongly implied that the 
country has chemical weapons and was prepared to use them against ‘external’ opponents. The 
following day, Russia’s MFA issued a statement pointing out that as a party to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol Syria was obligated not to employ chemical or biological weapons. The Syrian MFA 
statement and questions and answers are available at <http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=fqjWzGfOLlE>, (accessed 23 July 2013). For the Russian MFA statement, see 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Kommentarii Departamenta informatsii 
i pechati MID Rossii v svyazi s vyskazivaniem predstavitelya MID Sirii’ [Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Department of Information and Press Commentary in connection with a 
statement by the representative of the Ministry of International Affairs of Syria], 24 July 2012, 
<http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/1297AE8CCFEDDDEB44257A45005232B3>, 
(accessed 23 July 2013). In Mar. 2013 the UN Secretary-General authorized an investigation of 
alleged CW use in Syria based on a longstanding UN legal authority and a Syrian Government 
request made the same month. As of May 2013 the team, which had technical support from the 
OPCW and the World Health Organization (WHO), entered the country in August 2013 and 
concluded that sarin had been used at Ghouta. See ‘United Nations Mission to Investigate 
Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the 
Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013’ (note 
35). 
47 CWC, Article I, para. 5; and BTWC, Article I, para. 2. The BTWC does not contain the 
word ‘use’. The member states nevertheless agree that this convention covers use. 
48 Ronald G. Sutherland, Chemical and Biochemical Non-lethal Weapons, SIPRI policy 
paper no. 23 (2008). 
49 Sutherland (note 48); and Michael Crowley, Drawing the Line: Regulations of “Wide 
Area” Riot Control Agent Delivery Mechanisms under the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Bradford Non-lethal Weapons Project, Omega Research Foundation: Apr. 2013). 
50 In June 2013 the UN Human Rights Council ‘documents’ the ‘use of chemical agents’, it 
states that the Syrian government possesses chemical weapons and acknowledges that rebel 
forces ‘may have access [to] and use chemical weapons’. UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report 
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In recent years states have also undertaken efforts to extend control and 
oversight of chemical and biological materials beyond traditional chemical 
warfare agents and certain listed biological agents (which typically originate 
from agents evaluated by past state military programmes) to include toxic 
industrial chemicals (TICs) and a wider range of infectious disease-causing 
agents.51 Many of these oversight measures complement efforts to promote 
biosafety and chemical safety.52 There is also an increasing interface53 between 
chemistry and the life sciences as exemplified by the increasing use of biological 
and biologically-mediated processes in the chemical industry.54 The interface 
should be seen both in terms of production processes and physiological effects. It 
is also possible that future CBW agents might increasingly be evaluated utilizing 
chemicals databases, genomic sequencing technology and modeling software to 
search for compounds that affect human physiology in a preconceived manner 
with little laboratory bench work.55 Dr Peter Clevestig predicts that pathogen 
strains will routinely be shared digitally within 10 years.56 Equipment and 
technology advances are also lowering skill requirements for some types of 
chemistry and life sciences work.57 
                                                                                                                                               
 
of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic’, 
document A/HRC/23/58, 4 June 2013, pp. 1 & 21. 
51 ‘Select agent’ regulations (including certain terminology) were revised in Oct. 2012. 
Agents that meet four criteria are currently placed in the highest risk category (‘Tier 1’ agents). 
See Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel, 
 <http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/boards/fesap/Pages/default.aspx>, (accessed 16 June 
2013). For a list of TICs, see Annexe C. 
52 E.g., Eds. Philip Wexler, Jan van der Kolk, Asish Mohapatra and Ravi Agarwal, 
Chemicals, Environment, Heath: a Global Management Perspective (CRC Press: Boca Raton, 
Florida, 2012). 
53 Some scientists and analysts prefer to characterize the ‘overlap’ as an ‘interface’, thus 
signifying a continuing distinctiveness between the two scientific fields. The author is grateful 
to Dr Ralf Trapp for drawing his attention to this distinction over the course of an earlier 
research project. 
54 Frank Hollmann, et al., ‘Enzyme-mediated Oxidations for the Chemist’, Green Chemistry 
(Nov. 2011), pp. 226–265; and Benjamin G. Davis and Viviane Boyer, ‘Biocatalysis and 
Enzymes in Organic Synthesis’, Natural Product Reports, vol. 18 (Oct. 2001), pp. 618–640. 
55 On the state of computational biology, see Valda Vinson, Beverly A. Purnell, Laura M. 
Zahn and John Travis, ‘Introduction: Does It Compute?’, special section, Science, vol. 336 (13 
Apr. 2012), pp. 171–174. 
56 Discussion at Security Aspects of Microbiology, Medical Research and Health. Course 
presentation to Karolinska Institutet Biosafety and Sustainability Course, held at SIPRI, 20 Sep. 
2012, Stockholm. Dr Clevestig has kindly permitted me to mention this discussion point here. J. 
Craig Venter discusses similar developments for the downloading and sharing of DNA 
information for reproduction by so-called digital biological converters. These converters are the 
biological equivalent of 3-D printers. Venter has also characterized life as ‘DNA software 
driven’. J. Craig Venter interview by Charlie Rose, 21 Oct. 2013, 
 <http://charlierose.com/watch/60285321>, (accessed 3 Nov. 2013). See also J. Craig Venter, 
Life at the Speed of Light: From the Double Helix to the Dawn of Digital Life (Viking: New 
York City, 2013). 
57 John Hart and Ronald G. Sutherland, ‘Chemical industry verification under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention: scientific and technological developments and diplomatic practice’, pp. 
247–265 in Ed. Ralf Trapp, Academic Forum, The Hague, 18 & 19 September 2007, 
Conference Proceedings (Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael and 
TNO Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research: The Hague, 2008). On 
developments in computer modeling simulation of cell behaviour, see Jonathan R. Karr, 
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Such developments imply that attention should be given to the chemical 
(or ‘bio-chemical’) industries in at least two respects. One is within the arms 
control context and consists of the verification of the non-production of chemical 
warfare agents. The second context consists of more general analytical efforts by 
states to determine the nature and scope of possible CW programmes and 
activities, including for standby production capacity and related support 
mechanisms. This latter context is more centred in the law enforcement and 
defence establishment structures (e.g., biodefence-related activity), rather than 
possible non-state actor threats. 
 
1.1 Contribution to the Literature 
 
Factors that have been cited as evidence of a gap between the work produced by 
academics and intelligence analysts include the extent to which: (a) analyses 
should be qualitative or quantitative (or mixed), (b) intelligence practioners 
employ social sciences research methodologies, and (c) academics and 
intelligence practitioners reflect relevant S&T developments. Thus former CIA 
analyst Stephen Marrin has observed: ‘Since very few scholars have written 
doctoral dissertations on intelligence-related subjects, the literature on 
intelligence has not been explored or exploited for the lessons it might provide in 
the same way that other literatures have’.58 
James M. Nyce observes that intelligence practitioners (especially those in 
military intelligence) require scholarly studies that ‘can provide empirical and 
analytic insight as they attempt to define and acquire [relevant] resources, 
competences and structures necessary’ to implement their mandates.59 He also 
observes that most scholarly literature in the intelligence studies field ‘tend to 
focus on intra-governmental processes/structures and state to state relations’.60 
One area where open academic literature has played a large role in intelligence 
studies is on technical or scientific methodology or instrumentation. For 
example, during World War II the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development’s (OSRD) research mandate was partly informed by US 
Government efforts to define its defence and intelligence requirements and to 
match them with civilian expertise and research programmes.61 
The derivation and use of information to evaluate chemical warfare 
programmes and activities are also relevant to the study of strategic studies in 
several respects. The topic deals with a weapon system which poses a distinct 
potential threat to international peace and security that is usually outside the 
                                                                                                                                               
Jayodita C. Sanghvi, Derek N. Macklin, Miriam V. Gutschow, Jared M. Macobs, Benjamin 
Bolival, Nacyra Assad-Garcia, John I. Glass and Markus W. Covert, ‘A Whole-Cell 
Computational Model Predicts Phenotype from Genotype’, Cell, vol. 150, no. 2 (20 July 2012), 
pp. 389–401. 
58 Marrin (note 19), pp. 148–149. 
59 Nyce (note 3). 
60 Nyce (note 3). It should also be noted that there are those (mainly in academia and NGOs) 
who compare specific news reports agains official intelligence and arms control compliance 
assessments. This type of activity may be understood to a form of data mining by individuals 
and/or small groups. 
61 US National Archives, ‘Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
[OSRD]’, <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/227.html>, (accessed 2 
Aug. 2013). 
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mainstream of weapon system analysis.62 It is also concerned with expanding the 
concept of a type of analysis that has traditionally been the sole competence of 
security analysists and intelligence services. The increase in information 
availability and greater access to technical means of verification—informed by 
open-source information, declassified materials and the work of international 
bodies that implement arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament 
regimes—suggest that more insightful analyses by nongovernmental analysts and 
academics are feasible. A better understanding of threat perceptions and response 
capacities in the arms control and verification context should, in particular, help 
to inform defence and strategic studies. 
This study attempts to extend the literature in several respects. First, less 
attention has been paid to CW as opposed to nuclear or conventional weapon 
capabilities, intentions and holdings.63 Second, CW violation scenarios are often 
ambiguous, particularly in the non-state context.64 Third, some information 
regarding the Soviet, Iraqi and al-Qaeda affiliates remains little known or has not 
been sufficiently well-placed in a usable, analytical context. Fourth, there are 
limits to human understanding regarding CW capabilities and intentions (where 
much of the equipment, technology and material is dual-purpose).65 Fifth, 
insufficient attention has been devoted to the role of S&T in CW assessments 
aimed at the national security policymaking community. By considering the role 
of sampling and analysis, additional technical context to the suspected prohibited 
activities is provided. Such factors, should be further elucidated using a suitable 
analytical framework that highlights the underlying logic of the analysis. 
This study does not attempt to comprehensively capture all information 
and literature, but rather focuses on the processing and the identification of the 
significance of some key data. It is hoped that this study can assist to bridge a 
gap between the operational requirements of policy and the context provided by a 
broader analytical study done from an academic perspective. 
                                                 
62 Mauroni observes that currently ‘combating WMD’ is not part of mandatory coursework at 
defence colleges in the US and that ‘many’ US defence acquisition programmes ‘routinely 
waive CBRN survivabilty requirements’. Albert J. Mauroni, ‘A Counter-WMD Strategy for the 
Future’, Parameters, vol. 40, no. 2 (summer 2010), ref. 32, p. 73. At the international level, it is 
worth noting that no activity carried out by the US Department of State’s Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism with respect to CBRN weapons was solely dedicated to CW. 
However, some of the activities under this action were solely dedicated to biological and 
nuclear weapons, respectively. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Chapter 4: the 
Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 Report’ (Department of State: Washington, DC, 31 July 
2012), <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195548.htm>, (accessed 20 May 2013). 
63 In broad terms, this is reflected by the numbers of analysts, publications and funding line 
items for research. It is also reflected in the relative space devoted to CBRN weapon types in 
threat assessments and in military operations training manuals. Nuclear and conventional 
weapon-related programme requirements are invariably better funded and supported as 
compared to CW-related programme activities (where such activities exist). 
64 Violation scenarios include: (a) traditional state CBW development programmes; (b) 
standby capacity by states for either traditional military or non-traditional agents; (c) non-lethal 
and less-than-lethal agents developed by states for law enforcement, peacekeeping and the like 
which may also serve as a basis for a standby capacity for faster CBW ‘breakout’; and (d) non-
state actor activity. 
65 I.e., the equipment, technology or material can also be used for peaceful purposes. 
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In the early 1960s Knorr observed that no satisfactory theory of 
intelligence existed. In particular, there was no adequate descriptive theory that 
described how intelligence work was actually carried out, or a normative theory 
on how such work ought to be carried out.66 He further observed that no criteria 
or ‘indicators’ existed in the United States on how well intelligence work was 
being done or to suggest ways to improve it.67 Knorr called for the following 
problems to be considered as part of any effort to develop a descriptive and 
normative theory of intelligence: 
(a) ‘the procurement and processing of data (including indicators)’; 
(b) ‘the use of hypotheses for specifying what sorts of data are desirable for 
various intelligence tasks’; 
(c) ‘the use of general hypotheses in generating particular hypotheses about 
concrete situations’; 
(d) ‘the determinants and uses of good judgment, intuition, and superior 
insight’; 
(e) ‘the limits of intelligence forecasting, and criteria for ascertaining the 
success or failure of intelligence’; 
(f) ‘the types of biased vision and their minimization’; and 
(g) ‘the committee and bargaining aspects of intelligence production—their 
uses and control’.68 
Knorr emphasized the importance of developing and refining an 
‘intelligence doctrine’ (i.e., ‘the operational expression of the theory’) which 
defines: (a) the tasks to be carried out, (b) the methods to be employed, and (c) 
errors to be avoided.69 He underlined the importance of discovering the 
determinants of ‘good intuition’, ‘judgment’ and ‘insight’.70 Knorr also stated 
‘The indifference, suspicion, and sometimes built-in hostility with which not a 
few intelligence officers (as well as other government officials) look on the 
social sciences are well known’.71 
More recently, Stephen Marrin observed that ‘very little knowledge has 
been developed over the past 50 years on the utility and efficacy of various 
structured methods’ and that proof that analytic methods improve intelligence 
analysis remains elusive.72 Although over 200 analytic methods relevant to 
intelligence work have been developed, analysts are unaware if any of them are 
demonstrably superior to experience and intuition.73 Even though analytic 
intelligence techniques are taught, their actual use is ‘much less frequent’ and ‘in 
many cases the structured methods are ignored in favor of a more intuitive 
approach’.74 Nevertheless there is a continuing interest, including in Denmark, 
the UK and the United States, to explore options for improving analytical rigour 
                                                 
66 Knorr (note 6), p. 46. 
67 Knorr (note 6), p. 47. 
68 Knorr (note 6), p. 48. 
69 Knorr (note 6), p. 50. 
70 Knorr (note 6), p. 49. 
71 Knorr (note 6), p. 53. 
72 Marrin (note 19), p. 33. 
73 Marrin (note 19), p. 34. 
74 Marrin (note 19), p. 95. A recent, more general application approach of ACH is provided in 
Beebe and Pherson (note 10). 
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and consistency within and between organizations, including large 
bureaucracies.75 
 
1.2. The Problem of Data Overload and Related Considerations 
 
An important principle of scholarship is ‘to review the literature’ prior to 
carrying out an analysis. Another is to pose and structure the research questions 
prior to addressing them. This can entail long hours of attempting to come to 
grips with difficult (and perhaps rather dull) concepts. Reviewing the literature 
should result in developing a good sense of what material is available, what 
topics are generally covered within a given framework and what information is 
key. Detailed analysis can then be done on more narrowly-defined topics within a 
chosen field throughout the academic’s or analyst’s career without, generally 
speaking, restating first principles.76  
Information on CW assessment is both excessive and insufficient. The 
problem of data overload has been called ‘data asphyxiation’, ‘data smog’, 
‘information fatigue syndrome’ and ‘cognitive overload’.77 The information that 
can be obtained from academic databases alone is sufficient reading material for 
many lifetimes. 
The sheer volume of information that can be accessed through keyword 
searches on databases has implications for future scholarship that have perhaps 
not been fully appreciated by academia and government, especially at the top 
level.78 First, it accelerates ‘the review of the literature’ phase of a study. 
However, this does not necessarily result in a corresponding reduction of the 
time required to acquire depth and breadth of understanding—regardless of 
whether the person is a ‘hedgehog’ or ‘fox’.79 Referring to work carried out by 
Philip E. Tetlock on political predictions, Nate Silver also states that foxes ‘have 
developed an ability to emulate’ a ‘consensus process’.80 Thus, a review, in 
                                                 
 
75 On interest by US intelligence to improve analytical rigour and consistency, see Marrin 
(note 19), p. 35. The point regarding the size of US bureaucracies and the desire to have better 
consistency within and between them is mine.  
76 With the further caveat that people should not be overly certain. 
77 William van Winkle, David Shenk, David Lewis and Eric Schmidt, respectively, are 
credited with originating these terms. Anonymous, ‘Too Much Information’, The Economist, 
vol. 400, no. 8740 (2–8 July 2011), p. 59. 
78 Kenneth Cukier and Viktor Mayer-Scheonberger, ‘The Rise of Big Data’, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 92, no. 3 (May/June 2013), pp. 28–40. For historical perspective, see Ann M. Blair, Too 
Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information Before the Modern Age (Yale University 
Press: New Haven, Connecticut, 2010). 
79 Isaiah Berlin, drawing on the work of the classical Greek poet Archilochus, expanded on 
the notion that the fox knows many things, while the hedgehog is focused on a single object. 
See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: an Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson: 1953). 
80 Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail – but Some Don’t 
(Penguin Press: New York, 2012), p. 67. David R. Mandel and Alan Barnes (the former with 
the Defence Research and Development Canada, DRDC and the latter a retired official of 
Canada’s Intelligence Assessment Secretariat) reviewed the accuracy of 1514 strategic 
intelligence forecasts generated by the Middle East and Africa Division of the Canada’s 
Intelligence Assesment Secretariat. They found that both the discrimination and calibration of 
the forecasts were ‘very good’ and that discrimination was better among senior analysts’ 
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itself, is perhaps today less indicative of whether the person actually understands 
the topic, if the information selected is in fact representative or if the material has 
even been read. Today people are in an increasingly better position to produce 
pseudo-scholarly work. Such work is less systematic and exhibits a ‘curious’ mix 
of understanding and lack of sensitivity to important factors and information. 
‘Sensitivity’ should be apparent in both scholarly analysis and in terms of 
awareness of operational requirements and practice. 
The analyst should also possess sufficient ‘sense’ (partly based on 
experience) to identify the important information, while avoiding cognitive 
traps.81 The economics Nobel prize winning cognitive psychologist Daniel 
Kahneman cautions against the ‘what you see is all there is’ (WYSIATI) 
phenomenon (i.e., reaching for the first seemingly plausible explanation based on 
initial—or seemingly complete or otherwise sufficient—information).82 Analysts 
should understand operational requirements of those who use their products. The 
‘consumer’ may, in fact, know more (or understand) the topic better than the 
analyst. Brian D. Nordmann, a longserving US State Department official, thus 
observes that an intelligence consumer may have ‘many more years of expertise 
in the subject’ than the intelligence analyst. He also cites George Washington 
University research on the ‘skill levels’ of individuals that supports this 
observation.83 
Analysts should also consider the parameters associated with determining 
whether available information is representative of the whole (a criterion for 
success in applying ACH to chemical warfare assessments is the extent to which 
the analytical process has didactic value irrespective of the case study 
conclusions).84 
Analysts should ideally trace the original source of an item of information. 
Incorrect information enters the literature and has been repeated so often that it 
can become generally accepted to be true. This is a particular difficulty in the 
field of CBW-related studies where the tracing back to authoritative sources can 
be difficult or problematic.85 Such disputes can take on the character of a 
                                                                                                                                               
 
forecasts. David R. Mandel and Alan Barnes, ‘Accuracy of Forecasts in Strategic Intelligence’, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, (14 July 2014) <http://www.pnas.org/ 
content/early/2014/07/10/1406138111.abstract?tab=author-info>, (accessed 19 July 2014). 
81 The author is employing ‘sense’ in its ordinary meaning. This is distinct from the concept 
of ‘sense making’ in the intelligence literature. 
82 Kahneman (note 26), pp. 85–88. 
83 Brian D. Nordmann, The Tyranny of Experts: Analytic Misperception and the Rise of State-
Run Biological Weapons Programs, pp. 238–239. Doctoral dissertation, George Mason 
University (2008). 
84  The question of whether a given amount of information is ‘representative’ of information 
when the total ‘universe’ of information is not known remains problematic. In the intelligence 
studies literature, this problem is sometimes referred to as ‘the black hole’ problem 
(representing missing data), the ‘keyhole’ problem (the ability to see only part of the analysis 
target or a subset of data) and ‘brown worms’ (how to deal with misleading or deceptive data). 
B. L. William Wong and Margaret Varga, ‘Black Holes, Keyholes and Brown Worms: 
Challenges in Sense Making’, Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomic Society 
Annual Meeting (2012), pp. 287–291. Some foresee a future where all data (although not 
necessarily validated, including through human intervention) will essentially become digitized 
(i.e., ‘N=all’). Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger (note 78), pp. 30–31. 
85 The view that the US engaged in biological warfare during the Korean War is not 
uncommon in China, North Korea and Russia who often point out that the USA granted 
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theological dispute. Some information cannot be recovered because the original 
material has been destroyed or those directly involved are no longer working, 
while other data remain classified. 
People are also constrained in the amount of information they can 
evaluate.86 Those who are exposed to large quantities of data or information can 
become ‘passive’ and less likely to put forth the effort to actively consider the 
meaning or significance of the subject matter. In describing the challenges 
associated with the role of scientists and expertise in policy making, the Swedish 
theoretical physicist Kjell Andersson observes that overwhelming data flows 
tend to make the general public passive and that information must be filtered in 
order to allow people to meaningfully absorb it.87 Today, both the public and 
‘technical experts’ increasingly ‘surf’ the data. Many people, including in 
government, simply do not have much, if any, time for quiet reflection. 
More broadly, a generation shift is perhaps occurring whereby students 
are increasingly likely to understand where and how to access vast amounts of 
information. Some information can be checked against internet sites and 
paraphrased to make the analysis appear to be more informed or insightful than it 
is. Some authors, including many intelligence practioners and those in the media, 
are focused on getting a report issued by a given date, rather than trying to check 
its integrity or usefulness by taking any additional time that may be required.88 
Digitized information or indexes to publications distort the ‘universe’ of 
all the data in existence, including that which is classified or is located on the 
                                                                                                                                               
immunity from prosecution members of the Japanese biological warfare programme at the end 
of World War II in exchange for information on their activity and research results. Many who 
are today inclined to believe the US conducted BW refer to Stephen Endicott and Edward 
Hagerman, The United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from the Early Cold War and 
Korea (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 1998). This book, while suggestive, does not, 
among other things, properly describe and analyze the derivation and use of information to 
determine whether such weapons have been employed. Soviet archives indicate that at least part 
of these allegations came out of a disinformation campaign. Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Deceiving 
the Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological Weapons 
Use in Korea’, pp. 176–99 in Ed. Christian F. Ostermann, Cold War International History 
Project, Bulletin no. 11 (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Washington, DC, 
winter 1998). Finally, for authoritative background on these allegations, see Jeanne Guillemin, 
Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-Sponsored Programs to Contemporary 
Bioterrorism (Columbia University Press: New York, 2004), p. 100; and Martin Furmanski, and 
Mark Wheelis, ‘Allegations of Biological Weapons use’, pp. 253–61 in Eds. Mark Wheelis, 
Lajos Rózsa and Malcolm Dando, Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945 (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2006). 
In the interest of full disclosure, it should be noted that the text in this reference is taken from 
comments the author provided in 2012 on a draft report (focused on nuclear arms control) by 
another researcher. Any possible similarity in the selection of references regarding BW 
allegations during the Korean War is therefore due to this. 
86 For breakdowns of Internet usage by language, country and the like, see International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), ‘Statistics & Database’, <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/>, (accessed 17 Oct. 2012). 
87 Kjell Andersson, Transparency and Accountability in Science and Politics: the Awareness 
Principle (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2008), p. 2. 
88 In 2012, a US Senate subcommittee criticized the DHS saying the fusion centers had not 
produced a single report of usable intelligence. See Federal Support for and Involvement in 
State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and Minority Report, Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: Washington, DC, 2012). 
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‘dark web’ (i.e., non-public).89 Another distortion is language: not all material in 
the various relevant languages are digitized in a comparable manner. Variations 
also exist with respect to whether and to what extent states have undertaken CW-
related activities or analyzed them. Much of the relevant information—either in 
terms of volume or importance—is classified for reasons-of-state. Although 
statements have been periodically made that up to 95 per cent (or more) of the 
information available to the US Government is publicly available, this situation 
does not necessarily hold for all states or all topics.90 Also, the denominator 
representing the total amount of information available to the US Government is 
probably exceedingly large.91 Another distortion is the largescale US effort in 
recent years to systematically capture all digital information.92 A preference by 
some for presentation slides (as opposed to analytical studies) further distorts in 
favour of volume over quality of information. A small numerator may 
nevertheless represent an enormous amount of data in its own right (i.e., 
petabytes). 
Despite such caveats, it should be possible to systemize the consideration 
of the derivation and use of information for CW assessment purposes using 
reasonably focused, accurate and representative information. It is hoped that the 
analytical structure can function usefully regardless of the completeness or 
reliability of the data. It is also hoped that any interested readers will be able to 
determine whether the information presented is reliable using the analytical 
framework together with the analysis as a basis for other CW-related cases. 
Although information can be retrieved from libraries, databases and the 
internet and summarized without end, each ‘main’ topic should be treated in 
sufficient detail to convey a good fundamental understanding. This objective is 
admittedly subjective. However, as with ‘pornography’ or ‘obscenity’, some 
have argued that they know what is meant when they see it.93 
Numerous uncertainties, gaps and questions nevertheless exist and are 
unavoidable. I have therefore attempted to identify and to ‘explore’ what appear 
                                                 
89 See Sarah Kendzior, ‘Worlds Unknown: the Regions Ignored by Google Translate’, 
Atlantic, 1 May 2012 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/05/worlds-
unknown-the-regions-ignored-by-google-translate/256585/>, (accessed 16 June 2013); and 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), ‘Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) Statistics’, <http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/>, (accessed 16 June 2013). The ITU is the UN 
organization which has information and communications technologies at the centre of its 
mandate. 
90 The figure of 95 per cent is somewhat proverbial in the US context. E.g., President Harry 
Truman apparently said this. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (Harper & Row, Publishers: 
New York City, 1963), pp. 239–240. 
91 The United States is pursuing a ‘total information awareness’ approach to capture digital 
data. See James Bamford, ‘The NSA is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch 
What You Say)’, Wired Danger Room, 15 Mar. 2012, <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/ 
2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1>, (accessed 19 July 2013). 
92 Bamford (note 91). Bamford is the author of fundamental works on the history and activity 
of the US National Security Agency (NSA). See also Intelligence and Security Committee, 
Access to Communications Data by the Intelligence and Security Agencies (Stationary Office 
Limited: London, Feb. 2013). For more recent information on the scope and scale of US data 
collection capabilities and practice, see ‘Edward Snowden’, Guardian, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/edward-snowden>, (accessed 23 July 2013). 
93 See Paul Gewitz, ‘On “I Know It When I See It”’, Yale Law School, paper no. 1706 
(1996), <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1706> (accessed 18 May 2013). 
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to be the main, relevant points connected to the derivation and use of information 
for CW assessments. I have attempted to do this at a level of detail that does 
justice to the subject, while not losing the narrative thread or structural integrity 
of the methodological approach. It is thus hoped to elucidate principles and 
methods in order to help conceptualize and systemize thinking on the derivation 
and use of information as it relates to chemical warfare. 
Possible philosophical objections to seeking any pattern inherent in such a 
conceptualization should be noted. The late author and social commentator 
Christopher Hitchens observed that humans are ‘pattern-seeking mammals’ who 
prefer a bad theory to no theory. He said that arguments that explain everything, 
explain nothing.94 However, for the purposes of this study, I have decided not to 
focus on why ‘pattern seeking’ might be an unwarranted mental failing that does 
not reflect reality. The focus of this study is rather ‘instrumental’ and should, 
therefore, have relevance to tradecraft. As previously mentioned, it is hoped that 
this study can help to bridge operations analysis and academic research. 
Asserting that objective reality has no pattern (the characterizations of the 
natural world by mathematics and physics notwithstanding) also presupposes that 
there is no utility in the effort to discover principles and methods for thinking 
about CW-related activity. Efforts to discover and to employ principles and 
methods for such purposes will continue as a practical matter (i.e., to apply 
against problems for which people wish to obtain ‘answers’ and which can 
inform policy, including for arms control verification and security and defence 
acquisition). It should be sufficient to note this philosophical point regarding the 
nature of human understanding as a part of the general discussion on human 
perception and thought processes. 
 
                                                 
94 E.g., ‘A theory that tries to explain everything explains nothing’. Christopher Hitchens, 
‘An Anglosphere Future’, Arguably: Essays by Christopher Hitchens (McClelland & Stewart: 
Toronto, 2011), p. 102. 
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2 
 
 
 
THE RISE OF ‘MODERN’ CHEMICAL WARFARE 
 
 
hroughout history, humans have harboured feelings of abhorrence towards 
substances that might cause them to contract disease (e.g., through the 
poisoning of wells) or to be choked to death (e.g., by noxious fumes). 
Such feelings have been exacerbated by little or no understanding of how to 
avoid falling victim to such weapons. The poems of Wilfred Owen and Siegfried 
Sassoon, and John Singer Sargent’s 1919 painting Gassed which depicts a line of 
soldiers with bandaged eyes being led to an aid station, have influenced popular 
imagination regarding World War I as the start of the ‘modern age’ of chemical 
warfare.95 The painting leaves one in doubt as to whether the blindness is 
permanent.96 
T 
Traditional chemical warfare agents are based on World War I and World 
War II-era technology. Sulphur mustard was synthesised as early as 1822 by 
Despretz.97 The agents used or considered for use during World War I were 
primarily those already produced in quantity by the chemical industry, including, 
perhaps most notably, chlorine and phosgene. French forces used grenades filled 
with the lachrymator ethyl bromoacetate in August 1914 and later switched to 
chloroacetone because of shortages of bromine.98 However, the German forces 
failed to notice the effects as they were masked by the effects of various other 
gases and smokes generated by conventional munitions. On 22 April 1915 
German forces released chlorine at Ypres, Belgium. In July 1917 German forces 
employed sulphur mustard, also at Ypres. Both attacks were, in a sense, effective 
in that the opposing front lines weakened or (in the case of the April 1915 
                                                 
95 See ‘Dulce Et Decorum Est’, (8 Oct.–Mar. 1918), by Wilfred Owen, 
<http://www.oucs.ox.ac.uk/ww1lit/collections/document/5215/4631>, (accessed 21 July 2014). 
96 The painting is located at London’s Imperial War Museum (IWM). There is conflicting 
information on whether the painting is dated 1918 or 1919. The IWM gives 1919 as the date. 
For an image, see IWM, ‘Gassed’, <http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/23722> 
(accessed 17 Oct. 2012). 
97 The literature usually credits Guthrie and Niemann of independently synthesizing the 
chemical in 1859–60. Riche may also have synthesized it in 1855. See Frederick Guthrie, ‘On 
Some Derivatives from the Olefines’, Quarterly Journal of the Chemical Society, vol. 12 
(1860), pp. 128–142; and Frederick Guthrie, ‘On Some Derivatives from the Olefines’, 
Quarterly Journal of the Chemical Society, vol. 13 (1861), pp. 129–135. Further information 
and citations are provided by Julian P. Perry Robinson and Ralf Trapp, ‘Production and 
Chemistry of Mustard Gas’, p. 4 in Ed. S. Johan Lundin, Verification of Dual-use Chemicals 
under the Chemical Weapons Convention: the Case of Thiodiglycol, SIPRI Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Studies no. 13 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1991). Frank C. Whitmore 
credits Guthrie with an 1860 synthesis of sulphur mustard. Guthrie, Ann. 113 (1860), cited in 
Frank C. Whitmore, Organic Chemistry: Part I, Aliphatic Compounds (Dover Publications: 
Mineola, New York, 1951), p. 33. 
98 SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 1, The Rise of CB Weapons 
(Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm, 1971), p. 42. 
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chlorine attack) temporarily abandoned. The CW attacks also had a great 
psychological impact on their opponents, as well as their respective leaderships 
and societies. 
Augustin M. Prentiss of the US Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) 
estimates that the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Germany, Italy, France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Russia together produced 150 000 
tonnes99 of CW agents during the war, of which 25 000 tonnes were left unused 
when hostilities ended on 11 November 1918.100 During the war, some 66 
million CW artillery shells were fired and both conventional and chemical 
munitions continue to be recovered annually from World War I European 
battlefields.101 
Analysts have since argued over the CW casualty numbers. Sulphur 
mustard, although introduced on the battlefield in 1917, caused more than half of 
all CW casualties. This is despite the fact that the French and British did not 
possess battlefield supplies until June 1918 and September 1918 respectively and 
could not respond in kind in the intervening period.102 Yet the percentage of 
those exposed to sulphur mustard who died appears to be under five per cent.103 
Second, discrepencies exist between the statistics given by Gilchrist, Hanslian 
and Prentiss, three of the most widely cited authorities on CW casualty 
figures.104 Third, of all the belligerant countries, Russia’s statistics are the most 
uncertain.105 This is partly because of the government’s collapse and the 
country’s subsequent disintegration into civil war that did not subside until 1921. 
In addition, many of Germany’s World War I archives were destroyed during 
World War II. Haber provides an authoritative analysis on the difficulties 
                                                 
99 The type of ‘ton’ is not specified (long ton, short ton, metric tonne, etc.). 
100 Augustin M. Prentiss, Chemicals in War: a Treatise on Chemical Warfare (McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc.: New York, 1937), p. 661. 
101 Ron Manley, ‘The Problem of old chemical weapons which contain “mustard gas” or 
organoarsenic compounds: an overview’, p. 2, in Eds. Joseph F. Bunnett and Marian 
Mikolojczyk, Arsenic and Old Mustard: Chemical Problems in the Destruction of Old 
Arsenical and ‘Mustard’ Munitions (Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 1998). 
102 SIPRI (note 98), p. 49. 
103 Gilchrist states that 599 of 27711 sulphur mustard casualties died (i.e., 2.2%). Harry L. 
Gilchrist, A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons (US 
Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1928), table no. VII, p. 21. The percentages may 
not be reliable. Longer-term health effects of exposure to sulphur mustard include genetic 
mutations, the formation of holes and pitting in the cornea, and an increased incidence in cancer 
of the windpipe. 
104 Gilchrist (note 103); Rudolf Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg [Chemical Warfare], vol. 1 
(Von E. S. Mittler & Son: Berlin, 1937), pp. 35–36; and Prentiss (note 100), p. 653. 
105 In fact, Basil Gourko (the Chief of the Russian Imperial General Staff in November 1916–
March 1917 and Commander-in-Chief of Western Armies in March 1917–June 1917) 
downplayed the military utility of CW against Russian forces. He argued that CW’s actual 
utility was generally marginal, especially the cylinder attacks, partly because the agent would 
not infrequently blow back over German positions. He did believe that CW was useful when it 
was filled into artillery shells and used in conjunction with conventional explosives prior to an 
attack. He noted that even in such cases, the Germans were themselves often the ones affected 
because if they succeeded in taking a Russian trench they were themselves contaminated and 
hence more vulnerable to counter-attack. Basil Gourko, Memories & Impressions of War and 
Revolution in Russia 1914–1917 (John Murray: London, 1918), pp. 166–167. Possible increased 
effectiveness of use of CW by Germany in 1918 and variation in German CW use according to 
sector of operations should not be overlooked when considering Gourko’s assessment. 
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associated with determining World War I CW casualty and death statistics, the 
uncertainties of which will probably not be elucidated further to any significant 
degree.106 
 
Table 2.1 World War I CW casualty estimates 
 
Country    No.  Deaths  % of deaths/casualties 
 
Russia*    475 340  56 000  11.7 
France    190 000  8 000  4.2 
Italy*    13 300  4 627  34.7 
United States   70 752  1 421  2 
United Kingdom   180 983  6 062  3.3 
Germany   78 663  2 280  2.9 
 
Total    1 009 038 78 390  7.7 
 
Source: Gilchrist, Harry L., A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons 
(Edgewood Arsenal: Maryland, 1928), p. 7. *Deemed by Gilchrist to be unreliable. Gilchrist’s numbers 
are partly based on the UK’s Official History of the War, Medical Services, British Army, vol. 2 (1924?); 
and, probably, W. D. Bancroft, et al, The Medical Department of the United States Army in the World 
War, Medical Aspects of Gas Warfare, vol. XIV (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 
1926). The UK issued similar studies of WW I casualties and deaths. It is not known how many World 
War I veterans suffered died earlier than they would have otherwise. Their longerterm health problems 
were also not properly documented. Thousands of Iranian soldiers who were exposed to sulphur mustard 
during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War remain under regular medical care due to longerterm health effects, 
including late onset blindness. The relevant scientific literature should be consulted for further 
information. See, for e.g., Kawa Dizaye, ‘Case Report: Victims of the Long Term Effects of Chemical 
Weapons in Kurdistan of Iraq’, Middle East Journal of Internal Medicine, vol. 5, no. 4 (July 2012), pp. 
27-35. With one exception, a 1941 Soviet publication provides (with no citation) numbers identical to 
those in the first column, including the cumulative total. The publication states that Russia lost 475390 
personnel (a probable typo). S. I. Azar’ev and N. A. Balashov, Boevaya Sluzhba Krasnoarmeitsa-
Khimika [Military Service of a Red Army Chemist] (Military Publisher of the Peoples’ Comissariat of the 
Defence of the USSR: Moscow, 1941), p. 8. 
 
The contemporary understanding of chemical warfare emerged during 
World War I.107 This was partly because a reasonably well-developed scientific 
understanding of the cause and effect of chemical and biological substances had, 
hitherto, not been developed sufficiently.108 Nor had such an understanding yet 
been incorporated into weapons development, training programmes and doctrine. 
World War I exemplified a new, more highly-refined mode of military planning 
and organization that involved the large-scale use of materials and manpower, 
                                                 
106 Ludwig F. Haber, The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002, reprint), pp. 239–258. 
107 Various proposals for the use of noxious fumes were in recent modern times, including 
for the Crimean War and the US Civil War. See Charles Stephenson, The Admiral’s Secret 
Weapon: Lord Dundonald and the Origins of Chemical Warfare (The Boydell Press: 
Woolbridge, UK, 2006). 
108 E.g., one not infrequently encountered discussion of the ill health effects of miasmas or 
‘bad humours’ in marshlands and swamps. Benjamin C. Garrett and John Hart, Historical 
Dictionary of Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Warfare, Historical Dictionaries of War, 
Revolution, and Civil Unrest no. 33 (The Scarecrow Press, Inc.: Lanham, Maryland, 2007), 
‘Introduction’, p. xxviii. 
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including civilian industrial production and research capacity.109 ‘Industrialized’ 
warfare (or ‘total war’) entailed the mass mobilization and coordination of 
manpower and natural resources, such as using the expertise of university 
chemists for CW-related work. 
In addition, the military strategist and historian John F. C. Fuller favoured 
the use of riot control agents and authored a UK memoradum on 5 November 
1918 entitled Bloodless Means of Quelling Civil Disturbances.110 In this 
memorandum and a later book, he maintains that the Jallianwalabagh 
massacre111 and Cawnpore massacre112 would have been averted had non-lethal 
gases been employed.113 Fuller has argued that ‘Gas, especially in its non-lethal 
forms, is the ideal weapon, because its production does not detrimentally affect 
prosperity; it is simple to manufacture; its nature can be kept secret; it can 
incapacitate without killing and it does no permanent damage to property’.114 
Fuller also argued that chemical weapons, not unlike general surgical anaesthetic, 
would eventually humanize war.115 Fuller also said in the interwar period that 
gas, even if prohibited or restricted, ‘will be used in the next war’ and that 
probably ‘it will be used as a brutal instrument’ (though not necessarily more 
brutal than the results produced by being blown to pieces or stabbed with a 
bayonet).116 
After the war, many military planners and strategists came to view 
chemical and biological warfare as an inevitable component of science and 
technology for the development of more effective weapons.117 They expected 
such weapons to become commonplace in future wars, or at least felt it prudent 
to plan accordingly.118 The influential British military strategist Basil H. Liddell-
Hart favoured the use of chemicals for law enforcement and as a method of 
                                                 
109 The OSRD was a temporary executive branch organization headed by Dr Vannevar Bush 
which coordinated civilian war research in the United States during World War II. The OSRD, 
through its Office of Field Service (OFS), provided the bulk of the scientific expertise to the 
A
rving Democracy, reprint (Greenwood Press: 1985). 
 convinced that a rebellion was incipient and ordered a Gurkha detachment to 
fir
at Cawnpore, many of whom were killed 
(in ). See Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria’s Little Wars (Harper & 
R ed by Norton in 1985. 
ks that influenced military planners in this regard were Prentiss 
(n
921). 
LSOS Mission. See also Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men: a Discussion of the 
Role of Science in Prese
110 John F. C. Fuller, The Dragon’s Teeth: a Study of War and Peace (Constable & Co. Ltd.: 
London, 1932), p. 221. 
111 Jallianwala Bagh (or Amritsar) massacre is the more common current spelling. The 
killings referred to a 13 April 1919 shooting in present-day northwest India. A British 
commander was
e repeatedly into an unarmed crowd resulting in the deaths of at least 379. Other estimates are 
closer to 1500. 
112 In 1857 Indians (Sepoys) besieged British forces 
cluding women and children
ow, Publishers: 1972). Reprint
113 Fuller (note 110), p. 221. 
114 Fuller (note 110), p. 221. 
115 Fuller (note 110), p. 222. 
116 Fuller (note 110), pp. 222–223. 
117 Two fundamental wor
ote 100); and Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West, Chemical Warfare (McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc.: New York, 1
118 See, for e.g., Fuller (note 110); and Henry F. Thuillier, Gas in the Next War (Geoffrey 
Blis: London, 1939). 
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warfare.119 To support his case, he pointed to the work of a sub-committee to the 
Preparatory Commission on Disarmament in Geneva that was tasked in 1926 to 
consider the possibility that the chemical industry could be converted to produce 
chemical warfare agents.120 This body concluded that ‘chemical factories, 
especially dyeworks and factories connected therewith, can be very quickly 
adapted’ to CW manufacture, that ‘it is impossible to prevent or hinder the 
manufacture’ of CW and that ‘there is no technical means of preventing chemical 
warfare’.121 This sense of urgency and inevitability of CW use has since 
subsided except with regard to non-state actor threats as understood by some 
govern
                                                
ments, analysts and sections of the public.122 
In the 1930s the three main types of nitrogen mustards were developed 
(HN1, HN2, HN3) and further work was carried out on the lewisites (named for 
Captain Winford Lee Lewis who headed a group of chemical weapon researchers 
at Catholic University in the United States).123 In the 1930s the major discoveries 
of organophosphates were made by German scientists. Tabun (GA) was 
discovered in 1936 by the I. G. Farben scientist Gerhard Schrader. The 
compound, Ethyl N,N-dimethylphoroamidocyanidate, was reported to the 
chemical warfare section of the German army under a regulation that required 
that scientific discoveries of potential military value or affecting national defence 
be reported.124 Sarin (GB), O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate, was 
discovered in 1939. Soman (GD), O-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate, was 
discovered in 1944 by either Richard Kuhn or Konrad Henkel.125 Of the 
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119 Liddell-Hart observed: ‘Those apparent sentimentalists, but actual brutalists, to whom the 
word “gas” is still anathema, may find the fact worth noting that the United States has been the 
one country to develop this humanising force in quelling disorder. First used against criminals 
in the cities and against the boll-weevil on the plains, it is now being used with satisfactory 
results against lynch-mobs in the South. May the proof of its humane effectiveness in quelling 
disorder pave the way for its recognition as the means of lessening the evils of war! To continue 
the prohibit
tile’. Basil H. Liddell-Hart, The Remaking of Modern Armies (John Murray: London, 1927), 
pp. 86–87. 
120 The work was carried out under the League of Nations. For a description of the work of 
the League of
ficial, see Salvador de Madariaga, Disa
. 158–164. 
121 Liddell-Hart (note 119), pp. 80–81. 
122 While it is true that CW threat perceptions increased in a number of mainly Western states 
following the attacks in 2001 against politicians and members of the media using powdered 
Bacillus anthracis spores (the causative agent for anthrax) in the United States through the post, 
most states do not feel directly threatened by such attacks. As of 2012 (with the accession of 
South Sudan in 2011), the UN had 193 members. The sense of urgency associated with possible 
CBW attacks by non-state actors was probably the highest in the period immediately following 
the 2001 attacks which resulted in five confirmed fatalities. For information on the investigation 
into the attacks, see Department of Justice, ‘Amerithrax Documents’, 
<http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/>, (accessed 16 June 2013); an
vestigation, ‘Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation’, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax>, (accessed 16 June 2013). 
123 See Joel A. Vilensky, Dew
eapon of Mass Destruction (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, Indiana, 2005). 
124 SIPRI (note 98), pp. 71–72. 
125 Kuhn, as head of the laboratory, has traditionally received credit for the synthesis. Recent 
research suggests that Henkel was more directly responsible for the disco
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organophosphorus nerve agents produced during World War II, only sarin and 
tabun were produced in significant quantities and by Germany only.126 Allied 
forces were surprised to learn of the existence of such agents at the end of the 
war. The Allies, in turn, started (or redoubled) their own development and 
stockpiling programmes of organophosphorus nerve agents.127 In late 1944, a 
group of Soviet officers from Shikhany examined a German sarin and tabun 
production plant in Silesia where samples of sarin, pinacolyl alcohol (a key 
ingredient for the manufacture of soman) and paperwork were recovered. The 
plant w
mer 
POW r
as dismantled and reassembled in the Soviet Union.128 
German prisoners-of-war (POWs) returning to the West in the years 
following World War II (most who survived were repatriated by 1955) identified 
CW facilities in Dzerzhinsk, Yerevan and Beketovka (factory no. 91, south of 
Stalingrad).129 The dismantled German organophosphorus nerve agent 
production equipment taken from Dyhernfurth was reportedly reassembled at the 
Beketovka Plant (part of the Khimprom facility in Volgograd). While knowing 
that the Dyhernfurth facility had been dismantled and reassembled in the Soviet 
Union, the British were uncertain as to when the Soviet Union had begun the 
full-scale production of any of the organophosphorus nerve agents. At one point 
in the post-World War II period, the UK estimated, partly on the basis of for
eports, that this full-scale production would occur in 1951 or 1952.130 
The nerve agent VX was discovered in the 1950s. The USA weaponized 
O-ethyl S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothiolate.131 Soviet V-
agent is an isomer of VX and its synthesis was partly informed the work of the 
Swedish chemist Lars-Erik Tammelin who later headed the Swedish Defence 
                                                                                                                                               
Schmaltz, ‘Neurosciences and Research on Chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction in Nazi 
Germany’, Journal of the History of Neurosciences, vol. 15 (2006), pp. 186–209. 
126 The actual production is difficult to ascertain for various reasons including conflation of 
agent weight with that of munition bodies, and uncertaintly over whether the nameplate 
production capacities of facilities were fully utilized. SIPRI estimated that one German plant 
site had a 1 000 tonne/month capacity, while 2 other plant sites may have had 100 and 500 
tonne/month production capacities. Further context is provided by figures on amounts and types 
of CW captured and later tested or disposed of. See, for e.g., SIPRI (note 98), pp. 282 & 305. 
On post-WW II UK stocks of trophy German tabun, see Roy Sloan, The Tale of Tabun (Gwasg 
Carreg Gwalch: Llanrwst, Wales, 1998). 
127 See below for Reginald V. Jone’s summary of the UK’s understanding of Germany’s CW 
activity. 
128 N. I. Alimov (et. al), Khimicheskaya Oborona Rossii: k 70-letiyu Tsentral’nogo Nauchno-
Issledovatel’skogo Ispytatel’nogo Instituta Radiatsionnoi, Khimicheskoi i Biologicheskoe 
Zashchity Chemical Defence of Russia on the 70th Anniversary of the Central Scientific-
Research and Experimental Institute of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Protection 
(Letopis’ Publisher: Saratov, 1998), p. 39. The plant was almost certainly at Dyhernfurth. Some 
sources date the Soviet capture of Dyhernfurth at early 1945. 
129 STO/2/DE48, DEFE 41/145; JSJT/STO(49)31, DEFE 41/146; STIBs ‘A’ and ‘C’ series 
files, DEFE 41/30; STO/11NO/48; STO/25/NO/48, DEFE 41/145; STO/16/NO/48, DEFE 
41/145; and JSJT/STO(49)11, DEFE 41/146 as cited in Paul Maddrell, Spying on Science: 
Western Intelligence in Divided Germany 1945–1961 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006, 
reprinted 2008), p. 111. 
130 Maddrell (note 129), p. 112. 
131 The UK filled GB into some artillery shells. It did not, however, weaponize VX. The UK 
initially synthesized VX using the so-called water process before abandoning it. The US used 
the Newport process. Personal communication, Sep. 2013. On the Newport process, see US 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (note 12), p. 26. 
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Research Establishment (FOA) and, in the early 1950s, synthesized an unstable 
form of sulphur-containing acetylcholinesterase inhibitors called Tammelin 
esters.
ide (LSD).133 Some experiments induced fear in cats of 
mice a
0–1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi forces mixed 
132 As isomers, V-agent and VX are chemically similar, but structurally 
different. Their physico-chemical effects therefore differ somewhat. 
After World War II, work was also carried out on various hallucinogenic 
agents. This included British and US work on 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) and 
lysergic acid diethylam
nd caused soldier volunteers to drop their weapons and to wander about 
oblivious to orders.134 
In 1987–1990 the US produced binary nerve agent weapons (in the sense 
of two, relatively non-toxic chemicals being mixed within a weapon as it is 
fired).135 One such munition was the Big Eye, which contained canisters of 
elemental sulphur (NE) and O’ethyl methylphosphonite (QL) which, when 
mixed, formed VX. Another US binary involved the mixing of 
methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF) with a mixture containing isopropyl alcohol to 
produce sarin. Despite their reputation for being a ‘second’ or ‘third generation’ 
weapon, such munitions sometimes produced incomplete mixing.136 While safer 
to manufacture and handle, they tended to deliver less actual agent to target than 
unitary munitions. The term ‘binary weapon’ was also used politically to imply 
that a state had a more sophisticated, and therefore more dangerous, chemical 
weapon stockpile.137 During the 198
                                                 
132 In the 1960s Tammelin headed FOA’s chemico-medical department (kemisk-medicinska 
avdelningen) before becoming FOA’s General Director (1984–1985). Lennart Larsson, 
‘K
ns on Sacred Drugs, Mysticism and Science 
(M
f Medical Testing of Army Volunteers with 
In
rmanski, ‘Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs’, pp. 
23
ight. 
ss 
pr
emiska stridsmedel – verkan and skydd [Chemical warfare agents – work and protection]’, 
pp. 185–187 in Försvarets Forskningsanstalt: 1945–1995 [Defence Research Institute: 1945–
1995] (PROBUS Förlag HB: Stockholm 1995). 
133 LSD was first synthesized by the Swiss chemist Albert Hoffmann. See Albert Hoffmann, 
LSD, My Problem Child: Reflectio
ultidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS): Santa Cruz, California, 2009); 
and Malcolm Dando and Martin Furmanski, ‘Midspectrum incapacitant programs’, pp. 236–51, 
in Wheelis, Rózsa and Dando (note 85). 
134 For an example of a contemporary US Army publicity film of a cat becoming fearful of a 
mouse due to the effects of an unnamed agent, see ‘Psychoactive Agents Research Chemical 
Warfare Edgewood Maryland 1950s US Army’, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
X6Z41exm3T0> (accessed 16 June 2013). See also James S. Ketchum, Chemical Warfare 
Secrets Almost Forgotten: A Personal Story o
capacitating Agents during the Cold War (1955–1975) (James S. Ketchum: Tehachapi, CA, 
2006); and Malcolm Dando and Martin Fu
6–51, in Wheelis, Rózsa and Dando (note 85). 
135 Another understanding of ‘binary’ involves the mixing of two toxic chemicals that are 
chemical warfare agents in their own r
136 The effectiveness of the mixing has ranged from very poor to complete and effective. The 
variance is partly due to munition design and the technical capacity of the personnel involved. 
Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
137 In World War I and the inter-war period, ‘binary’ in the chemical weapon context was 
understood to mean artillery shells with at least two CW agents in separate chambers (e.g., glass 
containers). A typical example of such a munition was Germany’s WW I 7.7 cm Blue Cro
ojectile. Blue Cross shells (so named because of blue cross paint markings) contained various 
formulations of irritant agents, usually based on diphenylchloroarsine (Clark I) or ethylcarbazol 
(Clark II). The author viewed these and other projectiles at Munsterlager (Germany) in 2006. 
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some n
 been destroyed. As of July 2013, 
previo
icals, 1230 unfilled munitions, 2 
                                                
erve agent precursors in the field in order to generate the agent in the 
weapon immediately prior to use.138 
Finally, the entry-into-force of the CWC in 1997 has resulted in the 
release of further information on past CW programmes and their legacies. As of 
December 2013, 190 states were party to the CWC.139 Since the treaty entered 
into force, the following declarations have been submitted to the OPCW. A total 
of 14 of the parties have declared to the OPCW that they possessed one of more 
chemical weapon production facilities since 1 January 1946. Four of the parties 
have declared chemical weapons that have been abandoned on their terroritory by 
others.140 Also 15 of the parties have declared the possession of old chemical 
weapons, while eight of the parties have declared the possession of chemical 
weapon stockpiles.141 The states that had declared chemical weapon stockpiles to 
the OPCW are Albania, India, Iraq, South Korea, Libya, Russia, Syria and the 
United States. Albania, India and South Korea have destroyed all of their 
declared chemical weapons. The largest possessors of CW stockpiles were (and 
remain) Russia and the United States. As of December 2013 58 528 metric 
tonnes of 72 531 metric tonnes declared have
usly undeclared Libyan CW (sulphur mustard and some unfilled 
munitions) were scheduled for destruction.142 
Starting in late 2013 international verification and destruction operations 
were also ongoing in Syria.143 Syria declared to the OPCW on 19 September and 
4 October the possession of sulphur mustard agent, sarin precursors and VX 
precursors. It declared having 41 facilities at 23 sites, 18 chemical weapon 
production facilities, 12 chemical weapon storage facilities, 8 mobile filling 
units, 3 CW-related facilities, 1000 tonnes of Category 1 chemicals (mainly 
precursors), 290 tonnes of Category 2 chem
 
138 To an extent, this practice is described in rather general terms with respect to the al-
 Karlheinz Lohs, The Challenge of Old 
C
es that had signed, but not acceded, to the CWC were Israel and Myanmar. The 
st
entional. 
A
mical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to 
su
cle/libya-completes-destruction-of-
its
 the Ruwagha depot. 
Husayn warhead unitary and binary warheads. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to 
the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, vol. 3 (30 Sep. 2004), p. 9. Report of the US Iraq Survey Report (‘The 
Duelfer Report’). See also Ron G. Manley, ‘UNSCOM’s Experience with Chemical Warfare 
Agents and Munitions’, p. 242 in Eds. Thomas Stock and
hemical Munitions and Toxic Armament Wastes, SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Studies no. 16 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997). 
139 The stat
ates that had neither signed nor acceded to the CWC were Angola, Egypt, North Korea and 
South Sudan. 
140 The countries that have declared ACWs to the OPCW are China, Iran, Italy and Panama. 
The Technical Secretariat determined the ACW munitions declared by Iran to be conv
CWs are defined as chemical weapons that were abandoned by a state after 1 Jan. 1925 on the 
territory of another state without the permission of the latter. CWC, Article II, para. 6.  
141 The countries that have declared OCWs to the OPCW are Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, 
Switzerland, the UK and the USA. OCWs are defined as chemical weapons that were produced 
before 1925 or che
ch an extent that they are no longer usable in the manner in which they were designed. CWC, 
Article II, para. 5. 
142 OPCW, ‘Libya Completes Destruction of its Bulk Sulfur Mustard Stockpile’, OPCW 
Press Release, 6 May 2013, <http://www.opcw.org/news/arti
-bulk-sulfur-mustard-stockpile/>, (accessed 8 May 2013). The completion of sulphur mustard 
destruction refers to that stored at
143 OPCW, ‘Syria and the OPCW’, <http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/the-opcw-and-
syria/>, (accessed 4 Nov. 2013). 
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cylinde
uring the hydrolysis of the 
hemical agents) were to be used for peaceful purposes by private companies 
146 
aerial attack (including with incendiary devices and chemical or biological 
warfare agents).147
rs not claimed by the Syrian Government and possibly filled with CW, 
and site diagrams for CW storage facilities.144 
A focus of the inspection and verification effort (which was hindered by a 
lack of effective security measures within the country) was on ensuring the 
completeness and correctness of the declarations and to finish the destruction of 
Category 3 CW in 2013. A major component to the internationally-verified 
destruction of the weapons stockpile was also the removal by ship in 
January-June 2014 of organophosphorus nerve agent precursors, isopropanol 
(diluted in water) and sulphur mustard agent. The removal operation (Operation 
Removal of Chemical Agents from Syria (OPER RECSYR)) was under the 
overall direction of OPCW and included the transfer of toxic chemicals to a 
shipboard hydrolysis unit in the Mediterranean Sea.145 Denmark and Norway 
agreed to transfer the toxic chemicals from the Syrian port of Latakia, while the 
USA provided a ship specially fitted with the CW destruction hydrolysis unit. 
Hydrolysates (i.e., degradation products formed d
c
awarded public tenders circulated by the OPCW.
 
2.1. Preparedness and Awareness Raising 
 
In the inter-war period, preparedness and awareness compaigns were also begun 
mainly in Europe to inform the public of the risks of chemical and biological 
warfare. Groups interested in the promotion of peace wrote on the scale of 
destruction that could be expected in future wars by armoured formations and 
 Some feared that aerial attack would be decisive in any future 
                                                 
144 ‘Note by the Director-General: Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical 
W
Union also 
pu
n Norman Angell, et al, What Would be the 
C
 
eapons Programme’, OPCW document EC-M-34/DG.1, 25 Oct. 2013. 
145 Seaborne hydrolysis was decided upon after consultations among the parties to the CWC 
resulted in no state being willing to accept these chemicals onto its terriory. This appears to 
have been mainly due to an unwillingness to face public opposition. 
146 For documentation and related information, see OPCW (note 143). 
147 E.g., Thuillier (note 118). This volume is part of The Next War Series edited by Basil 
Liddell-Hart. See also Norman Angell, et al, What Would be the Character of a New War? 
(Victor Gollancz Ltd.: London, 1933). The chapters in Angell were produced under the auspices 
of an enquiry organised by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva. The Soviet 
blished a translation of the work of a certain General Groves in which the Soviet author of the 
forward indicated that chemical weapons would be a decisive means in future war. Grovs 
[Groves], Za Dymovoi Zavesoi [Behind the Smoke Screen] (State Military Publisher ‘Ogiz’: 
Moscow, 1934), p. III. Translated from English with a foreward by E. Tatarchenko. 
The first name of Groves is not provided. However, the author is probably ‘General Groves’ 
who was the Director of Aerial Operations for the British front in 1918. See Gertrud Woker, 
‘Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 358 i
haracter of a New War? (Victor Gollancz Ltd.: London, 1933). Thuillier was Director of Gas 
Services at General Headquarters in France during World War I. He later became Controller of 
the Chemical Warfare section of the UK Ministry of Munitions. In 1939 he had achieved the 
rank of Major-General. Thuillier (note 118), p. x. 
More generally, it should perhaps also be noted that the Soviet Union issued translations of 
the standard chemical and biological warfare works published by Western states (without, one 
suspects, obtaining copyright permission). Professor Hermann Büscher’s popular gas awareness 
book (Giftgas! Und Wir?) states that all copyright is asserted ‘including in Russian’ (‘Alle 
Rechte, insbesondere das Übersetzungsrecht – auch ins Russische – vorbehalten’). Hermann 
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war. In the 1920s-1930s, numerous popular books were devoted to the nature of 
future warfare (given the mass deaths and the industrial and technological nature 
of World War I).148 Some of this literature pertained to the activity of peace 
societies or arms limitation talks by the League of Nations. Notable 
commentators, such as the military historian and strategist John F. C. Fuller, the 
scientist John B. S. Haldane, the philosopher, mathematician and peace activist 
Bertrand Russell and the author and social commentator Herbert G. Wells, gave 
lectures and wrote on future conflict, international tensions, and civil defence. 
Others sought to clarify the military strategic implications of technological 
developments, modes of warfare and weapons.149 
Fuller, one of the more influential inter-World War proponents of 
chemical warfare, had little patience for arms control and disarmament advocates 
then active in the League of Nations and elsewhere. He argued ‘To paralyse an 
army by chemical action is surely more beneficial to humanity than blowing it to 
pieces; to send a city to sleep is surely preferable to bombarding it or starving it 
into surrender, and even to burn a man’s skin with mustard gas is surely more 
humane than digging out his entrails with a bayonet. Yet these humane methods 
are not the ideals of the humanitarians; to them, if war is to continue, then 
blowing to pieces, starving and mutiliating are the rightful methods of war’.150 
To Fuller, future warfare would be characterized by: 1. machine guns, 2. the 
motor-car, 3. the tank, 4. the submarine, 5. aircraft and 6. gas.151 Liddell Hart 
held similar views and believed that another war with Germany was probable and 
edited a series of books entitled The Next War Series with such views in mind.152 
In addition, various officials and public commentators issued disturbing 
estimates on the effects of CW agents. On 14 July 1928 Lord Halsbury (Chief of 
the Explosives Department in the UK Ministry of War) informed the House of 
Lords that 40 tonnes of diphenylchlorarsine would be sufficient to destroy the 
                                                                                                                                               
Büscher, Giftgas! Und Wir?, Die Welt der Giftgas: Wesen und Wirkung/Hilfe und Heilung 
[Poison Gas! And Us? The World of Poison Gas: Nature and Effects/Help and Healing] (Verlag 
R. Himmelheber & Co.: Hamburg, 1932), front inside cover. Although it should perhaps also be 
p expertise and 
in
Army on the March] (Albert 
B
 des 
Sc té de Lausanne: Paris, 1926), (edited by Arthur Rousseau). 
 Territorial in the Next War, by 
W
noted that V. I. Shvemberger of the Red Army Chemical Directorate published in 1927 was said 
to be an authorized edition of Julius Meyer’s Der Gaskampf und die Chemischen Kampsoffe 
[Gas Warfare and Chemical Warfare Agents], 2nd edtn. (Leipzig, 1926) (Shvemberger also 
confirms in his preface that Yakov Fishman held a doctorate in chemistry. I mention the point 
about Fishman’s academic credential because at least one US scientist with a dee
terest in CBW history has had a longstanding interest in clarifying this point.) 
148 E.g., Herbert Timm, Röda Armén Marsherar [The Red 
onniers Förlag: Stockholm, 1936), transl. by C. F. Palmstierna. 
149 E.g., J. M. Kenworthy, New Wars: New Weapons, Colonial Edtn. (Elkin Mathews & 
Marrot: London, 1930); J. M. Kenworthy, Peace or War? (Boni & Liveright: New York City, 
1927). Kenworthy served on the UK Admiralty War Staff in London and was a Member of 
Parliament. For a Francophone view on the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, 
see M. De Lavallaz, Essai Sur Le Désarmement et le Pacte de la Société des Nations [Essays on 
Disarmament and the League of Nations Treaty], fascicule II (Collection de L’École
iences Sociales de L’Universi
150 Fuller (note 110), p. 222. 
151 Fuller (note 110), p. 277. 
152 The titles of The Next War Series, edited by Liddell, were Sea Power in the Next War, by 
Russell Grenfell; Air Power in the Next War, by James M. Spaight; Propaganda in the Next 
War, by Sidney Rogerson; Tanks in the Next War, by E. W. Sheppard; Infantry in the Next War, 
by T. A. Lowe; Gas in the Next War, by Henry F. Thuillier; The
. E. Green; and The Civilian in the Next War, by J. D. Bernal. 
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entire population of London.153 A Soviet AVIAKhim publication translated by a 
Bern paper and subsequently referred to by the Swiss organic chemist and peace 
activist Gertrud Woker stated that a city of 500 000 inhabitants covering a 
territor
 explosives 
attack]
s Fries and Clarence West) was popular in the Soviet Union partly 
becaus
Such efforts also tended to prompt speculation on the existence of secret ‘super 
weapons’ and attendant sensational news stories.160 Even unusual disease 
                                                
y of approximately 200 sq km could ‘if unprotected, be turned into a field 
of corpses by a squadron of 40 to 50 aeroplanes’.154 
Professor Philip Noel Baker, a former British member of the League of 
Nations Secretariat and author of Disarmament (1926), stated that ‘three drops’ 
of Lewisite is sufficient to kill a person and that ‘No reasonable person can hope 
that General Groves155 was mistaken when he said that millions of lives could be 
lost in a few hours [to aerial chemical and perhaps conventional
.156 The alleged lethality of Lewisite was echoed in a 1927 speech by 
Stalin (see Chapter 12). Such estimates are uninformed hyperbole.157 
The extent to which Soviet CW specialists accepted the assertions 
regarding the effectiveness of Lewisite in Western publications is not clear. In 
addition, to the quotation ascribed to Baker, the US CWS in the immediate post-
World War I period viewed Lewisite as the US’s own special contribution and 
not infrequently promoted its effectiveness as a blister agent alternative to 
sulphur mustard. According the Russian and US chemist Vladimir Nikolayevich 
Ipatiev who assisted in the development of Russia’s CW programme during 
World War I, Chemical Warfare (a book published in 1921 by two US army 
officers, Amo
e of the interest it generated about Lewisite, often referred to as the ‘dew 
of death’.158 
In 1924 the Study Commission of the League of Nations on Chemical 
Warfare issued a report on threats posed by chemical and biological weapons in 
future conflict which provides better context in which to place the various 
sensationalist claims, including one made by Joseph Stalin regarding Lewisite at 
the 15th Congress of the Communist Party held in 1927 (see Chapter 12).159 
 
153 Gertrud Woker, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 363 in Angell (note 147). 
154 Gertrud Woker, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 364 in Angell (note 147). 
155 ‘General Groves’ in this instance was the Director of Aerial Operations for the British 
front in 1918, not Leslie Richard Groves who headed the Manhattan Project in World War II. 
Gertrud Woker, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 358 in Angell (note 147). 
156 Gertrud Woker, ‘Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 362 in Angell (note 147). 
157 On CW lethality effects, see Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents, US Army 
Technical Manual TM 3-215 (unclassified) (Department of Defense: Washington, DC, Dec. 
1963). 
158 Ipatieff states that Lewisite was investigated ‘in especial detail’. Vladimir N. Ipatieff, The 
Life of a Chemist (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 1946), p. 387. Fries is 
discussed in Soviet military journals and books dealing with CW issues (i.e., his publications, 
speeches and opinions). 
159 Document A.16 (1924), IX, League of Nations. As cited by Gertrud Woker, ‘Chemical 
and Bacteriological Warfare’, p. 385 in Angell (note 147). 
160 For pre-World War I fears of biological warfare, see Anonymous, ‘Plague Missiles, New 
War Scheme’, Washington Post, 4 Feb. 1912, p. M6 (accessed via ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers database); and Anonymous, ‘Smallpox Shells for War: Death-Dealing Horrors 
[the] British Government are Considering Will Make Peace Desirable’, Washington Post, 11 
Feb. 1912, p. M1 (accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers database). This item was 
apparently a reprint of an article that appeared in Pearson’s Weekly. 
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outbreaks might therefore acquire a more sinister meaning. Such factors 
heightened the threat perceptions that states had of each other.161 
 
2.2. CW Evaluation and War Planning 
 
During World War I a series of events occurred that provide useful context to the 
consideration of ‘offensive’ versus ‘defensive’ chemical weapon programme 
indicators. In April 1916 Field Marshal Douglas Haig instructed that defensive 
and offensive services of the UK chemical warfare activity be placed under the 
command of Brigadier-General Henry F. Thuillier in order to ‘secure unity of 
organisation and direction’.162 
Thuillier subsequently summarized British CW evaluation (including 
intelligence principles) and war planning carried out by the British during the 
war. Parallels exist between the World War I military intelligence CW evaluation 
context and subsequent technical discussions on CW arms control verification 
that were conducted under the auspices of the League of Nations. 
With respect to the general indicators of a CW programme, Thuillier 
states: 
‘The gas warfare directors must study not only the nature of the chemical 
substances that would make valuable war weapons, but also the capacity 
of the country’s industries to produce them, and the availability of 
materials, especially metals of various kinds, for the appliances in which 
they are to be used. With metals carefully rationed, as they were in the 
last war, it is useless to contemplate the introduction of such an appliance 
as the Livens projector163 unless the rationing committee can be prevailed 
on to allot the necessary supply of steel for their manufacture’.164 
                                                 
161 E.g., see Heinz Liepmann, Death from the Skies: a Study of Gas and Microbial Warfare 
(Martin Secker & Warburg: London, 1937); and Wickham Steed, ‘Aerial warfare: secret 
German plans’, The Nineteenth Century and After, no. 689 (July 1934), pp. 1–15. For a 
discussion on threat perceptions in the biological field, see Erhard Geissler, John Ellis van 
Courtland Moon, and Graham S. Pearson, ‘Lessons from the History of Biological and Toxin 
Warfare’, chap. 12, pp. 255–276 in Eds. Erhard Geissler and John Ellis van Courtland Moon, 
Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, 
SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 18 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999). 
Nineteenth Century and After was first issued in 1877. It was subsequently renamed Twentieth 
Century. The journal received British and US government (including intelligence) funding to 
support those governments’ cultural struggle against their communist counterparts. Frances 
Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: the CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (The New 
Press: New York, 1999), pp. 109–110. 
162 Thuillier (note 118), unnumbered footnote, p. 39. 
163 Named for William Howard Livens, a British civil engineer who served in the Special 
Brigade (a WW I British chemical weapons unit), the device consists of a mortar tube 
embedded into the ground in rows which eject drums of CW agent simultaneously via an 
electrical firing mechanism. The system was able to generate quickly lethal concentrations of 
CW agents with little to no warning. Those who prepared the rows were liable to be hit by CW 
agent if German forces became aware of their work and brought down an artillery barrage. 
Garrett and Hart (note 108), pp. 131–132. 
164 Thuillier (note 118), p. 161. 
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With respect to CW protective equipment, Thuillier continues: 
‘The same applies to the materials required for protective appliances, 
especially gas respirators which are required in [the] millions. For these 
the supplies of rubber, textile fabrics, light metals, special charcoals, etc., 
have to be ensured. In 1917 it was found difficult to obtain the materials 
required for the production of the special charcoal for respirators, so 
advertisements were inserted in newspapers asking the public to collect 
and send in all stones of fruit, such as peaches, plums, cherries, etc., 
which, when burned produced charcoal of the requisite standard. 
Quantities of them soon poured in. In addition, agents were sent to South 
America to obtain large consignments of special nuts the shells of which 
were specially suitable for the same purpose’.165 
Thuillier also observes: 
‘The converse of such forms of investigations is the necessity for 
examining the enemy’s resources, both of chemicals and of other 
substances, in order to see what he is likely to use against us, and also to 
discover whether he can command the substances necessary for the 
protection of his troops against the chemicals we are contemplating using. 
The necessity for a highly organised chemical intelligence service at the 
front in order to discover the enemy’s gas warfare plans, and the state of 
his defence against ours, has already been described in Chapter V, but a 
farther reaching intelligence service is necessary to discover the enemy’s 
industrial capacity, his stocks of the chemical and other raw materials 
required for chemical warfare, and his ability or otherwise to replace 
exhausted stocks or obtain those materials which his own country cannot 
produce’.166 
A chemical warfare intelligence service must: (a) ‘gather, evaluate, sift 
and collate all information available from every possible source in regard to the 
intentions of the enemy to use gas, to the nature of the gases he is likely to use, 
and to the methods and appliances by which he will use it’; and (b) collect 
information regarding the effects of one’s own CW agents on the enemy (e.g., in 
light of the enemy’s state of protection).167 
Thuillier also emphasized the importance of having trained chemists in the 
intelligence service with a couple of World War I examples. Prior to the April 
1915 chlorine attack, the Allies had intercepted German messages that displayed 
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anxiety over the unfavourable wind direction and that mentioned the name 
‘[Fritz] Haber’ the German chemist who subsequently became known as ‘the 
father of chemical warfare’ for successfully prompting the German High 
Command to initiate a CW attack at Ypres in April 1915. One message in 
particular clearly stated that Haber believed the wind to be unfavourable.168 The 
same month (prior to the initial chlorine attack) British forces had captured Hill 
60 in the Ypres sector and discovered numerous metal cylinders which, as it later 
transpired, were meant to hold chlorine. The significance of the cylinders was not 
appreciated until after the chlorine attack.169 Finally Private August Jaeger, a 
captured German soldier informed the Allies at the French 11th Divisional 
Headquarters that Germany was planning a CW attack in the sector. Shortly after 
his name was published in the 1930s in an article in France, German authorities 
arrested and imprisoned him. Jaeger was later confined at the Buchenwald, 
Malthusen and Dachau concentration camps before being released by the Soviet 
Army at the close of World War II.170 
Thuillier characterizes the UK’s World War I methodology for CW evaluation as 
follows: 
‘Between April, 1915, and the end of the war an exhaustive investigation 
was carried out to discover chemical substances that could be used in gas 
warfare. Every single compound described in Beilstein’s Handbook of 
Organic Chemistry [Beilstein Handbook of Organic Chemistry], that well-
known compilation which contains a description of every chemical 
compound known to science, was subjected to careful consideration and 
every one that showed under this preliminary enquiry any chance of being 
utilisable for gas warfare was subjected to physiological examination and 
trial in a laboratory. For this immense investigation many of the ablest 
scientific men in the country gave their assistance and a large number of 
chemical workers carried out researches in every university laboratory in 
the United Kingdom. The few substances which from these researches 
gave promise of being of real war value were then carried on to the stage 
of field experiment’.171 
British military intelligence received a flood of reports in February or 
early March 1918 that Germany was about to employ an extremely effective CW 
agent.172 They originated from POW interviews, captured documents, reports 
from third countries and ‘from other secret services sources’.173 Several factors 
led the UK to doubt the veracity of these reports. First, they began suddenly. 
Second, such a large number of reports had not previously occurred, particularly 
prior to the German first use of sulphur mustard in July 1917. Third, France, the 
UK and United States were preparing for largescale deployment of Adamsite and 
diphenylchloroarsine. The Allies suspected that these two agents in particular 
would cause great damage to the opposing forces and that Germany, therefore, 
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wished to forestall their use. Fourth, the reports had the common theme that no 
respirator could defend against the CW agent and no information (speculative or 
otherwise) was available concerning the mystery agent’s composition.174 Fifth, 
the occurrence of the reports appeared to be ‘regular’.175 
The UK chemical warfare intelligence personnel were not overly 
concerned that Germany might possess such a highly effective agent. This was 
partly because of the confidence the British had in their own protective 
equipment and because the UK had systematically reviewed the chemistry 
literature.176 British intelligence analysts then learned that the Council of the 
International Red Cross Society177 based in Berne178 was about to issue an 
appeal to all belligerants to cease chemical warfare.179 The analysts also learned 
that a member of the Council was a German chemist and pacifist who had 
recently returned from a visit to Germany where he had apparently been asked to 
join CW-related activity.180 This chemist was reportedly horrified at the prospect 
and returned to Switzerland where he spoke of the terrible effects of CW. This 
prompted British suspicion that the chemist was being manipulated by Germany 
to try to stop or delay Allied CW attacks. The British speculated that this was 
prompted by Germany’s diminishing resources.181 The UK nevertheless had to 
consider the risk of exposing Allied forces to a potentially highly effective agent 
when a humanitatarian opportunity presented by the Red Cross Council could 
instead be followed up.182 
Thuillier continues the story:  
‘In a very short time, the appeal from the International Red Cross Council 
duly arrived, addressed to the British Government, and to the 
Governments of all the belligerants, to enter into an agreement to stop the 
use of gas or chemicals in any form, on the grounds of humanity, and 
[es]specially in view of the terrible sufferings to the troops and civil 
populations that would be likely to ensure from the use of the more deadly 
gases which it was believed that belligerants on both sides were preparing 
to employ’.183 
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The UK provided a ‘sympathetic and diplomatic reply which, however, in 
effect declined’ and the other Allies gave similar responses. The reports of the 
super CW agent then suddenly ceased.184 Later, a member of the Council visited 
the UK and met with the head of the British Chemical Warfare Service.185 This 
member assured the head that the German chemistry professor was true to his 
stated convictions.186 
CW analysts must also consider the offensive, defensive or deterrent 
character of a state’s military doctrine.187 Most states planned to use chemical 
weapons against staging areas, to slow enemy advances and to protect one’s 
flanks.188 A perennial question is whether CW can play a useful tactical or 
strategic military role (or is envisaged as such). A tactical role would be to 
protect the flanks of a military column with sulphur mustard, as was done by 
Italian forces during its war in Abyssinia,189 while a strategic role could be the 
delivery of a persistent CW agent (e.g., VX) behind enemy lines. 
Thus James M. Spaight observes that, for some, the major lesson from the 
Italo-Abysssinia conflict was that a future war could be won by using aircraft 
loaded with CW.190 The Soviet Union may have drawn just such a lesson. 
According to one Russian chemical weapon history, Italian forces employed 
15000 chemical air bombs, and up to 400 tonnes of sulphur mustard and lewisite 
over a three month period in 1936.191 This source maintains that 30 per cent of 
Ethiopian casualties from the war were due to CW.192 In addition, a Soviet 
officer attached to Ras Kassa’s army was quoted by G. Martelli as stating: 
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‘The moral effect of aviation in this war was enormous. If the land space 
was unconquered as yet, the aerial belonged to the Italians. From their 
heights they penetrated our life, turned it upside down. They could 
intervene in all our movements. They prevented us from eating and 
warming ourselves after a heavy march round our camp fires, which they 
were afraid to light. They turned us into moles who dashed into their 
burrows at the slightest alarm. Insignificant though the losses which they 
inflicted on us might be, each Ethiopian thought that he was the special 
target of the bomb released. All the day under the menace of an enemy 
who followed us step by step, with something near impunity, since he knew 
he was master’.193  
It should also be noted that the author Evelyn Waugh, who was a war 
correspondent in Ethiopia, as well as a British intelligence agent during World 
War II, disputed the decisiveness in the conflict of Italy’s use of CW. He 
concluded: ‘It is difficult to get reliable figures, but it seems that at no time was 
gas or yperite very effective as a lethal weapon. Nor was it primarily used as 
such. Its value to the invading army was to sterilize the bush along the line of 
advance, so that the mechanized column could push forward rapidly without fear 
of ambush’. He argued instead that Ethiopian morale was broken primarily by 
machine gunning from the air.194 
Both chemical and biological weapons were employed extensively by 
Japan on mainland China and were incorporated into extensive human 
experimentation against mainly Chinese nationals.195 CW stocks were positioned 
in all major theatres of operation.196 It is also worth noting that France 
experimented with munitions containing flechettes that combined the delivery of 
Bacillus anthracis. The flechettes were meant to increase casualty and lethal 
effects.197 
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In general, countries that established chemical officer training courses 
usually chose to have a separate chemical corps in the army. University chemists 
were sometimes given military rank and sent into the field to observe chemical 
attacks and to offer assistance on production and storage problems.198 The units 
responsible for using chemical weapons were often responsible for smoke and 
flame operations.199 While chemical weapon units have often had some 
responsibility for biological warfare development and protection measures, most 
of the specialists in the biological area appear to have come out of (or had some 
affiliation with) military medical academies.200 Offensive biological weapons 
work has generally been highly secret and, not infrequently, kept separate from 
the chemical units (i.e., a military medical versus a chemical corps career path). 
Simultaneously the major military powers, principally in Europe, 
increased their inter-World War research efforts to discover suitable chemical 
warfare agents and methods for their dispersion, including by aircraft.201 
Volunteer organizations were established in order to promote physical fitness and 
various skills deemed important for national defence. For example, 
OSOAVIAKhIM was established in 1927 in the Soviet Union to promote 
chemistry and chemical defence.202 OSOAVIAKhIM is the Russian acronym for 
the ‘the General Society for Aviation and Chemistry (Obshchoe Soyuznoe 
Obschestvo Aviatsy i Khimy), a voluntary patriotic military organization that 
existed in the USSR from 1927-1948 and underwent several name changes.203 Its 
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purpose was to assist with the development of the aviation industry, promote 
chemistry in Soviet society and to better prepare the country against possible air 
or chemical attack. The organization promoted its work under the slogan 
‘chemicalization’ and justified its role in terms of (a) the drive towards 
collectivization of Soviet agriculture, (b) acquiring and developing the means for 
domestic production of the most modern technology and equipment and (c) 
strengthening the military capabilities of the country.204 In the 1930s factories 
typically had an ‘OSOAViaKhim Corner’ and in 1936 some one million workers 
in Leningrad were trained in anti-aircraft and anti-gas defence.205 
Another analytically relevant consideration is whether CW capabilities, 
declared stockpiles or ambiguous holdings are meant to play a military role or 
merely serve a (perhaps implicit) political function. In terms of elucidating CW 
motivations, it is important to consider whether military doctrine derives 
principally from processes internal to the state, or if the doctrine is primarily 
shaped by international developments and processes.206 With respect to the 
assessment of capability, it is important to consider the degree to which CW has 
been integrated into military doctrine, including the extent to which such 
weapons are included in logistics planning, the manner in which they are 
reflected in military manuals, and the extent to which military personnel are 
proficient in the use of CW, protective equipment and decontamination 
procedures.207 
These points are mainly relevant for the assessment of state activities. 
With respect to non-state actors, the corresponding questions focus more on 
intent and capability.208 Distinctions exist between the objectives normally 
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pursued by states versus objectives pursued by individuals and groups. Assessing 
intent and capability requires a deeper understanding of divergent ideologies 
(including those derived from ethics, social norms and religion) which will tend 
to produce greater ambiguity than that resulting from officially sanctioned state 
ideology or national security requirements.209 For example, states may be 
interested in artillery and rocket firing and bomb dropping tables for the various 
calibre munitions (so as to avoid having to conduct their own field trials which, 
in turn, are potentially discoverable through the intelligence gathering efforts of 
other states). Non-state actors, by contrast, would almost certainly find such data 
to be irrelevant or of ‘academic interest’ only. 
For those working in state military programmes in the 20th century, the 
identification of chemical agents outside the laboratory for possible use as 
weapons was a longstanding analytical objective.210 It has never been as fully 
addressed in the academic literature as compared to nuclear weapon development 
programmes.211 This probably also reflects a desire by states to limit the spread 
of proliferation sensitive information. In addition, military planners dislike 
having to factor into their scenarios the logistical requirements for protecting 
troops against such weapons and possibly supplying them with CW—both for 
the planned first use and for retaliatory-only purposes, as well as the potentially 
burdensome medical care consequences.212 Planners and commanders have also 
tended to view with dissatisfaction the wide variability in possible killing or 
casualty-causing effects of such weapons.213 They have instead preferred 
weapons whose effects can be predicted reliably and may decide not to expend 
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resources on protective measures required if chemical weapon use is 
undertaken.214 Determining the effects of such weapons is further complicated 
by the fact that the enemy might only wish to cause his opponent to ‘suit up’ and 
thus degrade operational effectiveness.215 Military planners have also devoted 
attention to the creation and validation of firing tables.216 States have also 
analysed possible threats posed by non-state actors especially since the end of 
World War II.217 Finally, it is noteworthy that chemical and biological weapons 
have been linked to and disassociated from each other to varying degrees 
(including in the arms control context since the Protocol for the Prohibition of 
the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925 Geneva Protocol) was concluded).218 
However, the growing interface between chemistry and the life sciences means 
that the two types of weapons are inextricably linked in terms of the evaluation 
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chemical warfare program which could produce a variety of chemical agents suitable for 
clandestine introduction into the US. However, large quantities would be required to obtain 
effective concentrations on most types of targets, and delivery with precise timing would be 
subject to unpredictable conditions of wind and weather. Nevertheless, chemical agents could 
be used effectively on a small scale against personnel in key installations. A supply of nerve 
gases ample for this purpose could be clandestinely produced in the US without great difficulty 
or great risk of detection. Psychogenic agents could not readily be produced in the US and 
would probably have to be introduced clandestinely. We believe, however, that the possible 
advantages of psychogenic agenst over nerve agents would not be sufficient in the Soviet view 
to warrant the risk of clandestine introduction’. The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction into the US, NIE report no. 11-7-63, declassified (Central Intelligence 
Agency: 13 Mar. 1963), p. 3. An early 1950s estimate stated ‘The only method of clandestine 
attack with chemical warfare agents likely to be employed by the USSR is the smuggling of 
limited quantities of nerve gas into the US for dissemination against personnel in key 
installations. The possiblity of small-scale nerve gas attacks cannot be overlooked’. CIA, Soviet 
Capabilities for Clandestine Attack Against the US with Weapons of Mass Destruction and the 
Vulnerability of the US to Such Attack (Mid-1951 to Mid-1952) (1952?), para. 4. 
218 In the late 1968, states agreed to negotiate a separate agreement against biological warfare 
within the framework of the present-day Conference on Disarmament (CD), while the 1925 
Geneva Protocol would continue to inform further consideration of strengthening the 
international prohibitions against chemical and biological warfare. On the split, see SIPRI, The 
Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970, vol. 
IV (Almqvist & Wiksell: Stockholm, 1971), pp. 253–260.  
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of their development, production and use (i.e., compounds that affect the 
physiology of animals, humans and plants). The OPCW Scientific Advisory 
Board (SAB) therefore established a temporary working group devoted to the 
convergence of biology and chemistry.219 
 
2.3. International Cooperation on Chemical Weapons 
 
Perhaps the most notable inter-World War CW cooperation was that carried out 
between Germany and the Soviet Union. The 1922 Treaty of Rapallo permitted 
Germany to circumvent restrictions placed on its military by the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles which inter alia required that Germany not develop or stockpile CW. 
From the 1920s until the early 1930s Germany and the Soviet Union cooperated 
on the development and testing of chemical warfare agents. The establishment of 
the Shikhany Central Military Chemical Proving Ground was the most lasting 
result of the German-Soviet cooperation in the field of CW.220  
The Germans contributed approximately 1 million Reichsmarks worth of 
equipment for the Tomka facility and the facility eventually included: a 
decontamination chamber, four laboratories, two vivariums and five barracks 
where the Germans lived.221 The Germans were also not allowed to carry out 
CW work without Soviet participation. The work conducted at Tomka was 
concealed through a German-Soviet trade agreement between, on the Soviet side, 
the Joint Stock Company on the Fight against Vermin and the Use of Synthetic 
Fertilizers (code-named ‘M’) and, on the German side, the Joint Stock Company 
on the Use of Raw Materials (code-named ‘V’). The Soviets became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the German contribution to the joint CW projects because they 
felt that the Germans were not sufficiently open or forthcoming with information 
and assistance. Hitler ended joint military cooperation with the Soviet Union 
following his rise to power in 1933. Tomka was dismantled between 26 July and 
15 August 1933.222 
                                                 
 
219 ‘Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its 
Seventeenth Session’, OPCW document C-17/DG.16*, 26 Nov. 2012, p. 12. For a listing of 
SAB reports, see OPCW, ‘Reports’, <http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/subsidiary-
bodies/scientific-advisory-board/reports/>, (accessed 28 May 2013). 
220 Tomka, sometimes spelled ‘Tomko’, was the name of the village that once existed at the 
site where a field test facility was established in 1926 adjacent to the Shikhany military 
chemical establishment during secret German-Soviet CW cooperation within the framework of 
the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Points on the Shikhany proving ground are generally named for the 
villages that once stood there. 
221 The decision on where to build the facility was based partly on the fact that the region was 
populated by Volga Germans who had settled in the region in the 18th century. Soviet 
authorities believed that the presence of the German-speaking visitors would therefore attract 
less attention. However, the German visitors were generally confined to their base and were 
forbidden from traveling without special permission. The Germans were not allowed to take 
photographs or to have private conversations with the Soviet security details. John Hart, 
‘Historical Note: the Shikhany Central Scientific-Research [and] Experimental Institute of 
Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense’, ASA Newsletter, no. 104 (29 Oct. 2004), pp. 
16–19. See also F. L. Carsten, ‘Reports by Two German Officers on the Red Army’, Slavonic 
and East European Review, vol. 41, no. 96 (1962), pp. 217–244. 
222 Alimov (note 128), p. 17. See also Edward H. Carr, German-Soviet Relations Between the 
Two World Wars: 1919–1939 (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, Maryland, 1951); and Eds. V. 
N. Orlov, (et al), My Zashchitily Rossiyu: Istoricheskii Ocherk o Sozdanii i Deyatel’nosti 
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Another German-Soviet joint venture of the same period, code-named 
‘Bersol’, was a project for the manufacture of chemical warfare agents and 
weapons. The venture was also called ‘The Russo–German Factory Bersol’. The 
Bersol Company was set up through a May 1923 agreement, calling for German 
assistance for the design and construction of a factory to produce various CW 
agents, including phosgene and sulphur mustard. The factory was to be 
constructed in Ivashchenkovo (Samara oblast’) on the site of a WW I-era 
chlorine plant. The Bersol venture failed and was cancelled by a Soviet Politburo 
resolution on 13 February 1927. One source reports that chlorine trifluoride 
(ClF3) was to have been among the chemicals to be produced by the venture. 
However, the claim is uncertain as its synthesis was not reported until 1930, 
three years after the Bersol project was cancelled. It is therefore unlikely that 
chlorine trifluoride would have been part of plans for Bersol if those plans were 
completed well before the chemical had been synthesized.223 Some military 
planners suspected that the chemical could be used to ignite peoples’ hair (the 
chemical is not, however, suitable for this purpose). 
In the 1920s-1930s the German chemist and entrepreneur Hugo 
Stoltzenberg also sold ‘off-the-shelf’ sulphur mustard plants (or otherwise 
facilitated their construction) to a number of countries, including Brazil, Italy, the 
Soviet Union (at Samara), Spain and Yugoslavia.224 
 
2.4. Evolution of Chemical Weapons Threat Assessments 
 
In the inter-World War period states viewed patriotic organizations as a form of 
military preparedness standby capacity and attempted to infer military intentions 
and capabilities in view of the existence and activities of such organizations.225 
States have often reviewed the publications by researchers and academics 
affiliated with chemical weapon-related work in order to obtain insight into the 
CW programmes of other states. The CW work by the United States was looked 
at and perhaps even emulated in some respects by the Soviet Union. For 
example, a Soviet historical account states that the 1921 study Chemical Warfare 
                                                                                                                                               
Nauchno-Tekhnicheskogo Komiteta, Upravleniya Zakazov, Proizvodstva i Snabzheniya i 
Upravleniya Biologicheskogo Zashchity UNV RKhB Zashchity MO RF We Defended Russia: 
Historical Outline on the Establishment and Activities of the Scientific-Technical Committee, 
the Directorate of Orders, Production and Supply and the Directorate of Biological Defence of 
the Directorate of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence Forces Command of the 
Russian Federation Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation: 
Moscow, 2000). 
223 This paragraph was published in Hart (note 221), pp. 16–19. This text was provided by Dr 
Benjamin C. Garrett and was published with minor changes. 
224 Garrett and Hart (note 108), ‘Stoltzenberg, Hugo (1883–1974)’, pp. 200–201. Chan 
discusses the chemical warfare capabilities of some Chinese warlords during the inter-World 
War period, including the role of technical assistance provided by international partners. See 
Anthony Bernard Chan, Chinese Warlords and the Western Armaments Trade, 1920-1928, pp. 
262–265. Doctoral dissertation, York University, 1979. See also Benjamin Garrett, ‘The CW 
Almanac: August 1998, the Chinese Warlords’ Chemical Arms Race’, ASA Newsletter, no. 67 
(14 Aug. 1998), pp. 16–17. British archival documents describing Spain’s CW production and 
use against Morocco in the 1920s are provided in Sebastian Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco 
and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002). The study is 
partly based on declassified UK intelligence reports located at the UK’s Public Record Office. 
225 Timm (note 148). 
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by Amos Fries and Clarence J. West was the impetus for the Soviets to produce 
Lewisite because the CWS officers spoke so highly of it.226 
In the 1980s binary chemical weapons were often characterized as being 
more advanced—although their effectiveness was not especially notable due to 
problems of delivery and ballistics (e.g., of liquid-filled warheads). By contrast, 
incomplete mixing was in some cases sufficiently addressed, but was in any 
event, a secondary challenge.227 The US decision to resume chemical weapons 
(binary) production in the early 1980s, according to some, prompted the Soviets 
to do likewise.228 
Today, perhaps the most problematic target of analysis are non-state 
actors, including their capabilities and intentions regarding the possible use of 
toxic chemicals and their precursors to cause death or other harm. A wide range 
of non-traditional chemical and bio-chemical agents could theoretically prove 
attractive to non-state actors, partly due to the ease with which they might be 
obtained and possibly so as to maintain ambiguity as to who is responsible for an 
attack. An attack may not necessarily be recognizable against the background of 
disease burden, chronic exposure to toxic chemicals and industrial accidents. 
Forensics techniques are therefore being developed to meet this analytical 
problem.229 Such techniques include exploring the technical possibilities for 
determining the manner and route by which a chemical agent was 
manufactured.230 Evaluating the intentions of disparate, decentralized groups and 
individuals poses further analytical difficulties since this increasingly depends on 
a proper understanding of the derivation and use of relevant information. For 
example, efforts to assess CW threats posed by non-state actors is heavily 
dependent on analysis of Internet traffic, including attempts to uncover social 
networks. This can entail attempts to identify key actors who are often lower 
level people who are only prominent in social networks because of their 
‘connectiveness’. Analysts have also attempted to discover the ‘structural 
signatures’ that indicate the degree of ‘connectiveness’ of group participants.231 
                                                 
226 Fries and West (note 117); and Ipatieff (note 158), p. 387. 
227 Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
228 Whether the Soviets produced binaries (as commonly understood during the 1980s rather 
than the binary artillery designs of WW I) was one of the points of contention between the 
Soviet Union and the United States in the implementation of a 1989 Memorandum of 
Understanding on chemical weapons that included a data exchange on the countries’ respective 
CW stockpiles. The US assessed that the Soviet phase I declaration deficiencies included: (a) a 
declared CW stockpile of 39 927 tonnes (rather than the US intelligence estimate of 50–70 000 
tonnes, and (b) a failure to declare ‘many of their known CW development, production and 
storage facilities, including some of which the former Soviet Union declared under Phase I and 
the US subsequently visited’. [Accuracy of Russia’s Reporting on Chemical Weapons], 
declassified Aug. 2005, pp. 7–8, <http:www.foia.cia.gov>, (accessed 23 July 2013). 
229 Eds. Bruce Budowle, Steven E. Schutzer, Roger G. Breeze, Paul S. Keim and Stephen A. 
Morse, Microbial Forensics, second edtn. (Elsevier Academic Press: Burlington, Mass., 2011). 
230 E.g., Carlos G. Fraga, et al., ‘Impurity Profiling to Match a Nerve Agent to its Precursor 
Source for Chemical Forensics Applications’, Analytical Chemistry, vol. 83 (31 Oct. 2011), pp. 
9564–9572; and D. Noort, et al., ‘Chemical Profiling of Chemical Warfare Agents for Forensics 
Purposes’. Paper presented by TNO Prins Maurits Laboratory at 10th International Symposium 
on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents; Swedish Defence Research 
Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitutet, FOI); 8–11 June 2010; Stockholm, Sweden. 
231 Anonymous, ‘Untangling the Social Web’, Technology Quarterly, 4 Sep. 2010, p. 13 in 
The Economist, vol. 396, no. 8698 (4–10 Sep. 2010). 
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2.5. Chemical Industry 
 
The chemical industry has been both supportive and non-supportive of chemical 
weapon programmes in history. It not infrequently provided raw material to 
military chemical weapon production facilities.232 The chemicals producers were 
sometimes operated by the government (e.g., the US Army Phosphate 
Development Works located on the property of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
near Muscle Shoals, Alabama).233 The Soviet Union was perhaps unique in 
placing chemical production facilities within sometimes very large chemical 
industry facilities such as at Novocheboksarsk, the site of the largest 
concentration of post-World War II Soviet chemical weapon production 
facilities, as well as Berezniki, Derzhinsk and Volgograd.234 
Between the two World Wars, most leading military powers gave some 
consideration of their chemical industry in terms of how it could support their 
war fighting capacity (e.g., as a standby mobilization capacity).235 In addition, 
chemical industry and chemical infrastructure were adapted to support chemical 
warfare starting in World War I.236 The incorporation of chemical industry and 
civilian scientists into a chemical warfare programme is of continuing relevance 
to the assessment of possible CW activities and the verification of the CWC. 
University chemists and laboratories were employed, for example, at the United 
States at American University and the Catholic University, in order to develop or 
adapt chemicals for warfare and to develop means to protect against them.237 
Much of the original expertise in respirators originated in the mining sector.238 
Rubber product manufacturers, such as the Pirelli company, produced chemical 
protection equipment (including respirators).239 
                                                 
232 For a review of the chemical industry in support of WW I chemical warfare activity, see 
Haber (note 106), pp. 150–166. 
233 T. L. Ferguson, A. R. Hylton and C. E. Mumma, Studies on the Technical Arms Control 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 4 vols., contract no. ACDA/ST-197, unclassified 
(Midwest Research Institute: 13 Nov. 1972) vol. I, pp. 6–8; and vol. IV, pp. 4–58. Report 
prepared for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
234 Russia declared 24 CWPFs to the OPCW following the entry-into-force of the CWC. 
235 S. M. Vishnev, Kapitalisticheskaya Tekhnika i Podgotovka k Voine [Capitalist 
Technology and the Preparation for War] (State Socialist-Economic Publisher: Moscow, 1936), 
pp. 147–157. 
236 E.g., see Haber (note 106), pp. 139–175. For a Soviet survey of the chemical industry, see 
Porokhin, N., ‘Sostoyanie Mirovoi Khimicheskoi Promyshlennosti [The Status of the 
international chemical industry], Voina i Tekhika [War and Technology], no. 8 (Aug. 1927), pp. 
69–84. 
237 E.g., see Martin K. Gordon, Barry R. Sude and Ruth Ann Overbeck, ‘Chemical testing in 
the Great War: the American University Experiment Station’, Washington History, vol. 6, no. 1 
(spring/summer 1994), pp. 28–45. Magazine of the Historical Society of Washington, DC. 
238 See Van H. Manning, ‘War gas investigations’, War Work of the Bureau of Mines, 
Bulletin 178 (Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1919). In addition, the British 
phsyiologist J. B. S. Haldane advised the UK on chemical weapons development and protection. 
See John B. S. Haldane, Callinicus: A Defence of Chemical Warfare (Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co.: London, 1925). 
239 For the company’s inter-war product line, see Protezione Contro Gas, Liquidi, Polveri, 
Sostanze Tossiche [Protection against Gas, Liquids, Powders [and] Toxic Substances] (Società 
Italiana Pirelli: Milan, 1932). 
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In a 1927 article aimed at the Soviet military establishment N. Porokhin 
identified four factors necessary for the Soviet chemical industry to support 
national defence requirements: (a) the presence of raw materials in the Soviet 
Union, (b) the need to develop scientific-research work, (c) the facilitation of 
such work through the establishment of a strong economic basis and (d) the 
necessity to consider the national security relevance of various chemical industry 
sectors.240 
According to Pirokhin, the Soviet Union possessed virtually all of the raw 
materials necessary for chemical industry (especially pyrites and coal). He 
recommended that geological surveys be expanded with state support and that 
chemical industry factories working with primary raw materials be located in the 
regions where such materials were to be found in order to reduce transportation 
costs or (in the case of sulphuric acid)241 establishing the factories closer to their 
consumer. Transportation costs could thus be rationalized and, for example, 
pyrite imports minimized. 
In order to develop the Soviet scientific research work, Pirokhin 
recommended the expansion of academic programmes (through Institutions of 
Higher Learning (Vysshie Uchebnoe Zavedenie, VUZ) and Technical Colleges 
(Vysshee Tekhnicheskoe Uchebnoe Zavedenie, VTUZ)), the establishment of 
production scientific-research laboratories attached to large chemical factories 
(or, at least, attached to chemical associations or trusts that supervise the 
factories), and the raising of import duties to encourage domestic production and 
to make the factories competitive internationally. 
As to key defence-related sectors, Pirokhin stated that the Soviet Union 
must develop its synthetic nitrogen production capacity (i.e., through nitrogen 
fixation) and be capable of synthesizing various nitrate compounds 
(organophosphorus, nitrogen-based fertilizers and potash). He also emphasized 
the necessity of establishing more aniline dye factories. The Soviet Union could 
thus free itself of the need to import intermediate chemicals and aniline dyes in 
future.242 
Chemical industry has often been reluctant to become involved with 
chemical weapon programmes. The profits were generally lower than those 
derived from civilian commercial purposes and involvement with the military on 
chemical weapon-related programmes could, it was not infrequently feared, 
adversely affect commercial operations. For example, the companies involved in 
providing the US Government chemicals to produce riot control agents (RCAs) 
during the Vietnam War often received negative publicity and various forms of 
public scrutiny (e.g., Congressional hearings). Producers of chemicals suitable 
for use as defoliants (perhaps most notably Agent Orange of which 
approximately 75 million liters were used) became the target of a number of class 
                                                 
240 Porokhin (note 236), p. 83. 
241 Sulphuric acid and nitric acid are perhaps the most important chemicals for basic 
chemical industry. 
242 Porokhin (note 236), pp. 83–84. 
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action lawsuits.243 In the 1980s US Congress drafted legislation to compel 
companies to provide starter materials to the US Army for binary production.244 
Chemical industry facilities and specialists have nevertheless periodically 
contributed to the chemical weapon expertise and capacities of, for example, 
France, Germany and the UK since World War I. 
                                                 
243 See William A. Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: the Air Force and Herbicides 
in Southeast Asia, 1961–1971 (Office of Air Force History: Washington, DC, 1982), 
unclassified. 
244 Julian P. Perry Robinson, ‘Disarmament and Other Options for Western Policy-Making 
on Chemical Warfare’, International Affairs, vol. 63, no. 1 (Winter 1986–1987), pp. 65–80. 
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3 
 
 
 
ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-
PROLIFERATION: CONTEMPORARY VERIFICATION 
CONTEXT 
 
 
lements of arms control and disarmament activity and principles can be 
found in various post-conflict settlements imposed by the victors. 
Verification elements of greater contemporary relevance to arms control 
were incorporated into the 1919 Treaty of Versailles which required Germany to 
demilitarize the Rhineland and were to be verified by the Inter-War Allied 
Commission.245 States also negotiated limitations on chemical and biological 
warfare in the inter-war period, including within the framework of the League of 
Nations.246 States negotiated the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare (Geneva Protocol of 1925) and discussed its implementation with 
League of Nations Secretariat support.247 
E 
In addition, consideration of whether and how to use RCAs in the arms 
control context dates at least to the implementation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. 
For example, in 1932 the General Disarmament Conference of the League of 
Nations attempted to divide known CW agents into two categories in order to 
agree the conditions under which lachrimatory (referred to as ‘tear gases’ in the 
1930s) and sternutators (referred to as ‘sneezing gases’ in the 1930s) could be 
permitted (as opposed to CW agents meant to cause death or serious, longer 
lasting harm).248 
The League of Nations discussed a range of proposals to limit or prohibit 
weapons. With respect to disarmament they fell under three main categories: (a) 
disarmament of Germany, (b) international force reductions and budget cuts, and 
(c) international naval arms limitations. League of Nations disarmament activity 
may also be classified according to three phases: (a) League disarmament I: the 
limited approach, (b) League disarmament II: disarmament for security and (c) 
League disarmament III: general disarmament.249 
Under the limited disarmament approach (activity I), states concluded 
several agreements, including a Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms 
                                                 
245 Richard J. Shuster, German Disarmament after World War I: the Diplomacy of 
International Arms Inspection 1920-1931 (Routledge: New York City, 2006), p. 66. See also 
‘Special Issue, Enforcing Arms Limits: Germany Post 1919; Iraq Post 1991’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, vol. 29, no. 2 (Apr. 2006). 
246 On League of Nations efforts to constrain chemical warfare, see De Madariaga (note 120), 
pp. 158–164. 
247 De Madariaga (note 120), pp. 158–164. 
248 Thuillier (note 118), pp. 144–145. 
249 Andrew Webster, ‘From Versailles to Germany: the Many Forms of Interwar 
Disarmament’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, no. 2 (Apr. 2006), pp. 225–246. 
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and Ammunition (1919) which called for the adoption of a system of published 
licenses for arms transfers. However, this Convention never entered-into-
force.250 In the early 1920s the League of Nations also passed several resolutions 
on the desirability of restricting the activity of private arms manufacturers and 
suppliers. Approaches to limit state military expenditure were also considered. 
The 1925 Geneva Protocol was notable. Japan and the United States, however, 
did not join the Protocol until 1970 and 1975, respectively.251 Andrew Webster 
observes that this phase of League of Nations activity set the important precedent 
in arms control agreements that such agreements should be open to universal 
participation and enjoy universal adherence.252 
Under disarmament for security (activity II), the League of Nations 
undertook activities to achieve ‘extensive reductions’ in military forces to help 
establish a new framework of international security.253 These negotiations 
proceeded along two tracks: one for disarmament and one for mutual security 
guarantees. Proposals on security guarantees were reflected in draft versions of 
the Treaty of Mutual Assistance which were considered by the League of Nations 
Assembly in September 1923.254 Because Germany, the Soviet Union and the 
United States were not League of Nations members, the Coordination 
Commission was renamed in December 1925 the Preparatory Commission for 
the Disarmament Conference in order to permit their participation in these 
negotiations.255 
Under general disarmament (activity III), the Preparatory Commission 
engaged in wide ranging technical and philosophical debates on the nature of 
general disarmament.256 Starting in 1927 the Soviet delegation (cynically or 
idealistically) proposed the abolition of air, ground and naval forces.257 This 
phase of negotiations ground to a halt when the World Disarmament Conference 
of 1932-1934 failed to agree anything. Further proposals through 1938 similarly 
failed.258 
During the Washington Naval Conference (held from 12 November 1921-
6 February 1922), a technical sub-committee considered the matter of ‘poison 
gas’. The sub-committee could not agree any method by which states could 
verify that toxic substances were not being developed or stockpiled for chemical 
warfare purposes. This sub-committee was generally of the view that any 
verification of specific CW agents would necessitate a politically unacceptable 
                                                 
250 The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was opened for signature in 2013. 
251 The Soviet Union acceded to the Protocol on 15 April 1928 with the reservations that it 
would not consider itself bound by the protocol with respect to states that had not acceded to the 
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degree of intrusiveness and restriction over civilian chemical industries.259 The 
UK was concerned that it was too simple to violate a ban against chemical 
warfare and that verification measures could expose state vulnerability to such 
weapons.260 By contrast, US General John J. Pershing, who led a 1913 incursion 
against Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa in Mexico and commanded the US 
expeditionary force in Europe during World War I, supported the complete and 
unequivocal renouncement of chemical warfare.261 Following the Washington 
Conference, an eight member technical sub-committee under the League of 
Nations auspices (perhaps the same one) further evaluated the manufacture and 
use of CBW agents and, in 1924, expressed skepticism over the ability of states 
to verify non-production and warned against the dangers of such agents to 
civilians as well as to military personnel.262 
Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger observe that ‘…long-term 
enforcement of disarmament requires either a permanent change in mindset, 
moral disarmament (which is rare), or complete defeat and overthrow of the 
enemy regime followed by long-term and nationwide occupation with a large 
military force—the “models” imposed on Germany and Japan in 1945’.263 
Nevertheless the Washington Conference approved a resolution that was 
incorporated into Article V of the Washington Treaty that condemned ‘the use in 
war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices’.264 The parties to the Treaty, which formed a partial basis 
for the later 1925 Geneva Protocol, undertook to uphold the international ban on 
chemical warfare. However, verification of non-production of CW agents was 
left unresolved. 
 
3.1. Arms Control During the Cold War 
 
Former CIA Director Allen Dulles observed in the early 1960s that the United 
States considered onsite inspection ‘essential to a controlled [nuclear] 
disarmament’265 and that in the absence of international acceptance of this 
principle, it was the responsibility of state intelligence services to fulfil the task 
                                                 
259 Edward M. Spiers, ‘Gas Disarmament in the 1920s: Hopes Confounded’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, vol.29, no. 2 (Apr. 2006), pp. 287–288. 
260 Key, The National Archives, Foreign Office records 371/7245, A. J. Balfour to D. Lloyd 
George, 22 Dec. 1921; and War Office records 188/144, British Empire Delegation, ‘Report of 
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263 Martin S. Alexander and John F. V. Keiger, ‘Limiting Arms, Enforcing Limits: 
International Inspections and the Challenges of Compellence in Germany post-1919, Iraq post-
1991’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 29, no. 2 (Apr. 2006), p. 387. 
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251), ‘Chapter 1. General survey of the CBW prohibitions and of pertinent evidence’, pp. 21–
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of ‘Trust, but verify’ principle. 
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of ‘evening the balance of knowledge and hence of preparation [for conflict] by 
breaking through this [Soviet] shield of secrecy’.266 
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin have observed that any 
given arms control purpose is also generally a ‘continuing urgent objective of 
national military strategy’.267 In 1961 they postulated that arms control could 
eventually be seen as ‘a step in the assimilation of military policy in over-all 
national strategy’.268 This reflects the fact that military strategy must concern 
itself with both winning (or at least not losing) armed conflicts and exercising 
influence over potential opponents.269 Attempting to influence potential enemies 
through engagement (e.g., through arms control processes and—more recently—
cooperative threat reduction activities) grew out of a partial recognition by some 
analysts that the post-World War II nuclear armed Cold War blocks were headed 
for long-term strategic confrontation interspersed with limited regional wars. The 
alternative, all-out conflict, implied mutual annihilation—for combatants and 
non-combatants alike.270 
Schelling and Halperin characterized arms control to include ‘all the 
forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of 
reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the 
political and economic costs of being prepared for it’.271 They also state that 
arms control can be viewed ‘as an effort, by some kind of reciprocity or 
cooperation with potential enemies, to minimize, to offset, to compensate or to 
deflate’ certain characteristics of modern weaponry and military expectations, 
including an apparent perceived advantage accruing to the side that initiates a 
nuclear weapon strike.272 Thus a ‘hair trigger’ nuclear first strike posture could 
be switched to a more defensive or retaliatory only strike posture. Arms control 
and disarmament advocates maintained that such a change would reduce the 
likelihood for misunderstanding and inadvertent escalation to fullscale nuclear 
war. 
Schelling and Halperin also argue that the essential feature of arms control 
is ‘the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and 
cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military 
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establishments’.273 Activities associated with arms control can include: (a) 
‘reductions in certain kinds of military force’, (b) ‘increases in certain kinds of 
military force’, (c) ‘qualitative changes in weaponry’, and (d) ‘different modes of 
deployment, or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems’.274 
In addition, beginning in the 1960s the Cold War superpowers tended to 
focus on arms control, rather than disarmament. Disarmament was usually 
associated with the anti-nuclear movement and was not embraced by negotiators 
or state weapon experts.275 By contrast, the term ‘arms control’ reflected the 
‘technocratic’ or ‘problem-solving’ aspect of arms control practice which 
therefore represented a ‘techno-managerial’ project.276 It should be noted that the 
argument that arms control and disarmament differ by virture of the former being 
‘techno-managerial’ in nature is disputed by some academics and analysts.277 
Implicit to arms control and disarmament is the view that the state enjoys a 
monopoly on the exercise of force and violence.278 The fact that the superpowers 
acknowledged the vulnerability of civilian populations and infrastructure as 
reflected by theories of nuclear deterrence, such as the doctrine of Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD), was also implicit to Cold War arms control.279 
However, the ethics (or morality) of largescale deaths were not generally explicit 
in policy and the periodic modification by possessor states of their nuclear force 
postures. 
Intelligence capabilities during the Cold War provided the Soviet Union 
and the United States a baseline of data from which to negotiate strategic nuclear 
arms limitation agreements starting in the 1960s.280 Some argue that without this 
baseline, negotiations between these states could not have been started.281 The 
two sides’ NTM consisted mainly of overhead imagery and telemetry 
interception and their respective intelligence capabilities shaped the arms control 
negotiations.282 This meant, for example, that the verification provisions of the 
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SALT) I focused on counting launchers, 
rather than on non-strategic nuclear weapons or missile production. Article XII 
contains measures to enhance the effectiveness of NTM measures (i.e., overhead 
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imagery) upon request of one of the parties, such as displaying in the open road-
mobile ICBM launchers.283 In the late 1970s when US Senator John Glenn 
suggested that NTM be defined in the draft SALT II text, both the Soviet and US 
delegations reacted negatively. Thomas Graham Jr., the former General Counsel 
of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), said that no one 
wished to declare the NTM or associated technology ‘least of all the United 
States’.284 According to Graham, the Soviet Ambassador leading SALT 
negotiations, reacted somewhat cryptically by saying: ‘Minerva’s owl flies only 
at night’.285 In the late 1970s the Soviet Union and the United States agreed a 
ban on telemetry encryption as part of SALT II negotiations.286 Russia and the 
United States have reduced their nuclear weapon stockpiles further since they 
signed the 2010 Russian-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty).287 Today the 
CWC verification regime would be fundamentally undermined without the 
incorporation of NTM through inter alia the convention’s challenge inspection 
mechanism.288 
 
3.2. Post-Cold War Arms Control 
 
Contemporary arms control and disarmament practice is also increasingly 
concerned with coping with varied and diffuse groups of non-state actors (such 
as through oversight of the financial sector to prevent criminal acts or the tracing 
of support for illicit activity), organized criminals and violent non-conformists 
and violent separatists.289 International relations deterrence theory has yet to 
adequately explain (much less predict) the behaviour and motivations of non-
state actors in this context.290 
Current nonproliferation measures include activity underaken within the 
frameworks of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the G-8 Global 
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and UN Security Council Resolution 
1540 (2004).291 The Security Council resolution requires states to adopt and 
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enforce laws criminalizing acts by citizens or legal persons related to developing, 
acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.292 
Another arms control characteristic of the post-Cold War period is that 
stronger powers must show greater flexibility in their interaction with other states 
in order to agree common understandings and to mitigate shared security 
concerns. This dynamic is evident within multilateral arms control and 
disarmament regimes such as at the 2012-2015 annual Meetings of Experts and 
Meetings of Parties to the BTWC in Geneva, the OPCW and at the UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). 
Areas of disagreement, such as the cross linkage of issues within and from 
outside the arms control context in order to block consensus, must be managed in 
a constructive and sensible manner. As such, states may agree general principles, 
while avoiding explicit or detailed discussion on sensitive points, including those 
having operational relevance, in the near term. Alternatively, states can consult 
informally at the margins of meetings until the broader political situation 
develops in a manner that allows for a more formal understanding and agreement 
on specific detail. For example, during the 1993-1997 OPCW Preparatory 
Commission (PrepCom), China and Japan were the two ‘most interested parties’ 
on abandoned chemical weapons (ACW). However, they could not agree ACW 
phrasing in the draft OPCW Handbook during the PrepCom because a higher-
level political understanding between the two governments had not yet been 
achieved.293 Thus, the more the ACW topics were discussed, the more 
complicated the language became partly thanks to a cross-linkage of political and 
technical issues by other delegations.294 
Keith Krause argues that contemporary arms control practice can also be 
understood ‘through the lense of governmentality’.295 Arms control can therefore 
be redefined as being concerned with ‘who can possess, use, develop and transfer 
the technologies of violence, under what circumstances, against whom, and for 
what ends?’296 Members of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) generally oppose 
such characterizations within multilateral arms control and disarmament fora. 
This is partly reflected by literature on the ‘post-proliferation world’ in which 
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S&T and development gaps between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ have effectively 
disappeared.297 
Political and more philosophical differences exist among states in the 
multilateral arms control and disarmament context that have implications for how 
verification and compliance issues are handled both in theory and practice. The 
NAM state delegations at arms control and disarmament forums generally (in the 
absence of specific, convincing actual cases, such as that of the A. Q. Khan 
nuclear smuggling network) tend towards greater skepticism of the possible 
threats posed by the spread of dual-purpose material, technology and know-
how.298 They also tend to focus more on the full and effective implementation of 
technological cooperation and assistance provisions (Article XI, CWC).299 
Similar tensions are evident in the nuclear arms control context. The 
former Director General of the IAEA Mohamed Elbaradei, for example, 
characterized the behaviour of Western involved in the nuclear arms control 
discussions and involvement in clarifying Iran’s status of adherence with the 
1968 Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as: 
‘typical’ in that these states ‘always wanted to be perceived as being in 
charge—to push, to prod, to put pressure [on], to set deadlines, to 
dominate the debate, to inflict punishments—which inevitably gave them 
the appearance of the schoolyard bully and undermined precisely the 
objectives they hoped to achieve’.300 
Dichotomies are also evident in discussions regarding strategic trade 
controls of dual purpose material, technology and know-how which may be 
misused for NBC weapon purposes. For example, a perception exists among 
many, mainly NAM, states that the UN Security Council (in particular at least 
three of the P-5 permanent members) is unduly responsive to the wishes of 
Western states.301 This is reflected in discussions at the UN of the respective 
roles of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly in which the 
NAM and other states generally maintain that the latter is the body with greater 
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(or only true) legitimacy. This disaffection (or at least perceived lack of 
legitimacy) with the Security Council was an underlying cause in the delay in 
finalizing the UN-OPCW agreement regulating the rights and obligations of the 
two bodies and, in particular, the circumstances under which cases of CWC 
violations and associated data can be referred to the UN without violating the 
OPCW’s Confidentiality Policy.302 More generally, the composition and powers 
of the UN Security Council reflect the international security environment as it 
existed at the end of World War II. All proposals for restructuring it (e.g., by 
adding more non-Western states or changing the permanent member status of the 
P-5 or modifying the P-5 veto power) have been unsuccessful. 
Regarding the future of arms control, Krause has expanded on the 
changed context (using Halperin’s definition as a basis) of the purpose of arms 
control to: 
‘1. Reducing the risk of war: today involves extensive post-conflict 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes designed to 
eliminate the potential for a resurgence of violent conflict; 
2. Reducing the destructiveness of war should it break out: today involves 
campaigns to promote and extend international humanitarian norms 
concerning what weapons are used and how they are used by both state 
and non-state armed actors; as well as the collection and destruction of 
surplus weapons and restrictions on the international transfer of arms; 
3. Reducing the costs of preparing for war: today involves the exercise by 
international and bilateral donors of intrusive oversight and pressure on 
client states—as a form of liberal governmentability—over the size, 
structure, training and armaments of their armed forces, as well as over 
military spending and the security sector as a whole.’303 
 
Neil Cooper and David Mutimer argue that the overall Cold War arms 
control paradigm should today be thought of as controlling the means of violence 
(CMV).304 They propose that Schelling and Halperin’s early 1960s arms control 
aims be restated as: 
‘1. To reduce the likelihood that the instruments of armed violence are 
used against individuals, communities, or states; 
2. To reduce the effects of armed violence should it be employed; and 
3. To reduce the resources employed in the development, acquisition and 
deployment of the instruments of armed violence (a deliberately more 
ambitious formula than that of classical arms control)’.305 
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This broader conceptualization of arms control and disarmament includes 
conventional weapon systems and touches on aspects of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in post-conflict areas and security sector 
reform (SSR) programmes which, in turn, partly seek to transform the 
sensibilities of participants away from belligerence as part of the CMV 
concepts.306 According to CMV proponents, its indirect effect should reduce 
militarism and promote cultures of peace.307 The 2 April 2013 adoption of the 
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and its future implementation will perhaps offer 
further support for this conceptualization. 
The future relevance of arms control and disarmament field should also 
take into account several more trenchant criticisms. Colin S. Gray, a prominent 
critic, essentially argues that such regimes do not address underlying political 
conflict and that the absence of weapons does not remove the conflict.308 Hans J. 
Morgenthau, a founding father of the Realist School of international reations (IR) 
theory, reverses the argument by stating ‘Men do not fight because they have 
arms. They have arms because they deem it necessary to fight’.309 Morgenthau 
further observes: ‘The modern philosophy of disarmament proceeds from the 
assumption that men fight because they have arms. From this assumption the 
conclusion follows logically that if men would give up arms, all fighting would 
become impossible’ and that even the arguments of arms control skeptics does 
not invalidate the existence of ‘a direct relation between the possession of arms, 
or at least of certain kinds and quantities of arms, and the issue of war and 
peace’.310 Such efforts should also be considered in terms of efforts to constrain 
or prohibit inhumane weapons, much of which is institutionally focused on the 
ICRC. 
It should also be noted that immediately after World War I, the Irish 
author and social commentator Bernard Shaw asserted that disarmament per se 
cannot prevent war and, even if it could, such a restraint would be a ‘sort of 
preventive’ having little moral value. He further argued that any peace that is 
‘produced by disablement is worth no more than that which is produced by 
manacles and fetters’.311 Shaw instead argued that true disarmament at the state 
level could only be achieved once individuals in society no longer felt compelled 
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to carry weapons in their daily lives and that this state of affairs could only be 
achieved once the ‘wild edges of civilization’ were brought under control.312 In 
other words, the various societies should share a certain basic level and standard 
of behavioural and civilizational norms. 
The arguments over causes and effects of arms control and the 
determination of possible precondiations for successful arms control essentially 
constitute a variation of the ‘chicken and egg’ argument (in addition to the 
question of whether arms control either influences or promotes conflict or peace). 
More precisely, can one attribute the existence or non-existence of conflict to the 
existence or non-existence of arms control agreements or arrangements? Arms 
control, to an extent, limits the ability of a state to engage in aggressive or 
preemptive war. 
It should nevertheless be noted that Schelling and Halperin maintained 
that they do not agree with the ‘notion, implicit in many pleas for disarmament, 
that a reduction in the level of military forces is necessarily desirable if only it is 
“inspectable” and that it necessarily makes war less likely’.313 Thus, the 
argument that the presence of weapons increases the likelihood of war versus the 
existence of arms control arrangements decreasing the likelihood of war (over 
either the shorter or longer-term) remains contentious (i.e., unproven). 
Furthermore, the extent to which the behaviour of individuals and states 
can be shaped or influenced towards non-violence is limited.314 The ability of 
states to evaluate their security needs also requires a degree of military and 
security capacity or capability. Without this, such evaluations risk devolving into 
paper writing exercises that are divorced from operational understanding or 
relevance.315 Such evaluation capacity can be subsumed somewhat into defence 
and security institutional frameworks such as the EU and NATO. If so, some 
national capacities of participating states can (and have) been allowed to become 
degraded.316 
 
3.3. Verification Aspects of Arms Control, Disarmament and 
Nonproliferation Regimes 
 
Contemporary arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes 
nevertheless assist to clarify the legal and technical basis of allegations of the 
development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. 
They also provide a framework for how allegations of violations are handled. 
The CWC contains measures for consultation, clarification and fact-finding. The 
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BTWC has similar, but distinct and weaker, provisions. The UN Secretary-
General has sent teams to investigate allegations of use of chemical or biological 
weapons without the authority of the General Assembly or the Security 
Council.317 The UNODA has continued to develop its relationship with the 
OPCW and coordinate and support efforts to update the technical guidelines and 
procedures, as well as the roster of experts and laboratories that the UN 
Secretary-General may draw on when initiating such investigations (as was done 
during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War).318 
The requirements for verifying treaty compliance with an arms control 
and disarmament agreement (including through the carrying out of onsite 
inspections) are distinct from the strategic and national security requirements of a 
state.319 In particular, data derived from arms control and disarmament are a 
component of the domestic taskings by states for the collection and analysis of 
NTM. 
Freeman Dyson, a British-born mathematician who later moved to the 
United States where he became a member of the JASON advisory group, argues: 
‘Verification of treaties is important, just as military strength is important. 
But verification, like military strength, must be pursued as a means to an 
end and not as an end in itself. The end which verification is supposed to 
serve is to discourage the parties to a treaty from serious and deliberate 
violations. A limited and unobtrusive verification system is usually 
adequate for the purpose. When verification becomes an an end in itself, it 
stands in the way of arms control, just as it stood in the way of the 
comprehensive [nuclear] test ban in 1963’.320 
Dyson thus argues that the purpose of verification is to permit action. In 
practice, however, this is not necessarily possible.321 
The refusal by the United States to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was also largely due to the fact that domestic 
critics of the treaty argued that the agreement was not sufficiently verifiable. The 
verifiability criticism arose from a more fundamental philosophical objection to 
the treaty itself (e.g., the creation of another UN-type organization that would 
constrain US defence and security capacity and options). 
Dyson also cautions ‘the details of the verification systems’ should not 
outweigh ‘the substance of the agreements which are to be verified’ by, for 
example, risking charges of intelligence collection.322 
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Schelling and Halperin identify two criteria for judging the utility of 
onsite inspection systems. The first is how well the verification system can be 
employed to uncover the truth in cases where the inspected party wishes to 
conceal a violation. The second criterion (‘the positive-evidence principle’) is 
how well the verification system allows the inspected party to display or 
demonstrate its compliance with the agreement.323 The international inspection 
regime put in place by UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) is an example 
of the former type. Multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes such as 
the BTWC, CWC and NPT are of the latter type. Some analysts seeking lessons 
from the Iraq experience of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC fail to take this 
distinction into account.324 Those states wishing to abide by a treaty’s provisions 
are motivated to be forthcoming in their efforts to demonstrate their intentions. 
The degree to which a state is willing to actively ‘demonstrate’ its compliance 
with arms control agreements or commitments may be influenced by cultural, 
social and political factors. Suspected non-compliance becomes increasingly 
apparent as a consequence of active obstructionism or the cumulative effect of 
persistent ambiguities and unresolved questions. 
A key arms control verification objective is to distinguish the political and 
technical aspects of inspection results and other related activity. Elbaradei 
cautions that verification (or compliance) assessments should not consist of ‘an 
alignment of unverified data interpreted according to a worst-case scenario’ as 
occurred when US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell presented to the UN his 
country’s assessment of the status of Iraq’s NBC weapon and longer-range 
missile programmes in 2003.325 A lawyer by training, Elbaradei also cautions 
against a common misperception concerning the behaviour and purpose of 
inspections carried out under multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes, 
namely: ‘IAEA inspectors are not detectives, nor are they security officers or 
police. They are accustomed to looking for and pointing out quantitative and 
qualitative discrepencies—including deliberate coverups—and they do not shrink 
from confronting the party under inspection with the evidence’.326 International 
inspectors within such regimes should ideally be respectful, situationally aware 
and consistent irrespective of which state is inspected. 
With respect to international inspection and verification activity in Iraq, 
the IAEA ‘action team’—established to implement the nuclear inspection and 
verification component of the implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 (1991)—arguably more represented established multilateral arms 
control and disarmament practice as compared to UNSCOM.327 The latter 
                                                                                                                                               
 
322 Dyson (note 320), p. 176. 
323 Schelling and Halperin (note 267), p. 97. 
324 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 17. 
325 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 3. The UN prohibited Iraq from possessing ballistic missiles with 
a range greater than 150 km. For a transcript of Powell’s speech, see ‘A Policy of Evasion and 
Deception’, Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/ 
powelltext_020503.html>, (accessed 20 May 2013). 
326 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 17. 
327 In a general sense, the IAEA Action Team and UNSCOM were both adversarial and ad 
hoc in their inspection and verification approaches. The extent to which the former was more 
consensual and more in accord with standard UN-type organization procedures and 
philosophical approach is perhaps a question of degree. This consideration is also influenced by 
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represented an ad hoc, adversarial model established as part of the terms for the 
cessation of hostilities imposed on Iraq for the cessation of hostilities to the First 
Gulf War in February 1991.328 Elbaradei described his impression of US 
nationals—predominantly from national nuclear weapons laboratories—while he 
was in Iraq as being ‘highly qualified technically’ but having ‘no clue about how 
to conduct international inspections or, for that matter, about the nuances of how 
to behave in different cultures’.329 He further lamented: ‘From their brash 
conversation, it was clear they believed that, having come to a defeated country, 
they had free rein to behave as they pleased’.330 
The more adversarial approach taken by UNSCOM and its successor 
organization, UNMOVIC, (especially during the period immediately following 
the end of the First Gulf War) was only possible in the context of terms imposed 
by victorious military powers onto a defeated opponent. This had certain 
advantages. Arrangements were made for UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to receive 
information derived by UN member states’ NTM. Most of the CBW and ballistic 
missile experts were seconded from the national defence establishments of 
primarily Western and Eastern bloc UN member states. In fact, the work of 
UNSCOM represents one of the first truly cooperative activities between the 
former Cold War blocs.331 Some national intelligence services did carry out 
parallel information collection activity during UNSCOM inspection and 
verification activity.332 The UK and the United States were among the first states 
to provide UNSCOM with intelligence and providers generally assumed that any 
information provided would eventually spread to other governments and be 
publicized in some form.333 
The UN culture is ill-suited to the receipt of intelligence partly because 
this implies that some staff and states are excluded from having access to such 
information. Such activity also tends to conflict with the standard UN-type 
                                                                                                                                               
the specific actions one looks at when comparing the IAEA Action Team and UNSCOM 
respectively. 
328 The institutional character of UNMOVIC represented a small, yet significant, shift back 
towards a more standard UN multilateral character closer to that of the IAEA itself, particularly 
with respect to personnel policy (including hiring). UNSCOM hiring practice was based on 
secondments of national experts and the hiring of personnel through informal consultations 
involving the Executive Chairman. 
329 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 23. 
330 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 23. 
331 I am grateful to one of the reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. 
332 E.g., former US marine Scott Ritter who worked as an UNSCOM inspector has published 
on aspects of this which have been partially confirmed. His statements should be assessed 
carefully partly in light of a number of wider strong personality and political differences of 
opinion and understanding (among states and individuals). Ritter subsequently became 
estranged with former UNSCOM and US Government colleagues over the question of whether 
Iraq had terminated its NBC and longer-range ballistic missile programmes (he maintained that 
Iraq had essentially ceased these programmes). See, for e.g., Scott Ritter, Iraq Confidential: the 
Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam 
Hussein (I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.: London, 2006). 
333 Tim Trevan, ‘Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations’, p. 214 in Ed. 
Raymond A. Zilinskas, Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: Boulder, Colorado, 2000). Tim Trevan formerly worked in the UK FCO’s Arms 
Control and Disarmament Department. He headed the chemical warfare section of the UK 
delegation to the CD and was a special advisor to UNSCOM Executive Chairmen between 
1992–1995. 
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organization principle of ‘equitable geographic distribution’ (i.e., sharing should 
be done with ‘due regard’ to this principle). Such activity also tends to 
undermine the principle (i.e., view) that all states have equal rights and 
obligations, regardless of other factors such as differences in economic, military 
and political power and variations between states (and groupings) in terms of 
their political engagement and interest. UNSCOM took the view that it would, in 
principle, receive information from states that allowed it to fulfill its mandate and 
only inform other states if such information helped it to fulfill its mandate (e.g., 
with regard to questionable shipments of goods and materials from a given 
country).334 In practice, particularly in the earliest phases of operation, many of 
the UNSCOM personnel were technical experts from NATO member states on 
loan from their governments and who had experience working with secure 
operational procedures.335 UNSCOM personnel also had to maintain operational 
security in order to prevent or minimize the ability of Iraq to anticipate inspection 
targets and thus remove incriminating evidence. 
The former UN inspector Tim Trevan notes that UNSCOM’s Information 
Assessment Unit eventually developed ‘a more profound knowledge of Iraq’s 
weapons programs than that available to any one intelligence agency’.336 
However, discussing the relationship between national intelligence services and 
UNSCOM, former UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Hans Blix states 
‘Considering how misleading much of the intelligence given us eventually 
proved to be, perhaps it was a blessing that we did not get more. What we came 
to discover was that no sites given to us by intelligence were ever found to 
harbor weapons of mass destruction’.337 It should also be noted that UNMOVIC 
established a special office to receive ‘outside information sources’ which, 
except for the Executive Chairman, was designated ‘the sole entrance point for 
intelligence provided by governments’.338 The policy was that intelligence flow 
into UNMOVIC ‘must be one-way only’ and ‘have regard to matters relevant to 
the mandate of UNMOVIC’.339 
It should also be noted that when Richard Butler was asked in an 
interview to specify malfeascance that occurred under his tenure as UNSCOM 
Executive Chairman, he replied ‘I was perfectly aware that people on my staff 
were reporting to their home governments, separate and apart from their 
responsibility to me. Now that’s a low level of malfeasance’.340 
                                                 
334 Tim Trevan, ‘Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations’, p. 216 in Zilinskas 
(note 333). 
335 Tim Trevan, ‘Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations’, p. 217 in Zilinskas 
(note 333). 
336 Tim Trevan, ‘Exploiting Intelligence in International Organizations’, p. 218 in Zilinskas 
(note 333). 
337 Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: the Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (Bloomsbury: 
London, 2004), p. 93. 
338 UNMOVIC, Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in the Chemical, 
Biological and Missile Areas (UN: New York, June 2007), p. 26. 
339 UNMOVIC (note 338), p. 26. 
340 ‘The Lessons and Legacy of UNSCOM: an Interview with Ambassador Richard Butler’, 
Arms Control Today, (June 1999), p. 8. Butler went on to cite Scott Ritter’s outspokenness on 
Iraqi compliance with UN Security Resolution 687 (1991) as an example of more serious 
malfeascance. The interview was published the same month Butler resigned as UNSCOM’s 
Executive Chairman. 
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With respect to nuclear inspections in Iraq, Elbaradei suggests that a sign 
of the tension between the requirements of national intelligence acquisition and 
the procedures normally associated with the handling of information obtained 
under multilateral arms control and disarmament arrangements is the fact that 
during an early phase of post-conflict inspections David A. Kay (the head of the 
IAEA Action Team) and Robert L. Gallucci (of UNSCOM) reportedly 
transferred ‘critical papers’ to the US Department of State before the IAEA or 
UNSCOM had received them.341 
It will also be important to consider the theory and practice of information 
sharing in the case of the 2013 international verification and inspection activities 
concerning chemical weapons in Syria. 
 
3.4. Current and Future Verification Activities 
 
With respect to current and future verification preparations in the CW context, 
the OPCW is continuing to develop its sampling and analysis guidelines to better 
ensure it is able to identify and characterize the nature of a CW attack. For 
example, on 8-9 December 2011 the Finnish Institute for Verification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN) and the OPCW convened the Third 
International Workshop on Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents to Mark the 
International Year of Chemistry 2011.342 NATO was, in principle, scheduled to 
publish a handbook for the sampling and identification of biological, chemical, 
and radiological agents (SIBCRA) in 2013. As noted in the Executive Summary, 
since Nov. 2009 the OPCW has been carrying out confidence-building exercises 
for the laboratory testing of biomedical samples for biomarkers of CW agents.343 
Other frameworks for dealing with CW violations include the OPCW 
Working Group on Terrorism, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) (via 
the 1540 Committee) and the 2006 UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. The 
Australia Group (AG), an informal arrangement of states and the European 
Union, seek to ensure that appropriate and effective strategic trade controls are 
put in place and harmonized in order to prevent the development or acquisition of 
chemical and biological weapons.344 
Verification aspects are considered in further detail in the chapter on 
sampling and analysis and the case studies (see Chapter 11). 
                                                 
341 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 26. 
342 VERIFIN, ‘Third International Workshop on Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents to 
Mark the International Year of Chemistry 2011’, <http://www.helsinki.fi/verifin/VERIFIN/ 
english/cwa3-info.htm>, (accessed 2 Aug. 2013). 
343 Koller (note 22), p. L-25. 
344 As of Jan. 2014, the AG had 42 participants including the European Union. See 
<http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html> (accessed 21 Jan. 2014). 
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4 
 
 
 
INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND MANAGEMENT: 
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 
he information management and analysis literature appears to focus on 
data management studies (e.g., on the challenges of the processing of 
large amounts of data for scientific research or business management 
purposes), rather than for intelligence or CW verification purposes.345 
‘Intelligence’ and ‘information’ have been used interchangeably, partly 
because of efforts by states to promote information sharing between intelligence 
and law enforcement.346 In particular, the intelligence field’s traditional ‘need to 
know’ principle has been modified (to varying and controversial degrees) in the 
post-11 September 2001 counterterrorism context towards a ‘need to share’ 
information and intelligence.347 Information may nevertheless be understood to 
mean raw data, while intelligence is data that have been collected and/or 
transformed for a preconceived purpose.348 Data-driven analysis tends to be 
inductive, while conceptual driven analysis tends to be deductive.349 
T 
The United States (and to an extent some other states) decided to attempt 
the shift towards ‘the need to share’ largely because of US investigations into its 
failure to prevent the airplane attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent 
mailing of letters filled with dried B. anthracis spores to politicians and members 
of the media.350 Consequently, all 16 of the US intelligence agencies were 
                                                 
 
345 E.g., Boris Kovalerchuk and Evgenii Vityaev, ‘Symbolic Methodology for Numeric Data 
Mining’, Intelligent Data Analysis, vol. 12, no. 2 (Apr. 2008), pp. 165–188. This assessment is 
based on the results of keyword searches in various US academic databases over a period of 
several months during the preparation of this study. 
346 It should perhaps be noted that the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was 
succeeded by the CIA, was originally called the Coordinator of Information (COI). Dulles (note 
90), p. 42. 
347 Robert B. Murphy, ‘Problems and Progress in Information Sharing’, pp. 163–179, in 
Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship: Can’t We All Just Get 
Along? (US National Defense Intelligence College: Washington, DC, June 2007). 
348 In a 1965 documentary film on Cold War espionage, former CIA head (and lawyer) Allen 
W. Dulles stated that ‘intelligence is nothing really, other than information and knowledge’. The 
Science of Spying (1965), minute 3:26, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fi710fkvLwQ>, 
(accessed 20 May 2013). This interpretation is not universally accepted, including by academia. 
See also Dulles (note 90). 
349 Marrin (note 19), p. 24. Marrin cautions that the intelligence literature use of the terms 
inductive and deductive does not necessarily correspond to the philosophical or epistemological 
understanding of these terms. See Marrin (note 19), p. 24, ref. 21. 
350 E.g., Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001—By the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Senate report no. 107-351, declassified (US Congress: Washington, DC: Dec. 
2002), pp. 33, 53. FBI analyst and interpreter Ali H. Soufan describes his frustration about 
information sharing on al-Qaeda activity between his agency and the CIA prior to the attacks on 
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nominally consolidated under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI).351 The United States also took steps to ensure better information sharing 
between the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The CIA was 
granted some formal authority to operate domestically by, for example, 
participating in regional ‘fusion centers’ which have been established since 2001. 
Former CIA and US National Intelligence Council (NIC) official Paul R. 
Pillar warns against Washington’s ‘rhetorical pendulum’ between sharing 
information and ensuring its secrecy saying ‘The next espionage case that is 
serious enough to become a scandal and in which the spy is found to have 
exploited access to multiple databases’ will result in a renewed emphasis on 
ensuring secrecy at the expense of sharing.352 This warning has since been borne 
out by the 2013 surveillance collection revelations of the former NSA contractor 
Edward J. Snowden which provided the basis for the awarding of the 2014 
Pulitzer Prize for public service to the Guardian US and the Washington Post, 
respectively.353 
The Washington Post has also reported on the expansion, secrecy and 
effectiveness of the current US intelligence establishment.354 Dana Priest and 
William M. Arkin have concluded that ‘fusion’ intelligence work represents one 
of the most duplicated tasks in the United States with at least 31 located in the 
                                                                                                                                               
11 September 2001 in Ali H. Soufan, The Black Banners: the Inside Story of 9/11 and the War 
Against al-Qaeda (W. W. Norton & Company: New York City, 2011). 
A focus of subsequent US law enforcement and intelligence miscommunication regarding the 
perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks was on the interaction between FBI employees 
Harry Samit and Catherine Kiser. Samit, based at the FBI’s Minneapolis field office, had 
received a tip expressing concern about Zacarias Moussaoui taking flying lessons on how to 
handle a Boeing 747, but was not interested in practicing take-offs and landings. Samit had 
interviewed him and become greatly concerned about his intentions and wished to a FISA 
authorization to search his laptop. To do so, he contacted Catherine Kiser for assistance who 
worked in the Bureau’s counter-terrorism section. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to 
break through the organization’s bureacratic inertia. For an account of this, see Tim Weiner, 
Enemies: a History of the FBI (Random House: New York City, 2012), pp. 413–417. For 
Weiner’s account of Soufan, see pp. 423–427. An authoritative account of Amerithrax is Jeanne 
Guillemin, American Anthrax: Fear, Crime, and the Investigation of the Nation’s Deadliest 
Bioterror Attack (Times Books (Henry Holt and Co.): New York City, 2011). 
351 ODNI and DoD are sometimes also counted as members of the intelligence community. 
The Executive Order only lists 16, namely: Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central 
Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of 
Energy intelligence unit, Department of Homeland Security intelligence unit, Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (Department of State), Department of the Treasury intelligence unit, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaisance Office, National Security 
Agency and Navy Intelligence. The mandate of the US intelligence community is based on 
Executive Order 12333 in 1981. It was modified by Executive Order 13355 in 2004 and again 
by Executive Order 13470 in 2008. See also Columbia University Libraries, ‘The US 
intelligence community: information resources’, <http://library.columbia.edu/subject-
guides/social-sciences/intell.html>, (accessed 23 July 2013). 
352 Pillar (note 25), p. 299. 
353 The Pulitzer Prizes, ‘The 2014 Pulitzer Prize Winners: Public Service’, 
<http://www.pulitzer.org/citation/2014-Public-Service> (accessed 3 May 2014). 
354 The Washington Post, ‘Top Secret America’ <http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-
secret-america/>, (accessed 16 June 2013); and Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret 
America: the Rise of the New American Security State (Little, Brown and Company: New York, 
2011). 
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Washington, DC area.355 While some merge intelligence and information to 
support military operations in the field, Arkin and Priest believe that most such 
centres are ‘simply a kind of super-briefing machine for senior leaders, one that 
replaced the PowerPoint presentations of the 1990s with flat-screen interactive 
geo-located presentations’.356 As with all bureacracies, the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of the activity are likely to be somewhere in between. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funds the fusion centers which are 
jointly staffed by members of local and regional law enforcement. An October 
2012 US Senate report concluded that the centres have provided no useful 
intelligence and that they ‘forwarded intelligence of uneven quality—oftentimes 
shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ liberties and Privacy Act 
protections, occasionally taken from already published public sources, and more 
often than not unrelated to terrorism’.357 The report also finds that up to $1.4 
billion for the centers are unaccounted for and that four of the 72 fusion centers 
that DHS publicly states it possesses do not in fact exist.358 DHS disputed the 
Senate committee’s findings and one Senator argued that the report focused on 
intelligence sharing between fusion centers and other Washington agencies 
thereby ignoring the benefits of information sharing among law enforcement 
organizations.359 
The DHS interaction with local and regional law enforcement, including 
through fusion centres, has resulted in extensive equipment (including 
surveillance) upgrades and a wider, more systematic use of integrated databases 
to automatically run license plate numbers to provide officers in the field with 
personal data on people they encounter.360 This has been done partly to try to 
avoid the situation where police pulled over the leader of the 9/11 attacks, 
Mohamed Atta, for speeding when he had an outstanding arrest warrant for not 
paying a fine for using an expired driver’s license.361 
Arkin and Priest have also estimated that the United States probably 
currently has twice the number of intelligence analysts as it did prior to 11 
September 2001, and ‘too many of them can do little but move the same 
                                                 
355 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 92. 
356 Arkin and Priest state that most fusion centres possess ‘the same rows or clusters of 
computer stations facing two or three wall-sized television screens and maps. More elaborate 
centers have a VIP balcony where senior policy makers, members of Congress, admirals, and 
generals can watch the inaction from above. The experience is not that different from sitting in a 
movie balcony watching six very slow-moving movies at once’. Priest and Arkin (note 354), pp. 
92–93. 
357 Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (note 88). 
358 Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (note 88). 
359 Robert O’Harrow, ‘Homeland Security’s “Fusion Centers” Defended in Response to 
Sharply Critical Senate Report’, Washington Post, 4 Oct. 2012, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fusion-centers-defendedin-response-
to-senate-report/2012/10/03/58841b38-0da2-11e2-a310-2363842b7057_story.html>, (accessed 
17 Oct. 2012). See also Gudrun Persson, Fusion Centres—Lessons Learned (Center for 
Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish Defence Colllege: Stockholm, 2013), (in 
Swedish), 
<http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/publikatione
r/Fusion%20Centres%20-%20Lessons%20Learned%20%28svenska%29.pdf>, (accessed 4 
Nov. 2013). 
360 Priest and Arkin (note 354), pp. 138–143. 
361 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 142. 
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intelligence around; they lack the expertise and ability to go beyond what has 
already been packaged and presented. The analysts simply flood their 
commanders and policy makers with marginally informative and redundant 
conclusions’.362 According to Richard H. Immerman, a former Assistant Deputy 
Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Standards and 
Analytic Ombudsman for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘It’s 
the soccer ball syndrome. Something happens, and they want to rush to cover 
it’.363 Arkin estimates that at least 1074 US federal government organizations 
and just under 2000 private companies are ‘involved with programs related to 
counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence’ operating at the Top 
Secret level classification at approximately 17000 locations in the United 
States.364 There are currently approximately 800 known intelligence agencies 
worldwide.365 
The past decade or so has witnessed a tendency for experienced US 
Government employees to leave for private companies only to be immediately 
hired back by the government at substantially higher salaries. Ronald Sanders, an 
ODNI personnel department official, has stated: ‘We could not perform our 
mission without them. They serve as our reserves, providing flexibility and 
expertise we can’t acquire’.366 Consequences include: (a) about half of the staff 
of the DHS are private contractors, (b) the NSA has expanded the number of 
private contractors since 11 September 2011 to at least 480, (c) translation and 
interpretation work could not be carried out without private contractors, (d) over 
400 private contractors provide the US intelligence community with critical 
computer and communication systems and support services.367 
Arkin and Priest also state that the quality of intelligence analysis in the 
United States has been degraded by the fact that experienced, mid-career analysts 
have moved to the private sector.368 Two-thirds of the CIA analysts have less 
than five years experience, while two-thirds of the FBI analyst positions did not 
exist prior to 11 September 2001.369 They observe: 
‘in contrast to the cold war era, when there was one primary target and 
analysts were hired out of specialized Soviet studies programs and spoke 
fluent Russian, a typical analyst hired these days knows very little about 
the priority countries – Iraq, Iran, Afganistan, Pakistan and Yemen – 
when he or she first comes on board. Most are not fluent in the relevant 
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364 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 86. 
365 The Security Website, ‘Global Intelligence Agencies’, <http://www.thesecurity 
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367 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 182. An important summary of US information collection 
priorities and practice (based on documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward 
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languages, either. And while the CIA and other agencies have made an 
effort to recruit native speakers, the number needed far exceeds the 
number available, particularly in jobs requiring the highest security 
clearances’.370 
As previously mentioned, the type and quantity of information previously 
difficult to obtain and largely within the purview of classified intelligence work, 
are today more readily available thanks to declassification of historical 
documents, the development of large electronic databases and the increased 
information on the Internet.371 In addition, some information previously 
considered sensitive is no longer viewed as such, partly because of the 
implementation of arms control and disarmament regimes which involve regular 
declarations and the carrying out of onsite inspections, including at military sites 
and sensitive civilian industrial facilities under ‘managed [i.e., restricted by 
mutual agreement] access’ treaty provisions.372 Countervailing tendencies or 
efforts towards greater secrecy are nevertheless also evident and have given rise 
to the growing field of ‘secrecy policy’.373 Paul R. Pillar has argued that the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission were unnecessary, ineffective and 
counterproductive. This included the superimposition of a new coordinating body 
(the ODNI) above the intelligence community.374 Pillar argues that the 9/11 
Commission exemplifies the Washington political establishment mistaking 
change for ‘reform’.375 
Case study information appears lacking in much of the literature on structured 
analytical techniques (SATs) directed towards intelligence and law enforcement 
taskings. Where such information exists, it often focuses on individuals, 
institutions, and on conventional and nuclear capabilities. By comparison, the 
least amount of literature concerns CBW. Some information from the CW arms 
control verification literature can be integrated with that on the intelligence cycle 
or SATs. This integration does not appear to have been carried out—at least in 
the open literature—probably in part because the ‘verification audience’ includes 
government officials who negotiate or implement multilateral arms control and 
disarmament agreements. Many (or most) of such officials are not typically 
‘mainline’ consumers of intelligence. They instead tend to have legal or 
international affairs-oriented perspectives and reading lists and, as foreign 
ministry officials, they focus on diplomacy (i.e., the sending and receiving of 
                                                 
370 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 83. 
371 E.g., George Washington University, ‘The National Security Archive’, 
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signals). Such officials are also aware of the political sensitivity connected to the 
use of information derived from NTM. 
The manner in which NTM is used in a multilateral framework impinges on 
political and institutional sensitivities which must be handled with understanding 
and discretion so as not to undermine the viability of the regime, while achieving 
the necessary clarification or remedial action to bring a non-compliant state back 
into good standing with its treaty obligations.376 Thus, suggestions of non-
compliance may be difficult to address operationally within regimes where all the 
member states have equal obligations and responsibilities.377 The amount and 
quality of NTM varies among states. In some regimes the role of NTM is an 
internal matter left to individual states to determine whether and how to bring it 
to the attention of the other regime participants.378 
                                                 
376 For a definition and further consideration of NTM, see Annexe A. 
377 Mohamed Daoudi, John Hart, Ajey Lele and Ralf Trapp The Future of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention: Policy and Planning Aspects, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 35 (SIPRI: 
Stockholm, Apr. 2013), p. 13. 
378 During strategic nuclear arms negotiations in Vienna in 1970 General Nikolai V. Ogarkov 
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view. 
64   HART  
 
5 
 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FRAMING THE ISSUE 
 
 
CH tends to focus on procedure, process and technique, rather than on 
achieving a greater understanding of motivations and actions of actors 
(e.g., as is carried out under international relations (IR) regime theory) or 
the broader political implications. The application of ACH methodology, as 
developed by this study, is meant to elucidate operational analytical challenges 
and to inform at least four overarching strategic security questions: 
A 
 
1. What are the motivations for actors to pursue CW programmes and 
activities (e.g., the relevance of the relationship between capabilities and 
intentions)? 
2. How does the present study fit into the theory and practice of strategic and 
defence studies? 
3. How might an ACH on CW be integrated into current arms control and 
disarmament regimes where the derivation and use of information for CW 
verification purposes presents systemic political and technical challenges 
(both in terms of general process and for particular cases)? 
4. What are the major elements of a strategic theoretical application of ACH 
with regard to CW assessment in the fields of arms control verification 
and intelligence analysis? 
 
Policy is focused on framing ideas in a manner that promotes its own 
implementation, often with incomplete or uncertain information and 
understanding. Policy goals are ostensibly determined for reasons-of-state. The 
measures and means by which to achieve these goals are then defined and 
structured in a politically acceptable (‘politically correct’) manner. Academic 
research is more predicated on discovering models and structures that explain 
how policy was implemented and may assume the availability of sufficient (or 
even complete) information. Intelligence theory, by contrast, has traditionally 
entailed numerous and large gaps in understanding due to a generally greater lack 
of information about the target. Information gaps and deception are understood to 
be the norm in intelligence theory, despite the possible increased amounts of data 
that are now available to some states. 
Policy ideally reflects ‘reality’ and should have heuristic power (i.e., to 
suggest actions to take). Some policy processes are internal to the state and need 
not involve engagement in the policy formation within other states, groups of 
states or international organizations (e.g., UN-type organizations). However, in 
international treaty negotiations and implementation, some of the policy 
formation is ‘internalized’ through consultation by one state with other states, 
groups of states, or secretariat staff of UN-type organizations. 
Internal government guidance should, within defined or understood 
parameters, allow for policy implementation (e.g., guidelines, indicators, 
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parameters, talking points) without referring back to the capital for permission to 
carry out sub-activities (i.e., to avoid micro-management of operational detail). 
The authority held by delegations should be sufficiently flexible on negotiation 
points that are not of fundamental importance to the state. Policy analytical skills 
include the ability to produce very short papers, memos, and talking points, while 
academic research attempts to capture or to reflect the policy conditions and 
process ‘drivers’. It is also useful to consider the extent to which ‘experts’ are 
correct in their assessments as compared to non-experts. Policymakers and 
decisionmakers may, in fact, be more knowledgeable than ‘the experts’.379 
Theories or analytical frameworks should strip the world to its essential 
features. They should assist with the conceptualization of complex processes 
encountered in the ‘real world’. Their validity can be evaluated according to their 
ability to explain or predict such processes. Consideration of the three cases 
should result in better geographic scope of available research, as well as the 
further dissemination of relevant source material. Each case study is also 
important on its own terms. 
Typical research designs in the intelligence field include: (a) evaluations, (b) 
case studies, (c) longitudinal studies (d) comparisons, (e) cross-sectional studies, 
(f) longitudinal comparisons, and (g) experiments or quasi-experimental 
studies.380 
Evaluations are carried out to support possible intervention activity (e.g., to 
influence an election or to support a covert intervention). Case studies inform 
readers what is occurring. Longitudinal studies are designed to determine what 
changes have occurred over time. Comparison studies explore how and why A 
and B differ. Cross sectional studies explore how and why A and B differ at the 
present time. Longitudinal comparisons consider how and why A and B differ 
over time. Finally, experiments or quasi-experimental studies seek to elucidate 
the effect of A on B (i.e., the effect of an independent on a dependent 
variable).381 
The principles, definitions and structures provided by Heuer (as well as 
Prunckun) are principally aimed at intelligence analyst trainees. Thus, they are 
meant to have a practical application whose structure and content are perhaps 
unfamiliar to many in academia. 
A case study-based approach is appropriate partly because the present 
analysis is mainly qualitative. According to one heavily cited social science 
research methods scholar, the use of case studies has advantages over other 
strategies (i.e., archival analysis, experiment, history, and survey) when the 
manner and motivation for a given set of events of contemporary relevance is 
                                                 
379 Brian D. Nordmann of the US Department of State observes ‘…the image of the “green 
eyeshade” intelligence analyst spending years understanding the tiniest nuance of an arcane 
foreign behavior pattern has evolved into a (not necessarily) young techno-geek sitting in front 
of a bank of computer monitors, extracting data from a myriad of databases and attempting to 
make sense of the bytes in front of him. Today’s analyst is weaned on the Internet, just as are 
many of today’s intelligence consumers….in fact, the consumer may have many more years of 
expertise in the subject than the intelligence analyst’. Nordmann (note 83), p. 238. 
380 Hank Prunckun, Handbook of Scientific Methods of Inquiry for Intelligence Analysis, 
Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series no. 11 (Scarecrow Press, Inc.: Lanham, 
2010), p. 24. 
381 Prunckun (note 380), p. 24. 
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being investigated by a researcher who is in an observer position.382 Case studies 
also readily allow for the incorporation of other methods (including quantitative) 
to produce customized, multi-method research approaches.383 
In addition, Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman emphasize the importance of 
counterfactual thinking about conditions under which a researcher’s predictions 
could be proved incorrect in order to prevent cognitive biases.384 They note the 
importance of broadening and deepening the literature on cognitive biases and 
developing strategies to avoid them.385 ACH was developed largely with a view 
towards the prevention of cognitive biases. Its application to the derivation and 
use of information for CW-related assessments presents a non-traditional 
example of a case study-based methodology in strategic and defence studies. 
With regard to the formulation of intelligence studies research design, 
Prunckun identifies three main approaches: (a) quantitative research, (b) 
qualitative research and (c) mixed methods research.386 Factors that would 
indicate the appropriateness of a quantitative approach include the existence of a 
large data set, the professional or academic interest and background of the 
analysts (e.g., mathematicians, or computer programmers), the existence of 
validated data collection instrumentation, a desire to predict future outcomes in a 
manner that minimizes or eliminates personal views, and the degree to which the 
consumers of the product are interested in or capable of understanding 
quantitative analysis (e.g., regression analysis).387 
Prunckun observes that qualitative research can be either field (i.e., 
interactive) or documentary (i.e., non-interactive with its subject) and that such 
research is suitable for pilot studies or to develop a theory that can later be tested 
using quantitative data techniques.388 In qualitative analyses, the analyst 
describes his or her impressions in terms of ‘concepts’, ‘categories’, and 
‘properties’.389 Further characteristics of an intelligence analytical problem that 
lend themselves to a qualitative approach include cases where: (a) the target’s 
behaviour, emotion or thoughts are of interest, (b) existing literature on the topic 
is limited and an overarching analysis is required and (c) an in-depth 
understanding of the issues that quantitative approaches cannot readily elucidate 
is required.390 
The third, and final, approach to a general structuring of intelligence research 
are the so-called mixed methods (also known as ‘methodological pluralism’ or 
‘methodological eclecticism’). 
                                                 
382 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 4th Edtn. (Sage Publications: 
London, 2009), pp. 8 & 11. 
383 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Case Study Methods’, p. 511 in Eds. Christian Reus-
Smit and Duncan Snidal, The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2008, 2010 paperback edtn.). 
384 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Case Study Methods’, p. 512 in Reus-Smit and Snidal 
(note 383). 
385 Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, ‘Case Study Methods’, p. 512 in Reus-Smit and Snidal 
(note 383). 
386 Prunckun (note 380), p. 54. 
387 These factors are based on those provided by Hank Prunckun and are somewhat further 
developed and rephrased by the author. See Prunckun (note 380), p. 55. 
388 Prunckun (note 380), p. 55. 
389 Prunckun (note 380), p. 56. 
390 Based on Prunckun (note 380), p. 56. 
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Mixed methods for intelligence research design include: (a) experimental, (b) 
quasi-experimental, (c) case studies, (d) evaluations, (e) focus groups, (f) in-
depth interviews, (g) ethnographies, (h) grounded theory, (i) time series studies, 
(j) pre- and post-design and (k) meta-analysis.391 
In experimental research designs, one or more independent variables are 
manipulated in order to study a dependent variable. Quasi-experimental designs 
are those that cannot be said to be fully experimental, including interrupted and 
non-interrupted time series analysis. Case studies can be understood to be single 
issue problems that can be elucidated by examining the activity of a person, 
group, or incident. Case studies allow for more in-depth analysis than approaches 
that focus on a single dependent variable. Case studies can encompass mixed 
qualitative and quantitative techniques. Evaluations may be defined as ‘the 
systematic assessment of an intelligence operation, a tactical service, or a 
strategic program’.392 Such an approach seeks to determine whether the desired 
outcome of an operation or programme was achieved and recommends 
improvements. Focus groups entail open-ended questions and interactive 
discussions from a statistically significant group of people. The analyst then 
evaluates the discussion and statements for meaning. In-depth interviews involve 
a limited number of people and are more suited to ensuring discretion and 
confidentiality (e.g., during counter-intelligence investigations).393 
Ethnographies may be understood as research designed to better understand how 
people live and think based on social and national factors. Grounded theory 
approaches are those where the theory is developed from data directly, rather 
than from data that is developed in order to test already established theories. In 
other words, grounded theory is an inductive method of analysis which starts 
with specific detail from which generalizations are made.394 Time series studies 
(also called ‘repeated masures studies’) involve taking two or more observations 
(or measures) of a variable at different times. The sequence of resulting 
observations can then be used as a basis for making predictions.395 Pre- and 
post-design entails measuring change that results from some sort of intervention 
where A represents the baseline phase, and B represents the intervention phase. 
Variations of so-called A-B designs include: A-B-A, A-B-A-B, and B-A-B.396 
Finally, meta-analysis entails statistical research that analyzes previously 
conducted studies and are entirely quantitative.397 
To reiterate, it is hoped that the evaluation of an older large, traditional state 
programme, a recent medium state programme and current non-state activities 
will allow for an ACH analytical framework to be tested against a sufficient 
range of programmes and activities. Questions regarding the applicability of data 
acquisition, and sampling and analysis for each of these case studies will 
probably arise. However, it is hoped that the differences illustrated in the 
applicability of these two aspects of ACH as applied to CW will also serve to 
                                                 
391 Prunckun (note 380), pp. 56–59. 
392 Prunckun (note 380), p. 57. 
393 Prunckun (note 380), p. 58. 
394 Prunckun (note 380), p. 58. 
395 Prunckun (note 380), p. 58. 
396 Prunckun (note 380), p. 59. 
397 Prunckun (note 380), p. 59. 
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inform through their differences. Each represents a set of political and technical 
challenges for their context (e.g., period, political situation).  
Case studies also serve to improve understanding of how well a 
methodological conceptualization can function as a tool to clarify and, perhaps, 
to systemize seemingly disparate concepts, facts and hunches. It can also be 
argued that an historical component to any inquiry, including through the use of 
case studies, is appropriate in view of the original meaning of term history: the 
Greek word historia (ἱστορία) can be translated as ‘a learning or knowing by 
inquiry’.398 It is also hoped that case studies can facilitate the development of 
structured knowledge by investigation and that the past events reflected in this 
study will satisfy Benedetto Croce’s dictum that ‘all history is contemporary’.399 
                                                 
398 Section H, ‘History’, p. 305, in The Oxford English Dictionary, vols. V, H-K (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 1933), reprinted 1978. 
399 For an e.g. of the contemporary relevance of historical case studies, see Robert Jervis, 
Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, New York, 2010). 
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6 
 
 
 
STRUCTURING THE ANALYSIS 
 
 
n objective of this study is to develop and to test a CW structured 
analysis of competing hypotheses. This section provides background to 
its conceptualization. The objective is to achieve an ‘ordered knowledge 
based on systematic inquiry’.400 
 
A 
6.1. The Political Dimension 
 
The first, most general level of the analysis is the nature of human perception and 
understanding within a political science context. To achieve this, the basic 
ontology (‘nature of being’)401 and epistemology (view of the world) of the 
following approaches to political science can be briefly recalled: (a) 
behavioralism, (b) rational choice theory, (c) institutionalism and (d) 
constructivism (interpretive theory). There are numerous and growing gradations 
between and within these schools.402 Human perception and understanding will 
be considered primarily in a political science context, rather than in a 
philosophical or purely epistemological framework. This is because the focus of 
analysis is policy-oriented and more relevant to defence and strategic studies. To 
do so is consistent with Robert Ayson’s definition of strategic studies as ‘the 
political origins, applications, and implications of organized violence in times of 
both war and peace’.403 
The principal ontological views connected to SATs for arms control, law 
enforcement or intelligence purposes are whether objective truth exists and is 
discoverable versus the hermeneutic view that human perception is mediated by a 
first observer and second person recipient.404 Thus, a first and second order 
                                                 
 
400 Gerry Stoker and David Marsh, ‘Introduction’, p. 11, in Eds. David Marsh and Gerry 
Stoker, Theory and Methods of Political Science, second edtn. (Palgrave Macmillan: 
Basingstoke, United Kingdom, 2002). 
401 The Austrian philosopher Karl Popper questioned whether ontology, as a philosophical 
theory of being, is a valid concept. He instead argued that the essence of its definition is rather a 
tautology (i.e., ‘what is, is’). Popper observed: ‘Many philosophers talk nowadays about 
ontology, or theory of being, and many philosophers attribute an ontology to Parmenides. I do 
not think that there is any such thing as ontology, or a theory of being, or that an ontology can 
be seriously attributed to Parmenides’. ‘Essay 6, The World of Parmenides: Notes on 
Parmenides’ Poem and Its Origin in Early Greek Cosmology’, p. 130 in Eds. Arne F. Petersen 
and Jørgen Mejer, Karl Popper, The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic 
Enlightenment (Routledge: London, 2012). 
402 E.g., Keren Yarhi-Milo, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence 
Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries’, International Security, vol. 38, no. 1 
(summer 2013), pp. 7–51. 
403 Robert Ayson, ‘Strategic Studies’, p. 559 in Reus-Smit and Snidal (note 383). 
404 The latter view has its origins in the allegory of the cave (or Plato’s Cave), in which Plato 
has Socrates describing a thought experiment whereby people are chained inside a cave and are 
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mediation of observed events exists. The first view (that objective truth exists 
and is discoverable) emphasizes explanation, while the second view (regarding 
mediation of human perception) stresses an inherent subjective quality to 
understanding. Perceptions of truth and whether it is discoverable are implicit to 
the work of Heuer who approaches intelligence studies from a cognitive 
psychology perspective. Heuer’s ACH takes into account the work of Karl 
Popper.405 These factors also inform the work of Daniel Kahneman (the co-
winner of the 2002 Nobel prize in economics) who has applied the psychology of 
judgment to international security threat perceptions and decision making, such 
as possible psychological reasons for why the views of hawks are 
organizationally favoured over those of doves in international peace and security 
policy formation and implementation.406 Within an intelligence studies context, 
the hawks are favoured by the cost of failure and, perhaps, lack of time 
factors
ide context to the strategic and 
efence analysis in the conclusions of the study. 
6.1.1. Behaviouralism 
s that 
an be tested through falsification. Normative political analysis is avoided. 
.1.2. Rational Choice Theory 
l interests which are a function of their position and role within 
stitutions. 
.1.3. Institutionalism 
                                                                                                                                              
.407 
An overview of human perception and understanding will now be 
considered within the contexts of the four identified schools of international 
relations (IR) theory. This is meant to help prov
d
 
 
Behaviouralism claims to be value-free and empirical. It attempts to derive 
general laws and principles through the generation of theoretical statement
c
 
6
 
Rational choice theory focuses on the generation of value-free, empirical laws 
and principles having predictive value. Normative political analysis is more 
commonly incorporated. It assumes that politics are mainly informed by actors 
making rational decisions, including decisions that are understandable in light of 
their persona
in
 
6
 
This framework has institutions and institutional processes, rather than 
individuals, as the main driver of political decisions and processes. It attempts to 
 
only able to observe the outside world by looking at shadows cast on the cave wall. Those 
chained may thus mistakenly take the forms reflected on the wall to be ‘reality’. The allegory is 
from Plato’s theory of forms. 
405 E.g., The Logic of Science (1959). Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 160. 
406 Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, ‘Why Hawks Win’, Foreign Policy, 27 Dec. 
2006, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/12/27/why_hawks_win?print=yes&hide 
comments=yes&page=full>, (accessed 17 Oct. 2012). 
407 Isaac Ben-Israel, ‘Philosophy and the Meaning of Intelligence: the Logic of the 
Estimative Process’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4, no. 4 (1989), pp. 670–671 & 
691. 
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present empirically based, theoretically informed analyses. It attempts to link 
mpirical analysis with normative theory. 
                                                
e
6.1.4. Constructivism (Interpretive Theory) 
 
Constructivism claims that knowledge is always provisional and contested. It 
views political processes as a contested narrative. Bayesian analysis is favoured 
by many in the intelligence studies field, particularly in the non-state actor 
context and can be viewed as possessing similarities to constructivism.408 
Reference to these four approaches should assist to elucidate, in a 
structured manner, difficulties associated with human perception and 
understanding. For example, to positivists, an objective truth exists and is, in 
principle, knowable, including through quantitative methods and through the 
testing of hypotheses. The question of CW development or use becomes a binary 
yes or no determination. It is possible to conclude that a positive objective truth 
can be stated with certainty if large numbers of people display sulphur mustard 
burns, and nearby spent munitions exhibit traces of sulphur mustard or known 
degradation products. The sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents and 
the determination of their degradation products are objectively ‘knowable’ truths 
(i.e., ‘facts’) that can, in principle, be determined to a degree sufficient to secure 
criminal convictions. If properly done, the sampling and analysis should not be 
vulnerable to politicization (i.e., multiple interpretation—deliberate or otherwise) 
by governments or other actors. In practice, this can be problematic because the 
presence or absence of a degradation product or its meaning cannot always be 
established with certainty. Thus a ‘first order’ truth may be unambiguous, while a 
‘second order’ truth is not. Humans may be able to comprehend the second order 
truth, but not necessarily comprehend the first order truth. 
Constructivism (interpretative theory), by contrast, essentially claims that 
knowledge is always provisional and contested.409 This view is more in 
accordance with the statement attributed to an unnamed US intelligence analyst 
who said, after the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, ‘We are all 
Bayesians now’.410 
Gregory F. Treverton, the Director of the RAND Corporation’s Center for 
Global Risk and Security, defines contemporary Bayesian intelligence analysis as 
‘both an inclination and a process to update subjective probabilities in light of 
new evidence’.411 Intelligence analysis—and, by extension, ‘all-source 
analysis’—is characterized less by relatively ‘bounded’412 puzzle solving (as 
 
408 See Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, NY, 2009). 
409 Gerry Stoker and David Marsh, ‘Introduction’, p. 7, in Marsh and Stoker (note 400). 
410 Treverton (note 408), p. 39.  
411 Treverton (note 408), p. 39. Thomas Bayes was an English mathematician and 
Presbyterian minister. 
412 Herbert Simon used the term bounded to mean limited rationality which were caused by 
the limitations of the human mind to deal with the complexity of the surrounding environment. 
Simon’s work helped to inform psychological research on attention span, memory, perception 
and the reasoning capacity associated with the ‘mental machinery’ of humans. See Herbert 
Simon, Models of Man: Social and National (John Wiley: New York City, 1957). Cited by 
Richards J. Heuer, ‘Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: a Cognitive Process Approach’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 1981), p. 295. 
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during the Cold War), and more by ‘unbounded’ ‘sensemaking’ of complex 
processes obtained through wider and diffuse means with large amounts of 
background ‘clutter’ that interferes with analysts’ attempts to understand possible 
threats. Thus in 2009 the JASON Defense Advisory Group concluded that ‘no 
credible approach’ had been documented to ‘anticipate the existence and 
characterization’ of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD-T) 
and that there continues to exist a ‘significant deficiency in applying standard 
approaches from engineering and science’ towards predicting such events 
resultin
 determined, 
eratively reduced or eliminated by referring to the ontology (‘nature of being’) 
 these four IR schools within an arms 
ontrol verification and intelligence studies context. 
Anothe
                                                
g from false alarm rates and signal detection that are obscured by 
‘massive clutter’.413 Operational requirements of sensemaking also have the 
effect of blurring the distinction between intelligence and policy.414 
This study attempts to clarify the ‘real’ or ‘objective’ relations between 
social phenomena and the manner in which ambiguity can be
it
and epistemology (view of the world) of
c
 
6.2. Intelligence Management Cycle 
 
r level of analysis (and conceptualization) is the intelligence cycle: the 
traditional theoretical model of the discipline which arose in the post-World War 
II US context.415 
The field of intelligence studies can also be divided according to: (a) 
functional, (b) historical/biographical, (c) structural and institional and (d) 
political.416 The functional school essentially focuses on problems of human 
awareness and mechanisms to define and elucidate analytical methods. This 
includes the Heuer Model (a form of ACH) developed by the UK Defence 
Intelligence Staff that consists of a structured approach that allows analysts to 
compare competing hypotheses and to elucidate their underlying assumptions. 
Fuzzy logic and Bayesian iterative approaches are also components (with strong 
qualitative elements) to the functional (or analytic) approach. Correct answers 
may be obtained for the wrong analytical and organizational reasons. Analysts 
should ideally understand how to verify this. In cases where they are unable to do 
so, they should be aware of this. Alternatively the ‘correctness’ of an evaluation 
or understanding of a ‘fact’ may never been fully ascertained or demonstrated. 
Much of this discussion follows from the post-World War II work of the Yale 
historian and US intelligence analyst Sherman Kent. The historical/biographical 
model consists of historical case studies. The structural and institional approach 
considers the effects of structure and institutions on the preparation of 
assessments, including the merits of regional versus functionally structured 
 
413 JASON Defense Advisory Group, Rare Events, unclassified (MITRE Corporation: 
McLean, VA, Oct. 2009), p. 8. 
414 David T. Moore, Sensemaking: a Structure for an Intelligence Revolution (National 
Defense Intelligence College: Washington, DC, Mar. 2011), p. x. 
415 Clark (note 29), pp. 12–13. 
416 Michael S. Goodman and David Omand, ‘Teaching intelligence analysts in the UK’, 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol-52-no-4/teaching-intelligence-analysts-in-the-uk.html>, (accessed 25 Jan. 
2010). 
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analyses, as well as the various overlapping institutional agendas and 
expectations. Finally, the political approach considers intelligence production in 
terms of producer-consumer relationships. For example, the ‘customers’ for 
analys
s partly because more 
recent 
 production using open 
source
tion of quality intelligence analysis’, and 
(d) providing ‘an understanding of the significance of organizational structures 
421 
anding information acquisition and relevance 
es of non-state actor threats are much broader and include customs 
officials and police. In this context, a CW threat assessment process is not only 
‘top down’, but is, ideally, also ‘bottom up’ (i.e., it is a two-way process). 
Intelligence studies have often focused on historical events. James M. 
Nyce argues that the scholarly literature on intelligence studies ‘has long been 
dominated by historians and political scientists’.417 This i
activity tends to remain classified in order to protect sources and methods. 
The literature on the intelligence management cycle is also rather general 
because the details of specific cases are deemed sensitive. 
In 1964 Knorr offered two reasons to explain the limited amount of 
published literature on intelligence production: inaccessibility of intelligence 
operations to academic scholars (due to their being classified) and the recent 
development of such production as a distinct discipline involving more scholarly 
research and the use of open sources (as opposed to clandestine field work and 
the production of analyses based largely on clandestine operations-derived 
information).418 Knorr argues that largescale intelligence
s began during World War II.419 He also credits William (‘Wild Bill’) J. 
Donovan for introducing social science academic techniques to the production of 
intelligence by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).420 
Stephen Marrin argues that the academic literature on intelligence should 
ideally provide the practitioner with ‘criteria and metrics’ for evaluating: (a) 
‘analytic quality’ (b) ‘best practices in terms of employing analytic methods to 
support inferences and judgements’ (c) ‘guidance for how to develop core 
competencies necessary for the produc
and processes in the development and aggregation of different kinds of analytic 
expertise in a team or unit context’.
Table 6.1 Levels of analysis for underst
 
Level 1 
uman understanding and political theory H
 
Level 2 
telligence/Information Management CycleIn  
H) 
Objective: Conceptualization of derivation and use of information for a CW-oriented Structured Analysis 
of Competing Hypotheses. 
 
 
Level 3 
Competing Hypotheses (ACAnalysis of 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
                                                 
417 Nyce (note 3). 
418 Knorr (note 6), pp. 5–6. 
419 Knorr (note 6), p. 5. 
420 Knorr (note 6), p. 6. 
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6.2.1. Background on Intelligence and Information Management Cycles 
 
Much literature has been produced on the intelligence cycle, especially since 
World War II.422 Traditionally, this cycle is a loop starting and ending with the 
consumer who makes the original request for analysis or data.423 Much of the 
literature on the intelligence cycle is unsatisfactory because it consists of long 
lists of procedures and principles. As such, they provide little insight into specific 
weapon systems and the significance of actual cases. Much of the literature is 
also written from a great power perspective. 
The ‘powerpoint culture’ of some government agencies and analysts has 
also promoted a proliferation of cluttered ‘visual aids’ which consist of long lists 
of agencies, lines-of-responsibility and overlapping bubbles and pie charts.424 
Demand for visual aids is often driven by the needs of government bureaucracy, 
including for organization management and oversight purposes. Visual aids 
might also support or reflect an organizational requirement for obtaining funding 
or the implementation of key performance indicator (KPI) (or equivalent) 
principles. The broader process and requirements of government ought not to be 
diverted by operationally irrelevant theoretical or historical digressions. The 
academic literature, some of which is driven by a desire to develop and test IR 
theory, can also contain many diagrams, tables and charts. An increased reliance 
on multimodal data sets that incorporate non-textual-based information is also 
driving this trend towards more (including unusual) visualization techniques in 
order to promote better understanding. 
The founders—all US nationals—of ‘the scholarly literature on the 
methods and processes of intelligence analysis’ include Richards J. Heuer, Roger 
Hilsman, Willmoore Kendall, Sherman Kent, Klaus Knorr, George Pettee, and 
Washington Platt.425 Sherman Kent is widely widely cited as ‘the father of 
intelligence analysis’ and the Center for Intelligence Analysis at the CIA 
University is named for him.426 During World War II, he worked in the Research 
and Analysis Branch of the OSS. From 1950-67 he was the chairman of the 
former US Board of National Estimates, the body that originally produced 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).427 He also wrote Strategic Intelligence 
for American World Policy (1949). Washington Platt was a lesser-known pioneer 
in the identification and development of intelligence analysis methods. He 
elucidated elements of the intelligence management cycle. An instructor of 
                                                                                                                                               
421 Marrin (note 19), p. 3. 
422 E.g. Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles (Frederick A. 
Praeger, Publishers: New York, 1957); and Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American 
World Policy (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1949). 
423 The loop starts with a request for information, the requirements of the request are 
formalized and issued, the necessary information is collected, followed by analysis and 
assessment. The results are finalized and disseminated to the user or information requester. 
Omand (note 13), p. 118. 
424 Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘We Have Met the Enemy and He is Powerpoint’, New York Times, 
26 Apr. 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/world/27powerpoint.html>, (accessed 29 
July 2013). 
425 Marrin (note 19), p. 3. Marrin does not mention Platt. 
426 Kent (note 422). 
427 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. xiv. 
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mechanical engineering at Cornell University, a former Brigadier General in the 
US Air Force and a consultant to the US Government,428 Platt approached the 
information cycle under the heading of ‘strategic intelligence production’ (see 
Table 6.2). 
 Structure of intelligence management and principles according to Platt. Table 6.2
 
Strategic Intelligence Management 
ess 
eculiarities and difficulties associated with pursuing a career in intelligence 
ce principles
General principles 
Intellectual proc
Social sciences 
Intelligence tools 
Questions intelligence officers must ask 
Desirability to develop a system of academic study of intelligence 
P
 
Intelligen  
f sources 
f the people’ 
tainty 
onclusions 
Purpose 
Definition 
Exploitation o
Significance 
Cause and effect 
‘Spirit o
Trends 
Degree of cer
C
 
Act of creative thinking 
General survey, Definitions and Collection of Data (‘Accumulation stage 1’) 
Interpretation of data, Form hypotheses and Draw Conclusions (‘Illumination, stage 2’) 
Present conclusions, verify and present 
 
Source: Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles (Frederick A. Praeger, 
Publishers: New York, 1957), pp. 41-45, 103, 273-274. 
other channel’. In other words, scientific or technical experts should be 
                                                
S&T also place particular demands on intelligence analysis. Reginald 
Victor Jones, a British physicist by training and the author of Most Secret War: 
British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (1978), has been called ‘the founder of 
modern scientific intelligence’.429 He observed that one of the British failures in 
scientific intelligence during World War II was its inability to uncover (i.e., to 
become institutionally aware of) Germany’s organophosphorus nerve agent 
programme. Jones attributed this to the fact that intelligence in this area ‘had 
been left in the hands of our experts at Porton [Down], who had dismissed 
reports that the Germans’ possessed such agents ‘probably because the materials 
in question were new ones whose behaviour was unknown at Porton’. He 
concluded that ‘while expert advice is often very good, it must be assessed in 
parallel with information coming through other channels of intelligence’. Where 
the information from all channels is contradictory, the scientific expert advice 
‘should be investigated as deeply as would be information coming through any 
 
428 Platt (note 422), p. 267. 
429 Omand (note 13), p. 46. 
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challenged, including by those outside their fields.430 Otherwise, one risks 
negative side effects of ‘expertism’ and sub-optimal analytical conclusions. 
 
6.2.2. The Intelligence Cycle Today: Towards a Conception of Information 
Acquisition and Management for CW Assessment Purposes 
 
Intelligence and information are sometimes used interchangeably, although the 
former implies that data have been collected or modified with a particular 
purpose in mind.431 Klaus Knorr defined ‘intelligence’ as ‘an operation for 
procuring and prossessing information about the external environment in which 
an organization….wants to maximize the net achievement of its various 
goals’.432 ‘Open-source intelligence’ is a related term which has been defined as 
‘unclassified information that has been deliberately discovered, discriminated, 
distilled and disseminated to a select audience in order to address a specific 
question’.433 Robert M. Clark states ‘Intelligence is about reducing uncertainty in 
conflict’.434 Hank Pruncken defines four meanings of intelligence: (a) actions or 
processes used to produce knowledge, (b) the body of knowledge thereby 
produced, (c) organizations that deal in knowledge (e.g., an intelligence agency), 
and (d) the reports and briefings produced in the process or by such 
organizations.435 Information may therefore be said to consist of data points, 
while intelligence has predictive value. 
The word intelligence is misused in some quarters—often for institutional 
reasons in order to emphasize the importance attached to the work.436 In view of 
the fact that much information that was once considered sensitive is more widely 
and readily available, the term ‘information’ may be more appropriate in certain 
situations (e.g., best practices for chemical safety and security modeling some of 
which may reveal facility-sensitive information from both a physical protection 
or national security perspective). In addition, the incipient ‘age of big data’ may 
                                                 
430 Reginald V. Jones, ‘Some Lessons in Intelligence: Enduring Principles’, Remarks at 
symposium at CIA Headquarters, 26 Oct. 1993, <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Jones.html> (accessed 24 
July 2013). 
431 As previously noted, in a 1965 documentary film on espionage, former CIA head Allen 
Dulles stated that ‘intelligence is nothing really, other than information and knowledge’. The 
Science of Spying (1965), minute 3:26, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fi710fkvLwQ> 
(accessed 20 May 2013).  
432 Knorr (note 6), p. 1. 
433 Robert David Steele, ‘Open Source Intelligence’, p. 129 in Ed. Loch K. Johnson, 
Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Routledge: Abingdon, 2007). Steele is the CEO of 
OSS.Net.Inc, a US defence contractor. Previously, he worked for the CIA and the Marine Corps 
Intelligence Command. 
434 Clark (note 29), p. 8. 
435 Prunckun (note 380), p. 3. 
436 The US Senate has questioned whether DHS fusion centres’ information products deserve 
to be called ‘intelligence’. In 2012 a Senate sub-committee found that DHS involvement with 
state and local fusion centres had ‘not produced useful intelligence to support federal 
counterterrorism efforts’ and that DHS-assigned personnel to such centres ‘forwarded 
“intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering 
citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published 
public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism’. Federal Support for and 
Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (note 88), p. 1. 
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result in a situation where ‘accuracy and precision’ will become increasingly 
viewed as ‘an artifact of an information-constrained environment’.437 The 
importance people attach to accuracy and the validation of information may 
therefore tend to become subordinate to the requirements of manipulating large 
data (not necessarily validated) sets and the limitation of humans to absorb it. 
Language is a potential complicating factor. For example, the Chinese 
‘quingbao’ can be interpreted as either ‘information’ or ‘intelligence’, and 
‘ziliao’ can be understood as ‘data’, ‘information’ or ‘material’. The best 
translation depends on context.438 Zhongwen and Zongxiao distinguish 
‘information’ and ‘intelligence’. They emphasized the importance of doing so 
both conceptually and in terms of practical experience. They argue in favour of a 
‘catalyzing and activating process in order to extract intelligence from 
information’.439 
Academics have typically viewed open source information as an input in 
the intelligence cycle.440 Open source information, sometimes called ‘overt 
intelligence’,441 may also perform an instrumental role in a national intelligence 
community (and perhaps within international intelligence sharing frameworks) in 
that such information may be described and utilized in order to promote 
organizational interests.442 Hamilton Bean, who has worked in the US 
intelligence establishment as an analyst, has examined open source information 
in terms of new institutionalim (neoinstitutionalism) social theory which attempts 
to develop a sociological view of how organizations and institutions interact with 
each other and affect society.443 
As previously noted, some have argued that after the 11 September 2001 
attacks in the United States intelligence agencies must change their modus 
operandi from ‘the need to know’ to ‘the need to share’ and that institutional and 
legal barriers between law enforcement and intelligence must be broken down.444 
However, for the United States the need to share policy has also resulted in a 
                                                 
437 Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger (note 78), p. 31. 
438 ‘Editor’s comment’ on translation of Sources and Techniques of Obtaining National 
Defense Science and Technology Intelligence, by Huo Zhongwen and Wang Zongxiao (Kexue 
Jishu Wenxuan Publishing Co.: Beijing, 1991), <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/docs/ 
sources.html>, (accessed 14 May 2013). 
439 Huo Zhongwen and Wang Zongxiao, Sources and Techniques of Obtaining National 
Defense Science and Technology Intelligence, chapter 1 (note 438). 
440 Hamilton Bean, No More Secrets: Open Source Information and the Reshaping of US 
Intelligence (Praeger: Oxford, 2011), p. 49. 
441 Dulles (note 90), p. 56. 
442 For a theoretical treatment of multilateral intelligence sharing, see Björn Fägersten, 
Sharing Secrets: Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation (Lund University: Lund, 
2010), doctoral thesis. 
443 Bean (note 440). 
444 The 9/11 Commission recommended the establishment of a National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC) to help break down such barriers. The Commission also reviewed information 
sharing barriers bertween law enforcement and intelligence. The 9/11 Commission Report 
(Washington, DC, 21 Aug. 2004), pp. 269–275 & 403–405. The releases of information by 
Wikileaks, particularly documents released in 2010, prompted the US Government to reassess 
its information oversight and handling procedures. 
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plethora of pseudo-classification markings and prompted wider discussion on the 
nature and proper role of secrecy in democratic societies.445  
One also encounters a rather counter-intuitive situation in which local 
police departments in the United States produce ‘intelligence’.446 Their output 
generally appears to consist of listings of generic threats, groups ‘of concern’ and 
updates on ongoing criminal investigations (e.g., bulletins and current threats and 
briefing papers on traditional organized criminal activity).447 
Possible countervailing tendencies regarding the future availability of 
information and its type also exist. A de facto chilling effect may exist in some 
states when their inhabitants leave various digital signatures on the Internet.448 
Governments might therefore more easily preempt or shut down an individual’s 
activity (political or otherwise). The Internet structure in China, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, for example, allows for restricting or shutting down politically sensitive 
discourse (via software and hardware product development).449 Australian 
internet governance policies have also been criticized for promoting 
undemocratic tendencies in that country.450 The Internet may, therefore, not be 
the instrument for anonymous sharing of information, but rather the footprint that 
remains in an individual’s ‘permanent record’ which can be accessed, in 
principle, at any time.451 Further related issues are the longterm stability and 
integrity of electronic data held in storage, the surreptitious tapping opportunity 
for the various states is not equal, and there are huge power consumption 
                                                 
445 Emerging Threats: Overclassification and Pseudo-Classification, Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, serial no. 109-
18 (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 2 Mar. 2005). As of 2011 the US 
Administration was carrying out a review of classification information (The Fundamental 
Classification Guidance Review). This review requires US Government agencies to review their 
classification procedures in order to identify and eliminate classification requirements deemed 
to be obsolete. The deadline for the completion the reviews is 29 June 2012. Executive Order 
13526, enacted 29 Dec. 2009, was the prior operative instruction on how classified information 
in the US should be handled. 
On 7 October 2011 Obama issued an Executive Order to improve security of digital 
information. See Office of the Press Secretary (White House), ‘Executive Order, Structural 
Reforms to Improve the Security of Classified Networks and the Responsible Sharing and 
Safeguarding of Classified Information’, Press Release, 7 Oct. 2011. The order was 
promulgated partly in order to prevent future occurences of a wiki leak-type incident. 
446 Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers (note 88). 
447 Priest and Arkin (note 354), pp. 80–82. 
448 For an interview with Fang Binxing (sometimes called ‘the father of the Great Firewall of 
China’), see Fang Yunyu, ‘China’s Great Firewall Father Speaks Out’, Global Times, 18 Feb. 
2011. 
449 Kathrin Hille, ‘Screw Slowly Tightens on Technology Companies’, Financial Times, 22 
Feb. 2010, p. 2. 
450 Daniel Nazer, ‘Australia Moves to Massively Expand Internet Surveillance’, Center for 
Internet and Society (Stanford Law School), 28 Aug. 2012, 
<http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/08/australia-moves-massively-expand-internet-
surveillance>, (accessed 9 May 2013); and Equipping Australia Against Emerging and Evolving 
Threats (Australia, Attorney-General’s Department: July 2012). 
451 A number of people have observed that the Internet is the greatest surveillance tool in 
history. E.g., Bruce Schneier, ‘The Internet is a Surveillance State’, 16 Mar. 2013, CNN, 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance/index.html>, 
(accessed 18 Mar. 2013). 
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requirements necessary to support a ‘total data’ capture and storage strategy.452 
According to one estimate the NSA collects approximately 1.7 billion ‘pieces of 
intercepted communications’ every 24 hours (e.g., emails, telephone calls, radio 
signals cell phone conversations, web postings, IP addresses).453 
James Bamford, the author of ground breaking works on the National 
Security Agency (NSA), has noted that as the agency moves toward achieving 
exaflop-level computing it risks becoming a sort of Jorge Luis Borge’s Library of 
Babel: ‘a place where the collection of information is both infinite and at the 
same time monstrous, where the entire world’s knowledge is stored, but not a 
single word understood’.454 According to Borges, this ‘labyrinth of letters’ 
contain ‘leagues of senseless cacophonies, verbal jumbles and incoherence’.455 
In 2012 Russian Television interviewed William Binney, a mathematician who 
quit the NSA in 2001, in which he stated that the US policy is to capture and 
store all internet traffick inside the country, including retaining copies of 
emails.456 Starting in June 2013 The Guardian confirmed, on the basis of 
information provided by the former US defence contractor Edward J. Snowden, 
the existence of a long list of Internet surveillance programmes.457 
                                                
The institutional affiliation, background and interests of analysts also 
affect their work, including with respect to emphasis and the selection of data.458 
In presenting his review of US intelligence on the Iranian Revolution and Iraq’s 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and ballistic 
missile programmes, Robert Jervis concludes: ‘A final and related surprise was 
the importance of norms, informal organizational dynamics, and incentive 
structure that characterized the production of intelligence’.459 This observation 
was apparently prompted by the fact that a CIA official who read one of Jervis’ 
reports stated ‘Jervis is an expert on misperception, so it is no wonder that he 
found it’.460 Jervis admitted that, while there was some truth to this remark, the 
observation in itself ‘illustrates the propensity for people to see’ what they 
expect.461 Jervis effectively shifts the burden of responsibility for the 
characterization of perception back onto the anonymous CIA official. Who is 
deemed ‘responsible’ for a given perception regarding the derivation and use of 
 
452 The electric power supply, a limiting factor to intelligence collection and storage, is 
sometimes called the ‘coin of the realm’ (e.g., by James Bamford). 
453 Priest and Arkin (note 354), p. 77. 
454 James Bamford, The Shadow Factory: the Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the 
Eavesdropping on America (Doubleday: New York City, 2008), p. 340. 
455 Bamford (note 454), p. 340. 
456 ‘”Everyone in US Under Virtual Surveillance”’—NSA Whistleblower’, 4 Dec. 2012, 
<http://rt.com/usa/surveillance-spying-e-mail-citizens-178/>, (accessed 9 May 2013). Russian 
Television interview of William Binney. 
457 E.g., Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data 
of Apple, Google and Others’, Guardian, 7 June 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 
2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data>, (accessed 9 June 2013); and Glenn Greenwald, 
‘XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet”’, Guardian, 
31 July 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-
data>, (accessed 4 Aug. 2013). 
458 Yarhi-Milo (note 402) 
459 Jervis (note 399), p. 23. 
460 Jervis (note 399), p. 23. 
461 Jervis (note 399), p. 23. 
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information for a weapon system analysis (and in what manner) is therefore a 
theme which should be considered further within the context of ACH case 
studies. 
Further analytical risks deserve consideration. One is the balance between 
analysis and detail. Sufficient detail should be provided in order to allow the 
consumer to understand the difficulties associated with assessing suspected CW 
programmes. The interested reader should be able to arrive at a ‘reasoned and 
balanced’ opinion that may differ from those of other analysts through the use of 
the information and methodology provided. Readers should ideally achieve a 
better understanding of why they believe any given point to be true, as well as to 
better appreciate the context of any statements (past and future) that allege that 
an actor has attempted to acquire, develop or use CW.462 
Another relevant dichotomy is between current (i.e., short term or 
realtime) intelligence requirements and longer-term intelligence research 
requirements. The former tends to favour a ‘multi-tasking’ generalist, while the 
latter favour specialists with deep expertise and understanding. Institutionally the 
latter approach may not be tenable. Even in the early 1960s, a longtime US 
intelligence official told Klaus Knorr: 
‘You rightly emphasize the fact that the intelligence professionals need to 
have more time for study and reflection. This is a great weakness of modern 
government everywhere. If a man is found at his desk reading a book, he is 
assumed to be a loafer. Actually, he may be most profitably employed. I 
sometimes think it would be an admirable thing if some of the top [US 
intelligence community] members could devote the first two hours of the day to 
reading and study without particular reference to any current problem’.463 
Analyses should also be sensitive to both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches (or some combination of the two). Decisions and policies may also 
be viewed in terms of which actor is the principal motivator (or ‘driver’) of a 
process. Such actors may be individuals, institutions or largely undirected (or 
autonomous) geo-political processes. 
 
6.3. Types of Intelligence Activity 
 
The manner in which intelligence production techniques and principles can be 
understood in terms of an information management cycle should also be 
reviewed. The methodology and principles that are elaborated should be 
evaluated in terms of CW assessments in general and the three case studies in 
particular. Key questions must be posed and then the methodology tested against 
the case studies. 
                                                 
462 As mentioned in the Summary, it worth recalling Gordon S. Wood’s apt description of the 
ability of the eminent US jurist John Marshall (1755–1835) to balance detail and their broader 
implications: ‘Marshall could grasp a subject in its whole and yet simultaneously analyze its 
parts and relate them to the whole. He could move progressively and efficiently from premise to 
conclusion in a logical and rigorous manner and extract the essence of the law from the mass of 
particulars’. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: a History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), p. 434. 
463 Knorr (note 6), p. 54. 
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The intelligence cycle management has been defined as consisting of: (a) 
intelligence collection management, (b) intelligence analysis management and (c) 
intelligence dissemination (see Table 6.3). 
Robert M. Clark observes that the INT names in the US intelligence 
community traditionally reflect ‘bureaucratic initiatives, not proper INT 
descriptions’.464 For example, the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
was once responsible for IMINT. After it was renamed the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, its responsibility was recast as GEOINT.465 
Table 6.3 Intelligence Cycle Management 
 
Intelligence collection management 
 Acoustic intelligence (ACINT) 
Communications intelligence (COMINT) 
 Electronic intelligence (ELINT) 
 Geographical intelligence (GEOINT) 
Human intelligence (HUMINT) 
 Imagery intelligence (IMINT) 
 Location intelligence (LOCINT) 
 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) 
 Open source intelligence (OSINT) 
 Protected information (PROTINT) 
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
 
Intelligence analysis management 
 Intelligence analysis 
 Cognitive traps 
 Words of estimative probability 
 Analysis of competing hypotheses 
 Intelligence cycle (target-centric approach) 
 
Intelligence dissemination 
 Intelligence cycle security 
 Counter-intelligence 
 Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations 
 Counter-intelligence failures 
 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
The traditional intelligence cycle consists of a loop with the following 
elements: 1. Direction setting (i.e., problem formulation and planning), 2. 
Information collection, 3. Data collection, 4. Data manipulation and processing 
and 4. Data analysis. The intelligence is then written up as reports and 
transmitted to the customer (e.g., policymakers) who may then provide 
feedback.466 It is the traditional domestic intelligence cycle model. 
The intelligence cycle concept is less favoured and David Omand, a 
former director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)—
responsible for the UK’s signals intelligence and related information assurance 
support—and currently a visiting professor at King’s College, states that it has 
today largely been replaced with a variation of the ‘“National security” all-risks 
                                                 
464 Clark (note 29), p. 88. 
465 Clark (note 29), p. 89. 
466 Prunckun (note 380), pp. 4–5. 
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intelligence cycle’. This conceptualization has user interaction at the centre 
surrounded by five interlinked activities: (a) action-on, (b) direct requirements, 
(c) access, (d) elucidate and (e) disseminate.467 This conceptualization reflects 
the fact that intelligence activity in the non-state actor context has become 
internationalised to a great extent. A blurring of distinction between strategic and 
tactical intelligence requirements in the non-state actor threat context has also 
occurred. Finally, the creation and development of ‘situational awareness’ is 
increasingly less a function of uncovering ‘secret intelligence’, as it is a matter of 
appreciating the difficulties associated with the identification and accessing of 
relevant information (e.g., in libraries or on the Internet). The item of information 
itself may not, in fact, be secret or sensitive. Rather the task is to achieve ‘sense-
making’ of large quantities of data that otherwise tend to lose meaning due to the 
quantity of information. 
Karl E. Weick appears to have originated the term sense making.468 James 
M. Nyce states that the term has not been properly defined, and has been used 
inconsistently in a manner that is often too far removed from the meaning 
attached to it by Weick. Nyce also argues that Weick’s application of the term is 
insufficiently developed.469 
The taxonomy of intelligence research can be defined as (a) tactical 
intelligence, (b) strategic intelligence and (c) operational intelligence.470 The 
taxonomy of the present study is strategic intelligence which, in turn, is 
characterized by: (a) being a ‘higher form’ of intelligence, (b) provides a 
comprehensive view of the target or activity, (c) comments on future possibilities 
or identifies potential issues, (d) provides advice on threats, risks and 
vulnerabilities, (e) provides options for planning and policy development, (f) 
assists in the allocation of resources and (g) requires extensive knowledge of the 
target or the area of activity.471 
Finally, analysts have devoted increased attention to how intelligence 
management cycle can be extended to better cover non-state actor threats. 
Treverton has summarized important areas where this distinction exists (see 
Table 6.4). 
 
                                                 
467 Omand (note 13), p. 119. 
468 Karl E. Weick, ‘The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: the Mann Gulch 
Disaster’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4 (1993), pp. 628–652. The author was 
made aware of Weick’s work by Nyce (note 3). 
469 Nyce (note 3). 
470 Prunckun (note 380), pp. 6–7. 
471 Prunckun (note 380), pp. 6–7. 
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Table 6.4 Intelligence target characteristics during Cold War and today. 
 
    During Cold War   Non-state actor era 
 
Target   Superpowers   Transnational actors, some states 
 
Object of scrutiny Mostly large, rich, central  Many small states, individuals,  
peripheral to internt’l community 
 
‘Story’ of target  States are geographic,  No common theme. Variety of  
   hierarchal, bureaucratic  sizes and types of non-state  
actors 
 
Location of target External    Domestic and international 
 
Consumers  Limited. Primarily  Enormous nos. in principle: 
   government officials, military local, regional and private 
 
‘Boundedness’  Relatively bounded because Less bounded. Non-state actors 
   of nature of superpowers  patient. However, new groups 
       and new methods of attack 
 
Information  Too little. Dominated by  Too much. Broader range of 
   secret sources   sources. Secrets still matter. 
 
Interaction with  Relatively little   Great deal. Assymetric threat. 
target 
 
Form of intel.  Answer for puzzles.  Sensemaking for complexities in  
   Best estimate and speculation addition 
   on answers to mysteries 
 
Primacy of intel.  Important, not primary.  Primary. Prevention dependent  
   Deterrence not intelligence- on intelligence 
   rich. 
 
Source: Based on Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, Mass., 2009), p. 22. 
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OBSERVATIONS ON THE DERIVATION AND USE OF 
CW-RELATED INFORMATION 
 
 
he derivation and use of information to assess possible CW activities and 
programmes present a compelling, if somewhat obscure, history. Key 
analyses of a given target are necessarily opaque or classified in order to 
protect intelligence and law enforcement sources and methods.472 Other factors 
that promote secrecy include a desire to conceal incompetence and plagiarism, 
political sensitivity, and procedural and bureaucratic pressures (including 
inertia).473 The academic literature is sometimes overly generalized in that there 
is little or no specific case information or the analyses are too far removed from 
operational or other primary information that is typically accessible to 
government employees, defence contractors and some international civil servants 
only. Thus, a gap frequently exists between the operational requirements of 
government (e.g., for law enforcement, intelligence or other reasons-of-state) and 
the interests of academic researchers (e.g. political scientists and laboratory 
personnel). In the case of IR theory, the academic literature can focus on the 
development and modeling of theoretical approaches to understanding a process 
as the goal.474 
T 
There are also those whose writings are meant to promote political and 
national agendas or which reflect various prejudices which are not readily 
apparent. Facts may be deliberately mixed with misinformation, something that 
has not infrequently occurred with newspaper articles. 
A useful operating principle is to assume that one does not know what one 
thinks he or she knows unless those more directly involved have sufficiently 
convinced him or her. And then the ‘fact’ should only be accepted provisionally. 
Some facts are essentially known, while others should be viewed as working 
hypotheses. Political expediency, political affiliation and the taking of actions for 
reasons-of-state should not be confused with attempts to understand the ‘facts’ or 
the ‘truth’ as such. 
The factors and processes underlying this topic and the actors and the 
various related institutional behaviours cannot be disentangled readily. In 
addition, the arms control verification field has undergone several generational 
shifts which can be linked to the state of international relations (e.g., the 
‘classical’ European balance-of-power period, the Cold War phases, the rise and 
                                                 
472 E.g. see redactions in Report of the Defense Science Board: Summer Study on Chemical 
Warfare (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering: Washington, 
DC, Jan. 1981) Proceedings of meeting held on 3–15 Aug. 1980; San Diego, California 
(declassified). 
473 Garrett and Hart (note 108), ‘Bibliography,’ pp. 238–240. 
474 Garrett and Hart (note 108), ‘Bibliography’, pp. 238–240. 
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maturation of arms control and disarmament regimes, the information age, the 
biotechnology century, and non-state actor threat age). 
The derivation and use of information for CW assessments is thus affected 
by the scientific and political context of period, although many of the underlying 
principles remain the same. Expertise was developed and maintained with 
different threats in mind. In some instances, institutional mechanisms exist to 
maintain this expertise or the historical record of it. In other cases, the expertise 
has resided with a limited number of national experts who have since moved on, 
retired or passed away. While some of the underlying principles of these analyses 
remain constant, the specifics driving the creation of the various documentation 
have changed. This is partly driven by changes in science and technology and 
partly because the particulars of what activity the actors targeted are engaged in 
inevitably changes. 
Every field of inquiry possesses its own literature and individuals and 
institutions who are acknowledged as leading authorities. Every expert is 
generally able to discern whether someone is ‘in’ the field or from outside based 
on the terminology and sources used. 
Analytical methods evolve, partly in order to take into account S&T 
developments (e.g., of overhead imagery and the exchange of data over the 
internet). It also reflects changing understandings of the nature of information 
that is considered to be ‘sensitive’ and how it can or should be protected. The 
contemporary understanding of data mining with its emphasis on computer 
searchable data streams naturally differs from the manner in which information 
was acquired between World War I and World War II. 
Sampling and analysis for CW agents and their possible degradation 
products have been fundamentally transformed by scientific developments (e.g. 
through the development of portable GC/MS detectors) and the possibilities for 
physical access to the territories and facilities where such samples might be taken 
have generally expanded. The latter is partly thanks to the establishment of 
international arms control and disarmament regimes that allow for the taking of 
such samples under certain circumstances and, given the frequency and scale of 
international travel, the possibilities for surreptitious sampling have also 
expanded.475 Nevertheless, some underlying principles can be usefully contrasted 
and analysed in the three areas of focus in the methodology. 
 
                                                 
475 In 2013 there was much discussion on the serreptitious taking of samples from Syria by 
several states, including, apparently France, the UK and the United States. On 25 Apr. 2013, the 
White House sent an open letter to the US Congress which stated ’Our intelligence community 
does assess with varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical 
weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin. This assessment is 
based in part on physiological samples’. Letter by Miguel E. Rodriguez (Director, Office of 
Legislative Affairs, White House) to Senator Carl Levin copied to Senator John McCain, 25 
Apr. 2013.  
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ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
 
 
euer originated the concept of ACH while working at the CIA in 1978-
1986.476 His fundamental work in this area—at least in the public 
domain—is Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (1999).477 He states that 
ACH is distinctive from ‘conventional intuitive analysis’ in three major respects: 
 
H 
1. ‘Analysis starts with a full set of alternative possibilities, rather than 
with a most likely alternative for which the analyst seeks confirmation. 
This ensures that alternative hypotheses receive equal treatment and a 
fair shake’; 
2. ‘Analysis identifies and emphasizes the few items of evidence or 
assumptions that have the greatest diagnostic value in judging the 
relative likelihood of the alternative hypotheses. In conventional 
intuitive analysis, the fact that key evidence may also be consistent with 
alternative hypotheses is rarely considered explicitly and often 
ignored’; and 
3. ‘Analysis of competing hypotheses involves seeking evidence to refute 
hypotheses. The most probable hypothesis is usually the one with the 
least evidence against it, not the one with the most evidence for it. 
Conventional analysis generally entails looking for evidence to confirm 
a favored hypothesis’.478 
Variations of ACH are used as a training aid to help heighten intelligence 
analysts’ awareness of cognitive biases. Some defence contractor personnel focus 
solely on developing ACH methodologies.479 However, the sample hypotheses 
described in the literature often appear to be either rather straightforward thought 
experiments or attempts to quantify and automate data collection and analysis.480 
There appears to be a gap in the open literature on how ACH might be applied to 
strategic studies, weapon systems, or dual-purpose technology. 
Some work has been carried out in the military strategic context (e.g., on 
deception). The UK Defence Intelligence Staff has developed a structured 
version of ACH.481 Frank J. Stech and Christopher Elsaesser have modified the 
                                                 
476 Wheaton and Chido (note 4), p. 12. 
477 Heuer, Jr. (note 427). 
478 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 108. 
479 Personal communication with Department of State official. 
480 E.g., Simon Pope and Audun Jøsang, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses using Subjective 
Logic (ACH-SL), briefing slides, DSTC, CRC for Enterprise Distributed Ssytems Technology, 
General Purpose South, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, 13–16 June 2005. 
481 Goodman and Omand (note 416). 
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ACH to develop a business process and semi-automated tools to detect deception 
which they test against how this SAT might have been used in the lead up to the 
Battle of Midway.482 Simon Pope and Audun Jøsang have modified ACH using a 
semi-automated system based on the mathematics of subjective logic which they 
term ACH-SL.483 Wheaton and Chido propose, through SACH, the generation of 
sub-hypotheses and the introduction and development of automation as a means 
to evaluate the resulting decision-trees. A variation of ACH could help to address 
the difficulty of practical future policy application of the methodology with 
regard to chemical weapons-related activity. 
ACH involves a reiterative 8-step process or cycle. The 8-steps call for 
continuous reassessment and improvement of assessments based on new 
information and the results of repeated testing of hypotheses. They are: 
1. Hypothesis generation. Identify the possible hypotheses to be 
considered. 
2. List evidence and arguments.  
3. Prepare a matrix. Hypotheses are to be placed at the top of the matrix 
with evidence listed vertically. The ‘diagnosticity of the evidence and 
arguments should be analyzed in order to identify the items most useful in 
determining the relative likelihood of the hypotheses. 
4. Refine the matrix. Reconsider the hypotheses and delete evidence and 
arguments that have no diagnostic value. 
5. Tentative conclusions. Draw tentative conclusions about the relative 
likelihood of each hypotheses. Attempt to disprove the hypotheses, rather 
than to prove them. 
6. Reevaluate weight of critical evidence. Analyze how sensitive the 
conclusions are to a few critical items of evidence. Consider the 
consequences if the evidence supportng the analysis is incorrect, 
misleading or subject to different interpretation. 
7. Report conclusions. Discuss the likelihood of all hypotheses, not just 
the most likely one or the one that was ‘accepted’. 
8. Identify milestones for future observation. These milestones may 
indicate events that take a different course than expected. Collection of 
additional information can also suggest other possibilities for future.484 
 
Wheaton and Chido identify two main strengths of ACH. First, the 
methodology creates an audit or evidence trail that reveals the analytic process 
and the evidence upon which it is based. Managers of intelligence units can 
therefore more easily evaluate ‘after-action reviews’ to determine where the 
results were correct as part of process validation. Second, ACH compels analysts 
to consider alternate explanations or hypotheses systematically, thereby 
                                                 
482 Frank J. Stech and Christopher Elsaesser, Midway Revisited: Detecting Deception by 
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, performing organization report no. 04-0813, unclassified 
(The MITRE Corporation: McLean, Virginia, 11 Nov. 2004). 
483 Pope and Jøsang (note 480). 
484 Phrasing based, with slight modifications, on Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 97; and Wheaton 
and Chido (note 4), pp. 12–13. 
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minimizing or making explicit intuitive assumptions. Wheaton and Chido also 
identify two weaknesses of ACH. First, it depends on the validity of the 
‘evidence’. Unreliable evidence or disinformation can undermine seemingly 
‘scientific’ processes and conclusions. Second, carrying out ACH in the absence 
of an automated process or mechanism can be highly time consuming given the 
large numbers of hypotheses and amount of evidence analysts are actually faced 
with in their daily routines.485 
Any system pre-supposes the existence of patterns, order or relationships 
where none may exist. An assumption that objective facts can be discovered and 
understood may also exist. Alternatively, one could view efforts to achieve a 
better understanding as an iterative process (Bayesian). In philosophy and 
elsewhere, observers also sometimes speak of the risks posed by ‘determined’ or 
‘over-determined’ outcomes. Any application of a methodology carries this risk 
and retrospective analyses unavoidably introduce distortions. For example, after-
the-fact awareness often shapes ‘received wisdom’ at that moment, rather than 
the received wisdom at the time events were predicted or were actually 
occurring. Some analysts and officials therefore argue that if an event or 
understanding was not documented at the time it occurred, the event did not 
occur or the understanding did not exist.486 
Cognitive traps may occur due to: (a) the effect of underlying views, (b) a 
failure of imagination, (c) a role of religion, (d) the role of philosophical and 
political views, (e) ‘cherry picking’ of evidence and (f) deception measures 
implemented by the target of analysis. It is therefore useful to test a variation of 
ACH using multiple hypotheses and sub-hypotheses for a specific type of 
analytical problem: the evaluation of CW programmes and activities. Because 
sub-hypotheses are introduced in the present study, this essentially meets the 
definitional requirements of Wheaton and Chido for SACH. The methodology 
used in this study is therefore labeled SACH-CW. In other words, in cases where 
the estimate is reasonably ‘clear’, the complexity of the hypothesis can be 
increased with an eventual view towards supporting strategic analysis. In cases 
where the estimate is not sufficiently clear, further information must be sought—
preferably information which is ‘diagnostic’. 
 
                                                 
485 Wheaton and Chido (note 4), p. 13. 
486 This point has been raised in the context of the preparation of oral histories of UN 
inspections in Iraq where contemporary recollections do not necessarily coincide with the 
documentation. Personal communication with UNODA official. 
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9 
 
 
DEFINING CW-FOCUSED STRUCTRUED ANALYSIS OF 
COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
 
 
his section attempts to define an operationally meaningful ACH 
methodology specific to chemical warfare. This formulation of ACH is 
tested against three case studies. Each case study consists of a narrative 
that is informed by a structured table of topics. While matrices and hypotheses 
are offered, the structured table of topics will be done to help focus and structure 
the narrative, as well as to make it more apparent to the reader. It is not possible 
to transform a complicated and wide-ranging set of information into a matrix 
without narrative. While automation and quantification present interesting 
analytical problems, the author is of the view that focused qualitative analysis 
can better inform operational requirements of arms control verification, 
intelligence analysis and broader policy. It is hoped that the study will elucidate 
the degree to which a SACH-CW is applicable or practical in these areas. 
T 
 
9.1. CW Matrices, Decisionmaking Process and Indicators 
 
Wheaton and Chido offer a basic ACH matrix and a SACH flowchart. In cases 
where clear estimates are possible, the competing hypotheses can be made more 
complex (i.e., more structured). 
 
Figure 9.1 Structured Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (SACH) process.487 
 
                                                 
487 Wheaton and Chido (note 4), p. 15. 
90   HART  
Traditionally, indicators for offensive and defensive CBW were developed 
with state military programmes in mind. As mentioned previously, much of the 
work on offensive and defensive indicators for biological warfare programmes 
has been done by Milton Leitenberg (see Table 9.1). The 1993 US OTA report 
reviews CBRN and ballistic missile indicators.488 Many are are also broadly 
applicable as potential chemical warfare programme indicators. The principal 
acquisition steps of chemical weapons identified by the OTA report are: (a) 
acquire equipment, material and expertise, (b) initiate pilot-scale production of 
agent, (c) purchase or domestic production of munition componenets, (d) 
munition filling, (e) establish storage and associated infrastructure, (f) undertake 
the acquisition of chemical defence capabilities (e.g., detection, decontamination 
equipment), (g) undertake the development of military doctrine and training 
programmes.489 
Intelligence and arms control verification analysts should be cognizant of 
the relevance of developments in science and technology to such models. The 
dichotomies identified by Leitenberg in 1996 (see Table 9.1), for example, have 
become less relevant due to changes in science and technology, research and 
industry practice and an increased focus on non-state actor threats. With respect 
to the distinction between BW and non-BW ‘facilities, security, and equipment’, 
all information used by civilian life sciences facilities today is generally 
considered proprietary (i.e., it is not public). Also aerosol test chambers are now 
common to such facilities (not only to defence-related facilities). Furthermore, 
the security and sophistication of software and hardware systems at civilian 
facilities can actually be higher than those at defence-related facilities. In some 
respects, defence and non-defence facilities are converging in terms of their 
design, operating protocols and capabilities, partly as a consequence of 
international efforts to promote and integrate safety and security measures for 
chemicals and biological substances. 
                                                 
488 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (note 12). See also Frisina, M. E., ‘The 
Offensive-defensive Fistinction in Military Biological Research’, Hastings Center Report, vol. 
20, no. 3 (May/June 1990), pp. 19–22; and Roger Roffey, ‘Biological Weapons and Potential 
Indicators of Offensive Biological Weapon Activities’, SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004), pp. 557–571. 
489 Based on US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (note 12), p. 19. 
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Table 9.1 Overview of offensive vs. defensive BW indicators. 
 
Categories: 
Funding and personnel 
Facility design, equipment and security 
Technical considerations 
Safety 
Process flow 
 
Funding and personnel 
 
BW facility    Legitimate facility 
1. Military funding    1. Private enterprise or non-military 
2. High salary    2. Salary within normal limits 
3. Funding exceeds product/research output 3. Average or underfunded for expected output 
4. Scientist/technician ratio high  4. Average ratio 
5. Limited ethnic diversity490  5. Integrated work staff 
6. Elite workforce/trained abroad491  6. Domestically trained workforce 
7. Multi-lingual competency  7. Limited linguistic capabilities 
8. High ratio of military to civilian  8. Military personnel unlikely 
 
Facilities, security, and equipment 
 
BW facility    Legitimate facility 
1.Access control: high walls, guard towers, 1. Avg. security (badges and little else) 
  motion detectors, video cameras, 
 elite security force, badges and 
 security clearance procedures 
2. Transport provided   2. Public or private transport 
3. Quarantine facilities onsite  3. No quarantine 
4. Travel to other countries restricted 4. Unrestricted travel to other countries 
 (readily available to some) 
5. Refrigerated bunkers, secure area 5. Cold rooms in facility 
6. Advanced software, external database 6. Open information (except proprietary) 
 access, ADP security, high 
 foreign access 
7. Static aerosol test chambers  7. No aerosol test chambers 
8. Military with weapons expertise  8. No military with weapons expertise 
9. Rail or heavy trucking required for 9. Only light truck transportation 
 filling facility 
 
Technical considerations 
 
BW facility    Legitimate facility 
1. Pathogenic or toxic strains  1. Non-pathogenic or non-toxic strains 
2. Test aimed at killing animals  2 Test aimed at minimizing animal mortality 
3. Facilities for large animals  3. Facilities for smaller animals, specific 
 such as monkeys and   inbred strains 
 primates 
4. Negative air flow   4. Positive air flow 
5. No commercial products  5. Commercial products 
6. Weapons-filling equipment  6. Bottle-filling equipment 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
490 Applicable for some states. 
491 Applicable for some states. 
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Safety 
 
BW facility    Legitimate facility 
1. Physical barriers to prevent animal-  1. Physical barriers designed animal to 
 to-animal and animal-to-human  animal and human to animal  
 transmission    transmission 
2. HEPA filters present, exhaust  2. HEPA filters possible, intake 
3. Dedicated biosafety personnel  3. May or may not be present 
4. Infectious and toxic agent trained 4. Dedicated highly trained medical staff  
 medical staff    less likely 
5. Decontamination equipment and  5. Not needed on a large scale 
 showers 
6. Large capacity pass through autoclaves 6. Small bench top autoclaves 
7. Dedicated waste treatment  7. Waste treatment integrated with local 
      system 
8. Specialized sterilization of waste  8. May or may not exist 
9. Test animals sterilized before final 9. Animals may not need to be sterilized 
 disposal     before final disposal 
 
Process flow 
 
BW facility     Legitimate facility 
1. Raw material consumption does not equal 1. Raw material consumption relates to 
 output     output 
2. Large volume fermenters (greater than 2. Large- and small-scale fermentation but 
 500 litres), cell cultures (thousands  cell culture and eggs in smaller 
 of culture flasks/roller bottles),  volume 
 embryonated eggs (hundreds, or 
 thousands) 
3. Air pressure gradients keep microbes 3. Air pressure gradients keep contaminants  within vessel
    out of vessel 
4. Finished product—wet stored at low 4. Labelled by product, batch no., date, etc. 
 temperature in sealed (often double 
 packaging) containers—not readily 
 identifiable 
5. Milling equipment operated in biohazard 5. Milling equipment is not operated in 
 protective suits    biohazard areas 
6. Storage—low temperature, high security, 6. Storage in temperature controlled 
 bunkers with biocontainment  environment, clean warehouse 
      conditions 
7. Munitions—special filling buildings 7. Non-issue 
 and/or explosives handling 
 facilities 
 
Source: Reproduced with slight modifications from Milton Leitenberg, ‘Biological Weapons Arms 
Control’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 17, no. 1 (Apr. 1996), pp. 57-58. 
The main hypotheses for an ACH application to CW and their matrices 
are given in the following section. The indicators have been selected with the 
following criteria in mind. First, they must be fundamental to the analysis of 
potential CW activities or programmes. Second, they should be limited in 
number. Third, they should be sufficiently broad so as to permit a meaningful 
analytical narrative for any case study (historical, contemporary or future; 
technical or political). Fifth, the indicators should provide sufficient structure to 
allow one to identify and organize key data from large amounts of information in 
order to produce meaningful, policy-relevant analyses. Doing so might also assist 
in the consideration of Heuer’s step 6 (reevaluate weight of critical evidence) and 
step 8 (identify milestones for future observation). 
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Each matrix is based on a major hypothesis (i.e., the production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons). However, the supporting analysis should—in 
view of the great volume of information—be largely qualitative. The selection of 
key questions necessary to address each main hypothesis must also be kept 
within reasonable limits so as not to lose analytical focus. For example, Jervis 
observes that while the number of [intelligence-relevant] questions that can be 
posed are ‘theoretically limitless’, it is nevertheless ‘often possible to find a 
relatively small number of crucial ones, which, if answered differently, would 
most alter one’s understanding of the situation and the predictions one would 
make’.492 He also argues that feedback from policymakers would assist in the 
selection of the most relevant questions.493 The same may also be said of those 
responsible for carrying out any weapon-related verification measures. In 
addition, Jervis concluded that the estimates by US intelligence on the pre-
Iranian Revolution political status did not provide a range of interpretations. He 
therefore recommends that estimates provide evidence for and against alternate 
conclusions or assessments as part of normal practice.494 
Consideration of computer automation of ACH will also be avoided. 
Although such automation is possible, it is a complication that deserves separate 
treatment in order to assess its feasiblity for CW. Automation may also reflect, to 
an extent, a US bias in wishing to seek a technical solution to what is in fact 
rather a matter of how to assess political and ideological motivation and the 
significance of human behaviour.495 
It is also perhaps notable that organizational security procedures have 
been developed to the point which disallow certain types of individual initiative 
that are common to organizations that have fewer or less extensive procedures 
(e.g., in small or medium power states). Those involved in CW evaluations in 
various states are undoubtedly constrained by institutional procedures and 
expectations. These can include: the parameters of what constitutes an 
‘acceptable’ estimate, and understandings of what constitutes ‘sensitive’ 
                                                 
492 Jervis (note 399), p. 48. 
493 Jervis (note 399), p. 48. 
494 Jervis (note 399), p. 48. 
495 Living with ambiguity and attempting to resolve it within the chemical warfare context 
deserves attention and will be considered further in the conclusions. Diarmaid MacCulloch 
relates how a Moscow priest said that the difference between how people in the West and the 
Orthodox East react to a problem is that, in the West, people look for a solution, while the 
Orthodox are more inclined to live with the problem. This remark was made within a religious 
and cultural context. Diarmaid MacCulloch, A History of Christianity: the First Three Thousand 
Years (Allen Lane: London, 2009), p. 509. It has also been often observed that the United 
States, in particular, approaches policy challenges and security threats by devoting large 
resources to their ‘solution’. The author suspects that this may, in part, be related to a ‘law suit 
culture’ which demands and expects that all precautions and measures be taken in order to try to 
achieve absolute security (i.e. to protect the environment and population). 
In 2011 the US DHS was engaged in the trial testing of the Future Attribute Screening 
Technology (FAST) programme (formerly known as Project Hostile Intent) which consists of a 
suite that includes infrared cameras and pressure pads designed to detect discomfort (such as 
fidgeting, increased heart rate, facial blushing and pupil dialation) consistent with those who 
might be contemplating an illegal act. Nick Allen, ‘US Crime Predicting Technology Tests 
Draw Minority Report Comparisons’, Telegraph, 11 Oct. 2011, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8818716/US-crime-predicting-
technology-tests-draw-Minority-Report-comparisons.html>, (accessed 18 July 2013). 
94   HART  
information. Sensitive information may be so considered for organizational 
reasons, rather than for being inherently sensitive as such. A view that a given 
piece of information is sensitive may also reflect the fact that the individual is 
largely (or only) familiar with the closed literature on the topic. Thus, all but the 
most prosaic information can be viewed as ‘sensitive’. The leadership of an 
organization may wish to limit information dissemination and, therefore, imposes 
a broad understanding of the term sensitive in order to limit autonomous or 
otherwise unapproved actions by the lower echelons. To do otherwise, may 
introduce undesirable ambiguity because individuals would be provided greater 
latitude resulting in unpredictable situations that affect the institution’s 
operational integrity or the state’s policymaking process. 
A major methodological question is how one approaches defining and 
elucidating a method for the derivation and use of information in order to assess 
CW activities and programmes. In the case of ACH, this entails developing: (a) 
an audit trail, (b) insight into how to structure and populate a CW-specific series 
of matrices and (c) a policy relevant procedure for refining the analytical output. 
The analysis should also attempt to pose questions systematically so as to 
yield different conclusions that must be further tested and refined iteratively (i.e., 
to weigh and assess competing hypotheses and sub-hypotheses). Whether the 
information provided is representative and the criteria by which this is 
determined should be considered. 
ACH methodology may also be applied according to three ‘philosophical’ 
approaches during the testing phase (steps 6 and 7): 1. all information is 
interpreted in the most positive manner (i.e., that the activity of the target of 
analysis is non-prohibited under the CWC), 2. ambiguous and non-commital 
wherever possible and 3. a worst case scenario interpretation. Each should result 
in a distinct analytical outcome. The differences (or lack thereof) should form 
part of the analysis. Approaching the analysis in this manner by a single author 
helps to serve the function of multiple hypotheses generated by several 
individuals or groups. 
The focus should be on the analytical process, rather than, for example, on 
the broader political and organizational matters that define consumer–producer 
relations in the field of intelligence reporting or the capacity and procedures of 
states to support arms control verification. The principal focus should be on the 
qualitative analysis in the main text with possible supplemental (including 
quantitative) annexes. 
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10 
 
 
 
OPERATIONALISING A CW-FOCUSED ACH: 
ORGANISATION OF ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
 
 
WC-defined violation scenarios are considered for each of the three case 
studies: (a) the production of chemical weapons or (b) the stockpiling of 
chemical weapons. Adhering to CWC-defined violations focuses the 
analysis and make it more relevant to contemporary and future arms control 
verification, intelligence methodology and strategic and defence analysis. The 
CWC also prohibits the development, use, and transfer of chemical weapons. 
However, as previously noted, the development and use of chemical weapons 
will only be considered insofar as it relates to the production or stockpiling of 
such weapons (e.g., as part of analysis of intent). This is done in order to narrow 
the focus. Stockpiling is more susceptible to detection than laboratory-scale 
research and scale-up of CW production. Stockpiling is thus less susceptible to 
politicized legal hair splitting arguments as compared to small-scale development 
and production. The transfer of chemical weapons deserves separate analysis 
within the framework of current oversight and control of chemical transfers. 
Therefore transfers of chemical weapons or their possible precursors will also not 
be considered except somewhat tangentially. 
C 
The ACH methodology can also be used to test a ‘situational logic’ that 
can then be checked for internal consistency and set against other situational 
logic-defined scenarios. 
Situational logic is the most common analytic strategy used by 
intelligence analysts.496 It means that a given scenario should be understood 
according to ‘the terms of its unique logic, rather than as one example of a broad 
class of comparable events’.497 The scenario should be internally consistent and 
function as a ‘plausible narrative’. The analyst may then ‘work backwards to 
explain the origins or causes of the current situation or forward to estimate the 
future outcome’.498 Situational logic focuses on elucidating cause-effect relations 
and means-ends relations. In doing so, the analyst ‘identifies the goals being 
pursued and explains’ why the actor believes ‘certain means will achieve those 
goals’.499 
Heuer identifies two principal weaknesses to this analytic strategy: (a) 
understanding the mental and bureacratic processes of other actors can be 
extremely difficult, and (b) the strategy can fail to take advantage of the 
theoretical knowledge derived from the study of similar phenomena in other 
states and for other periods.500 
                                                 
496 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 32. 
497 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 32. 
498 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 33. 
499 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 33. 
500 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 33. 
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Step 1. Identify the Possible Hypotheses to be Considered 
 
As previously noted, the two main hypotheses considered in the case studies are: 
(a) the production of chemical weapons and (b) the stockpiling of chemical 
weapons. As part of defining the problem, the CWC’s definition of a chemical 
weapon is employed.501 
 
Main hypothesis 1.  
Has the target of analysis produced chemical weapons? 
Main hypothesis 2.  
Has the target of analysis stockpiled chemical weapons? 
 
It is not necessary for ACH to be conducted by groups or using dedicated 
software. To the extent that group activity in developing the technique is 
desirable, this study may be seen as an initial assessment that can be subjected to 
peer review and other forms of evaluation or validation. This application may 
also serve as a starting point for further iterations of the hypotheses and matrices 
by others. 
Heuer and Pherson believe that the technique is ‘well-suited for 
addressing questions about technical issues in the chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear arena’.502 
 
Step 2. Make a List of Significant Evidence and Arguments For and 
Against Each Hypothesis 
 
The principal requirement under this step is to provide basic background on 
chemical-weapon related activities for each of the case studies. This information 
is provided according to the following structure (Table 10.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
501 Namely, the convention defines such weapons as the following together or separately: (a) 
toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; (b) 
munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic 
properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a 
result of the employment of such munitions and devices; (c) any equipment specifically 
designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified 
in subparagraph (b). CWC, Article II, para. 1. 
502 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 161. 
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Table 10.1 Structure of Background Narrative to Case Studies. 
 
Political factors 
 
Definition of violation 
Intent 
 Doctrine 
 Consistent with types and quanties? 
Threat perception 
Apparent 
Actual 
Demand side factors 
Supply side factors 
 
 
Technical factors 
 
Assimilation 
Capability 
Technological stages 
Verification measures 
Onsite 
Nearsite 
Offsite 
 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Weapons acquisition and assimiliation are determined by the dynamics of 
push-pull factors. Thus, a variety of supply and demand factors determine the 
acquisition and integration of chemical weapons into training, doctrine and 
logistics.503 The process of assimilation of new technology into weapon systems 
is often slow and characterized by special interest advocacy, military disfavour 
and moral or ethical repugnance.504 A military must adapt its operating 
procedure and adjust its structure to accommodate a new weapon system or 
technology.505 This adaptation process imposes an ‘opportunity cost’ in that the 
adoption of a given weapon system or technology inhibits the adaptation or 
adaptability of other weapon systems and associated technology.506 Julian P. 
Perry Robinson argues that so long as a weapon system is not fully assimilated, 
‘its status is determined by supply side factors’ and its final acceptance therefore 
remains uncertain.507 The public language of military strategy and defence 
analysis can also influence the negotiations of arms control and disarmament 
agreements and their implementation.508 
                                                 
503 Most of the literature on demand-supply side factors is from the nuclear (and possibly 
conventional) weapons field. The terminology is similar to, but distinct from, push-pull factor 
analysis. 
504 Julian P. Perry Robinson phrases it as ‘special-interest advocacy, military disfavour and 
moral obloquy’. Robinson (note 41), p. 117. 
505 Robinson (note 41), p. 117. 
506 Robinson (note 41), p. 117. 
507 Robinson (note 41), p. 120. 
508 Robinson (note 41), p. 120. 
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Two key points for analysis of assessing a CW programme are whether 
the opponent has a no-first use policy, and whether there is active CW 
assimilation or active CW dis-assimilation.509 Momentum for or against 
assimilation of a given weapon system can also be affected by the political, legal 
and defence and security aspects associated with the consideration of weapons 
free zones (e.g., chemical or nuclear). If weapons modernization, for example, is 
pursued in order to strengthen one’s negotiating position on a disarmament 
agreement, then a certain de facto momentum towards assimilation (and longer-
term acceptance) of the weapon system may result.510 Prior to the finalization of 
the CWC, the Reagan Administration pursued a CW modernization programme 
in the 1980s partly through the development of binary systems. Conversely, 
demonstrating a willingness to retain weapon systems, or to modernize or 
stockpile them can arguably prompt negotiating states to conclude negotiations 
sooner.511 
Heuer, citing Alexander George, identifies the following pitfalls which 
may be encountered when attempting to create a full set of hypotheses: (a) 
‘satisficing’, (b) incrementalism, (c) consensus, (d) reasoning by analogy, and (e) 
relying on sets of principles or maxims.512 
Satisficing occurs when an analyst selects the first available option that 
seems ‘good enough’, rather than examining all possible alternatives in order to 
try to determine which is ‘best’. The reasons for this are similar to those that 
produce confirmation bias. Incrementalism refers to an analyst’s focus on ‘a 
narrow range of alternatives that represent marginal change’ rather than 
completely reassessing one’s mental approach and opinion. Consensus refers to 
the tendency by analysts to reach conclusions they believe will garner agreement 
or support within the institution or government. This reflects a basic 
unwillingness to contradict accepted or ‘received wisdom’. Reasoning by 
analogy can be a useful technique so long as one understands its purpose and 
underlying assumptions. However, reasoning by analogy should be avoided if it 
consists of selecting an alternative ‘that appears most likely to avoid some 
previous error or to duplicate a previous success’. Finally, any set of principles 
that dictates whether alternatives are ‘bad’ or ‘good’ can itself be misleading. 
 
 
                                                 
509 Robinson (note 41), p. 122. 
510 See Julian P. Perry Robinson, ‘An Historical Context for European Chemical-Weapon-
Free Zone Concepts, with an Account of Current European Chemical-Warfare Forces’, pp. 1–29 
in Ed. Ralf Trapp, Chemical Weapon Free Zones?, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare 
Studies no. 7 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987, reprinted 1988). 
511 The Reagan Administration’s deployment of Pershing II nuclear missiles to Europe 
arguably helped to facilitate the subsequent agreement by the Soviet Union and the United 
States on the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 
512 Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: the Effective Use of 
Information and Advice (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1980), chap. 2. Cited in Heuer, Jr. 
(note 427), p. 43. 
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Step 3. Prepare matrix with hypotheses 
 
Heuer considers evidence to be ‘diagnostic’ when it affects one’s judgement of 
the ‘relative likelihood’ of the hypotheses identified in step 1.513 He attempts to 
illustrate the concept, which is often cited in the intelligence field, by using the 
medical analogy of a patient with a fever. There are many reasons for a high 
temperature and the temperature reading is not especially useful for medical 
diagnostic purposes in the absence of further context.514 In the field of 
intelligence or information analysis, Heuer considers a factor to have high 
‘diagnosticity’ if it is somehow uniquely revealing or if it brings special 
understanding to the problem. Information that tends to support prevailing views 
or assessments is not highly ‘diagnostic’ unless it yields further (preferably 
unusual) understanding. 
Bayesian analysis is also dependent on the concept of diagnosticity. A 
simplified quantitative application of diagnosticity using Bayesian logic is 
provided by Omand.515 A target country is periodically evaluated for whether its 
rocket programme is for civil and/or military purposes. Based on existing 
evidence, the analysis concludes that there is a 20 per cent likelihood that current 
testing is military. The question arises as to whether the most recent test is 
civilian or military. The telemetry of the most recent test is encrypted with a 
system used by the military. If all civilian tests are so encrypted, the knowledge 
that the most recent test was encrypted with such a military system adds nothing 
in terms of diagnosticity to the analysis. To repeat, the information that the 
telemetry was encrypted with a code used by the military has no diagnostic 
value. Therefore, with all other factors remaining the same, the estimate must 
remain the same (i.e., there is an 80 per cent chance the test was civilian). 
However, if no previous civilian tests had used encrypted telemetry 
(whether the encryption used is known to be employed by the military is a 
related, but distinct issue), then this fact does have diagnostic value. Thus, with 
all other relevant factors remaining the same, the likelihood that the most recent 
test was civilian must be lowered (conversely the likelihood that the test was 
military must be raised). 
Startling or unusual information does not necessarily have diagnostic 
value and could distort an assessment (or its reading by the consumer) because of 
its unexpectedness or novelty. Well-known publicly available information, by 
contrast, may have high diagnosticity, but its implications are underappreciated 
because the information is ‘common knowledge’. The concept of diagnosticity 
will be a major focus of analytical narrative and has parallels to Daniel 
Kahneman’s analysis of ‘heuristics’ (i.e., ‘rules of thumb’ to identify and 
explicate cognitive biases), including for the avoidance of WYSIATI and 
hindsight bias. 
The matrices for the stockpiling and use of chemical weapons are 
provided below. The responses to each hypothesis are: consistent (C), 
inconsistent (I) or not applicable (N/A). This labeling is meant to provide an 
                                                 
513 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 102. 
514 On the parallel between medical and intelligence diagnostics, see Marrin (note 19), pp. 
111–123; and Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 42. 
515 Omand (note 13), pp. 155–156. 
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overview of ‘all the significant components’ of the analytical problem.516 The 
format of this particular ACH matrix is based on one provided by Heuer.517 
The number of questions posed in each matrix should, in my view, meet 
the following criteria: (a) be of key or fundamental importance to addressing the 
hypotheses, (b) be as few in number as possible and (c) serve as ‘hooks’ with 
which essentially all the important questions can be discussed in the analytical 
narrative. 
It is also important to inquire whether the order in which the hypotheses 
are dealt with can affect the reader’s opinion of their relative validity. Will a 
reader, for example, be more attracted to the first hypothesis and least receptive 
to the last hypothesis when looking at the matrix (or after reading through the 
analysis in a yes, no, ambiguous/maybe order)? Some brain science research 
suggests that humans are inclined to accept an initial presentation or 
characterization of ‘facts’ over those subsequently presented even when they are 
explicitly told of this physiologically-based, statistically significant tendency. 
 
Matrix  Production/Stockpiling 
 
Question: Has the target (i.e., state or non-state actor) stockpiled chemical weapons? 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1 No production/stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=18, I=8, N/A=10] 
H2 Yes production/stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=18, I=17, N/A=1] 
        H1 H2 
 
IR1. Does target have CW technical capacity (e.g. military, medical)? 
 E.1 General publications aimed at domestic audience  (yes) I C 
 E.2 General publications aimed at domestic audience (no) C I 
 E.3 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (yes) N/A C 
 E.4 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (no) C I 
 E.5 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (yes) N/A C 
 E.6 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (no) C I 
 
Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
IR2. Is CW mentioned in military doctrine? 
 E.1 Defence against CW in civil defence context (yes) N/A C 
 E.2 Defence against CW in civil defence context (no)  C I 
 E.3 Defence against CW for military personnel (yes)  N/A C 
 E.4 Defence against CW for military personnel (no)  C I 
 E.5 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) N/A C 
 E.6 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no)  C I 
 E.7 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) N/A C 
 E.8 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no) C I 
 
 Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
IR3. Statements and similar communications 
E.1 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (no)  C I 
 
Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
                                                 
516 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 100. 
517 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), figure 15, p. 101. 
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IR4. Weight of evidence of integration of CW into military doctrine? 
 E.1 Publications indicate integration of CW (yes)  I C 
 E.2 Publications indicate integration of CW (no)  C I 
 E.3 Arms control policy statements against CW (yes)  C I 
 E.4 Arms control policy statements for CW (yes)*  I C 
 
Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
IR5. Interest in CW activities of others? 
 E.1 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (no)  C N/A 
 
Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW production? 
 E.1 Laboratory scale synthesis (extraction) of CW agents (yes) N/A C 
 E.2 Laboratory scale synthesis (extraction) of CW agents (no) C I 
 E.3 CW production facility indicators (yes)   I C 
 E.4 CW production facility indicators (no)   C I 
 E.5 CW stockpiling indicators (yes) **   I C 
 E.6 CW stockpiling indicators (no)    C I 
 E.7 Documentation of production (yes)   I C 
 E.8 Documentation of production (no)   C I 
 E.9 Documentation of stockpiling (yes)**   I C 
 E.10 Documentation of stockpiling (no)   C I 
 E.11 Availability of CW production material/equipment (yes) N/A C 
 E.12 Availability of CW production material/equipment (no) C I 
 E.13 Availability of CW munition (yes)   I C 
 E.14 Availability of CW munition (no)   C I 
 
Qualitative working assessment: SUMMARIZE 
 
Qualitative summary: 
 Weight of data integrity and consistency difficulties (key dichotomies)? Re: production, planning, 
documentation. 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Heuer’s ACH matrix. C=consistent, I=inconsistent and N/A=not 
applicable, IR=information request, E=evidence. *E.g., Some parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
reserved the right to use CW if such weapons were first used against them. **The question is not a non 
sequitor in the sense that, for e.g., overhead imagery might be available that suggests such stockpiling. 
People and groups will naturally fill in such a table differently. However, 
the rationale for why it was done so should be evident, including to those who 
disagree. 
The evidence and sub-evidence chains can (and almost certainly have) 
been developed using ACH programmes. This is appropriate when massive 
amounts of data are being systematically collated and evaluated by multiple 
analysts or working groups. Such an approach lends itself to quantitative 
analysis. 
For qualitative or strategic analysis, a simplified version of the ACH 
tables is preferable. To promote qualitative, including strategic, analysis the 
evidence chains should be limited in range and scope. The evidence chains 
should also be balanced and sufficiently focused. For in-depth, highly detailed 
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quantitative data analysis, special computer programmes should probably be 
employed that show multiple chains of evidence and their interlinkages.518 
A further point of possible analysis is whether different personality types 
are statistically more inclined to place C’s and I’s that reveal patterns. A 
symmetry exists in the question pairings listed above. For example: 
 
 E.1 General publications aimed at domestic audience  (yes) I C 
 E.2 General publications aimed at domestic audience (no) C I 
 
An apparent asymmetry that may reflect the point of view of an analyst is 
evident in the following: 
 
 E.1 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (no)  C I 
 
In a general sense, laboratory-scale synthesis of CW being marked N/A 
for H1 (No stockpiling of chemical weapons) can perhaps be a matter of opinion. 
Some analysts might argue that N/A should read ‘I’. How one views this 
particular point depends on whether one accepts that states may legitimately 
develop and test CW agents at the laboratory-scale. Such work is allowed under 
the CWC today and would generally be understood to constitute part of a 
‘defence CW programme’.519 In a pre-CWC international security environment 
(e.g., during the inter-World War period), any laboratory scale synthesis of CW 
agent would probably be judged as an indicator that is consistent with the 
production and stockpiling of chemical weapons by a state. There is an increased 
emphasis on non-state actor threats in the current international security 
environment. Also chemical warfare is prohibited by international law under any 
circumstances. In view of these two factors, synthesis of CW at the laboratory 
scale can be viewed as fairly non-threatening or even routine (if done by states). 
One can therefore argue that the evidence chain E.1 is—to varying degrees—
‘delinked’ from the consideration of H1 and H2 in the context of the current 
international security environment.520 
Analysts will also probably disagree on the optimal content and phrasing 
of information requests and evidence lines. For example, addressing the question 
of CW ‘production’ can become somewhat confused when one considers the 
actual indicators and related information. Such indicators and information may 
suggest or relate to small-scale laboratory production, or large-scale production 
or a standby production capacity. Analysts might also disagree on specific 
information regarding materials, technology and know-how that can be used for 
both peaceful purposes and to support offensive CW activity and programmes. 
                                                 
518 See Pherson Associates, <www.pherson.org>, (accessed 26 May 2013); and Palo Alto 
Research Center, ‘ACH2.0.5 Download Page’, <www2.parc.com/istl/projects/ach/ach.html>, 
(accessed 26 May 2013). 
519 The parties may produce Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
protective purposes at a so-called single small-scale facility. CW agents may also be produced 
at ‘other facilities’ subject to certain restrictions. CWC, Verification Annex, Part VI, paras. 8–
12. 
520 A similar delinking can be argued for E.1 under IR5 (interest in CW activities of others). 
Such an interest need not necessarily support H2 as is currently indicated in the Matrix. 
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This can result in disputes over whether N/A should appear in the following 
pairing: 
 E.11 Availability of CW production material/equipment (yes) N/A C 
 E.12 Availability of CW production material/equipment (no) C I 
 
Somewhat more prosaically, analysts might also not agree on the use of 
term ‘indicator’ in the evidence line: ‘CW stockpiling indicators’ could be 
singular or plural. An individual’s results should be contrasted against and 
supplemented with the results from other individuals or groups as part of an 
ongoing process of revision. Results can then be transformed into a form suitable 
for quantitative and qualitative analyses respectively. 
Toxicological modeling is a large and growing activity. It is possible that 
research and development can be carried out in the absence of chemical 
experimentation. 
By attempting to create a hybrid ACH combined with structured 
argumentation, the potential criticism that ACH is overly mechanistic to properly 
reflect the variety and complexity of human thought and activity can hopefully 
be addressed usefully. 
The above matrix has been filled according to the view of the author. Each 
information request section is discussed individually. Information gaps are 
normal to such an exercise. The methodology can be applied using software that 
‘drills down’ to extreme detail which is continuously updated by multiple 
individuals and groups. For a single author to use a programme-based approach 
would effectively become a ‘self-conversation’, although the datasets would 
evolve over months or years as additional datapoints are loaded in and the 
analyst’s views change. An emphasis on the accumulation of data points would 
transform the nature of the study towards more of a technical operational manual, 
rather than one of qualitative strategic analysis. The objective is to review an 
ACH methodology according to a particular set of information requirements and 
evidence chains in a manner that: 
(a) permits the reader to grasp the reasoning behind how the table has 
been developed, and 
(b) facilitates strategic qualitative analysis with a view towards developing 
a strategic application of ACH specific to CW. 
 
An ‘answer’ to the main hypotheses is desirable. However, the method, at 
a minimum, facilitates achieving progressively better understanding through 
progressive iterations of the matrix. 
The use of such matrices thus allow others to review briefly the thinking 
of the analyst and the data points employed. 
It may be desirable to develop matrices that contain questions where 
‘N/A’ responses are minimized or eliminated. The correlation of ‘N/A’ with one 
or the other main hypothesis should be noted. In this case, all instances of ‘N/A’ 
are associated with H1 and the response to the information request is affirmative 
(e.g., ‘Civil defence against CW policy documentation (yes)’ is given an ‘N/A’ 
response) (see above matrix). 
Further gradation of assessments is permitted through the use of ‘CC’ to 
denote ‘highly consistent’, or ‘I++’ to denote ‘very highly inconsistent’. Such 
markings are not employed in this study for the sake of simplicity. 
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A binary yes-no answer versus a N/A answer to the evidence chain may 
be insufficient to reflect an analyst’s understanding. Alternatively, the analyst’s 
understanding to the effect that the answer to the evidence chain does have a 
binary yes-no response can be disputed by others. 
 
Cumulative Preliminary Score 
 
The cumulative generic score for H1 is: C=18, I=8, N/A=10 
The cumulative generic score for H2 is: C=18, I=17, N/A=1 
 
These scores are the result of generic responses. They are not specific to any 
particular case study. 
A single analyst can run time series analysis of cumulative scores. 
Alternatively, multiple analysts can run aggregate or compare cumulative scores 
based on a single data set at one time. Such operations will not be performed for 
the following reasons: the author does not have access to multiple data sets, the 
author is not collaborating with others in this study, and such a quantitative 
(including through the use of specialized software) detracts from the broader 
qualitative strategic application objective. 
The type and number of questions selected, as well as the best estimate of 
the analyst, affect the scores. In this case, the likelihood of H1 and H2 are similar 
except in two respects. First, the N/A category for H1 is 10 times greater than 
that for H2. Second, the I category for H1 is just under half that of H2. 
 
IR1. Does Target Have CW Technical Capability (e.g., Military, Medical)? 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=3, I=1, N/A=2 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=3, I=3, N/A=0 
 
The scores are roughly comparable. The main reason for the difference or the 
lack of correspondence between the H1 and H2 scores is, in my view, that the 
existence of civil defence policy documentation and the existence of civil 
defence technical guidance are not applicable to the hypothesis that no CW 
stockpiling is occurring. Policy hawks or those who support worst-case scenario 
modeling will probably disagree with this position a priori. Using such a matrix 
would highlight such a distinction that supports a broader analysis or the 
application of matrices to specific cases. It is also possible that analysts apply 
worst-case scenario modeling to perceived rivals, while not doing so in the case 
of friends or allies (actual or apparent). 
 
IR2. Is CW Mentioned in Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=4, I=0, N/A=4 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=4, I=4, N/A=0 
 
The responses for the two hypotheses are mirror images (i.e., consistent versus 
inconsistent) with the exception of the ‘N/A’ reponses under H1. The reasons for 
the choice of N/A include a need to distinguish between ‘defensive’ versus 
‘offensive’ CW-related activities. Broadly speaking, this asymmetry in matrix 
responses reflects the fact that states can undertake programmes to protect 
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civilians and military personnel against CW and yet not plan to employ such 
weapons themselves. States that intend to use CBW are generally understood to 
wish to protect themselves against such weapons (e.g., through vaccination 
programmes, stockpiling of prophylactics and treatments). 
 
IR3. Statements and Similar Communications 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=1, I=1, N/A=0 
 
Discussion of possible patterns is not warranted in view of the fact that there are 
only two evidence chains under this information request (sub-evidence chains are 
possible). The definition of ‘leadership’ is open to dispute, including at the 
operational level. The manner and extent to which the leadership ‘discusses’ 
(e.g., signals, indicates, consults) is also open to dispute. 
 
IR4. Weight of Evidence of Integration of CW into Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=2, I=2, N/A=0 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=2, I=2, N/A=0 
 
The evidence chains are symmetric. However, the total number of evidence 
chains is too limited to permit meaningful tentative conclusions (the ‘n’ is too 
small). Analysts would almost certainly dispute the terms ‘indicate’ and, in some 
instances, whether a given arms control policy statement is ‘for’ or ‘against’ CW. 
 
IR5. Interest in CW Activities of Others? 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=1 
 
The evidence chains are limited (n=2) and generic. The term ‘discussion’ can be 
disputed. For example, should a single sentence in one policy statement be 
sufficient to allow for meaningful analysis or meaningful conclusions to be 
drawn? There is also a risk that aggregated matrix figures for ‘C’, ‘I’ and ‘N/A’ 
obscure the fact that such a mention has merited its inclusion (or exclusion). On 
the other hand, a review of the operative matrix combined with focused 
quantitative analysis ‘structured argument’ should make such shortcomings 
apparent to those wishing to discover the underlying logic of the analysis 
(perhaps with a view to confirm or to modify it). 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW Production? 
 
The sub-information request generic score for H1 is: C=7, I=5, N/A=2 
The sub-information request generic score for H2 is: C=7, I=7, N/A=0 
 
As with the previous evidence chains, definitions and understandings of terms 
can be disputed. This includes the point at which ‘laboratory-scale synthesis’ 
becomes non-laboratory scale. Also the nature and type of production facility 
indicators in the general sense can be disputed (e.g., how many indicators should 
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there be, how representative is the list of indicators). Once one deals with actual 
cases of such indicators, the scope for differences of understanding generally 
expands. Perhaps the other main term that could be disputed is ‘availability’ 
(e.g., of production material and/or equipment). Where and how should the 
production material and/or equipment be made available to support strategic CW 
stockpiling, for example. 
 
Table 10.2 Overview of generic scores for H1 and H2 
 
   H1     H2 
 
Cumulative C=18, I=8, N/A=10   C=18, I=17, N/A=1 
IR1  C=3, I=1, N/A=2    C=3, I=3, N/A=0 
IR2  C=4, I=0, N/A=4    C=4, I=4, N/A=0 
IR3  C=1, I=0, N/A=1    C=1, I=1, N/A=0 
IR4  C=2, I=2, N/A=0    C=2, I=2, N/A=0 
IR5  C=1, I=0, N/A=1    C=1, I=0, N/A=1 
IR6  C=7, I=5, N/A=2    C=7, I=7, N/A=0 
 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Step 4. Refine the Matrix 
 
Consideration of the case studies should focus on themes and periods. For 
example, the analytic outcome for the Soviet CW programme in the 1920s is, a 
priori, distinctive from that of the 1980s. A situational logic (or awareness) for 
the production/stockpiling (respectively) is distinct according to the period. 
For the Soviet Union, the question of stockpiling of chemical weapons 
will be based on the following question: Did the Soviet Union possess sufficient 
chemical weapon stockpiles during the early period of World War II to engage in 
strategic and tactical chemical warfare? 
The analytical focus for the second case study are allegations of the 
retention of chemical weapons by Iraq during the UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
period and how these allegations were understood or characterized to support the 
case for the United States to invade the country in April 2003. The focus is on 
analytical methodology of an ACH for CW, rather than developing an exhaustive 
review of available information. 
With respect to non-state actor threats, the alleged stockpiling and use 
hypotheses is applied to the alleged production of VX at a pharmaceutical plant 
in Sudan in 1998 (on behalf of non-state actors). The Department of State 
dissented from the US NIE that concluded that such activity was occurring. 
However, the US Government subsequently implicitly admitted being in error 
partly because it unfroze the assets of the plant’s Saudi owner. The owner hired a 
lawyer who subcontracted a semi-privatised sampling and analysis exercise in 
which Western chemical defence laboratories did the analysis. This story offers 
important insight into how sampling and analysis might be structured and utilised 
within a broader context of preferred policy decisions and outcomes and is 
relevant to the question of proving responsibility for CW use in Syria. 
More generally, there are a variety of indications that some al Qaeda 
affiliates wish to acquire, develop or use chemical weapons. Some former Iraqi 
chemical munitions have been modified by insurgents as improvised chemical 
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(i.e., chlorine) weapon devices.521 There are also indications that chemical 
warfare experiments have been carried out in Afghanistan. Much of the analysis 
regarding non-state actors necessarily focuses on statements of intent and 
ideology of, for the purpose of this study, Islamist extremists. An attempt is made 
to determine how an ACH methodology of the type developed here can help to 
inform analysis of future non-state actor threats. 
 
Step 5. Draw Tentative Conclusions About the Relative Likelihood of 
Each Hypothesis 
 
Under this step, a ‘picture’ emerges of the target of analysis. A key question is 
whether information is sufficient to permit accurate or otherwise useful analysis. 
Heuer cites research conducted by experimental psychologists that suggests: 
(a) ‘Once an experienced analyst has the minimum information 
necessary to make an informed judgement, obtaining additional 
information generally does not improve the accuracy of his or her 
estimates. Additional information does, however, lead the analyst to 
become more confident in the judgement, to the point of over-
confidence’ and 
(b) ‘Experienced analysts have an imperfect understanding of what 
information they actually use in making judgements. They are 
unaware of the extent to which their judgements are determined by a 
few dominant factors, rather than by the systematic integration of all 
available information. Analysts actually use much less of the 
available information than they think they do’.522 
Heuer also identifies four examples of when new information might affect 
an analyst’s judgement: (a) additional detail about variables already in the 
analysis, (b) identification of additional variables, (c) information concerning the 
value attributed to the variables already in the analysis and (d) information 
concerning which variables are most important and how they relate to each 
other.523 
Finally, analysis may be data-driven or concept-driven. Under data-driven 
analysis, it may be assumed that the analytical model is correct and that the 
analyst properly applies the model. In such cases, the accuracy of the analysis 
depends on the completeness of the data. The analysis of the combat readiness of 
military units is a typical example of such a data-driven approach.524 Conceptual-
driven analyses, by contrast, are structured so as to compensate for a lack of data 
or information. These analyses must cope with such factors as imperfectly 
understood relationships among variables, ‘known knowns’ and ‘unknown 
knowns’. Conceptual-driven analyses often consist of attempts to interpret 
current (including unexpected) events to one’s political leadership. In this case, 
the accuracy of judgement ‘depends almost exclusively upon the accuracy of 
                                                 
521 On improvised chlorine devices, see Fred Wehling, ‘A Toxic Cloud of Mystery: Lessons 
from Iraq for Deterring CBRN Terrorism’, pp. 273–298 in Wenger and Wilner (note 290). 
522 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 52. 
523 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), pp. 57–58. 
524 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 59. 
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mental model’.525 The technique of ‘mirroring’ elements of one’s own state’s 
activity onto the activity of another state (or non-state actor) may also be 
employed. If so, this can naturally lead to false (or otherwise misleading) results. 
The ‘mosaic theory of analysis’ should also be mentioned. It states that 
pieces of information are collected and assembled to reveal a mosaic (like pieces 
of a jigsaw puzzle). This theory, which is common among large technical 
intelligence collection systems (e.g., SIGNIT), suggests that the accuracy of an 
analysis is a function of systematic collection and the storage of information in 
order to generate ‘the picture’. Heuer cautions, however, that cognitive 
psychology research indicates that analysts do not operate in this manner, and 
that the most challenging analytical tasks cannot be based on the mosaic theory 
because they typically—and perhaps unavoidably—form a picture before the 
analyst selects the pieces to fit it.526 Heuer observes that ‘accurate estimates 
depend at least as much on the mental model used in forming the picture as upon 
the number of pieces of the puzzle that have been collected’.527 In other words, 
the mental model is more important than volume of data per se. 
 
Step 6. Analyse Sensitivity of Conclusions 
 
Perhaps reflecting a great power perspective, Heuer notes that major intelligence 
failures are usually a failure of analysis, rather than a failure of collection.528 
Small or medium powers, however, must focus or prioritize their data collection 
and analysis. This is because they have fewer resources and, perhaps, little to no 
interest in a ‘total information’ acquisition and management strategy as, for 
example, China and the United States appear to have adopted. 
Heuer suggests several techniques to allow the analyst to achieve different 
perspectives: (a) thinking backwards, (b) the ‘crystal ball’, (c) role playing and 
(d) playing ‘devil’s advocate’ (or, in the Catholic tradition, the advocatus 
diaboli).529 In thinking backwards, the analyst assumes an unexpected 
development and then tries to explain how one can interpret available 
information in a manner that predicts the unexpected event. The crystal ball 
mechanism involves imagining that a perfectly reliable piece of information 
demonstrates that an analyst’s assumption is incorrect. The analyst must then 
develop the situational logic underlying this scenario in order to uncover flaws in 
the analysis. Role playing involves deliberately taking another persona (e.g. ‘red-
teaming’ as part of war games). Finally, playing devil’s advocate essentially 
entails contradicting received wisdom, point-by-point. 
These ‘rules-of-thumb’ are, I believe, a major reason for the gap between, 
respectively, arms control verification and intelligence practitioner literature and 
the more academic theoretical literature. Those in academia tend to view such 
rules as not conducive to raising intelligence methodology, in particular, to the 
                                                 
525 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), pp. 60–61. 
526 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 62. 
527 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 62. 
528 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 65. 
529 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), pp. 71–73. The Catholic Church pits two advocates against each 
other to inform decisions on canonization: advocatus Dei (God’s advocate) versus advocatus 
diaboli (the Devil’s advocate). Properly framed, a comparative study between ACH and the 
experience of canonization by the Catholic Church could be useful. 
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level of a theory of strategic analysis. Arms control verification theory, by 
contrast, is more firmly grounded in the social sciences, including IR theory. 
ACH requires the analyst to ‘explicitly identify all reasonable alternatives 
and have them compete against each other for the analyst’s favor, rather than 
evaluating their plausibility one at a time’.530 It seeks to avoid the situation 
whereby an analyst intuitively selects the seemingly most likely answer and then 
seeks information to support it.531 ACH is therefore a form of dialectic (or 
counter-factual argument technique) whereby contradictory claims are 
systematically tested against each other resulting in a more accurate or 
sophisticated (i.e., deeper) understanding. 
In general, the posing and testing of propositions can be done by 
induction, reasoning by analogy and/or deduction. The ancient Greeks generally 
favoured deduction.532 Counter-factual argumentation is a longstanding 
technique in philosophy dating at least to Socrates and is reflected in the works 
of Plato and Aristotle in order to reconcile opposing statements.533 Two 
fundamental laws of logic underpinning any dialectic can be noted: Aristotle’s 
Law of Contradiction, and the Law of the Excluded Middle. The law of 
contradiction may be formulated as: ‘It is impossible for anything at the same 
time to be and not to be’, or ‘One side of a contradiction must be false’.534 The 
law of the excluded middle may be formulated as: ‘There cannot be an 
intermediate between two contradictories’, or ‘One side of a contradiction must 
be true’.535 In addition, the law of contradiction may be understood to pertain to 
existent objects only. This is because objects may also possess contradictory 
attributes in one’s mind (which, in turn, vary according to individual).536 In the 
19th century, Hegel juxtaposed a thesis againt an anti-thesis in order to achieve a 
synthesis through sublation (Aufhebung). The resulting synthesis then becomes 
the next thesis in an iterative, open-ended process. In Hegel’s system, the 
synthesis is meant to combine the best elements of the thesis and anti-thesis. In 
effect, one achieves a series of progressively more fundamental, or ‘higher’ 
truths and deeper insight.537 
                                                 
 
530 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 95. 
531 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 95. 
532 Morris Kline, Mathematics: the Loss of Certainty (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1980), p. 21. 
533 The extent to which Heuer’s method of dialectic contradiction owes its antecedents to 
classical Western philosophy (including, perhaps, Marx and Engels’ Dialectic Materialism) 
should be further considered as part of a separate, philosophical enquiry. 
534 Anders Wedberg, A History of Philosophy: Antiquity and the Middle Ages, vol. 1 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1982), p. 127. See also W. D. Ross (transl.), Metaphysics, Book IV, 
cols. 1011b23-1011b29, pp. 1597–1598 in Ed. Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 2 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1984). 
535 Wedberg (note 534), p. 127. Aristotle refers several times to the Law of the Excluded 
Middle. See J. L. Ackrill (transl.), De Interpretatione, cols. 18a28-19b4, pp. 28–32; in Ed. 
Jonathan Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 1 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1984). 
536 Categorical distinctions (e.g., of existence and being) have been considered extensively by 
those in the fields of inter alia logic, mathematics, philosophy and science. To treat this topic 
systematically is beyond the scope of this study. 
537 Hegel viewed history in terms of processes undergoing progressive development, rather 
than as being necessarily cyclical or static. He also believed that human thought could 
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It is worth noting that Croce’s principal criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of 
history is that it confuses opposition and distinction.538 Croce admitted that some 
concepts could be usefully contrasted as opposites (e.g., ‘good’ versus ‘bad’, 
‘positive freedom’ versus ‘negative freedom’). However, some, like Croce, have 
argued that the consideration of historical trends or motivations are better 
characterized in terms of their differences, rather than being subjected to a 
possibly misguided process of Hegelian dialectic juxtaposition. 
Perhaps the more fundamental points are: (a) the definition of categories, 
(b) the extent to which they can be compared and contrasted (e.g., comparing 
‘like’ categories with ‘like’ categories), and (c) whether a deeper understanding 
can be achieved through a Hegelian-type synthesis. For example, the British 
Middle Eastern news correspondent, historian and social commentator Robert 
Fisk has objected to discussions on Iraq’s internal security being divided 
according to: the Kurds, the Sunni and Shia partly on the grounds that the latter 
two categories are by religion. Fisk has expressed concern that Western media 
reporting that emphasizes these three distinctions has facilitated or promoted 
sectarian violence. A counter argument to the comparison of ‘like’ with ‘like’ is 
to maintain that this three-way categorization in the case of Iraq is appropriate if 
it is based on identifying the principal distinctions of those groups finding 
themselves in disagreement or conflict. 
Some of the social sciences literature on the definition and contrasting of 
categories is based on philosophy, while other literature is almost entirely 
quantitative. Every such field has its own specialized terminology and standard 
mode of application by the respective practitioners. 
Some form of counter-factual analysis and argumentation, such as that 
proposed by Heuer from a mainly cognitive psychological perspective, has 
probably existed in many historical and social contexts throughout much of 
history (wherever sufficiently politically ‘sophisticated’ and self-aware societies 
exist). Security and intelligence communities consider Heuer’s ACH as having 
continued operational relevance to the present day. 
Finally, it may not be entirely out-of-place for intelligence practitioners to 
acquire at least a passing familiarity with Marxist dialectic historical literature if 
only to improve one’s concentration (through the reading of dense prose) and to 
introduce distinctive (perhaps ‘alien’) thought patterns and perspectives (e.g., 
within various government circles). 
 
Step 7. Report Conclusions 
 
The analysis will discuss the possible correctness of all hypotheses. It will also 
consider how the meaning of ‘likely’ should or could be understood in an ACH 
in the CW context. 
                                                                                                                                               
progressively develop and not remain fundamentally static in its essentials over time. A key 
question in this regard is whether human nature and understanding of society remains 
essentially unchanged. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History (Dover 
Publications, Inc.: New York City, 1956). 
538 The Oxford Professor of philosophy Robin George Collingwood described Croce as 
Hegel’s ‘most serious and systematic’ critic in his influential, posthumously published: The 
Idea of History. Robin G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Galaxy Book: New York City, 
1964), p. 118. Seventh reprint of 1946 edition by Oxford University Press. 
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Step 8. Identify Milestones 
 
The analysis identifies and describes why selected ‘milestones’ or key indicators 
are important indicators of unexpected developments. It is possible that 
milestones identification processes in this context overlap with difficulties 
associated with the identification and implementation of milestones in 
organization theory and practice (e.g., KPIs in UN-type organizations or EU 
structures). 
To reiterate, the advantages to ACH include prompting or allowing 
analysts: (a) to create a complete set of alternate hypotheses, (b) to refute (or at 
least undermine) hypotheses, (c) to manage evidence for ongoing analysis, (d) to 
present conclusions in a manner that shows how they were reached, (e) to better 
identify indicators that can be evaluated in order to better determine the direction 
of events (e.g., assessment of ongoing weapon programmes) and (f) to create 
(and improve) an audit trail of how the analysis was carried out.539 Inter-office or 
inter-agency collaboration is facilitated, particularly if software is used.540 
The potential drawbacks of the technique are: (a) assumptions or logical 
deductions are omitted or are not apparent from the matrices, (b) insufficient 
attention is given to ‘less likely’ hypotheses, (c) the existence (perhaps secret) or 
introduction of ‘definitive evidence’ is not done justice by assigning it ‘high 
credibility’ in the ACH terminology, (d) the evidence and arguments are not 
representative of the overall analytical problem, and (e) a problem of 
‘diminishing returns’ exists after a certain amount of evidence has been 
accumulated because, beyond this point, any given additional item of information 
that is ‘inconsistent’ with the hypothesis carries less weight (in economic terms: 
‘diminishing marginal returns’).541 
 
10.1. Summary of Application 
 
This study integrates arms control CW verification literature into a variation of 
ACH developed by the author. This is done partly in order to set the stage for 
argument mapping in order to facilitate more general qualitative analysis on the 
role of CW assessments in the arms control, and security and defence fields. 
It is hypothesized that the application of a hybrid, qualitative and CW-
focused formulation of ACH directed to arms control verification and 
intelligence techniques will yield sufficient operational-level dichotomies that 
can then be used to inform a strategic analysis of neoliberal institutionalism and 
realist IR theoretical models. By employing a variation of established training 
methodologies for intelligence purposes, such distinctions (operational-level 
dichotomies) can help to explain and further develop these schools modeling of 
WMD deterrence theory, both in a traditional Cold War state-to-state context and 
a contemporary non-state actor context. In so doing, the gap between intelligence 
art and academic IR theory can be partially reconciled. 
                                                 
539 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), pp. 161–162. 
540 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 162. 
541 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), pp. 167–168. 
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ACH is an appropriate analytical technique for inter alia: (a) assessing the 
possibility of deception, (b) challenging one’s mental model and (c) managing 
conflicting mental models or opinions.542 ACH should be used in cases where it 
is difficult to decide between alternate explanations, where one requires a 
systematic approach to help uncover unsuspected outcomes, in cases where it is 
useful to leave behind an ‘audit trail’ that indicates how evidence was understood 
and employed in order to permit other analysts to reach alternate conclusions, 
and where a ‘robust flow of data’ must be absorbed and evaluated.543 Once 
again, Heuer and Pherson note that ACH is ‘well-suited for addressing questions 
about technical issues in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
arena’.544 
 
                                                
 
 
 
542 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), pp. 36–37. 
543 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), pp. 160–161. 
544 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 161. 
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11 
 
 
 
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS: BACKGROUND AND 
ATTRIBUTION 
 
 
ccording to one estimate approximately 30 main traditional CW 
formulations exist, including lewisite, sarin, soman, tabun, VX and 
sulphur mustard.545 There are three main types of lewisite, three main 
types of nitrogen mustard and at least nine major types of sulphur mustard (see 
below). Furthermore, the chemical composition of any given CW agent varies 
according to whether thickeners, freezing point depressants or stabilizers have 
been added. At least 120000 compounds are covered in the CWC’s Annex on 
Chemicals; they include standard CW agents, their precursors, known 
decomposition products, and related compounds.546 These chemicals are 
nevertheless a sub-set of toxic chemicals and numerous biological substances, 
including proteins and so-called toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). The 
widespread use of chlorine and phosgene during World War I may, today, also be 
viewed more as an employment of TICs for hostile purposes rather than CW 
agents as a method of warfare. 
A 
Only the blister agent sulphur mustard, and two organophosphorus agents 
sarin and VX will be considered in any detail.547 These three are the standard 
agents of 20th century state military programmes. Following a general 
introduction to sampling and analysis, the discussion focuses on GC/MS, the so-
called ‘gold standard’ of field detection systems.548 The principal degradation 
products and metabolites of these three CW agents will be considered within the 
context of GC/MS procedures. The overall analysis will be primarily political, 
but informed by these technical factors. The purpose is to provide a general 
                                                 
545 Shigeyuki Hanaoka, ‘Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents and Their Related 
Compounds’, p. 69 in Eds. Osamu Suzuki and Kanako Watanabe, Drugs and Poisons in 
Humans: a Handbook of Practical Analysis (Springer Verlag: Berlin, 2005). See also CWC, 
Annex on Chemicals. 
546 Shigeyuki Hanaoka, ‘Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents and Their Related 
Compounds’, p. 69 in Suzuki and Watanabe (note 545). The number of chemical compounds 
subject to routine declaration and verification is based on the OPCW Handbook on Chemicals. 
The 2009 edition of this Handbook lists approximately 7261 chemical names (some of which 
refer to the same chemical and therefore have identical CAS numbers). However, the CWC’s 
Annex on Chemicals covers classes of chemicals, as does the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (Harmonized System, HS). As such the number of chemicals 
covered under routine declaration and verification under the CWC is substantially greater. The 
HS nomenclature forms an important basis for strategic trade controls over chemicals transfers 
and can be used (depending on the number of digits specified) to denote a specific chemical or 
class of chemical, as well as to indicate the country of origin. 
547 There are numerous organonphosphorus nerve agents, including Chinese VX. On the 
distinction between Soviet V-agent and VX, see below. 
548 Frank Settle (ed.), Handbook of Instrumental Techniques for Analytical Chemistry 
(Prentice Hall PTR: Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, 1997). 
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review of the nature and type of toxic chemicals and their precursors, how they 
have been used as a method of warfare and their peaceful applications for 
scientific research and by the chemical industry. 
Chemical warfare agents can be categorized according to their principal 
physiological effects. A standard classification of agents is: (a) vesicants, (b) 
blood agents, (c) choking agents, (d) incapacitants, (e) organophosphorus nerve 
agents, (f) tear gas and (g) vomiting agents. 
Increased attention has also been devoted to the control and oversight of 
TICs as a result of the current increased focus on potential threats posed by non-
state actors. TICs can be defined as having a LCt50 of less than 100 000 mg-
min/m3 and being produced in amounts of over 30 tonnes annually at any given 
facility.549 This definition exemplifies a ‘types and quantities’ concept that 
complements part of the CWC’s definition of a chemical weapon.550 This 
definition also appears to be partly based on CWC declaration threshholds 
concerning certain discrete organic chemicals that may contain the elements 
phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine (DOC/PSFs).551 It should also be noted that not 
all DOC/PSFs are highly toxic. 
Vesicants cause skin blisters and can severely damage the eyes, throat, 
and lungs. Life-threatening infections in the trachea and lungs can result. 
Lewisite (L), nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN-3), sulphur mustard (H, HD), 
and phosgene oxime (CX) are blister agents. Their primary purpose is to cause 
mass casualties requiring intensive, long-term treatment, rather than death. Those 
exposed may also suffer from long-term health problems.552 
Blood agents, such as arsine (SA), cyanogen chloride (CK), and hydrogen 
cyanide (AC), inhibit cytochrome oxidase, an enzyme necessary to permit 
oxygen to be transferred from the blood to the body’s tissue and, in the case of 
significant exposure (mainly a function of time and concentration), rapidly 
become fatal.553 
Choking agents, such as chlorine, diphosgene (DP) and phosgene (CG), 
interfere with breathing. Phosgene and diphosgene interfere with transfer of 
oxygen via the lung’s alveoli sacks. Symptoms of phosgene poisoning do not 
become apparent for up to several hours. In addition, the chances for survival are 
a function of physical exertion. The more a victim exerts himself physically 
                                                 
549 Yin Sun and Kwok Y. Ong, Detection Technologies for Chemical Warfare Agents and 
Toxic Vapors (CRC Press: Boca Raton, Florida, 2005), p. 9. 
550 The CWC defines a chemical weapon to include inter alia ‘Toxic chemicals and their 
precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as 
the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes’. CWC, article II, para. 1(a). 
551 The production of DOCs above 200 tonnes annually must be declared to the OPCW, 
while the production of above 30 tonnes annually must be declared to the OPCW. The 
processing, consumption, import or export of DOCs or DOC/PSFs need not be declared to the 
OPCW under the CWC’s routine declaration and verification system. CWC, Verification 
Annex, Part IX, para. 1. 
552 Ed. Kouki Inai, Atlas of Mustard Gas Injuries: Building Bridges Between Iran and Japan 
through the Relief of Victims Exposed to Mustard Gas ([no publisher]: [no location] 2012). 
Distributed at 3rd CWC Review Conference, The Hague. 
553 John Eldridge (ed.), Jane’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence 2005–2006, 18th 
edtn. (Jane’s Information Group Ltd.: Coulsdon, UK, 2005), p. 69. 
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following exposure, the more likely death will result. Complete rest and oxygen 
treatment are recommended.554 
Incapacitating agents are designed to induce physical disability or mental 
disorientation. LSD (a form of lysergic acid) and BZ (3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) 
are two examples.555 The United States investigated the potential military uses of 
LSD.556 It also weaponized BZ, which can cause constipation, headaches, 
hallucinations, and a slowing of mental thought processes. 
The principal nerve agents, sarin (GB), cyclosarin (GF), soman (GD), 
tabun (GA) and V-agents, are all organophosphorus compounds that inhibit an 
enzyme responsible for breaking down acetylcholine, a neurotransmitter. Nerve 
agents may be inhaled or absorbed through the skin. Symptoms include drooling, 
dilated pinhead pupils, headache, involuntary defecation, and a runny nose. 
Death is caused by cardiac arrest or respiratory failure.557 
Tear gases, such as chloroacetephenone (CN) and O-
chlorobenzalmalonitrile (CS), cause irritation of the skin and uncontrolled 
tearing. Although they are designed to be used as non-lethal, riot control agents, 
their employment can result in death or injuries if improperly used at high doses, 
enclosed areas or for extended periods.558 
Although vomiting agents, such as Adamsite (DM), diphenylchloroarsine 
(DA), and diphenylcyanoarsine (DC), have been used for riot control purposes, 
they are now generally considered to be too toxic for this purpose.559 These 
agents are now considered unsuitable for use as CW against an opponent using 
modern protective equipment.560 Some choking or irritating compounds, such as 
chloropicrin and diphosgene, have been used for rodent control.561 
Finally, it should be noted that while all CW agents can be viewed as 
‘obsolete’, their use persists and states should continue to take steps ensure 
adequate preparedness and response capacities are available. 
 
11.1. CW Agent Synthesis 
 
Any attempt to list agents and munitions and associated technologies risks 
devolving into an open-ended exercise. Another difficulty is how to describe the 
characteristics of chemical weapons (known and possible) in a manner that 
permits meaningful and well-defined activities for control, verification or 
oversight purposes (e.g., arms control verification, customs or intelligence). 
                                                 
554 Eldridge (note 553), pp. 69–70. 
555 Eldridge (note 553), p. 70. 
556 Ketchum (note 134), pp. 53–68. 
557 Eldridge (note 553), pp. 70–71. 
558 Eldridge (note 553), pp. 72–73. 
559 Eldridge (note 553), p. 73. 
560 The OPCW SAB has concluded that Adamsite should not be used as an RCA. Following 
entry-into-force of the CWC some States Parties declared the agent as either an RCA or a CW 
agent. 
561 E.g., one OSOAViaKhim publication covers improvement of soil, diseases and pests in 
agriculture, chemical warfare agents and methods and means of aerial and ground CW attack 
and defence. It prescribes the use of chloropicrin to kill gophers. Enyukov (note 204), p. 189. 
Vials of chloropricin were also hung on the inside of safe doors to deter thiefs. Josh Berry, 
‘WWI-era Chemical Weapon Found in Benton, Ar.’, OzarksFIRST.com, 24 May 2013, 
<http://arkansasmatters.com/fulltext?nxd_id=666572>, (accessed 26 May 2013). 
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Those involved in oversight and control should ideally possess some 
understanding of production techniques of chemical weapons and the 
development and use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. A great deal of the 
literature on the prevention of chemical warfare concerns sulphur mustard and a 
limited number of ‘standard’ organophosphorus nerve agents that were 
weaponized as part of prior state programmes.562 
Sulphur mustard is a simple (i.e., short, and aliphatic—or straight chain) 
compound that is relatively easy to produce using precursors that are widely used 
in the chemical industry (e.g., thiodiglycol and hydrogen chloride (HCl)).563 
Production of the principal organophosphorus nerve agents does not traditionally 
require complex equipment. However, working with the highly reactive fluorine 
compounds (in the case of sarin) and the distillation and other purification steps 
associated with nerve agent production can be complex and potentially 
dangerous to the health and safety of those involved in their production.564 
Furthermore, repeated low-level exposure to cyclosarin (GF), for example, 
induces heightened sensitivity and, therefore, workers incur an increased risk for 
serious injury or death. It can also be argued that a technical progression from the 
G-agents to the V-agents may be required as part of an expertise ‘development 
curve’.565 
Two special characteristics of soman should also be noted. One is that 
soman has the additional effect that, within minutes, it will permanently 
deactivate AChE and oxime therapy therefore becomes ineffective. Second, 
pinacolyl alcohol (C6H14O, IUPAC name: 3, 3-dimethylbutan-2-ol, CAS 
no. 464-07-3) is necessary for the production of soman and appears not to be 
used by the chemical industry at the present time.566 Thus the presence of 
pinacolyl alcohol stocks is a potential indicator of CW activity and, as such, is 
subject to being ‘red flagged’ by those involved in implementing strategic trade 
contro
                                                
ls. 
Differences in technical challenges are to be expected with the production 
of CW agents at the laboratory level as compared to large-scale or industrial 
production.567 Chemical reactions, such a precipitation of sulphur impurities 
from an initial batch of agent may be seemingly impossible to induce even 
though the ‘procedure’ was followed correctly. It has been occasionally observed 
 
562 Lundin (note 97). 
563 Achieving highly pure (highly distilled) sulphur mustard may nevertheless pose a 
challenge to some, including for non-state actors. 
564 Accidents have occurred in large, technically advanced prior state programmes among 
production workers and human test volunteers. In 1953 the British military serviceman 
volunteer Ronald Maddison died when 200 mg of liquid sarin were deliberately poured onto his 
uniform. In 1968 sheep alongt the border of the Dugway Proving Ground were killed by an 
accidental release of VX as part of an open-air testing exercise. Garrett and Hart (note 108), 
‘Skull Valley Incident’, pp. 191–192. 
565 On largescale VX production difficulties at Muscle Shoals, Alabama, see Ferguson, 
Hylton and Mumma (note 233) vol. I, pp. 6–8. 
566 The auther cannot exclude current or future peaceful uses for this compound. Its presence 
has long been pointed to in chemical arms control verification discussions as a strong indicator 
of a CW programme. A 1993 OTA report stated unambiguously that this alcohol has no 
commercial uses. US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (note 12), p. 30. 
567 See Ferguson, Hylton and Mumma (note 233) vol. I, pp. 6–8. 
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that ch
erent 
ontexts. For example, customs bodies sometimes translate or retranslate 
rminology or misspellings.569 
warfare agent. Some such pesticides are not approved for use because of their 
high toxicity. The protein acetylcholinesterase can be inhibited by 
                                                
emistry, especially at the laboratory level, can resemble cooking in that the 
souflé may refuse to rise, even if the recipe has been carefully followed. 
Finally, consideration should also be given to chemical nomenclature. As 
chemical compounds were being discovered and analysed—the pace of discovery 
began to accelerate starting mainly in the 18th and 19th centuries—the 
underlying theory of atoms was underdeveloped or absent. Chemists also had to 
determine the basic chemical properties of elements and compounds such as 
boiling and freezing temperatures and weight. Chemists often gave names to 
chemicals on the basis of how they appeared, smelled or tasted. Thus the 
compound that later became known as arsenic trichloride (AsCl3), a potential 
precursor of various arsenic chemical warfare agents such as Lewisite, was 
formerly commonly known as ‘butter of arsenic’.568 Nor was it necessarily clear 
whether a chemical was an element or a compound. There are numerous 
synonyms for chemical compounds within and across languages. Some are out-
of-date. However, some older terminology may nevertheless be used in diff
c
chemical terms resulting in the use of older te
 
11.2. Organophosphorus Nerve Agents 
 
Organophosphorus nerve agents are the most toxic and studied class of chemical 
warfare agents. They can be divided according to G-class agents (soman, sarin 
and tabun) and the V-agents (VX and V-gas). The Soviet Union developed 
another group of nerve agents collectively known as novichoks 
(‘newcomers’).570 China also tested a variant (VS, or ‘Chinese VX’) which are 
today among the compounds used by some CWC States Parties to evaluate and 
improve sampling and analysis protocols.571 There are several thousand 
organophosphate compounds of moderate concern from the standpoint of their 
ability to cause serious acute (as opposed to chronic) toxicity effects in 
humans.572 Many of the physico-chemical effects of G- and V-agents are similar 
to those found among organophosphate pesticides. For example, work by Gosh 
and his associates after World War II on the development of the pesticide amiton 
prompted further work by the UK and United States to develop VX as a chemical 
 
568 Arsenious chloride (‘butter of arsenic’) was discovered by Carl Wilhelm Scheele in 1775. 
‘Arsenic’, <http://mysite.du.edu/~jcalvert/phys/arsenic.htm>, (accessed 10 Feb. 2013). 
569 Examples of this were considered at: SIPRI and Vinca Institute, Chemical Production 
Classification and Recognition: Foundation Course and Customs Table Top Exercise on 
Chemical Transfers in the Western Balkans, Course and Background Material; Vinca Institute, 
Serbia; 24–18 Nov. 2008. 
570 For an account by a scientist who participated, see Vil Mirzayanov, Vyzov [The Call] 
(“Dom Pechati” Publisher: Kazan’, 2002); and Vil S. Mirzyanov, State Secrets: An Insider’s 
Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program (Outskirts Press: Denver, Col., Jan. 
2009). 
571 Some of this work has been carried out within the framework of the OPCW SAB 
programmes of work. 
572 Toxicity numbers should always be considered both in terms of acute and chronic 
toxicity. See Annexe C for a list of common TICs. 
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organophosphorus nerve agents at its esterasic site or on both the esterasic and 
anionic sites.573  
The interaction of various acetylcholine receptors, such as muscarinic 
acetycholine receptors, have been studied partly within the context of 
understanding the effect of pesticides and related compounds that could 
potentially be used as CWAs. Amiton, for example, was originally developed in 
the 1950s by Drs Ranajit Ghosh and J. F. Newman for use as a pesticide but its 
use today for this purpose has been essentially ended.574 
A key structural difference between, on the one hand, the 
organophosphorus nerve agents sarin, soman, V-gas and VX and, on the other 
hand, organophosphorus pesticides is that the former have a phosphorus-methyl 
group (P-CH3). This bond, which is partly responsible for human toxicity effect, 
is strong and tends to remain intact in the agents’ various degradation products. 
Thus, the existence of this bond in a known degradation product of the above-
mentioned CW agents is a potential indication that the chemical was 
manufactured for non-peaceful purposes. 
There are numerous possible production routes to produce G- and V-
agents, particularly if one includes the alternate production routes for key or 
major precursors. Several synthesis routes for both classes of agents involve the 
use of methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) (sometimes called ‘dichlor’ for short) 
which, although highly corrosive, is relatively easy to ship and store in 
appropriate containers.575 A key production step occurs during the fluorination of 
DC, colloquially referred to as the ‘di-di mixture’ (which has no apparent 
peaceful uses).576 
The organophosphate tabun (N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate, 
C5H11N2O2P, CAS no. 77-81-6) is manufactured using readily accessible 
precursors, including ethanol hydroxide (EtOH), phosphorus trichloride (POCl3) 
and sodium cyanide (NaCN). Tabun was synthesized in 1936 by Gerhard 
Schrader as part of pesticide research. It has been observed that tabun is one of 
the simpler organophosphorus nerve agent to manufacture partly because it does 
not possess the somewhat challenging to synthesize phosphorus-alkyl group 
bond.577 
 
11.3. Vesicating Agents 
 
Of the vesicating or blister agents developed for military use, only sulphur 
mustard arguably retains potential military utility in case of a decision by a state 
that wishes to pursue a chemical warfare programme that includes such agents. 
 
 
                                                 
573 Eds. Satu M. Somani and James A. Romano, Chemical Warfare Agents: Toxicity at Low 
Levels (CRC Press: Boca Raton, Florida, 2001). 
574 R. Ghosh and J. F. Newman, ‘A New Group of Organophosphorus Pesticides’, Chemistry 
and Industry (29 Jan. 1955), p. 11. 
575 Jonathon B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda 
(Pantheon Books: New York, 2006). 
576 Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
577 As opposed to sarin. US Congress Office of Technology Assessment (note 12), p. 26. 
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11.3.1. Lewisite 
 
Lewisite consists of a group of three chlorovinyl arsine compounds 
(C2H2AsCl3—Lewisite-1, C4H4AsCl3—Lewisite-2 and C6H6AsCl3—Lewisite-
3). It was first prepared for use as a CW agent during World War I by the US 
chemist Dr Winford Lee Lewis based on a thesis by Julius Arthur Nieuwland 
using the reaction of arsenic trichloride with acetylene.578 Its development 
occurred too late to allow it to be used during World War I. A shipment of 
Lewisite from the United States was in route to Europe when the war ended.579 
Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union developed and stockpiled the agent, partly 
in order to mix with sulphur mustard in order to lower sulphur mustard’s freezing 
temperature.580 
The principal method for preparing Lewisite is still to react acetylene 
(C2H2) with arsenic trichloride (AsCl3) in the presence of an appropriate 
catalyst.581 Lewisite-1 is the principal yield. The secondary and tertiary lewisites 
are of less interest (e.g., Lewisite-2 displays a reduced blistering effect). The 
military utility of Lewisite was lessened by the discovery of a fairly effective 
treatment for arsenic poisoning called British Anti-Lewisite, BAL (2,3-
dimercaptopropanol). BAL is a chelating agent and has been used to treat metal 
poisoning more generally (chelants are organic compounds which sequester 
metal ions and thus render the metal compound essentially unreactive to an 
organism’s metabolic processes). Mixtures of Lewisite and sulphur mustard 
continue to be recovered in chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China 
during World War II.582 
 
11.3.2. Mustards 
 
The manufacture of mustard agents (i.e., sulphur and nitrogen) requires 
chlorinating agents (i.e., they require a chemical compound that can act as a 
chlorine donor). Common chlorinating agents include SOCl2 (thionyl chloride), 
PCl3 (phosphorus trichloride), and PCl5 (phosphorus pentachloride). 
                                                 
578 Classes of organic compounds include: alcohols (-OH, hydroxyl), and ethers (RO, 
alkoxyl). 
579 SIPRI (note 98), p. 62. 
580 Garrett and Hart (note 108), ‘Freezing-point Depressant’, pp. 80–81. 
581 In chemistry, catalysts have generally been metals or metal compounds. However, the use 
of enzymes is increasingly common in the further development of industrial chemical processes. 
582 On the status of destruction of Japanese ACW in China, see John Hart and Peter 
Clevestig, ‘Reducing Threats from Chemical and Biological Material’, SIPRI Yearbook 2013: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013), 
p. 375; and ‘Note by the Director-General, Overall Progress with Respect to the Destruction of 
the Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in the People’s Republic of China’, OPCW 
document EC-73/DG.11, 11 July 2013, <http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/executive-
council/seventy-third-session/>, (accessed 24 July 2013). 
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11.3.3. Nitrogen Mustard 
 
There are three forms of nitrogen mustard (HN1, HN2 and HN3). Interest in 
these compounds declined following World War II partly because CW planners 
realized the difficulty in developing a stabilizer that would allow them to be 
stored for longer-periods. In its free base form, nitrogen mustard solutions 
gradually become transformed into a piperazine salt and therefore lose their value 
as chemical warfare agents. Piperazine compounds, which bear a chemical 
resemblance to piperdine found in some black peppers, are today used in the 
manufacture of some pharmaceuticals, plastics and resins. 
Triethanolamine (TEA) is a possible precursor of nitrogen mustard and, 
for this reason, is listed in Schedule 3 of the CWC’s Annex of Chemicals. TEA is 
an organic compound with a range of commercial uses. For example, it acts as a 
weak base and can therefore be used as a pH balancer for body care products 
such as skin lotions and moisturizers. 
TEA is also capable of forming complex compounds with other materials 
in solution (i.e., it is a ‘complexing agent’). Such characteristics are desirable as 
part of broader attempts to design and control intermediate chemical processes. 
This typically includes making functional chemical groups susceptible to a 
desired reaction or sequestering them so that they are not reacted (i.e., chemically 
transformed prematurely) and can be made reactive at a later stage. 
 
11.3.4. Sulphur Mustard 
 
There are at least three main production routes for HD.583 The sulphur atom can 
be substituted with carbon-sulphur or oxygen-carbon-sulphur chains (e.g., 
sesqui-mustard (HT)). The choice of production route is informed by the 
suitability and availability of the chlorinating agent. Some, such as the 
Levenstein method, yield higher levels of sulphur impurities. Such sulphur 
mustard therefore tends to degrade faster. For example, a longstanding challenge 
for the storage of munitions or containers filled with sulphur mustard is that any 
hydrolysis yields some hydrogen chloride (HCl), a widely used industrial acid. 
HCl reacts with metal and gives off the inflammable gas hydrogen which has 
often resulted in a buildup of pressure (potentially explosive) within munition 
bodies or bulk storage containers. For this reason, munitions were often not fully 
filled to capacity with sulphur mustard and a great deal of effort was devoted by 
researchers into investigating stabilizers and thickeners which, among other 
things, slowed or inhibited chemical reactions with metal. Bulk storage 
containers were also routinely opened at storage sites to allow for off gassing. 
The chlorinating agent of greatest interest in the production of sulphur 
mustard is thionyl chloride (SOCl2).584 The production route using TDG is the 
most attractive for several reasons, including the fact that it yields the highest 
purity agent. Other chlorinating agents that have been used include phosphorus 
trichloride (PCl3) (the Meyer Process), chlorination by HCl in concentrated 
solution and chlorination by gaseous HCl. In order to increase sulphur mustard’s 
persistence and to lower its freezing temperature, various admixtures such as 
                                                 
583 Lundin (note 97), pp. 4–6. 
584 Lundin (note 97). 
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synthetic resins which are resistant to standard decontaminating agents and 
adhere to equipment and clothing ‘like glue’ have been developed. 
 
11.4. Chemical Warfare Agents in the CWC Annex on Chemicals 
 
The CWC prohibits all toxic chemicals and their precursors except for non-
prohibited purposes.585 The CWC’s routine declaration and verification regime is 
based on chemicals listed in the convention’s Annex on Chemicals. This Annex 
consists of three ‘schedules of chemicals’ (schedule 1, schedule 2 and schedule 
3). The convention also contains guidelines for the routine declaration and 
verification of certain discrete organic chemicals that may contain phosphorus, 
sulphur or fluorine (DOC/PSFs) (DOC/PSFs are not listed in the schedules). 
The CWC negotiations on how to define chemicals and regulate them, 
including their production and use by the chemical industry, were long and 
complex. The negotiators initially considered whether and how to categorize 
militarily significant chemicals as ‘super-toxic chemicals’, ‘other lethal 
chemicals’, or ‘other harmful chemicals’.586 Discussions initially focused on a 
chemical’s toxicity and included efforts to defined ‘militarily significant’ 
quantities of chemical agents and their deviation ranges, effective dosages, ratios 
of agent weight to body weight, median lethal dose (inhalation) and median 
lethal dose (subcutaneous).587 This resulted in detailed discussions on the 
methodologies used in toxicity studies and how differences in assumptions, test 
animals and control parameters affect results. CWC negotiators finally decided 
that efforts to reconcile the toxicity of a chemical with its potential use as a 
chemical warfare agent and its peaceful applications by the research community 
and the chemical industry were impractical. 
The negotiators instead decided to list chemicals in schedules not 
according to toxicity per se, but in terms of the threat they pose to the object and 
purpose of the treaty and the extent to which they have peaceful applications. 
Thus Schedule 1 chemicals are deemed to pose a ‘high’ risk to the CWC with 
few, if any, peaceful applications. Schedule 2 chemicals pose a ‘significant’ risk 
and Schedule 3 chemicals pose ‘some’ and have wider peaceful applications. The 
inclusion of DOC/PSFs in the treaty’s routine declaration and verification regime 
(as opposed to all toxic chemicals and their precursors being subject to 
verification through, for e.g., a challenge inspection) was done in order to help 
ensure that the treaty’s depth and scope are not overly restricted. In other words, 
the DOC/PSF verification regime helps to promote confidence among the parties 
to the CWC that the treaty is being fully and effectively implemented. 
                                                 
585 CWC, article II, para. 1. 
586 E.g., ‘Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General 
Assembly’, Committee on Disarmament document CD/421, 1 Sep. 1983, p. 66. 
587 This understanding was based on consultations held in March 1982 among 32 experts 
from 25 states. These experts unanimously agreed to recommend a standardized operating 
procedure for acute subcutaneous toxicity and acute inhalation toxicity determinants. ‘Annex on 
Chemicals, Introductory Note by the Chairman of Working Group 4’, Conference on 
Disarmament document CW/Group4/3, revision 3, undated, pp 18–22. Partly based on John 
Hart, ‘The Treatment of Perfluorisobutylene under the Chemical Weapons Convention’, ASA 
Newsletter, no. 88 (28 Feb. 2002), pp. 1, 20–23. 
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The OPCW continues to implement a range of activities to consult on and 
harmonize implementation practice, including how to ensure that chemical 
industry declarations are correct and complete and the further harmonization of 
data collection and declaration methodologies, as well as determining the most 
appropriate frequency of inspection and site selection procedures for onsite 
inspection. 
 
Table 11.1 Selected Schedule 1 Chemicals 
 
Trivial name      CAS no. 
 
Organophosphorus nerve agents 
Sarin       107-44-8 
Soman       96-64-0 
Tabun       77-81-6 
VX       50782-69-9 
V-gas       not provided 
 
Vesicants 
Lewisite 1      541-25-3 
Lewisite 2      40334-69-8 
Lewisite 3      40334-70-1 
Nitrogen mustard (HN1)     538-07-8 
Nitrogen mustard (HN2)     51-75-2 
Nitrogen mustard (HN3)     555-77-1 
Sesquimustard      3563-36-8 
Sulphur mustard (2-chloroethylchloromethylsulphide) 2625-76-5 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Table 11.2 Selected Schedule 2 Chemicals 
 
Trivial name      CAS no. 
 
Amiton       78-53-5 
PFIB       382-21-8 
BZ       6581-06-2 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Table 11.3 Selected Schedule 3 Chemicals 
 
Trivial name      CAS no. 
 
Chlorpicrin      76-06-2 
Cyanogen chloride     506-77-4 
Hydrogen cyanide     74-90-8 
Phosgene      75-44-5 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
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11.5. Incapacitants 
 
Incapacitants are meant to debilitate without causing permanent injury or death. 
Agents developed as part of traditional state chemical warfare programmes 
include BZ and LSD.588 This includes the filling of BZ into munitions and field 
and laboratory human trials. Some argue that a distinction should be made 
between incapacitants and RCAs. This is partly because the former are meant to 
cause a person to become docile, mentally incapacitated or to fall asleep. RCAs 
generally cause severe short term pain or irritation and are meant to compel those 
targetted to leave a given area immediately. Because toxicity is a function of 
dosage, as well as the fact that incapacitants and RCAs can be misused (e.g., in 
poorly ventilated enclosed environment), a range of ethical, legal, military and 
police doctrine and training issues arise.589 Also, as with any programme 
involving the development and use of chemicals for peacekeeping, counter-
terrorism, riot control and the like, there are continuing concerns that such 
activities may serve as standby capacity to break out of the CWC or effetively 
undermine the treaty norms through the routine development and use of such 
agents for ostensibly peaceful purposes (i.e., not as a ‘method of warfare’).  
 
11.6. Dual-purpose Chemicals 
 
In addition to the above-cited definition,590 TICs have been further sub-divided 
according to high, medium and low hazard indices.591 Examples of such 
chemicals include bleach solutions,592 cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide and 
phosgene. TICs have usually been considered in terms of their potential threat to 
health and safety and the environment, especially within the chemical industry 
context. Some toxic compounds have also been considered in terms of the toxic 
fumes created on the battlefield when electronic components and various plastics, 
solvents and fuels burn during combat. For example, perfluorisobutylene (PFIB) 
is a TIC of concern because PTFE (i.e. Teflon™) has a wide variety of 
commercial and military applications given its lubricity and chemical inertness. 
In the 1950s the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) found that employees 
at at facilities that were heat treating PTFE were suffering adverse pulmonary 
effects.593 The industry standard for particulate testing was generally at the parts 
per million level, rather than the parts per billion level. As ICI was unable to 
determine the cause of the illnesses, it approached Porton Down (the UK’s 
chemical defence establishment) whose experts then determined the cause and 
                                                 
588 E.g., in 1964 the US Army conducted BZ field trials (code-named ‘Project Dork’) on 
soldiers at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. Ketchum (note 134), pp. 141–152. 
589 Crowley (note 49). 
590 Sun and Ong (note 549), p. 9. 
591 Hazard Index (HI) = toxicity x state [i.e. gas or liquid] x distribution x producers. 
592 A common form is ‘chlorine bleach’ which consists of a solution of about 5 per cent 
sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl). 
593 For more recent research on the pulmonary effects of PFIB, see Hemei Wang, Rigao 
Ding, Jinxiu Ruan, Benli Yuan, Xiaohong Sun, Xiancheng Zhang, Shouzhong Yu and 
Wensheng Qu, ‘Perfluoroisobutylene-induced Acute Lung Injury and Mortality are Heralded by 
Neutrophil Sequestration and Accumulation’, Journal of Occupational Health, vol. 43 (2001), 
pp. 331–338. 
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also discovered that standard activated charcoal-based filters were unable to 
capture PFIB.594 Given the respirator technology at the time, this finding had 
security and defence implications. Today, however, PFIB remains an industrial 
health hazard that can be readily managed. PTFE is still produced in the millions 
of tonnes per annum.595 PTFE has also been used in the manufacture of military 
vehicles, including tanks, armored personnel carriers and aircraft.  
With the increased international focus on threats posed by non-state actors 
TICs have been brought increasingly into the mainstream of threat perceptions 
and risk analysis. The incorporation of TICs into non-state actor threat analyses 
and, in view of Parcelsus’ injunction that ‘the dose makes the toxicity’, the 
number of potentially hazardous chemicals that can be misused to cause physical 
harm or psychological or economic damage are today practically open-ended. A 
list of some commercially available TICs is provided in Annexe C. 
 
11.6.1. Chloripicrin 
 
Chloropicrin (CCl3NO2) was used as a lachrymator during World War I.596 The 
dye industry sometimes uses it. The chemical can also be used for the production 
of some insecticides.597 
 
11.6.2. Hydrogen Cyanide 
 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN) is a toxic chemical with wide applications in the 
chemical industry that was also field-tested as a potential chemical warfare agent 
by a number of states, including Germany and the Soviet Union.598 Although the 
HCN toxicity is high,599 its vapour pressure is also high600 and a part of the HCN 
will be destroyed when explosively disseminated (HCN is also fairly 
flammable).601 It therefore proved extremely difficult for military establishments 
to obtain the necessary field concentration. Allegations of use of cyanide 
compounds, including HCN, should therefore be evaluated in this light. 
Two major methods for the production of HCN by the chemical industry 
are the Andrussov Process (which consists of oxidizing a mixture of ammonia 
and methane with air using platinum as a catalyst) and the Degussa process 
which was developed by Degussa AG as a method for the detoxification of 
cyanide using hydrogen peroxide. This process has been applied to treat mining 
tailings. (A common method for the extraction of gold has involved cyanide 
                                                 
594 Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
595 Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
596 SIPRI (note 98), p. 47. 
597 An OSOAVIAKhim publication covering the improvement of soil, diseases and pests in 
agriculture prescribes the use of chloropicrin to kill gophers. Enyukov (note 204), p. 189. 
598 E.g., see Walter Hirsch, Soviet BW and CW Capabilities (“The Hirsch Report”) 
(declassified) (US Army Chemical Intelligence Branch: Washington, D.C., 15 May 1951). 
599 E.g., about 3200 mg/m3 is sufficient to kill a human within one minute. 
600 620 mm Hg at 20 degrees Celsius. 
601 The US National Fire Protection Association has given HCN a flammability rating of 4 
(‘severe fire hazard’). US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 
‘Occupational safety and helath guideline for hydrogen cyanide’, 
<http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/81-123/pdfs/0333.pdf>, (accessed 16 June 2013). 
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leaching in which a cyanide solution is used to dissolve gold from host rocks for 
later precipitation. This has resulted in widespread environmental contamination 
in gold mining areas.) 
Chlorine can be reacted with sodium cyanide (NaCN) or HCN to produce 
chlorine cyanide (ClCN). Chlorine cyanide is the key raw material for cyanuric 
acid—also known as cyanuric chloride (Cl3C3N3)—an important intermediate 
for the production of dyes, pesticides and detergents. Manufacturing processes 
are also continuing to be developed to meet major chemical industry demands for 
acrylonitrile (C3H3N). It is used in the manufacture of acrylic fibres, various 
nylons and some types of synthetic rubber. HCN is produced as a byproduct in 
the production of acrylonitrile in a process that involves the use of ammonia as 
an oxidizing agent of propylene (also called propene). 
Whether the CWC’s routine verification regime on the chemical industry 
captures HCN is partly dependent on how the term ‘captive use’ is understood 
and applied. HCN is typically used at the site where it is produced. Sometimes it 
is eliminated through in-line processes (i.e., the chemical is not removed from 
the production line process but is consumed within it). In other instances, HCN is 
stored in temporarily in ‘day tanks’. The chemical industry trends and facility 
design should be periodically considered in connection with specific information 
on the intent of those involved in the manufacture, transport and consumption of 
acrylonitrile and cyanuric chloride.602 
 
11.6.3. PFIB 
 
Perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB) is produced as a common by-product, in tens of 
thousands of tonne quantities, in the fluoropolymer industry, including the 
production of 1,1,1,3,3,3-hexafluoro-2-propanol (HFP) and tetrafluoroethylene 
(TFE) and processes involving the pyrolysis of polytetrafluoroethene (PTFE), 
more commonly known by its trade name Teflon™. As an unwanted by-product 
with apparently no known commercial uses above one tonne, it is generally 
eliminated through scrubbing or thermal treatment. PFIB is at least two orders of 
magnitude more toxic than phosgene. PFIB can cause pulmonary edema and 
those affected must then be treated for ‘polymer fume fever’.603 It can also act as 
a ‘mask breaker’ in one of two ways. Since PFIB is dipolar it cannot be absorbed 
by carbon. Second PFIB readily hydrolyzes to hydrogen fluoride (HF, an acid) in 
the presence of moisture or water (i.e., human breath).604 PFIB’s toxicity and 
effect are similar to those of phosgene and, like phosgene, no treatment for 
exposure is currently available with the exception of complete avoidance of 
physical activity and breathing pure oxygen or air with enriched oxygen.605 It is 
unclear whether the compound has ever actually been weaponized and 
incorporated into an offensive CW programme.606 
                                                 
602 Hart (note 587), pp. 1, 20–23. 
603 The literature on polymer fume fever is extensive. An early reference is D. Kenwin 
Harris, ‘Polymer-fume Fever’, Lancet (1 Dec. 1951), pp. 1008–1011. 
604 J. Bovenkamp, ‘The Development of Penetrant Protective Carbon (PPC)’, ASA Newsletter 
(12 Apr. 1996). 
605 PFIB is at least two orders of magnitude more toxic than phosgene. 
606 Hart (note 587), pp. 1, 20–23. See also C. M. Erasmus, ‘Perfluoroisobutylene (PFIB)’, BC 
2000, vol. 1, no. 3  (Nov. 1992), p. 8. Protechnick Laboratories (PTY) Ltd. Newsletter. 
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11.6.4. Phosgene 
 
Phosgene (COCl2) is an important industrial chemical which was also used as a 
choking agent during World War I. The onset of symptoms are delayed by up to 
three hours or more. The more the victim exerts himself, the more likely he is to 
die or suffer permanent injury. Perhaps the most notable industrial accident 
occurred in Bhopal, India in 1984 when phosgene was reacted with methyl amine 
(MeNH2) to yield methyl isocyanate (MIC). MIC, in turn, was an intermediate in 
the manufacture of the insecticide carbaryl (1-naphthyl methylcarbamate, 
C12H11NO2). The accident, which some maintain, was the result of industrial 
sabotage, caused over 3800 deaths with approximately 11000 disabilities.607 The 
treatment is complete rest and application of oxygen. Phosgene (CG) has 
periodically caused injury or deaths when shipments or storage containers are 
ruptured. The chemical industry produces phosgene by reacting chlorine with 
carbon monoxide (CO2) in the presence of a carbon catalyst at relatively low 
temperature (approximately 125 degrees celsius) and pressure (of several 
atmospheres). 
The key industrial objective involving phosgene is to obtain isocyanates 
(both di- and poly-) for use in the manufacture of polyurethanes and, to a lesser 
extent, aromatic608 polycarbonates and various polymerisation processes. To an 
extent isocyanates can be produced using dimethyl carbonate (DMC, 
(MeO)(CO)2), rather than phosgene. However, chemical processes involving the 
use of phosgene tend to be more economical than those involving the use of 
DMC. 
 
11.6.5. Other Industrial Chemicals and Their Applications 
 
Plastic additives for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and various plastics 
products are major end-uses for some chemicals appearing in Schedule 3 of the 
CWC’s Annex on Chemicals. Small amounts of highly-pure phosphorus 
trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride are essential for the production of high-
tech electronics products, including integrated circuit boards. 
Acetone (CH3COCH3) is a common chemical having wide industrial 
applications as a feedstock, solvent and drying agent. Its use during the 
preparation of some chemical warfare agents is standard and even necessary. It is 
used as a solvent for some sample preparations and by some who have attempted 
to process ricin from castor beans. 
                                                 
607 Jackson B. Browning, Union Carbide: Disaster at Bhopal (1993), 
<http://www.bhopal.com/~/media/Files/Bhopal/browning.pdf>, (accessed 16 June 2013). 
608 Aromatic compounds are a large class of organic compounds that possess five or more 
carbon atoms that are joined in a ring. Aliphatic compounds, by contrast, are a large class of 
organic compounds that possess straight or branched chains in the arrangements of their carbon 
atoms. Aliphatic compounds include alkanes, alkenes and alkynes. There are important 
distinctions in the behaviour of functional groups within aromatic and aliphatic compounds, 
respectively. 
128   HART  
Table 11.4 Selected chemical production processes with potential CW applications 
 
Production process  CW agents  Typical commercial products 
 
Chlorination   sulphur-mustard,  insecticides, herbicides 
    nitrogen mustard,  polymers, dyes, pharmaceuticals, 
    lewisite, sarin, VX solvents 
 
Fluorination   sarin, soman  polymers, solvents,  
pharmaceuticals, insecticides, herbicides, 
refrigerants gases, anasthetics 
 
Esterification   sarin, tabun,  insecticides, solvents, 
3-Quinuclidinyl Benzilate flavouring, pharmaceuticals 
(BZ) 
 
Phosphorylation   tabun, sarin, VX  insecticides, flame retardants, oil  
additives 
 
Alkylation   sarin, soman, VX  flame retardants, oil additives,  
petrochemicals 
 
Source: Robert J. Mathews, ‘Other chemical production facilities inspections’. Presentation at ‘Open 
Forum: the Chemical Weapons Convention—recent experience and future prospects’, OPCW Technical 
Secretariat, 9 Apr. 2008, The Hague. I thank Dr Mathews for permission to cite this table. 
11.6.6. Summary 
 
It is important for analysts to have basic familiarity with standard and non-
standard CBW agents and their traditional and possible future role in peaceful 
base research and applications. Such a consideration is an open-ended exercise 
which must be focused or appropriately linked to various verification-related 
analyses. It is also important to understand the theory and practice of CWC 
declaration and verification requirements. At the operational level there can be 
(and has been) legitimate scope for understanding among the States Parties on 
whether and how a given activity is declarable and the manner in which the 
declaration can or should be verified by inspectors. The States Parties should also 
continue to consider how S&T developments might improve the possibilities for 
more focused and effective verification, and where such developments might 
tend to undermine existing implementation practice.609 
 
11.7. Sampling and Analysis 
 
Sampling and analysis is an important component to multilateral arms control 
verification. In principle, the findings (if properly carried out) are distinct from 
other types of verification processes in that the results cannot be disputed (e.g., as 
opposed to witness statements). 
                                                 
609 An informal TS survey pointed to 3 main challenges for the CWC verification regime: (a) 
continued support by the member states, (b) constraints inherent in the CWC’s Verification 
Annex and (c) a need for the verification methodogies not to remain static. OPCW, ‘Summary 
of the Third Meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board Temporary Working Group on 
Verification’, OPCW document SAB-21/WP.6, 9 Apr. 2014, para. 3.1, p. 5. 
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The implementation of a chain-of-custody is the key to proper sampling 
and analysis and the subsequent verification of the existence or use of chemical 
warfare agents. Such a chain entails documenting, in a verifiable manner, who 
took a sample, how it was taken, stored and transported, in whose custody the 
sample was held prior to the analysis, how the sample was analysed and how the 
results were presented. Any results should be reproducible, although it is possible 
that a limited sample size may not yield sufficient material for further testing. 
Sampling and analysis protocols provide context to CBW allegations evaluations, 
including the question of degree of uncertainty the possible role of politicization 
of analysis and cognitive biases. 
OPCW analytical database include: (a) a discussion of whether 
unscheduled chemicals should be included and the extent to which they should 
be included; (b) developing an appropriate list of degradation products and, 
possibly, industrial intermediates; and (c) the inclusion and extent of inclusion of 
homologues.610 The database is divided into four analytical techniques each of 
which consists of a set of chemicals and analytical data that may be used with 
one of four approved analytical methods. The four techniques are: (a) Infrared 
(IR), (b) Mass spectrometry (MS), (c) Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), and 
(d) Gas Chromatography (GC). The addition of spectra to the database must 
undergo both technical and political approval. The technical approval is given by 
an informal validation group (mainly composed of members from the Scientific 
Advisory Board),611 while the Conference of States Parties must ultimately 
approve the changes upon the advice and recommendation of the Executive 
Council and the Director General. 
Because the analytical results of the OPCW might be disputed, the sample 
size should ideally be sufficiently large to permit the organization to conduct the 
analysis at least twice. This permits a second round of testing in case the results 
of the first round are disputed. This implies that two OPCW approved 
laboratories should have at least 2 sets of samples, a standby laboratory should 
have at least one set of samples and the Inspected State Party (ISP) should retain 
at least one set of samples. 
NATO, the UN and the OPCW continue to develop and test 
internationally recognized, peer-reviewed sampling and analysis procedures and 
techniques. These efforts are supported by national research and test facilities 
such as VERIFIN.612 
A number of effective international sampling and analysis protocols 
currently exist. Some states have developed such protocols for mainly national 
purposes. States have also developed protocols to support the negotiation and 
implementation of the CWC. For example, VERIFIN was established to help 
support the development and validation of CW sampling and analysis protocols 
to support the CWC. The OPCW conducts annual proficiency tests in order to 
give approval that a given facility can become an OPCW Designated Laboratory. 
Such laboratories must be capable of performing off-site analysis of chemical 
                                                 
610 Homologues may be defined as organic compounds having open-chain carbon atoms (i.e., 
aliphatic compounds) that differ only by the addition of a -CH2 group.  
611 The Validation Group is responsible to the SAB. Many of the members of the Validation 
Group also serve on the SAB. 
612 Ed. Markku Mesilaakso, Chemical Weapons Convention Chemicals Analysis: Sample 
Collection, Preparation and Analytical Methods (John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: Chichester, 2005). 
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samples collected by OPCW inspectors in order to help determine whether a 
violation of the CWC has occurred, including the possible production or use of 
CW. The proficiency tests are open to all interested laboratories in the Member 
States. As of March 2013, there were 22 OPCW Designated Laboratories from 
17 member states of which four facilities were suspended pending improvement 
on tests or delisting.613 The OPCW has also considered protocols for analyzing 
so-called mixed samples consisting of both chemical and biological 
substances.614 
Internationally-agreed standards for sampling and analysis carry greater 
weight (if proper and implemented in a sufficiently transparent manner) than 
national ones. An international inspection team’s sampling and analysis 
procedures, particularly if they indicate that the inspected party has carried out 
prohibited CW activity, must avoid being politicized (actual and in appearance). 
The authorization of an investigation of alleged CW use in Syria by the 
UN Secretary-General in 2013 highlights the continuing relevance of sampling 
and analysis for CW arms control verification. It would be useful to review the 
mandates and actions of relevant actors, as well as their priorities and capacities. 
It is also important to develop authoritative information, including with regard to 
the apparent clandestine sampling and analysis of physiological samples. By July 
2013 France, Russia, the UK and the USA issued public statements to the effect 
that believe chemical weapons had been used in Syria. France, the UK and the 
USA reportedly provided the UN with ‘a trove of evidence, including multiple 
blood, tissue and soil samples’ that the USA maintains ‘proves that Syrian troops 
used’ sarin ‘on the battlefield’.615  
In the case of sarin use allegations (e.g., in Syria), the following points are 
worth bearing in mind. Some weapon types are less suited to sarin dispersal, 
including grenades and explosive dissemination devices (which carry an 
attendant risk that too much of the agent will be consumed in the explosion). 
Unitary and multi-component bombs (including sub-munitions), as well as spray 
devices therefore are more suitable. 
Physiological samples may consist of blood, hair, tissue, or urine. One 
hydrolysis or decomposition product of sarin (including in blood) is isopropyl 
methylphosphonate (IMPA). A victim of sarin exposure would have depressed 
levels of acetylcholinesterase. IMPA is also detectable from urine using mass 
spectrometry. Any degradation products in urine would not be evident 
immediately following exposure and such products should be extracted within 
approximately 1 week. Unreacted (non-protein-bound) sarin may also be 
detectable in all tissue samples using GC/MS techniques.616 
                                                 
 
613 ‘Note by the Director-General, Status of Laboratories for the Analysis of Authentic 
Samples’, OPCW document S/1084/2013, 21 Mar. 2013, p. 2, <http://www.opcw.org/ 
index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16221>, (accessed 25 May 2013). 
614 On 2007 NATO mixed sample exercise, see Spiez Laboratory Annual Report 2007 
(Federal Office for Civil Protection: Spiez, Switzerland, 2008), pp. 26–27. 
615 Colum Lynch and Joby Warrick, ‘In Syrian Chemical Weapons Claim, Criticism About 
Lack of Transparency’, Washington Post, 20 June 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/in-syrian-chemical-weapons-claim-criticism-about-lack-of-
transparency/2013/06/20/fa799e6e-d925-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html>, (accessed 27 
July 2014). 
616 Carla EAM Degenhardt, Kees Pleijsier, Marcel J. van der Schans, Jan P. Langenberg, 
Kerry E. Preston, Maria I. Solano, V. L. Maggio, John R. Barr, ‘Improvements of the Fluoride 
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The case of Syria highlights the importance of the chain-of-custody of the 
samples, including those taken by national intelligence. The fact that the activity 
was carried out in a war zone is also important. The Syria case underlines both 
strengths and weaknesses associated with international norms against the 
possession and use of CW. Some of the difficulties associated with multilateral 
arms control include how to effectively extend the state-based prohibitions to the 
actions and interests (both suspected or known) of non-state actors. This is 
especially true for cases where non-state actors are operating in ungoverned 
spaces with the possible support of one or more states. 
 
11.8. Concepts, Principles and Procedures 
 
Any review of sampling and analysis principles and procedures risks creating 
long lists. Those responsible for the evaluation of possible chemical warfare-
related activity should nevertheless possess at least a passing familiarity with the 
basic procedures. This should include acquiring a general appreciation of the 
scientific and technical principles for sampling and analysis, the principal steps 
associated with the sampling and analysis for at least one major blister agent 
(sulphur mustard) and a persistent and non-persistent organophosphorus nerve 
agent (e.g., sarin and VX) and a familiarity with the challenges posed by non-
traditional agents or hallucinogens (e.g., TICs, glycolates and proteins). 
Samples may be taken from air, soil or water. Each requires a specific set 
of techniques to extract and prepare for analysis. 
The updated UN Secretary General’s technical guidelines and procedures 
outlines the principal areas in which laboratories should have expertise in 
chemistry, microbiology and toxicology including: 
 
(a) identification, in all types of sample, of known chemical warfare 
agents, as well as their impurities and their degradation productions 
(and evaluation of quantities); 
(b) identification and elucidation, in all the types of sample, of the 
structure of toxic agents, including those present in trace quantities 
(and evaluation of quantities); 
(c) identification and characterization, in different kinds of samples, 
including clinical and environmental samples, of biological warfare 
agents (bacteria, viruses, others) and/or toxins; 
(d) identification and characterization, in different kinds of samples, 
including clinical and environmental samples, of biological agents 
(bacteria, viruses, others) and/or toxins; 
(e) evaluation of the effects of biological warfare agents and toxins, 
including epidemiological and ecological modeling; 
(f) pathological and biochemical examination of organs and tissue taken 
from victims of CBT weapons, and where possible identification of 
the agent concerned; 
                                                                                                                                               
Reactivation Method for the Verification of Nerve Agent Exposure’, Journal of Analytical 
Toxicology, vol. 28 (July/Aug. 2004), pp. 364–371. 
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(g) expertise in investigation and diagnosis of animal or plant diseases, 
which may include toxicology, pathology, microbiology, and 
epidemiology; and 
(h) examination and evaluation of munitions, munition components, and 
other military delivery devices, including all their technical 
specifications, [and] analysis of explosives.617 
 
The UN Secretary General’s procedures for sample collection, handling, 
storage, transport and analysis are: 
 
(a) neat agent, munitions, remnants of munitions, other military delivery 
devices; 
(b)  NBC clothing and respirator canisters; 
(c) environmental samples; 
(d) food and drinking water; 
(e) biomedical samples from human or animal source; and 
(f) any affected crops and other vegetation.618 
 
The CWC states: ‘If the inspection team collects through, inter alia, 
identification of any impurities or other substances during laboratory analysis of 
samples taken, any information in the course of its investigation that might serve 
to identify the origin of any chemical weapons used, that information shall be 
included in the report’.619 
As previously mentioned, ideally, the sample size needs to be big enough 
to permit the body conducting the analysis to do so at least twice. This means 
that a portion of the sample should be placed into storage in case the initial 
analysis is challenged. 
 
11.8.1. Summary 
 
Sampling and analysis protocols are important. All chemical and biological agent 
detection systems have trade-offs, including size versus specificity and detection 
limits. Thus field detection systems tend to have higher (i.e., worse) detection 
limits, more false positive and negative readings and less specificity for reliably 
detecting the target agent. Older laboratory techniques (such as culturing) can 
take longer. One should also be aware of possible reasons for false and negative 
and positive readings. Biomedical samples (e.g., blood and urine) are major areas 
of focus, including in the context of the conflict in Syria. Environmental 
sampling was arguably more important in the case of Syria. Finally, it should be 
noted that epidemiology, medical case histories, statistical analysis of health 
treatment and the like are also important. 
 
                                                 
617 ‘Appendix V, List of diagnostic and analytical laboratory specializations’, 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/appendicies/V/>, 
(accessed 2 Jan. 2011). 
618 ‘Appendix VII, Procedures for sample collection, handling, storage, transport, and analysis’, 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/appendicies/VII/>, (accessed 2 Jan. 2011). 
619 CWC, Verification Annex, Part XI, para. 26. 
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11.9. Equipment 
 
The OPCW has a standard equipment ‘suite’ for in-field sampling and analysis of 
chemical warfare agents and their possible degradation products. In principle the 
DOC/PSF category covers all organic compounds except polymers and 
hydrocarbons under the routine verification system (i.e., those cases where 
allegations of non-compliance with the CWC have not been made).620 
The OPCW standard in-field configuration consists of approximately 20 
items, can be packed in a space occupying approximately 3 cubic meters and 
weighs approximately 1 tonne.621 
OPCW inspection equipment includes the following. CALID-3 detection 
paper that changes colour in the presence of G agents (orange), V agents (dark 
green) and sulphur mustard (bright red). The OPCW also uses ORI-217 chemical 
detection kit. This is a tube based system that is used to draw air samples for 
several minutes. When ready for analysis the second end is broken. The OPCW 
also uses CAMs (an IMS unit) which measures ion mobility and uses computer-
based algorithms to identify the presence of a range of chemical agents.622 
Finally the OPCW uses the handheld AP2C flame spectrometry detector system 
which detects the presence of sulphur- and phosphorus-based chemicals for both 
liquid and air samples.623 The AP2C flame spectrometry detector system detects 
colour changes which is suitable for use on the battlefield. The detector contains 
hydrogen gas stored in palladium.624 
OPCW inspectors use a protective ensemble with level 8 offering the 
maximum protection. OPCW inspectors fill out a special form to help ensure 
chain-of-custody. Information on the form include: an identifying number of the 
sample, whether the sample is authentic or a blank sample code, the type of 
sample, the weather conditions, whether and how the sample is split, a 
description of the circumstances under which the sample was taken, and the dates 
and times for analysis.625 Sample preparation may include some or all of the 
following steps: 1. add buffers, 2. derivitization, 3. solubility using various 
solvent, and 4. specific procedures according to type of agent (e.g., the lewisites). 
The OPCW takes 8 fractions of the sample. One is passed to the inspected State 
Party (2 for in-country analysis and 5 splits for off-site analysis).626 
The OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD), updated in 2013, does 
not include all degradation products of ‘standard’ CW agents.627 
                                                 
620 OPCW briefing at sampling and analysis demonstration exercise, 22 Aug. 2012, The 
Hague. 
621 OPCW briefing at sampling and analysis demonstration exercise, 22 Aug. 2012, The 
Hague. 
622 The algorithm compares the time-of-flight and only works if it has been validated. 
Sulphur mustard and organophosphorus nerve agent ions have opposite polarity. 
623 This system entails rubbing an absorbent pad on a surface of the sample point. The pad is 
then heated and the suspected CW agent desorbed. 
624 Some parties to the CWC object to OPCW inspection equipment that contains a 
radioactive source. 
625 OPCW briefing at sampling and analysis demonstration exercise, 22 Aug. 2012, The 
Hague. 
626 OPCW briefing at sampling and analysis demonstration exercise, 22 Aug. 2012, The 
Hague. 
627 One State Party in particular has blocked their inclusion for unclear reasons. 
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The OPCW requires two complementary methods for confirming the 
detection of a CW agent or known-CW degradation product. Preferably one of 
these methods should be spectrometric. 
 
11.10. Verification Results: Political and Technical Requirements 
 
Analysts should check if proper sampling and analysis has been carried out. 
Were those involved technically competent? What was the procedure by which 
the technical findings were assessed and used to inform policy? Were there pre-
existing (and validated) sampling and analysis protocols before the need arose to 
employ them? Was there an existing mechanism to evaluate the legal and 
political implications of the technical findings (including consideration of 
possible false positives and false negatives)? What role did political 
considerations, including preferred outcomes, play in the final assessment? 
The taking of samples from humans has periodically been considered in a 
CBW context. During World War II the US Office of the Surgeon General (at the 
suggestion of the War Research Service and with the approval of the Secretary of 
War) took blood samples from some POWs to determine whether they had been 
immunized against potential biological warfare agents.628 Cold War Allied 
operatives may also have arranged for Soviet military personnel to become 
involved in bar brawls after which they would be offered a hankerchief to wipe 
their bloody noses. The handerchiefs could then be tested to determine if they 
had been immunized or otherwise exposed to pathogens of interest.629 
The taking of biological samples from living or deceased humans or 
animals has been periodically considered within the CBW arms control and 
disarmament context, including under the UN Secretary-General’s CBW 
investigation mechanism. This was also considered by CWC negotiators and is 
discussed largely at the margins by some of the parties involved on sampling and 
analysis discussions. Some attention is also currently devoted to the development 
and validation of procedures for forensics analysis to support criminal 
investigation to possible acts of bioterrorism.630 
Finally, the UN Secretary-General’s technical guidelines and associated 
procedures for the investigation of alleged chemical and/or biological (CBW) use 
should be further considered in the light of the experience in Syria. Such an 
assessment could be structured according to: 
(a) information basis and pre-assessment (including formulation of 
inspection mandate), 
(b) sample activity, 
(c) interviewing, 
(d) analysis and 
(e) communication of findings. 
                                                 
628 Activities of the United States in the Field of Biological Warfare: a Report to the 
Secretary of War by George W. Merck, Special Consultant on Biological Warfare (the ‘Merck 
Report’), p. 18. Entry 488, Box 182, US National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington, DC. Declassified 2007. 
629 Personal communication with CBW academic. 
630 Kurt B. Nolte, Marc Fischer, Sarah Reagan and Ruth Lynfield, ‘Guidelines to Implement 
Medical Examiner/Coroner-Based Surveillance for Fatal Infectious Diseases and Bioterrorism’, 
American Journal of Forensic Medical Pathology, vol. 31, no. 4 (Dec. 2010), pp. 308–312 . 
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It should also systematically consider how investigations of alleged use 
have been structured and compare it against the experience in Syria. Relevant 
recent activity, such as the results of the OPCW SAB working groups on 
convergence and sampling and analysis, should be evaluated. 
The UN Secretary-General’s technical guidelines could also be contrasted 
and compared against the OPCW Inspection Manual (which contains at least 10 
SOPs for the investigation of alleged use), as well as associated OPCW Work 
Instructions (WIs) that inter alia outline procedures for decontamination, 
security, logistics, health & safety and the like. Past efforts to develop and test 
SOPs for the investigation of alleged CW use could be presented (e.g., by Soviet 
specialists in support of the UN during the Iran-Iraq War). The UN may be better 
positioned to provide logistics and political coverage, while the OPCW operates 
within the parameters of equal rights and responsibilities among the states parties 
(including with respect to the provision of logistics and security to the inspection 
team). The objective would be a further improvement of international capacity to 
respond authoritatively to allegations of alleged CBW use. 
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CASE STUDIES 
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12 
 
 
 
A LARGE STATE PROGRAMME:  
THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION 
 
 
euer’s 8 steps are presented in the context of a large state programme: 
the Soviet Union. Background is provided which is structured according 
to Table 10.1 as part of Step 2 (also reproduced below as Table 12.2). 
This is a hybrid, argument-mapping CW application. 
 
H 
12.1. Introduction 
 
The Soviet CW programme originated in Russia’s World War I programme. The 
Czarist government secured the services of chemists, such as Vladimir 
Nikolaiyevich Ipatiev, to assist with the development of respirators and the 
redirection of the country’s nascent chemical industry towards CW 
production.631 Russian planners had to identify the required chemicals and 
expertise and arrange for the relevant infrastructure. Artillery unit supply chains 
were employed to move, store and use the CW.632 
Although Russia employed chlorine, chloropicrin and phosgene, its CW 
capabilities were underdeveloped as compared to those of Germany. As noted 
previously, according to casualty figures provided by Gilchrist, Russia suffered 
more deaths from CW than any of the other belligerents: 56000, while France 
had the second highest number with 8000.633 Russia also suffered from 
underdeveloped production capacity, often poor gas discipline and sub-optimal 
integration of these weapons in its military doctrine. 
The Soviet Chemical Service was founded on the basis of decree no. 220 
issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on 13 November 
1918.634 On 15 August 1925 the Military-Chemical Directorate (part of the Red 
Army supply command) was formed under the leadership of Yakov M. 
Fishman.635 
CW was also used during Russia’s Civil War. British forces employed the 
irritant adamsite and Red Army units were authorized to use chlorine in 1921 
against partisans hiding in forests near the city of Tambov. Pozdnyakov, a Soviet 
                                                 
631 See Ipatieff (note 158). On Soviet respirators, see, for e.g., A. Melik-Kasparov, 
Karmannaya Knizhka Voiskovogo Artillerista [Pocket Handbook of Troop Artillery Personnel], 
4th edtn. (State Military Publishers: Moscow, 1931), pp. 390–393; and S. V. Aginsky and V. L. 
Zelensky, Kratkaya Tekhnologiya Sredstv Protivokhimicheskoi Zashchity [Short Technology of 
the Means of Chemical Defence] (State Military Publishers: Moscow, 1933). 
632 Orlov (note 222), pp. 26–27. 
633 All World War I casualty statistics should be treated with caution. See Gilchrist (note 
103), p. 7; and Chapter 1 of this volume. 
634 Kochubina and Lebedevsky (note 191), p. 5. 
635 Kochubina and Lebedevsky (note 191), p. 11. 
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officer, was told by a participant in the attack that Red Army units had used 
‘chemical shells’ to ‘destroy’ rebels in the Caucasus mountains.636 In the 1930s 
Soviet aircraft sprayed sulphur mustard onto Basmatch tribesmen (Pozdnyakov 
was told this by the commander of the operation).637 Lev Borisovich Kamenev638 
and Lev Davidovich Trotsky639 also reportedly sanctioned the use of ‘chemical 
shells and balloons’ against rebel Soviet naval units at the Kronstadt Fortress in 
1921 (the fortress guarded the approaches to St. Petersburg). However, the island 
fell before the plan could be implemented.640 
In 1923, the Soviet government reportedly received information from 
abroad on chemical weapon development in ‘capitalist’ countries which 
prompted the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic to establish the 
Interdepartmental Advisory Council on Chemical Methods of War.641 In 1924, 
this body became the Chemical Committee and was attached to the 
Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.642 
Fishman was perhaps the most important organizer and promoter of the 
Soviet CW programme in those areas where policy and technical expertise 
intersected. He did this partly, as previously noted, by helping to found and 
support OSOAVIAKhim, a volunteer society that sought to promote the 
development and application of chemistry for agriculture and industry and to 
prepare the country against possible CW attack.643 The society achieved the 
latter objective partly by organizing CW contamination avoidance drills and 
instructing Soviet citizens in decontamination procedures. Fishman was also a 
Soviet military attaché to Berlin in the 1920s and traveled to Europe for 
discussions on CW-related matters with German and Italian officials and 
specialists until he was purged (but not killed).644 Soviet embassies were tasked 
to collect CW-related information from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, 
                                                 
636 V. Pozdnyakov, ‘The Chemical Arm’, p. 385 in Basil H. Liddell-Hart (ed.), The Red 
Army: The Red Army—1918 to 1945, the Soviet Army—1946 to the Present (Harcourt, Brace 
and Company: New York City, 1956). 
637 V. Pozdnyakov, ‘The Chemical Arm’, p. 385 in Basil H. Liddell-Hart The Red Army (note 
636). 
638 Kamenev was Chairman of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars, as well as the Politburo 
during Lenin’s final convalescence. 
639 Trotsky held various positions and headed the RKKA. It was he who gave the order to 
attack the fortress. 
640 V. Pozdnyakov, ‘The Chemical Arm’, pp. 384–385 in Basil H. Liddell-Hart, The Red 
Army (note 636). 
641 Orlov (note 222), p. 32. 
642 Orlov (note 222), p. 32. 
643 See L. P. Borisov, ‘OSOAVIAKhim, Pages of History: 1927–1941’, Voprosy Istorii 
[Issues of History] (1965), pp. 45–60 (in Russian) accessed via EastView at 
<http//dlib.eastview.com>; Enyukov (note 204); and Yakob Fishman, Khimiya v Nardonom 
Khozyaistve i Oborone [Chemistry in the Peoples’ Economy and Defence] (State Military 
Publisher: Moscow, 1924). 
644 Lev A. Fedorov, Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie—Voina s Sobstvennym Narodom: 
Tragichesky Rossiisky Opit [Chemical Armament—War Against One’s Own People: the Tragic 
Russian Experience], vol. 1 (Moscow: Feb. 2009), pp. 69 & 76–78. An official history of 
Shikhany states that prior to being named head of the RKKA Military Chemical Directorate, 
Fishman ‘worked for a long time as assistant Soviet military attaché in Germany, and then 
Chairman of the Defence Commissariat of the USSR.  Alimov (note 128), p. 7. 
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Romania, Sweden and the United States.645 Some of this information is almost 
certainly reflected in Soviet journals such as War and Technology (see Table 
12.1).646 
 
Table 12.1 Soviet Military Journals 
 
Journal        Publisher 
 
Armeisky Sbornik [Army Collection]    State Military Publisher (?) 
Artilleriisky Zhurnal [Artillery Journal]    State Military Publisher 
Boets-Okhotnik [Warrior-Hunter]     State Military Publisher 
Krasnaya Konitsa [Red Cavalryman]    State Miltary Publisher 
Krasnoarmeets i Krasnoflotets [Red Army Man and Red Navy Sailor] State Military Publisher 
Kul’trabota v RKKA (Krasno-armeisky klub) [Cultural Work in the  
Worker-Peasant Red Army (Red Army Club)]  State Military Publisher 
Mekhanizatsiya i Motorizatsiya RKKA [Mechanization  
and Motorization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army]  State Military Publisher 
Sovietskoe Voennoe Obozrenie [Soviet Military Observer] 
Sovietsky Voin [Soviet Warrior]     Ministry of Defence 
Tekhnika i Vooruzhenie [Technology and Armaments]  State Military Publisher 
Tyl i Snabzhenie Sovetskikh Vooruzhenikh Sil [Rear and Supply of  
Soviet Armed Forces]***     State Military Publisher (?) 
Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota [Bulletin of the Air Force]  State Military Publisher 
Vestnik Protivodushnoi Oboroni [Bulletin of Air Defence]  State Military Publisher 
Voina i Revolyutsiya [War and Revolution]    State Military Publisher 
Voenno-Khimichesky Byulleten’ [Military-Chemical Bulletin]* Red Army Chemical Directorate 
Voenno-Istorichesky Zhurnal [Military-Historical Journal]  Ministry of Defence 
Voenno-Meditsinsky Zhurnal [Military-Medical Journal]  Ministry of Defence 
Voennaya Mysl’ [Military Thought] **    Ministry of Defence 
Voenny Vestnik [Military Bulletin]     State Military Publisher 
Voenny Khozyaistvo [Military Economy]    State Military Publisher (?) 
Voenny Zarubezhnik [Foreign Military Man]    State Military Publisher 
Voennie Znaniya [Military Knowledge]    Ministry of Defence 
 
Source: Author compilation. While none of the publications examined by the author had restriction 
markings, these journals were probably not available to the general public. They are aimed at non-
technical and semi-technical military personnel (as opposed to, for e.g., laboratory researchers carrying 
out base research on CW production-related work). *See Voenno-Khimichesky Byulletin’, vol. 4, no. 15 
(Fifth Directorate of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (Chemical Directorate): Moscow, 1940). 
**According to one source (a Western book), there are at least two versions of this journal. One is in 
general circulation, while the other is restricted to senior officers (e.g., to the ranking members of the 
General Staff). ***Later called Tyl Vooruzhenikh Sil [Rear Services of the Armed Forces] and then Tyl 
Vooruzhenkikh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Rear Services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation]. 
12.1.1. Information Sources 
 
Although a large literature exists on the Soviet CW programme, much of it is 
speculative or incomplete. A comprehensive treatment of the actors, policies and 
                                                 
645 Lev A. Fedorov, vol. 1 (note 644), pp. 56–61. 
646 ‘Voenno-khimicheskoe Delo, k Voprosu o “Zapreshchenii Khimicheskoi Voiny”’ 
[Military-chemical Matters, Towards the Question of the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare], 
Voina I Tekhnika [War and Technology], no. 1 (1928), pp. 58–62. This article summarizes CW 
activities in other countries, largely on the basis of information published in a 1927 French 
journal Chemical Industry. While the provenance of this article is not certain, Soviet embassies 
routinely collected such literature. 
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activities based on Soviet and Russian archival material is still lacking, including 
in terms of the scope, level of detail and authoritativeness. 
Dr Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov’s 2009 and 2011 studies nevertheless fill 
much of this gap.647 Fedorov was a chemist in the Soviet chemical defence 
establishment and is currently the President of the Union for Chemical Safety in 
Moscow. The 2009 study is a fundamental work, rich in detail and many of the 
1057 references are documents from the Russian state archives, while the 2011 
work has 773 references that are similar in nature. 
The first volume of the 2009 study describes the origins of the Soviet CW 
programme, including the development of the chemical industry and expertise to 
support it. The second volume provides an overview of the research and extent of 
the Soviet CW infrastructure. The final volume focuses on more contemporary 
issues, including the legacy of the programme for human health and 
environmental safety. Fedorov does not disguise his distaste for many of the 
individuals who developed the CW programme or the military and political 
leadership behind them, including their contribution to the poor working 
conditions for munitions workers and support of human testing. The 2009 study 
is disjointed partly because of periodic digressions and the insertion of extended 
quotations and lists. However, these extended quotations are useful in the 
absence of direct access to the original sources.648 
Soviet military literature was placed in libraries of military training 
facilities and academies. The security services would also circulate reports on 
international scientific, technical and political activities deemed relevant. The 
KGB and its predecessors had onsite representatives to oversee facility security 
and maintain checks on the political reliability of personnel. They presumably 
were also aware of and perhaps acted as the conduit for intelligence summaries 
being transferred into the facility. Other libraries and archives of relevance 
include the present-day Russian State Military Archive (located in Moscow, 
Bauman Region), and the archives of the Soviet Communist Party Central 
Committee.649 
                                                 
647 Lev A. Fedorov, Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie (note 644); and Lev A. Fedorov, 
Khimishekoe Razoruzhenie Po-Russky: Dokumental’ny Roman [Chemical Disarmament 
Russian-Style: a Documentary Novel] (New Literary Review: Moscow, 2011). 
648 Some of the text describing the 2009 study is based on: John Hart, ‘The Soviet Chemical 
Weapon Programme’ (Litteratur), Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlinger och Tidskrift 
[Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences Proceedings and Journal] no. 3 (July-Oct. 2010) (in 
English), pp. 180–183 [Review of Lev A. Fedorov’s Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie—Voina s 
Sobstvennym Narodnom: Tragichesky Rossiisky Opyt [Chemical Armament—War Against 
One’s Own People: the Tragic Russian Experience] (Moscow: Feb. 2009, self published)]. 
649 Upon taking control of the Soviet Union following the failed coup attempt against 
Mikhail Gorbachev, Russian President Boris Yeltsin placed the military historian Dmitri 
Volkogonov in charge of the Soviet Central Committee archives. Volkogonov is mainly known 
for his biographies of each Soviet leader which had a profound affect on the views of many 
Russians towards Soviet history. For example, he described the notations made by Lenin and 
Stalin on the margins of documentation with disparaging remarks or ordering executions and his 
own reactions and mental reassessment process as he read them. Volkogonov also characterized 
Chernyenko as the quintessential and natural end result of the mediocrity that plagued the 
Soviet leadership in the final years. The English-language editions of the biographies are 
shortened. It should also be noted that some academic historians have disparaged Volkogonov’s 
research and his ability as an historian more generally. 
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The professional literature includes a range of journals. Voenny Mysl’ 
[Military Thought], still published, consists of dense, jargon-filled articles 
authored by fairly high-ranking military officers on military planning and 
doctrine. Although more technocractic, the articles are somewhat comparable to 
those of the collected lectures of Soviet Marshal Kliment Voroshilov on military 
doctrine.650 With possible rare exceptions, the articles do not provide useful or 
usable information on the Soviet CW threat perceptions or CW capabilities. 
Raymond L. Garthoff, a longtime eminent and perceptive student of 
Soviet (and Russian) military strategy, observed in the 1950s that much of the 
Soviet military press was not marked restricted and, although its actual 
distribution may have been limited (e.g., Military Thought was meant to be 
circulated to Soviet officers), they were obtainable and texts dealing with matters 
of substance were generally less suffused with Soviet-communist political 
correctness.651 
I have a similar reaction with respect to inter-World War Soviet journals. 
Their language is generally focused on substance, and the political rhetoric is 
largely relegated to the front matter. Other professional literature (having varying 
degrees of politicization) includes Voenny Istorichesky Vestnik [Military 
Historical Bulletin], Voprosy Istorii [Questions of History]652 Voennie Znaniya 
[Military Knowledge], and the D. I. Mendeleev All-Union Chemical Society 
Journal. If one knows the names of chemists and military officers, one can find 
biographical information on them in such journals. 
Technical literature of greater interest includes the Russian Chemical 
Review, Voina i Tekhnika [War and Technology], and Voina i Revolyutsiya [War 
and Revolution]. Any publication by a chemist from certain institutions, such as 
GosNIIOKhT (State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and 
Technology) has, one can assume, been routinely flagged by various non-Soviet 
defence and security establishments. Voina i Revolyutsiya was, at least in the 
mid-1930s, an official publication of the Organ of the Central Council of 
OSOAviaKhim.653 Voenny Vestnik was a Soviet military-political weekly journal 
that was first published in 1920. 
Voina i Tekhnika, first published in 1919, appears to have been issued as 
both a single general journal and as occasional specialized supplements. These 
specialised supplements include: Voennoe Khozyaistvo [Military Economy], 
Vozdushny Flot [Air Force], Mekhanichesky Transport [Mechanized Transport], 
Voenno-Nauchnaya Zhizn’ [Military-Scientific Life], Svyaz’ Krasnoi Armii [Red 
                                                 
650 See Ed. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet 
General Staff Academy, vols. 1–3 (National Defense University Press: Washington, DC, 1989, 
1990, 1992). 
651 See Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Greenwood Press 
Publishers: Westport, Conn., 1974), ‘Source Materials on Soviet Strategy: a Bibliographic and 
Interpretive Guide’, pp. 253–274. This book is a facsimile reprint of the original 1958 printing 
by the Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. edition. It should be noted that Garthoff does not mention in 
this work several important Soviet publications, including, most notably, War and Technology. 
652 This can also be translated as Problems of History. 
653 Only one issue of Voina i Revolyutsiya examined by the author appears to have been 
explicitly affiliated with OSOAviaKhim: Voina i Revolyutsiya, no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 1936). Despite 
being issue number 1, this particular issue also states that the journal was published starting in 
1924. OSOAviakhim nevertheless appears to have been founded under this name in 1927. See 
Borisov (note 643), pp. 45–60. 
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Army Communications], and Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo [Military-Chemical 
Affairs]. In the general issues, CW-related articles in the 1920s-1930s appear not 
to consist of more than about 5 per cent of the total.654 
In a typical issue of Voina i Tekhnika, a general threat assessment of 
international chemical industry is provided.655 A series of special Military-
Chemical Matters issues of Voina i Tekhnika from the 1920s contain little, if any, 
political or Communist Party rhetoric characteristic of other journals and books, 
such as Voenny Mysl’ [Military Thought].656 Typical topics covered in Military-
Chemical Matters include listings of patents, general overviews of the state of 
chemical detection and protection, and smoke operations; and the organization of 
various CW military establishments. 
The sources of information for the articles in Military-Chemical Matters 
are often provided. However, the articles are not, as a rule, properly referenced. 
Citations from international book publications are provided. Sometimes a 
paragraph states that information is based on a ‘survey of literature’. A hint that 
some information is derived from intelligence can sometimes be inferred (if the 
reader is inclined to think in these terms). Much of the information likely 
originated from a systematic review of publications, as well as information 
obtained by Soviet embassies.657 
Military-Chemical Matters also provides an international chronology of 
events of CW relevance, including speeches by Amos Fries and activities of the 
US Chemical Warfare Association.658 The issues looked at by the author were 
written in a sober, factual manner. The journal also reviewed US publications 
such as the Army and Navy Journal and Military Chemist. The chronicle section 
also notes international trade association meetings and academic congresses of 
chemists. The issues also included a review of recent Soviet and international 
publications, such as Dr Gertrud Woker’s Der Kommende Giftgaskrieg (Kultur 
und Zeitfragen: Leipzig, 1925).659 The journal also published extracts from 
Haldane’s Callinicus and Rudolf Hanslian’s works and Edward Bright Vedder’s 
Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare (Baltimore, 1925).660 
                                                 
654 This is a rather subjective view of the author based on an incomplete review of 
approximately 100 journal issues. 
655 Voina i Tekhnika [War and Technology], no. 8 (1927), p. 69. 
656 The only issues of Military-Chemical Matters that the author could locate were from this 
period. 
657 Admittedly a subjective view by the author. 
658 Chemical Warfare Association members included: C. H. Herty of the Synthetic Organic 
Chemical Manufacturers’ Association, W. P. Bancroft of Cornell University, C. L. Parsons of 
the American Chemical Society, and C. L. Reese of Du Pont Co. Anonymous, ‘Khronika: za 
Rubezhom’ [International Chronicle], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo [War and 
Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 263–264 (Jan.–Feb. 1926), p. 40. 
659 Anonymous, ‘Kritika i Bibliographfiya’ [Criticism and Bibliography], Voina i Tekhnika, 
Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo [War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 263–264 
(Jan.–Feb. 1926), p. 46. 
660 Vedder (b. 1878, d. 1952) was a US physician and scientist who served as the chief of 
medical research in the US Chemical Warfare Service (CWS). Garrett and Hart (note 108), pp. 
223–224. 
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A. A. Goryainov reviewed the use of chloropicrin against plant pests.661 
Another problem identified in 1926 was to find a suitable decontaminating 
compound against this compound.662 The Soviets also noted that Edgewood 
Arsenal, on 1 May 1926, opened an exhibit of its CW-related achievements in 
which US chemical industry, scientists and government officials participated. 
The notation is a single paragraph with no explicit threat perception 
discussion.663 Voina i Tekknika also reviewed the price of arsenic in the United 
States, the production of paints in the United States, the exports of iodine from 
Chile (the UK is the top recipient at 401043 kg, while Italy is in last place at 
13836 kg), and the production capacity of sulphur in Italy.664 
Regarding the organization of CW military establishments, one issue of 
Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo states, citing Amos Fries, that the Italian CW 
programme was established in the early 1920s and that it is structured after that 
of the US Chemical Warfare Service.665 In 1926 E. P. Banchik reviews the US 
field organization for treating CW casualties.666 This article appears to 
paraphrase unreferenced US materials. For example translations of several terms 
are reproduced in the original (English). It is possible that the source is a single 
US publication or was synthesized from multiple booklets and possibly informed 
by discussions. To make a further determination, one would have to compare the 
lists of treatments and equipment against the presumed original documentary 
source, as well as the specific distances for collection points of gas casualties 
(i.e., 1.5-3 versts [1.4-3.2 km] behind front lines). If this specific detail could be 
linked to a US document that was restricted at the time, it would illustrate Soviet 
intelligence collection capabilities. However, such an analysis would not be a 
particularly worthwhile use of time because the substance of the article is basic 
and the question is of historical curiosity. So much time has elapsed that 
uncovering any meaningful or historically interesting information would be 
unlikely. Nevertheless, by describing the steps that one might undertake to 
determine Soviet information capabilities, one can obtain a better appreciation of 
some of the relevant Soviet thought processes involved in intelligence 
                                                 
661 A. A. Goryainov, ‘Khlorpikrin v Bor’be s Vreditel’yami Khleba i Rastenii’ [Chloropicrin 
in the Struggle against Bread and Plant Pests], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo 
[War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 275–276 (Mar.–Apr. 1926), pp. 38–48. 
662 V. Nekrasov, ‘O Reaktsiyakh na Khlorpikrin’, Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe 
Delo [War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 275–276 (Mar.–Apr. 1926), pp. 
32–33. 
663 Anonymous, ‘Za Rubezhom, I. Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo, Voenn-Khimicheskaya 
Vystavka v Ezhdvudskom Arsenale’ [Abroad, I. Military-Chemical Matters, Military Chemical 
Exhibit at Edgewood Arsenal], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo [War and 
Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 290–291 (May–June 1926), p. 48. 
664 Anonymous, ‘Za Rubezhom [Abroad], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo 
[War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 290–291 (May–June 1926), pp. 51–54. 
Iodine compounds were developed starting in World War I as lachrymators, including: 
iodoacetone, ethyl iodoacetate, and benzyl iodide. SIPRI (note 98), pp. 42–43. Such research 
continued intermittently after World War II as well. 
665 Khronika: za Rubezhom (note 658), p. 40. 
666 E. P. Banchik, ‘Polevaya Organizatsiya “Otdela Lecheniya Gazootravlennikh” v Armii S.-
A. Soedinennikh Shtatov’ [Field Organization of the “Gas Treatment Unit” in the US Army], 
Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimeskoe Delo [War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], 
nos. 263–264 (Jan.–Feb. 1926), pp. 13–17. 
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assessments such processes may possess contemporary relevance vis-à-vis 
Russia. 
Table 12.2 Soviet Inter-World War Field CW Response Requirements 
 
Purpose: for removal and neutralization of sulphur mustard. 
Prophylactics 
Gas-proof tents 
Extra blankets 
Kerosene 
Chlorinated lime 
Sodium bicarbonate 
 
Purpose: first aid with lewisite burns 
Prophylactics 
Tubes containing hydrates of iron oxide 
Sodium hydroxide 
 
Purpose: treatment of thermal burns 
Prophylactics 
Morphine 
Picric acid 
Wine spirits 
Cotton gauze 
Olive oil 
 
Purpose: Mustard and other CW burns  
Prophylactics 
Dichloramine T.* 
Calcium hypochlorite 
 
Purpose: For breathing irritating poisonous fumes 
Prophylactics 
Ammonium chloride dissolved in alcohol 
Chloroform 
Ether 
 
Source: E. P. Banchik, ‘Polevaya Organizatsiya “Otdela Lecheniya Gazootravlennikh” v Armii S.-A. 
Soedinennikh Shtatov’ [Field Organization of the “Gas Treatment Unit” in the US Army], Voina i 
Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimeskoe Delo [War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 263-264 
(Jan.-Feb. 1926), p. 14. *I do not know what the ‘t’ stands for. 
Often equipment and patents are reviewed (most of the patents looked at 
by the author are German). Other topics include: the development and testing of 
equipment to measure breathing resistance associated with various respirators, 
microscopic comparison of activated charcoal and studies on the diffusion of war 
gases from various materials (clothing, rubber, concrete, etc.). In another case, a 
project for a mobile smoke and CW exposure chamber for 50 people for training 
purposes constructed in a special rail car is reviewed.667 Other articles consider 
developments in filter design and testing. Still others analyse CW agents, such as 
                                                 
667 A. Zhukoborsky and N. Duriitsky, ‘Podvizhnaya Okurivatel’naya Kamera’ [Mobile 
Smoke Chamber], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-Khimicheskoe Delo [War and Technology, 
Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 263–264 (Jan.–Feb. 1926), pp. 25–26. 
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lewisite.668 Brief summaries of other states’ CW programmes are also provided. 
There is a particular focus on Amos Fries whose influential 1921 book on 
chemical warfare was often cited in by Soviet military chemists in their own 
textbooks.669 Articles in the 1920s and 1930s were also still focused on trying to 
learn the lessons of CW use during World War I. Frequently, this information 
reads like a basic summary of Prentiss’ seminal 1937 study Chemicals in War, 
such as summaries of World War I casualties and the CW programmes of other 
states.670 Such books were also examined by Soviet specialists in what generally 
appear to be non-copyrighted Soviet translations published by the Soviet State 
Military Publishers.671 
 
12.2. Framing the Hypotheses 
 
The main hypotheses are: Has the target of analysis stockpiled chemical weapons 
(yes or no)? 
To allow for more meaningful analysis, the scope and focus should be 
more narrowly defined. As noted in Chapter 9, the question of 
production/stockpiling of chemical weapons is meant to inform the broader 
strategic question: Did the Soviet Union possess sufficient chemical weapon 
stockpiles during the early period (i.e., prior to the Battle of Stalingrad) of World 
War II to engage in strategic chemical warfare? 
Related broader questions include why the German Army appears not to 
have captured large stocks of CW or CW production facilities, and was the 
Soviet Union capable of engaging in chemical warfare? If it was capable, what 
factors constrained the USSR from employing such weapons? 
The analytical problem must be broken down (i.e., decomposed) into more 
readily analyzable parts in order to facilitate ‘visualization’.672 The logic of the 
information provided should be apparent. A strategic analysis can then, in 
principle, be developed on the basis of extrapolation (unchanging forces), 
projection (changing forces) and predictions (changing and new forces) with the 
objective being to develop a strategic theoretical application of ACH as it relates 
to chemical weapons.673 
                                                 
 
668 Lewisite is named for Winfred Lewis. The compound was discovered in 1904, but 
became more widely known under this name and as a CW agent in 1918. P. E. [only initials 
provided], ‘Otravlenie Lyuizitom’ [Lewisite Contamination], Voina i Tekhnika, Voenno-
Khimicheskoe Delo [War and Technology, Military-Chemical Matters], nos. 290–291 (May–
June 1926), pp. 36–42. This article may paraphrase Vedder’s Medical Aspects of Chemical 
Warfare (1925). 
669 Fries and West (note 117). As head of the US CWS and public lobbyist for maintaining a 
chemical warfare programme, Fries had a higher profile than West in Soviet writings. On Fries’ 
successful efforts to lobby the chemical industry and the Congress to prevent the army from 
shutting down the CWS following the end of World War I, see Frederick J. Brown, Chemical 
Warfare: a Study in Restraints (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1968,) pp. 74–92. 
670 Prentiss (note 100). 
671 Intellectual property protection laws were sometimes criticized as capitalist or bourgeoisie 
means of keeping down the working classes, and undesirable or irrelevant to Soviet communist 
system. 
672 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 41. 
673 Clark (note 29), pp. 204–205. It should be noted that Clark employs these three terms 
(extrapolation, projection and prediction) in terms of ’target-centric’ intelligence analysis, not 
ACH. The distinction, however, is relevant in order to faciliate consideration of how 
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Strategic intelligence assessments from the post-World War II into the 
Cold War period are presented in Chapter 15 in order to facilitate consideration 
of the longer-term implications of the strategic CW stockpiling question that 
may, in turn, have continued relevance, including in terms of arms control 
verification and intelligence analysis. This discussion may also inform 
consideration of neoliberal institutionalism and realist models of IR theory. 
 
Step 1. Identify the Possible Hypotheses to be Considered 
 
The possible hypotheses are: 
1. Yes (the Soviet Union did possess the means to engage in strategic 
chemical warfare until the tide of the war turned in its favour at the Battle 
of Stalingrad (Aug. 1942-Feb. 1943)), or 
2. No (the Soviet Union did not possess the means to engage in strategic 
chemical warfare to the period ending at the Battle of Stalingrad (Aug. 
1942-Feb. 1943)). 
 
Engaging in strategic chemical warfare is understood to entail the 
systematic and widespread use of such weapons in the hundreds or thousands of 
tonnes—both along front lines and deep strikes against lines of communication 
and supply and troop concentration areas in order to implement Soviet strategic 
objectives. Incidental exposure to CW agent—as occurred when German soldiers 
were exposed to sulphur mustard at a bridge incident in the 1939 Polish 
campaign, the so-called Jaslo incident in Galicia674—or ad hoc/‘one-off’ 
employment of CW, would not rise to the level of strategic chemical warfare. A 
general employment of CW for strategic purposes would not go unnoticed and 
would probably not be subject to dispute. A limited number of instances of CW 
use for strategic purposes could be (and is) more ambiguous due to a lack of 
authoritative evidence and the passage of time. A proposition that may appear to 
be self-evident can nevertheless be formulated as a hypothesis and challenged 
using counter-factual test methods. 
 
Step 2. Make a List of Significant Evidence and Arguments For and 
Against Each Hypothesis 
 
The background for the significant evidence and arguments for and against each 
hypothesis must be provided for the main question. This background is structured 
according to Table 10.1 (reproduced here as Table 12.3). 
                                                                                                                                               
operational, counter-factual techniques can facilitate a higher level and broader strategic 
analysis. 
674 SIPRI (note 98), pp. 153–155; and Hermann Ochsner, History of German Chemical 
Warfare in World War II (Historical Office: Office Chief of Chemical Corps), pp. 16–17. US 
Chemical Corps Historical Studies, study no. 2. Declassified. 
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Table 12.3 Structure of Background Narrative to Case Studies. 
 
Political factors 
 
Definition of violation 
Intent 
 Doctrine 
 Consistent with types and quanties? 
Threat perception 
Apparent 
Actual 
Demand side factors 
Supply side factors 
 
 
Technical factors 
 
Assimilation 
Capability 
Technological stages 
Verification measures 
Onsite 
Nearsite 
Offsite 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Sufficient background for each hypothesis must be provided. The 
background should also be structured with a limited number of headers, have 
internal cohesion and be sufficiently broad to allow for a meaningful narrative 
that permits the reader to readily ascertain the connection between the logic of 
the argument and the evidence (or lack thereof). To do so, allows for further 
refinement of the analytical technique and modification of the conclusions as 
new insight and information become available. 
The background is structured according to political and technical factors. 
The political factors considered are: (a) the definition of a CWC-defined 
violation, (b) intent, (c) threat perception (apparent and actual), (d) demand side 
factors and (e) supply side factors. The technical factors considered are: (a) CW 
assimilation and (b) ‘verification measures’ (mainly derived from the arms 
control paradigm). These political and technical factors were developed by the 
author. However, it should be noted that supply and demand side factors are part 
of the standard nuclear arms control and disarmament literature.675 Also 
variations of integration and assimilation of weapons systems into military 
doctrine and training have long been considered by analysts in various 
contexts.676 
                                                 
675 For a recent summary of IR-based explanations for the low number of nuclear weapons 
states, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, ‘The Study of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation’, 
pp. 13–37 in Eds. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Forecasting Nuclear 
Proliferation in the 21st Century: the Role of Theory, vol. 1 (Stanford Security Studies: 
Stanford, Cal., 2010). 
676 E.g., Robinson (note 41), pp. 112–123; Jean Pascal Zanders, ‘Putting the Horse Before the 
Cart: Some Thoughts on Controlling Unconventional Arms in the Middle East’, Studia 
Diplomatica, vol. 51, nos. 3–4 (1998), pp. 40–42; and Arnett (note 41). 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES   149      
 
12.3. Political Factors 
 
CWC-defined violations are employed to serve as an agreed standard in the 
analysis (as well as for the other two case studies). This is despite the fact that 
geopolitical circumstances, including security perceptions and the existence and 
implementation practice of legal regimes, have changed over time. Although the 
CWC did not exist at this time, its provisions provide a contemporary and 
relevant standard by which to define and understand CW-related activity in both 
a 20th and 21st century arms control context, and a general security and defence 
intelligence analysis context. 
With respect to the stockpiling of chemical weapons for a large state 
programme, such as that of the Soviet Union, this may be understood to mean 
that the state has undertaken to produce and store multiple tonne amounts of 
munitions (filled and unfilled) as part of its military logistics system (as opposed 
to, for e.g., sabotage or assassination programmes by security services).677 It may 
also be understood to mean that the target of analysis has taken steps to ensure 
standby production capacity to meet its doctrinal requirements, including field 
filling stations for the replenishment of aged (i.e., degraded) chemical fill or 
empty ‘obsoleted’ munitions.678 A government implementing a large, traditional 
state programme which wished to maintain the option of engaging in chemical 
warfare would, prior to the end of the Cold War, view chemical warfare mainly 
in terms of state-to-state conflict for both tactical and strategic operations. 
Sabotage operations using chemical agents have also been a concern of states, 
though this aspect is generally less visible (at least in public).679 
A traditional large state-run programme that has not stockpiled CW would 
occur where any work with CW agents remains largely confined to the laboratory 
for protective and evaluation purposes. The ‘footprint’ of such activity would be 
much smaller and more dependent on systematic evaluation of scientific and 
technical publications, including the issuance of patents or certificates of 
invention.680 Such factors could be analyzed and presented in terms of the 
understanding of ‘types and quantities’ phrasing that informs whether activity 
involving toxic chemicals and their precursors are permitted under the CWC.681 
                                                 
677 ‘Militarily-significant’ amounts of CW agent was generally understood by CWC 
negotiators to be 100 tonnes or more, while significant quantities for non-state actor (terrorists) 
can be understood to be kilograms or grams of CW agent. On the latter point, see Ron G. 
Manley, ‘Chemical Weapons and Efforts to Prevent Their Use’, slide 14. Presented at SIPRI 
and Vinca Institute (note 569).  
678 Unlike many biological fills, chemical fills can, depending on purity and stability, be 
stored in viable form for at least ten years (or, sometimes, decades). ‘Obsoleted’ (as opposed to 
‘obsolete’) is normal usage (i.e., jargon) in some circles. 
679 Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine Attack Against the US with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and the Vulnerability of the US to Such Attack (mid-1951 to mid-1952), NIE-31 
(note 217). 
680 See John A. Martens, Secret Patenting in the USSR and Russia (Deep North Press: Santa 
Fe, New Mexico, 2010). 
681 CWC, article II, para. 1. 
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Overhead imagery (notwithstanding periodic airspace overflights) did not 
become generally available to the Cold War superpowers until the 1960s.682 
Without such imagery, literature reviews and individual discussions probably 
took on greater importance for those involved in developing threat assessments 
and related analyses. 
A large traditional state CW programme that wished to use such weapons 
would likely do so in a state-to-state armed conflict where reports from the field 
by opposing military forces would tend to confirm such use to even non-
specialists or onlookers. It is possible that sabotage or not-for-attribution ad hoc 
use could occur (perhaps for evaluation of response purposes or to induce social 
disturbance). However, traditional state programmes were mainly concerned with 
state opponents and would have viewed the non- or ‘less than fully attributable’ 
CW use scenarios as peripheral to their strategic and defence planning.683 The 
context of any given case study would have to inform the analysis of such 
factors. 
Western states have devoted much effort in attempting to discern meaning 
from Soviet doctrinal and politico-military literature. Accusations of CBW 
activity may be understood by others as an indication of CBW intentions by the 
first party (i.e., accusing others of an activity is carried out in order to justify 
one’s own activity).684 Soviet military doctrine was (and remains) a rather arcane 
sub-topic in which analysts study the various Soviet field regulations manuals 
and other published training material, searching for changes in phrasing or 
emphasis. Major questions with respect to CW include a desire to determine the 
capacity of a state to defend against CW and to employ such weapons in battle, 
as well as indications (implicit or explicit) as to whether the state intends to use 
CW in offensive or defensive operations or has a ‘no first use’ (i.e., retaliatory 
only) CW use policy. The Soviet Union acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on 
15 April 1928 with the reservation that it did not consider itself to be bound by 
the agreement if engaged in armed conflict with states that had not joined the 
Protocol or against states that did not respect the object and purpose of the 
Protocol.685 
Key military doctrinal figures in the inter-war period include Yakov 
Fishman, Mikhael Vasilyevich Frunze,686 Mikhael Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky, 
                                                 
 
682 The UK and the United States conducted short penetration overflights of the territory of 
the Soviet Union in the years immediately following the end of World War II. See Lennart 
Andersson, Bortom Horisontom: Svensk Flygspaning mot Sovjetunionen 1946-1952 [Beyond 
the Horizon: Swedish Aerial Reconnaissance against the Soviet Union] (Stenbom: Stockholm, 
2002). 
683 A CIA release of clandestine WMD attack scenarios is mainly concerned with nuclear 
weapons. Soviet Capabilities for Clandestine Attack Against the US with Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and the Vulnerability of the US to Such Attack (mid-1951 to mid-1952), NIE-31 
(note 217). 
684 Garthoff has observed: ‘Vociferous accusations that the United States is planning and 
conducting bacteriological-warfare research and has used germs in North Korea may be an 
indication of the fact that the USSR itself is preparing for bacteriological warfare’. Raymond L. 
Garthoff, How Russia Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine (George Allen & Unwin Ltd.: 
London, 1954), p. 319. 
685 The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, CBW and the Law of War, vol. 3 (note 
251), pp. 157 & 164. 
686 For an autobiographical summary (doc. 5) and extract of Frunze’s service record (doc. 6), 
see Eds. Colonel P. M. Kirillov and Major A. F. Metel’kin, M. V. Frunze Na Fronte 
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Leon Trotsky and Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov.687 Tukhachevsky was to 
become Marshal of the Soviet Union before being killed in a purge in 1937. He is 
associated with promoting the theory of ‘deep operations’ to destroy the enemy’s 
logistics and other support infrastructure. For most military establishments, CW 
has usually played a rather esoteric (i.e., non-central) role that was not very well 
regarded by command structures or particularly well reflected in the broader 
military preparations and training.688 
The Soviet military strategist Suleiman compared the rear military supply 
and support services for World War I and inter-World War periods.689 Much of 
his work touches on distances of supply routes (including the status and role 
played by railways), organization of the supply responsibilities, and organization 
of animal and human health support services, including field laboratories (e.g., 
by the Red Army during the Russian Civil War).690 He reviews the structure of 
the Russian Army rear organization and supply in 1914-1918691 and for the Red 
Army during the Russian Civil War.692 This includes summaries of the 
organization of chemical warfare services during World War I.693 A 1931 Soviet 
artillery field handbook aimed at mid-level commanders gives no indication of 
the possible existence of Soviet CW munitions or that Soviet doctrine envisions 
the employment under any circumstances of such weapons (whether smoke, 
                                                                                                                                               
Grazhdanskoi Voiny: Sbornik Dokumentov [M. V. Frunze on the Civil War Front: Collected 
Documents] (Military Publisher of the Peoples’ Commissariat of the Defence of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics: Moscow, 1941), pp. 38–43. Selected documents of the Central 
Archive of the Red Army. Frunze wrote the autobiographical summary in 1921 while 
commander of Red Army forces in the Ukraine and Crimea, and while simultaneously holding 
the position of fully-empowered Peoples’ Commissar of Military and Naval Matters of the 
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (attached to the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Soviet authorities perhaps felt the operational art 
reflected in the volume was relevant for the war with Germany. 
687 See A. Golubev, M. V. Frunze o Kharaktere Budushchei Voini [M. V. Frunze on the 
Character of Future War], (State Military Publisher: Moscow, 1931); Wardak (note 650); A. 
Svechin, Strategiya [Strategy] (Voenny Vestnik: Moscow, 1927); and Sally W. Stoecker, 
Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation 
(Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1998). For a comprehensive study of the Soviet military-
industrial complex, including the role of chemical weapon preparedness, see Nikolai S. 
Simonov, Voenno-Promyshlenny Kompleks SSSR v 1920-1950-e gody: Tempy 
Ekonomicheskogo Rosta, Struktura, Organizatsiya Proizvodstva i Upravlenie [The Military-
Industrial Complex of the USSR in the 1920s-1950s: Rates of Economic Growth, Structure, 
Organization of Production and Direction] (ROSSPEN Publisher: Moscow, 1996). 
688 On the structure of offensive and defensive infantry operations doctrine, see A. Lignau, 
Pekhota: Opyt Issledovaniya Ustroistva i Boevogo Primeneniya v Usloviyakh Manevrennoi 
Voiny [Infantry: Experience of Research Devices and Combat Application During Mobile War 
Conditions], Second Edtn. (corrected and supplemented) (Voenny Vestnik: Krasnaya Presnya 
Publisher, Stolyarny (?), Moscow (?), 1927), pp. 95, 360–374, 461–473. 
689 N. Suleiman, Tyl i Snabzhenie Deistvyushchei Armii [The Rear and Supply of a Mobile 
Army], part 2, Front i Armiya [The Front and the Army], (State Publisher, Military Literature 
Department: Moscow, Leningrad, 1927). 
690 Suleiman, part 2 (note 689). 
691 Suleiman, part 2 (note 689), pp. 79–167. 
692 Suleiman, part 2 (note 689), pp. 168–206. 
693 Suleiman, part 2 (note 689), pp. 360–361. 
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flame or lethal agents). The handbook does, however, describe some Soviet 
protective equipment, and detection and decontamination procedures.694 
CW seems to have also been generally absent from the pronouncements of 
the top political leadership. A notable exception in the context of the present case 
study was a speech by Stalin at the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, held on 2-19 December 1927, when he spoke at length about the 
need for Soviet military preparedness, and the lack of relevance of arms control 
and disarmament work then being conducted in Geneva. He noted that ‘the 
position as regards war chemicals is illustrated’ by the well-known statement of 
the head of the US CWS (see discussion below).695 
The timing of Stalin’s speech might be explained by the fact that the 
Soviet Union participated in the Preparatory Commission for the League of 
Nations’ Disarmament Conference for the first time that year (the Soviets had not 
participated in the first three sessions of the commission prior to this time).696 
(The work, carried out in Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, 
has parallels with contemporary arms control and disarmament discussions. For 
example, a sub-committee to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament in 
Geneva was tasked in 1926 to consider the possibility that chemical industry 
could be converted to produce chemical warfare agents.697 The sub-committee 
concluded that ‘chemical factories, especially dyeworks and factories connected 
therewith, can be very quickly adapted’ to CW manufacture, that ‘it is impossible 
to prevent or hinder the manufacture’ of CW and that ‘there is no technical 
means of preventing chemical warfare’.698) It should perhaps also be noted that 
Stalin was kept apprised of Italo—Soviet cooperation on CW which occurred in 
the early 1930s.699 
Any CW stockpiles developed for strategic use in state-to-state conflict 
would have to be at least in the hundreds of tonnes. One planning assumption for 
a single military engagement (e.g., to cover one’s flanks for in an advance to 
impede an enemy’s offense with sulphur mustard) would be 100-200 tonnes.700 
                                                 
694 A. Melik-Kasparov (note 631), pp. 385–396. 
695 Josef V. Stalin, ‘The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, 2–
19 Dec. 1927, in Stalin, J. V., [Works], vol. 10 (Foreign Language Publishers: Moscow, 1954); 
and Khronos: Universal History on the Internet (in Russian), ‘Joseph Stalin’, 
<http://www.hrono.ru/libris/stalin/10-13.html>, (accessed 16 June 2013). 
696 Jean Pascal Zanders, Dynamics of Chemical Armament: Towards a Theory of 
Proliferation, doctoral thesis (Free University of Brussels: Feb. 1996), p. 261. 
697 For a description of the work of the League of Nations on control over and prohibition of 
chemical warfare by a Secretariat official, see De Madariaga (note 120), pp. 158–164. 
698 Liddell-Hart (note 119), pp. 80–81. 
699 A 1934 technical mission headed by Fishman was received by Mussolini at a reception in 
which a toast was raised to future cooperation in this area. Italy and the Soviet Union agreed a 
19-point programme of cooperation that included the exchange of samples of the irritant and 
‘mask breaker’ diphenylchloroarsine (100 kg), and the blister agent sulphur mustard (350 kg). 
The two sides discussed how to lower the freezing temperature of sulphur mustard, to produce 
higher-purity sulphur mustard and methods of rubber (including synthetic) production. Stalin 
was kept apprised of these Italian-Soviet contacts. See Yakov Fishman, Preliminary Final 
Report on the Trip to Italy by the Military-Chemical Mission, dated 11 Aug. 1934, and other 
material, Russian State Military Archive, collection 31, special file 7, folder 38, pp. 77–84; and 
special file 8, folder 299, pp. 81–87. Quoted in Lev A. Fedorov, Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie, 
vol. 1 (note 644), p. 77. 
700 The latter numbers were discussed at the CD during the CWC negotiations. 
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12.3.1. Threat Perceptions 
 
There is little basis, at least in the published literature, for assessing the Soviet 
perception of CW threats and CW security requirements.701 Reasons for this 
include: (a) the fact that many non-Soviet/Russian analyses reflect the language 
constraints of the authors, (b) most of the Russian-language material is not 
available and that which is is fragmentary, and (c) Russian-language material that 
is more broadly accessible internationally often contains political or 
propagandistic ‘spin’ that describes Soviet intentions and reactions to 
international pressure and provocations (actual or perceived).702 
It has therefore been difficult for outsiders to obtain a good sense of what 
the Soviet technical experts and political leadership actually thought regarding 
CW threats and Soviet CW security requirements.703 Soviet military doctrine and 
preparedness literature often consists of a combination of hagiography, 
obscurantist Marxist-Leninist theory, and a lack of substantive or otherwise 
operationally-relevant detail. Some overarching principles may be provided.704 
Quoting a Soviet translation of Fries, a Russian CW history has Fries saying that 
chemical weapons would be the decisive factor in any future war.705 
While overarching principles or statements of political or strategic 
military planning may be stated, they offer little (if any) insight into military 
capabilities or operationally-relevant detail (e.g., structure, personnel, training, 
type of equipment). Nevertheless, as previously noted, Western states have 
devoted much effort in attempting to glean meaning from Soviet doctrinal and 
politico-military literature. 
One may posit that a number of actors were influential to the Soviet 
understanding of CW threats at different levels (e.g., at the technical, training, 
strategic and political levels). These actors can be identified according to the 
positions held, statements issued and work carried out. At the broader military 
strategic and political levels they do (or should) include the statements and work 
of Tukhachevsky, Trotsky and Frunze. As far as the author can determine, only 
one Soviet leader, Stalin, made a notable reference in a public speech concerning 
CW threats to the Soviet Union. 
As previously noted, at the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union, held on 2-19 December 1927, Stalin spoke at length about the 
need for Soviet military preparedness, the lack of relevance of arms control and 
disarmament work then being conducted in Geneva. He said that it was the 
policy of capitalist states to embark on ‘new imperialist wars’. 
                                                 
701 Soviet threat perceptions in the CBW area (and arms control more broadly) are provided 
by Gordon S. Barrass, The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors (Stanford 
Security Studies: Stanford, California, 2009). 
702 E.g. M. Yu. Raginsky, S. Ya. Rozenblit and L. N. Smirnov, Bakteriologicheskaya 
Voina—Prestupnoe Orudie Imperialisticheskoi Agressii [Bacteriological Warfare – the Criminal 
Weapon of Imperial Aggression] (Academy of Sciences of the USSR Press: Moscow, 1950). 
703 ‘Soviet CW security requirements’ are understood to include the Soviet policy towards 
achieving necessary national CW capabilities, including offensive. 
704 See Golubev (note 687). 
705 Kochubina and Lebedevsky (note 191), p. 9. The authors cite a 1924 Soviet translation of 
Fries and West’s book Chemical Warfare, p. 412. 
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He also stated that the friendship pacts between capitalist states and the 
‘Locarno System’ and ‘spirit of Locarno’ were essentially a process of aligning 
forces for ‘future military collisions’. In support of these points, Stalin stated that 
‘from 1913 to 1927 the numerical strength of the armies of France, Britain, Italy, 
the United States and Japan increased from 1,888,000 to 2,262,000 men: in the 
same period the military budgets of the same countries grew from 2,345 million 
gold rubles to 3,948 million; in the period from 1923 to 1927, the number of 
aircraft in commission in these five countrie rose from 2,655 to 4,340; the 
cruiser tonnage of these five powers rose from 724,000 tons in 1922 to 864,000 
tons in 1926; the position as regards war chemicals is illustrated by the well-
known statement of General Fries, Chief of the United States Chemical Warfare 
Service: “One chemical air-bomb of 560 kilograms charged with Lewisite can 
make ten blocks of New York uninhabitable, and 100 tons of Lewisite dropped 
from 50 aeroplanes can make the whole of New York uninhabitable, at least for a 
week”’.706 
Stalin’s final quotation is somewhat reminiscent of US Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen’s 1997 appearance on ABC News’ This Week 
programme where he held up a five pound bag of flour and stated that this 
amount of dried Bacillus anthracis spores would be sufficient to kill half the 
population of Washington, DC.707 Similar hyperbole, which discounts delivery-
to-target difficulties, was evident in the post-World War I discussion on the 
nature of science and technology in possible future conflict (see Chapter 2 on 
inter-war consideration of the nature of future conflict). 
Finally, Stalin added: 
‘Lastly, by the fact that nationalised industry is based on the working 
class, which is the leader in all our development, thanks to which it is able 
more easily to develop technology in general, and the productivity of 
labour in particular, and to apply rationalisation to production and 
management, with the support of the broad masses of the working class, 
which is not and cannot be the case under the capitalist system of 
industry. All this is proved beyond doubt by the rapid growth of our 
technology during the past two years and the rapid development of new 
branches of industry (machines, machine-tools, turbines, automobiles and 
aircraft, chemicals, etc.)’.708 
The timing of Stalin’s speech might be explained by the fact that the 
Soviet Union participated in the Preparatory Commission for the League of 
Nations’ Disarmament Conference for the first time that year (as previously 
noted the Soviets had not participated in the first three sessions of the 
                                                 
706 Joseph V. Stalin, ‘The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, 
2–19 Dec. 1927, p. 287 in Joseph V. Stalin, [Works] (note 695). 
707 The interview does not appear to be included in the ABC Internet site archive for This 
Week. See ‘Interview with William Cohen’, ABC This Week, 16 Nov. 1997, transcript no. 
97111604-j12, transcribed by the Federal Document Clearing House, Inc. (American 
Broadcasting Company: New York City, 1997) cited in Audrey Kurth Cronin, Terrorist 
Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, report 
no. RL31831 (Congressional Research Service: Washington, DC, 28 Mar. 2003), note 18, p. 5. 
708 Joseph V. Stalin, ‘The Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’, 
2–19 Dec. 1927, pp. 309–310 in Joseph V. Stalin, [Works] (note 695). 
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commission prior to this time).709 Mention of chemical weapons is generally 
absent from military preparedness literature and top-level political and policy 
pronouncements (as opposed to, for example, discussion of aerial threats in the 
inter-war period). The fact that an individual (Amos Fries) was mentioned in 
high-level political speech is also notable. It would be interesting (if possible) to 
clarify the planning and consultations that went into Stalin’s speech. 
Much of the history of CW threat perceptions and motivations may be 
irretrievable, even to Russian scholars who might be granted unrestricted access 
to all the relevant extant archives. This is partly because not all decisions taken 
by a bureaucracy are written down. Also, the Soviet Union is more generally 
known to have ‘air brushed’ some of its archives to remove political non-persons 
or modify narratives towards those deemed more politically acceptable. One can 
postulate that important functions in how the Soviet CW military complex 
operated included: personal and professional relations, perceived (and actual) 
political reliability and perceived (and actual) political influence. It has often 
been observed that careers in the Soviet Union (and now Russia) are to a 
significant extent based on personal affiliations to a patron, such as someone in 
the leadership of a ‘power ministry’. In the Soviet (now Russian) military, 
personnel in the same graduating class often assist each other in their careers.710 
Those who fail to obtain promotions together with the rest of the graduating class 
may be compelled to retire at that time. 
Distinctions probably also existed between civilian and military cadres. 
More narrowly focused, technical experts also probably played roles distinct 
from civilian and military leadership and lower-level management. Literature 
aimed at technical experts seems to ignore or downplay the finer points of 
political deviation (Left Socialism, Trotskyite, Cosmopolitanism, etc.) of the 
moment, especially during Stalin’s regime. Military personnel, to varying degree, 
may have been somewhat insulated during some periods of Soviet history from 
civilian leadership purges and the effects of purges on society in general. 
Members of the CW establishment were, however, purged and sometimes 
executed. Perhaps the most notable CW officer and technical expert who was 
purged (but not executed) was the first head of the Red Army Military Chemical 
Directorate, Jakov Fishman. The Communist Party also took steps to ensure that, 
through the early 1920s, experiments were carried out on the basis of collective 
decisionmaking until Lev Trotsky restored a version of traditional chain-of-
command and military discipline in the ranks with, over time, more politically 
reliable Soviet officers (rather than Czarist officers who had been impressed into 
the Red Army to fight in the Civil War).711 A number of chemists and other 
technical experts who were swept up in the Great Terror, served their time not in 
the regular Gulag, but in Sharashky [plural].712 Perhaps the most notable 
                                                 
709 Zanders (note 696), p. 261. 
710 This not infrequently also occurs in other states. 
711 See Stoecker (note 687). 
712 Sharaskhy were special facilities where scientists and technical specialists served their 
prison sentences working on scientific projects, including the development of chemical 
weapons. Some Sharashky were laboratories established within a prison complex. Other 
inmates were placed in regular research facilities and worked alongside non-prisoners. 
However, outside normal working hours, they were confined. Garrett and Hart (note 108), p. 
188. 
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Sharashka [singular] was GosNIIOKhT. The research institute still exists and is 
headquartered in Moscow.713 
Part of the Soviet military literature was classified, such as the technical 
specifications for the manufacture of chemical munitions. It is not possible to 
determine what percentage of the Soviet military literature was (or is) 
classified.714 Even a researcher with full access to the relevant archives may find 
this question problematic to clarify (e.g., if important paperwork is not digitized). 
However, it is reasonable to assume that some of the unclassified literature was 
not meant to be circulated outside the country.715 In these cases, the Soviet 
authorities may have been less concerned with placing restriction markings on 
such publications. For example, the publications listed in Table 12.2 do not have 
restriction markings. It is also possible that part of the military literature 
(politically or technically) parallels a type of literature that is currently produced 
by the Chinese state media (Xinhua News Agency) called ‘internal reference’ 
(neican). This literature is not necessarily based on intelligence information. 
However, it is meant to provide clearly articulated analyses of political 
developments to the senior political leadership that is unadulturated by Party 
‘spin’.716 
The Soviet leadership could probably generally distinguish between Party 
rhetoric and actual political interests and processes. Living in such a society 
caused many Soviet citizens’ attenae for the detection and interpretation of 
politically-slanted reporting to become highly-developed. However, the Archer 
Able 83 Nato exercise which the Soviet leadership appears to have understood to 
be a cover for a Western nuclear attack (a simulated Defcon 1 alert with full-
scale field exercises) suggests this was not necessarily always the case. The 
Soviet intelligence services appear to have issued reporting that coincided with 
what they believed the political leadership wished to hear (some of which was 
influenced by Soviet communist ideology).717 The threat reporting was 
                                                 
 
713 Vil S. Mirzyanov, State Secrets: An Insider’s Chronicle of the Russian Chemical 
Weapons Program (note 570), pp. 79 & 225. 
714 Martens provides estimates on Soviet patents and certificates of invention that have been 
declassified and the scale of those that might remain closed. Martens (note 680). 
715 Military Thought was, for at least a time, specifically limited to Soviet officers. Raymond 
L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (note 651), p. 253. Facsimile reprint of original 
1958 printing by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. edition. This restriction appears to me to be 
somewhat unusual for Soviet military periodicals. Rather the restrictions during the Soviet 
Union were more a function of de facto distribution and access to relevant library holdings. A 
related factor is reflected by a Soviet saying that a Soviet citizen is either in the ‘inner zone’ (i.e, 
in prison) or ‘outer zone’ (i.e., not under arrest or inprisoned). At least one version of Military 
Thought is available at libraries in various countries, including the SIPRI library (there appear 
to be two views on whether the journal has been produced in two versions—one being 
classified). 
716 Anonymous, ‘China’s Secret Media: Chinese Whispers’, The Economist, vol. 395 no. 
8687 (19–25 June 2010), pp. 51–52. 
717 See National Security Archive (George Washington University), The 1983 War Scare: 
“The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part I, Briefing Book no. 426, 16 May 2013, 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/>; National Security Archive (George 
Washington University), The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part II, 
Briefing book no. 427, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/>; and 
National Security Archive (George Washington University), The 1983 War Scare: “The Last 
Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part III, Briefing book no. 428, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv 
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believable in the case of Archer Able perhaps because it supported a particular 
‘preferred narrative’ of the Soviet Communist Party in the minds of the 
leadership.718 
External perceptions of Soviet CW activity should also be noted. One type 
of Soviet review of international military publications is broadly similar to ‘The 
Foreign Military Press’ section of The Coast Artillery Review.719 The Soviet 
reviews examined by the author are more detailed and less based on publications 
per se but also include summaries of speeches (e.g., by CWS officers) and 
assessments of CW patents. It must also be stated that, although it dealt with CW 
issues, including citation of Fishman on Soviet CW strategy, The Coast Artillery 
Journal was not focused on CW per se. Contributing authors to this journal did 
have access to Voina i Revolutsiya.720 The Swedish journal Effektivt Försvar: 
Fritt Militärt Forum [Effective Defence: the Free Military Forum] contains 
similar articles, but with a somewhat broader geo-political focus.721 
Referring to Fishman’s Military Chemistry, Alden H. Waitt of the US 
CWS summarizes Soviet CW military doctrine as follows.722 First air attacks 
should be carried out against troop concentrations in bivouc areas and rail 
stations. Fishman recommends the use of chemical air bombs combined with 
high explosives and incendiaries. For attacking troop columns, Fishman 
recommends the use of aerial sprayers filled with lewisite or sulphur mustard. He 
also recommends the use of persistent agents (e.g., sulphur mustard) against 
troop concentrations within forested areas rather than fragmentation bombs. 
Enemy units on the attack should be constricted and slowed by zones 
contaminated by sulphur mustard, especially in along probable main routes and 
river crossings.723 Waitt also states that Soviet chemical defence is based on six 
tasks (four of which are for tactical protection): discover the enemy’s intention; 
select the proper positions most suited to chemical defence; prevent the enemy 
                                                                                                                                               
NSAEBB/NSAEBB428/>. (all accessed 24 July 2013). 
718 Further insight into Soviet decisionmaking regarding chemical weapons threat 
assessments and their role in arms control policy formation are located in the Vitalii 
Leonidovich Kataev collection at the Hoover Institution (Stanford University). See 
<http://www.oac.cdlib.org 
/findaid/ark:/13030/kt900039p6/?query=kataev>, (accessed 4 Aug. 2013); and Jamie Doward, 
‘How a War Game Brought the World to the Brink of Nuclear Disaster’, Guardian, 2 Nov. 
2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/nov/02/nato-war-game-nuclear-disaster>, 
(accessed 3 Nov. 2013). 
719 Alexander L. P. Johnson, ‘The Foreign Military Press’, The Coast Artillery Journal, no. 4, 
vol. 78 (July-Aug. 1935), pp. 313–16. 
720 Alexander L. P. Johnson, ‘The Foreign Military Press: USSR – Voyna i Revolutsiya – 
January-February 1935, Military Developments of 1934 in Japan, Germany, and Poland. By A. 
Petrov’, The Coast Artillery Journal, vol. 78, no. 4 (July-Aug. 1935), p. 316. 
721 E.g. Lars-Erik Tammelin, ‘Biologiska Stridsmedel: Vapenteknikens “Dark Horse”’ 
[Biological Warfare Agents: Weapon Technology “Dark Horse”], Effektivt Försvar: Fritt 
Militärt Forum [Effective Defence: Free Military Forum], no. 6 (1962), pp. 255–57. 
722 Waitt gives the bibliographic information of Fishman’s publication as: ‘Military 
Chemistry, A Guide to Commanding Personnel of the Red Army. Moscow, 1930.’ Quoted in 
Alden H. Waitt, ‘Chemical Security: Part I, Methods of Chemical Attack and Chemical 
Intelligence’, The Coast Artillery Journal, vol. 78, no. 4 (July-Aug. 1935), reference 2, p. 270. 
723 Waitt gives a general overview of when and how CW can be employed with advantage. 
He is somewhat unclear as to how much of this discussion consists of Fishman’s 
recommendations. By page 272, Waitt’s discussion slides into British doctrine. Alden H. Waitt 
(note 722), p. 271. 
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CW attack through active defensive measures that include artillery fire; notify 
troops of CW threats; employ protective equipment; and maintain degassing 
equipment.724 
 
12.3.2. Demand and Supply Side Factors 
 
Demand and supply side factors are not considered in detail for this case study. 
In the post-World War I and post-Civil War periods, the Soviets were engaged in 
a broad-based effort to modernize their economy and related technical expertise. 
In addition to a general wish by the Soviet leadership to at least reach all around 
parity with the leading military powers, perhaps the most useful avenue for 
analysis on demand and supply factors as they pertained to CW in the inter-
World War period are the motivations, priorities and results achieved by those 
actors and institutions involved in volunteer societies such as OSOAVIAKHIM. 
These volunteer society activities represent a systematic attempt to align the 
objectives of developing a civilian chemical industry with the military 
requirements for expertise and CW production capacity. Such societies were also 
a means for mobilizing and harnessing mass political support, as well as 
improving civilian technical capacity and their ability to contribute to dual-
purpose civilian-military industrial enterprises (including as a standby 
workforce). A key question here is the extent to which such capacity was a driver 
or a byproduct of military programmes (i.e., are there cause-effect relations or 
analytically suggestive correlations). 
 
12.4. Technical Factors 
 
With respect to technical factors, most of the discussion would have to focus on 
assimilation of CW into the state’s economic, military, and technological 
infrastructure.725 Verification measures in the contemporary arms control and 
disarmament context would not be applicable except, perhaps, for those falling 
under the headings of ‘off-site’ or ‘near-site’ measures. Sampling and analysis 
protocols for potential CW agents and their degradation products would also 
largely be inapplicable for the period, partly because field-based chemical 
warfare detection systems were rare and not very capable.726 It is reasonable to 
suppose that, at a minimum, the Soviets sought to match major Western military 
                                                 
724 Alden H. Waitt (note 722), p. 272. 
725 See L. F. Fokin, Obzor Khimishskoi Promyshlennosti v Rossii [Survey of the Chemical 
Industry in Russia], part I (Scientific Chemico-Technical Publisher: Petrograd, 1920); L. F. 
Fokin, Obzor Khimisheskoi Promyshlennosti v Rossii: Promezhutochnie Produkty Krasochnogo 
i Khimiko-Farmatsevticheskogo Proizvodstva [Survey of the Chemical Industry in Russia: 
Intermediate Products of Dyes and Chemico-Pharmacological Production], part I, second edtn. 
(Scientific Chemico-Technical Publisher: Petrograd, 1921); Ryssland: Officiell Rapport av 
Engelska Fackföreningsdelegationen till Ryssland och Kaukasus i November och December 
1924 [Russia: Official Report of an English Factfinding Delegation to Russia and the Caucusus 
in November and December 1924], authorized translation (Frams Förlag: Stockholm, 1925), pp. 
74–94 [on industrial developments] and pp. 124–131 [on the Red Army]. 
726 On the taking of blood samples from Axis POWs during World War II, see Activities of 
the United States in the Field of Biological Warfare: a Report to the Secretary of War by 
George W. Merck, Special Consultant on Biological Warfare (the ‘Merck Report’) (note 628), 
p. 18. 
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capabilities, including on the chemical side. The US CWS started designing a 
CW analysis field laboratory in 1929 that was later standardized as the M1 Field 
Laboratory in 1936.727 The Soviet Union possessed CW exposure tent systems 
(for military personnel training) and railway car-based CW analytical and 
decontamination support equipment.728 
Assimilation in the chemical weapons programme or activity context is 
understood to include the capability of the target of analysis to acquire the 
expertise associated with the development, production, storage and use of CW. 
Following the Russian Revolution, the Soviets undertook a largescale and wide-
ranging series of measures to industrialize their society (e.g., through 
‘chemicalization’) and to modernize its military.729 This included the 
establishment of societies such as OSOAVIAKhim. 
If a state or non-state actor does not possess the capacity to technically 
support a chemical weapons programme, it may instead forgo such activity or 
seek to enter into joint development programmes or to simply import the 
weapons. In the 1920s the Soviet Union undertook to ameliorate its CW 
capability shortcomings by entering into a secret cooperative arrangement with 
Germany under the terms of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Germany assisted with 
the construction and scale up of the Soviet (now Russia’s) principal CW field test 
and development facility at Shikhany located on the lower Volga River (see 
Chapter 2).730 
 
Step 3. Prepare Matrices with Hypotheses 
 
A matrix should be prepared which has ‘diagnostic’ value (i.e., it provides 
insight and understanding that either confirms or counters the prevailing 
wisdom). 
 
                                                 
727 Smart (note 210), p. 5. 
728 Zhukoborsky and Duriitsky (note 667), pp. 25–26. 
729 Sarah White observes that ‘”Chemicalization” is a portmanteau word used by the Soviets 
to mean the widespread development of the chemical industry, by increasing its production and 
the number of its products, and by widening their use in other fields of the national economy, 
particularly in agriculture’. pp. Sarah White, Guide to Science and Technology in the USSR: a 
Reference Guide to Science and Technology in the Soviet Union (Francis Hodgson, Ltd.: 
Guernsey, UK, 1971), chap. 11, pp. 144–145. 
730 The Soviet Union permitted Germany to circumvent Treaty of Versailles restrictions on 
military training and research and development in various fields. On German-Soviet 
cooperation at Shikhany, see Alimov (note 128), pp. 11–19. See also Carsten (note 221), pp. 
217–244. 
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Matrix Stockpiling 
 
Question: Has the target (i.e., state or non-state actor) stockpiled chemical weapons? 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1 No stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=3, I=5, N/A=10] 
H2 Yes stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=15, I=3, N/A=0] 
        H1 H2 
 
IR1. Does target have CW technical capacity (e.g. military, medical)? 
 E.1 General publications aimed at domestic audience  (yes) I C 
 E.2 General publications aimed at domestic audience (no) - - 
 E.3 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (yes) N/A C 
 E.4 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (no) - - 
 E.5 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (yes) N/A C 
 E.6 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (no) - - 
 
IR2. Is CW mentioned in military doctrine? 
 E.1 Defence against CW in civil defence context (yes) N/A C 
 E.2 Defence against CW in civil defence context (no)  - - 
 E.3 Defence against CW for military personnel (yes)  N/A C 
 E.4 Defence against CW for military personnel (no)  - - 
 E.5 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) N/A C 
 E.6 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no)  - - 
 E.7 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) N/A C 
 E.8 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no) - - 
 
IR3. Statements and similar communications 
E.1 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (no)  - - 
 
IR4. Weight of evidence of integration of CW into military doctrine? 
 E.1 Publications indicate integration of CW (yes)  - - 
 E.2 Publications indicate integration of CW (no)  C I 
 E.3 Arms control policy statements against CW (yes)  C I 
 E.4 Arms control policy statements for CW (yes)*  - - 
 
IR5. Interest in CW activities of others? 
 E.1 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (no)  - - 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW production? 
 E.1 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (no)  - - 
 E.3 CW production facility indicators (yes)   I C 
 E.4 CW production facility indicators (no)   - - 
 E.5 CW stockpiling indicators (yes) **   - - 
 E.6 CW stockpiling indicators (no)    C I 
 E.7 Documentation of production (yes)   I C 
 E.8 Documentation of production (no)   - - 
 E.9 Documentation of stockpiling (yes)**   I C 
 E.10 Documentation of stockpiling (no)   - - 
 E.11 Availability of CW production material/equipment (yes) N/A C 
 E.12 Availability of CW production material/equipment (no) - - 
 E.13 Availability of CW munition (yes)   I C 
 E.14 Availability of CW munition (no)   - - 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Heuer’s ACH matrix. C=consistent, I=inconsistent and N/A=not 
applicable, IR=information request, E=evidence. *E.g., Some parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
reserved the right to use CW if such weapons were first used against them. **The question is not a non-
sequitor in the sense that, for e.g., overhead imagery might be available that suggests such stockpiling. 
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The cumulative scores for the hypotheses are: 
H1: C=3, I=5, N/A=10 
H2: C=15, I=3, N/A=0 
 
The aggregate consistent score for H2 is 5 times greater than for H1. H1 
has a N/A score that is 10 times higher than that for H2. 
Several points should be considered. One is the distinction between a 
trend and a pattern. Such trends or patterns may be reflected in the cumulative 
scores, or the scores for a particular information request. Another point is the 
concept of ‘significance’. Qualitatively speaking, significance means that the 
data pattern is not caused by chance. Finally, a broader pattern may emerge in the 
cumulative scores for each hypothesis. This can have the effect of obscuring 
operational facets or subtleties in cases where a binary yes-no assessment is 
made. Alternatively, the cumulative scores for each hypothesis may, given 
sufficient data points (or a sufficiently high ‘n’), point to an underlying 
(including counter-factual or counter-intuitive) tentative conclusion.731 
Information should be assessed according to that available to interested 
parties in the inter-World War period, during World War II and the post-World 
War II period. This is a distinct exercise from a cumulative, all-source, all-period 
hindsight evaluation. 
 
IR1. Does Target Have CW Technical Capability (e.g., Military, Medical)? 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=0, I=1, N/A=2 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=3, I=0, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H2) is favoured. 
It was evident to CW specialists of the major military powers in the inter-
World War period that starting no later than the early 1920s, all were engaged in 
CW threat evaluation and, at a minimum, in the small-scale production and 
testing of agents. This was done partly in the context of assessing the 
implications of World War I for future warfare. The Soviet Union possessed a 
CW technical capacity for evaluation and protective purposes. Its ability to 
engage in offensive CW warfare in the first half of World War II is less certain 
and subject to dispute. 
 
IR2. Is CW Mentioned in Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=4 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=4, I=0, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H2) is favoured. 
Offensive use of CW is discussed in terms of the planning of other states. 
CW is sometimes meant to include flame and smoke operations. Otherwise, 
                                                 
731 These points are undoubtedly very familiar to professional statisticians and others 
according to different terminology and criteria. The manner in which these points have been 
formulated have been intuitive and qualitative from the perspective of the author. Mathematics 
has been avoided for the sake of focusing on qualitative, including counter-factual, analysis. 
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mention of lethal CW agents or Soviet military capability for using such weapons 
is eschewed. 
 
IR3. Statements and Similar Communications 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H2) is favoured. 
Stalin addressed CW threats at the XVth Party Congress. Periodic, but less 
frequent and prominent, military leadership pronouncements on CW threats were 
issued. 
 
IR4. Weight of Evidence of Integration of CW into Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=2, I=0, N/A=0 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=0, I=2, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H1) is favoured. 
Soviet representatives generally gave pro-peace statements and anti-
Capitalist as war mongers statements. Soviet delegations delivered pro-peace and 
pro-disarmament statements to the League of Nations. Stalin addressed 
disarmament in favourable, but skeptical, terms at the XVth Party Congress. 
 
IR5. Interest in CW Activities of Others? 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H1) is favoured. 
Such discussion is clearly evident in the inter-World War Soviet military 
journals. 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW Production? 
 
The sub-generic score for H1 is: C=1, I=4, N/A=2 
The sub-generic score for H2 is: C=6, I=1, N/A=0 
 
At its face, the hypothesis for stockpiling (H2) is favoured. 
The Soviet Union synthesized laboratory scale World War I-type CW 
agents. Germany (and perhaps others) were aware of the Soviet CW field test 
facility since they supported its construction and the two countries ran joint tests 
there within the framework of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Fedorov’s archival 
research demonsrates that the Soviet Union produced CW in the thousands of 
tonnes range starting in the inter-World War II period. Some documentation was 
captured by Germany during World War II.732 Most of the Soviet literature (e.g., 
                                                 
732 E.g., Hirsch reviews Soviet munitions based on manuals and other literature. Hirsch (note 
598). 
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memoirs) mention flame and smoke operations.733 Soviet sources have 
consistently avoided discussing possible employment lethal CW agents by Soviet 
forces, including their weaponization and stockpiling.734 
 
Step 4. Refine the Matrix 
 
Analysts have long debated why CW were not employed on the Eastern front 
during World War II. A standard explanation is that the use of CW by Germany 
(even the employment of the then novel soman and tabun) would have slowed its 
advance against the Soviet Union and complicated its logistics requirements. As 
Germany retreated, it faced diminishing resources and a progressive loss of air 
superiority to the Allied forces. It has also been postulated that Hitler was 
opposed to the use of CW in general because of his temporary loss of vision after 
being exposed to sulphur mustard during World War I. Recently, Dr Thomas 
Weber of the University of Aberdeen states that a series of previously 
unpublished letters from 1943 contradict this claim and that the reason for 
Hitler’s hospitalization in 1918 was ‘hysterical amblyopia’.735 The question of 
why CW was not employed by Germany was given greater urgency at the end of 
the war when the UK and United States uncovered German stocks of the then 
(generally unknown to them) soman and tabun.736 One cannot also exclude the 
non-use by Germany of nerve agents due to an assumption by Hitler that the 
Allies possessed them as well. 
                                                 
733 E.g., Grigory A. Zhukov, Vospominaniya Voennogo Khimika [Recollections of a Military 
Chemist] (Military Publishers: Moscow, 1991). 
734 The ambiguity as to whether the Soviet army was prepared to use toxic chemicals to 
injure or kill (as opposed to engaging in smoke or flame operations) is maintained by A. Lignau 
in his treatment of offensive chemical operations by the Red Army. On ‘military-chemical 
matters’ (voenno-khimicheskoe gelo) during attack, see Lignau (note 688), pp. 461–473. Even 
examples of chemical munitions cited in Soviet publications are non-Soviet. See, for e.g., M. M. 
Voreisha, Boevie Pripasy Voiskovoi Artilerii [Ammunition of the Troop Artillery] (State 
Military Publisher: Moscow, 1932), pp. 14–16. 
735 Tom Kelly, ‘British Mustard Gas Attack Didn’t Blind Hitler: His Invented Trenches Myth 
Concealed Bout of Mental Illness’, Daily Mail, 21 Oct. 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-2051829/Mental-illness-Hitler-blind-British-mustard-gas-attack.html>, (accessed 
22 July 2013). 
736 There is some uncertainty as to whether scientists at Porton Down or the Soviet Union 
(e.g., GosNIIOKhT and, in particular, Professor Martin I. Kabachnik, knew or suspected that 
Germany was weaponizing organophosphorus nerve agents. Germany stopped publishing 
scientific articles concerning soman and tabun following Schrader’s employer informing the 
German government of the possible military significance of work on pesticides. Some evidence 
suggests that the Soviet Union produced organophosphorus nerve agents during World War II. 
An unclassified 1963 US NIE, for e.g., states: ‘There is good evidence that a tabun-like 
compound was synthesized in the USSR during World War II while the Germans were 
developing tabn (GA) itself’. Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Chemical 
Warfare, NIE report 11-10-63, 27 Dec. 1963, p. 3. 
As previously noted, Reginald V. Jones observed that one of the British failures in scientific 
intelligence during World War II was its inability to uncover and appreciate Germany’s 
organophosphorus nerve agent programme. Jones (note 430). 
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A Soviet explanation for why Germany did not use CW against it is: 
‘How can we explain that fascist Germany, which was thoroughly 
prepared for the use of chemical weapons, did not start chemical warfare 
against the Soviet Union? 
1. The main and basic reason is that the Soviet people were ready to repel 
the chemical attack of the enemy. The Soviet army and the population of 
the threatened belt had adequate means of protection. In such a situation, 
the use of chemical warfare weapons was not worthwhile and could not be 
successful. 
2. During the first period of the war, when Hitler’s troops had a certain 
technical advantage, and they succeeded in occupying a part of the 
territory of the USSR, there was no necessity to use such an extreme 
method of war as poison gases. 
3. The fear of mutual annihilation played a restraining role. It is timely in 
this context to remind one of the declaration of the Soviet government, 
warning Germany of the consequences of such a step, i. e., the use of 
chemical warfare weapons.737 The declaration of the USSR was supported 
by our military allies—the USA and England. 
4. The above-mentioned Geneva Protocol also had a restraining influence 
upon the unleashing of chemical warfare. 
5. Finally, Hitler’s troops could not use poison gases in the second half of 
the war, when the Soviet army evicted them from the territory of the USSR 
and continued to hit the foe on its own territory. The use of war gases was 
excluded in such conditions, for the German population was already 
enough angered by the burdens of war unleashed by Hitler’s clique, and 
could have risen against its own army’.738 
The World War II junior chemical officer Grigory Andreevich Zhukov 
stated, perhaps displaying preferred hindsight, that there were two main reasons 
                                                 
737 Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt did issue such a warning. Any possible Soviet 
warning to Germany is less certain, at least based on the standard English language literature. 
For background on the warning and associated intelligence from a British perspective, see 
Francis Harry Hinsley, C. F. G. Ransom, R. C. Knight and E. E. Thomas, British Intelligence in 
the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, vol. 2 (Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office: London, 1981), pp. 116–122 and 674–676. 
738 L. F. Supron, ‘The Toxicology, Clinical Aspects, and Therapy of Affections Caused by 
War Gases’, chap. 4, p. 171 in L. F. Supron and F. P. Zverev (Professor A. P. Mukhin as series 
editor), Medical and Civil Defense in Total War (Israel Program for Scientific Translations: 
Jerusalem, 1961). Anonymous English-language translation of L. F. Supron and F. P. Zverev 
(under the editorial direction of Professor A. P. Mukhin), Meditsinskoe Obespechenie 
Naseleniya v Usloviyakh Primeneniya Sredstv Massovogo Porazheniya [Medical Provision for 
the Population under Weapons of Mass Destruction Use] (State Publisher of the Belorussian 
Soviet Social Republic, Scientific-Technical Literature Editing: Minsk, 1959). The Russian 
language version of the title differs from that given by the translators. Furthermore, the spine of 
the book reads: Medical and Civil Defense in Total War. 
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Germany did not employ CW: the reliability of Soviet chemical protection and 
fear of retaliation.739 
The question of whether the Soviet Union was capable of employing CW 
during World War II and, if so, why it did not choose to do so at least perhaps to 
slow down the initial German advance remains open to debate. The main 
technical basis for this discussion in the West is almost certainly the Hirsch 
Report, which was prepared by a Wehrmacht chemical officer for the United 
States following the war. One view is perhaps best summarized by Pozdnyakov, 
a former Soviet chemical officer, in a study edited and published by Liddell-Hart 
in 1956. Pozdnyakov summarizes his view that when the war started in 1941 ‘the 
Soviet Army had modern chemical weapons and means of defence. Supplies 
were normal’.740 
Herman Oschner categorically states that the Soviet Union not only did 
not employ CW but that Germany was surprised they did not capture CW 
stockpiles. He states in a now declassified report he prepared for the US military 
following the war: 
‘Surprisingly enough, the Russians even did not use gas in 1941 in defense 
of their excellently prepared field fortifications within their rear defense 
lines….We never discovered what caused the Russians consistently to 
desist from the use of gas….The author [Oschner] does not believe that 
they did not possess sufficient quantities even though we found gas 
nowhere, because the Russians achieved marvelous feats in clearing their 
country of anything that might have been of any use to us. Thus it is 
possible that they removed their stockpiles of chemical warfare agents 
(which presumably, and in common with other states, they did not store 
near the borders)…’.741 
Zanders also argues the more sceptical position—that the Soviet Union 
was not capable of engaging in chemical warfare during Germany’s advance into 
the country. In particular, he notes: (a) the purges in the 1930s reduced the 
technical capacity of the Red Army to engage in chemical warfare, (b) the Red 
Army was greatly expanded in the 1930s which generated training and logistical 
challenges (c) the massive losses (some 3.35 million men captured by the 
Germans in 1941) were too destablizing to permit chemical warfare, (d) the 
disruption of relocating military industries to the Urals, and (e) no clear 
indication of offensive CW in Soviet military doctrine manuals.742 
                                                 
 
739 Zhukov (note 733), p. 5. 
740 V. Pozdnyakov, ‘The Chemical Arm’, p. 393 in Liddell-Hart, The Red Army (note 636). 
741 Ochsner (note 741), p. 20. 
742 Zanders states: ‘The Soviet counterattacks in front of Moscow in December 1941 halted 
the German advance. However, it was only after the war industry relocated to the east began 
increasing weapons production that the Red Army was able to mount counteroffensives. From 
an assimilation point of view, only then did it succeed in finding a high level of accordance 
between people, equipment and theory to execute the principles of manoeuvre. However, by 
that time CW had all but disappeared from the field manuals’. Zanders (note 696), pp. 306–09. 
A point for further consideration is to clarify whether and how the numerous manuals aimed at 
various ranks and for various purposes related to the overarching military doctrine. In other 
words, what sort of Soviet training material could or should fall under the term ‘field manual’? 
The different types of doctrinal materials would include small-unit pamphlets, chemical 
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Zanders summarizes: 
‘Contrary to the traditional presentations, the Second World War thus 
emerges as a major breakpoint in the development of the Soviet offensive 
chemical doctrine. Charting the limited information on Soviet CBW 
preparations during the interbellum on the political and military tracks of 
the assimilation model points to the Red Army’s general unpreparedness 
for offensive or defensive chemical operations as a consequence of the 
failure to reconcile military and political imperatives at any particular 
moment. The Soviets introduced chemical weapons into their military 
doctrine as instruments of high-technology warfare. It was an area, but 
not the only one, in which they lagged badly. Trotsky, who strongly 
advocated a Soviet CW posture, saw it as a means to offset the capitalist 
states’ technological superiority in his defensive doctrine. Later it became 
a cornerstone in offensive doctrinal theory and was merged 
predominantly with another high-technological development, the 
aeroplane. Thus, during the late 1920s, when doctrine and politics 
appeared closest, the lack of a sufficiently developed industrial base 
precluded the arming of the nascent Red Army with the required 
equipment. Offensive CW disappeared from the mainstream military 
doctrine with Stalin’s purges in the late thirties. When during the Second 
World War the Red Army became able to mount its own offensives, it had 
essentially achieved technological parity and was capable of producing 
equipment in greater quantities than the enemy. Offensive chemical 
weapons were then no longer necessary to achieve that parity’.743 
Grigory Andreevich Zhukov’s memoirs give a sense of the wartime 
training of chemical troops whose duties included the detection of and protection 
against CW attack and responsibility and support for smoke and flame operations 
(including Molotov cocktails for use against German armour).744 Zhukov (not to 
be confused with Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, the General Chief-of-Staff 
during World War II) carefully avoids stating or implying that the USSR 
produced or contemplated the use of CW. 
Ochsner’s view is consistent with Zander’s argument. For example, he 
states that although the Soviet CW defensive equipment (e.g., respirators, filters, 
protective suits, boots and gloves) was ‘good’, the Soviets were unable to ‘fully 
equip’ their forces following their initial heavy losses in 1941.745 Ochsner also 
notes that the Soviets had ample white phosphosphorus munitions which German 
forces found to be troublesome.746 
More recent research by Paul Maddrell using British archival sources led 
him to conclude that during World War II Germany only captured ‘quite a 
narrow range of gas-filled weapons’ (mainly aerial bombs) and that German 
intelligence obtained ‘useful information’ on CW that did not fall into their 
                                                                                                                                               
sargeant training, technical specialist training, role of CW in tactical and strategic engagements, 
and higher-level policy doctrinal guidance and analysis. 
743 Zanders (note 696), p. 310. 
744 Zhukov (note 733). 
745 Ochsner (note 674), p. 27 
746 Ochsner (note 674), p. 33. 
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hands.747 Maddrell states that Germany captured more than 12 types of CW 
bombs and 6 types of CW spray devices.748 Germany conducted field trials on 
cyanide compounds (hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride) during the war at 
Munsterlager (the present-day site of Germany’s OCW destruction programme 
and not to be confused with the city of Münster) based on information obtained 
on Soviet CW capabilities.749 
It should also be re-emphasized that the Soviet understanding of chemical 
units was not confined to traditional chemical warfare agents, but included the 
use of smokes, obscurants and flame throwers.750 These units also had 
responsibility for supplying Molotov cocktails. A further source of confusion 
regarding the possible use of traditional chemical warfare agents (including 
sulphur mustard) is a distinction made between defensive chemical equipment 
(the provision of respirators, decontamination units and field agent detection kits, 
for example) and weaponized lethal (e.g., nerve agents) or debilitating (e.g., 
sulphur mustard) CW agents.751 
Fedorov, as previously mentioned, a former Soviet military chemist who 
writes on environmental issues connected to the former Soviet CW programme, 
provides lists of munition type and quantities of agent to be produced prior to and 
during World War II in his fundamental 2009 history of the Soviet programme. 
His principal archival source appears to be the Russian State Military Archive. 
What is generally lacking from such data, however, is whether and to what extent 
the production targets were actually met. Fedorov provides locations of pre-
World War II CW stocks, including 121 artillery storage sites where CW was 
stored prior to the war (see Table 12.4). There is nevertheless ambiguity between 
production capacities and 5-year plan goals versus actual production.752 Much of 
the Soviet Union’s World War II CW production appears to have consisted of 
sulphur mustard and lewisite (mainly air bombs, artillery shells and mines). The 
cumulative tonnage for these agents for 1941-45 is over 2 million tonnes (which 
almost certainly includes the weight of the munition bodies).753 Finally, it should 
be noted that tables 12.5 and 12.6 are not consistent with each other. 
                                                 
 
747 Maddrell (note 129), p. 24. 
748 Maddrell (note 129), p. 24. 
749 Bernd Appler, ‘The Production of Chemical Warfare Agents by the Third Reich, 1933-
45’, p. 100 in Stock and Lohs (note 138). See also Hirsch (note 598). 
750 Zhukov (note 733), p. 44. For a history of US activity in this area, see Mountcastle (note 
199). 
751 For a summary of these and related points, see V. Pozdnyakov, ‘The Chemical Arm’, pp. 
384–394 in Liddell-Hart, The Red Army (note 636). 
752 Haber provides average World War I British chemical plant production performance as a 
percentage of the theoretical maximum for four chemicals: (a) bleaching powder (input 
material) to chloropicrin (end use), performance: 81%; (b) chlorine (input material) to phosgene 
(end use), performance: 63%; (c) alcohol (92% C2H5OH) to ethylene (end use), performance: 
48%; and (d) sulphur and chlorine (input material) to sulphur chloride (end use), performance: 
95%. Haber (note 106), p. 154. In addition to such difficulties, questions that arise with regard 
to the Soviet pre-WW II CW production targets include whether the quality control, facility 
personnel expertise and supply chains were comparable to those of other states. 
753 Partial Soviet CW production figures for the 1930s are provided in Fedorov, L. A., 
Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie, vol. 1 (note 644), p. 101. By comparison, Russia declared the 
possession of 40 000 agent tonnes of CW stored at 7 sites (all west of the Urals) to the OPCW 
following the entry into force of the convention in 1997. Tracy Keith, who carried out an 
extensive archival search on behalf of the OPCW PrepCom which was later published by the 
168   HART  
Table 12.4 Soviet Military-Chemical Storage Sites (1918–1945) 
 
Berdsk (Novosibirsk oblast’) 
Chita-II 
Gatchinia (Leningrad oblast’) 
Gorny (Saratov oblast’) 
Il’ino (Nizhegorsk oblast’) 
Irkutsk-Batareinaya 
Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) 
Khabarovsk-Krasnaya River 
Knorring (Primorsk krai) 
Lesnaya (Chitinskaya oblast’) 
Moscow-Ochakovo 
Novocherkassk (Rostov oblast’) 
Omsk 
Pes’yanka (Altai krai) 
Redva (Sverdlovsk oblast’) 
Rostov-Yaroslavsky (Yaroslavl oblast’) 
Rzhanitsa (Bryansk oblast’) 
Shikhany (Saratov oblast’) 
Sungach (Primorsk krai) 
Svobodny (Amursk oblast’) 
Tver’ 
Vozdvizhensky (Primorsk krai) 
 
Source: Lev A. Fedorov, Khimicheskoe Vooruzhenie—Voina s Sobstvennym Narodom: Tragicheskii 
Rossiiskii Opyt [Chemical Armaments—War Against One’s Own People: the Tragic Russian 
Experience], vol. 3 (self-published: Moscow, Feb. 2009), pp. 287–88. 
Table 12.5. Production of Chemical Warfare Agents in the Soviet Union during World War II 
(thousands of tonnes). 
 
CW agent    Years    Total 
    1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 [output; %] 
 
Sulphur mustard   14.4 26.7 22.6 10.3 2.8 [76.8; 62.6] 
Lewisite    2.2 6.1 8.5 2.9 0.5 [20.2; 16.5] 
Hydrogen cyanide (HCN)  1.5 2.7 2.8 2.4 1.7 [11.1; 9.1] 
(aka ‘Prussic acid’) 
Phosgene   0.6 1.7 2.7 2.6 0.7 [8.3; 6.8] 
Adamsite   1.0 1.8 2.5 0.8 -- [6.1; 5.0] 
 
Total    19.7 39.0 39.1 19.0 5.7 122.5 100 
 
Source: V. Ryabukhin, Voenno-Khimichekoe Proizvodstvo v Gody Otechestvennoi Voiny i v Poslevoenny 
Period [Chemical Warfare Production during the Great Patriotic War and the Post-War Period] (USSR 
Gosplan: 1948) p. not provided. Cited in Fedorov, Lev A., Khimishekoe Razoruzhenie Po-Russky: 
Dokumental’ny Roman [Chemical Disarmament Russian-Style: a Documentary Novel] (New Literary 
Review: Moscow, 2011), p. 25. 
                                                                                                                                               
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), estimated that 150 000 tonnes of CW agent 
were produced by all of the belligerants in World War II. If so, the 2 million tonne figure could 
represent agent tonnes. States began to provide CW weight estimates to agent fill only during 
the negotiations and subsequent implementation of the CWC so as to circulate the lowest 
possible numbers. The ratio of declared munitions to agent tonnes to the OPCW following the 
CWC’s entry-into-force is approximately 8.7 million rounds versus 76 000 agent tonnes. See 
OPCW, ‘Demilitarisation’, <http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/>, (accessed 3 
Nov. 2013). 
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Table 12.6. Output in the USSR of Chemical Munitions Filled with Persistent Agents during 
World War II. 
 
Munition type Formulation   Output (thousands of items) 
     1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 Total 
 
Air Chemical Bombs 
 
KhAB-500 sulphur mustard-Lewisite 2.35 18.8 23.8 7.0 -- 52.0 
KhAB-200 sulphur mustard  -- 10.5 27.3 16.4 0.06 54.3 
KhAB-200 sulphur mustard-Lewisite 4.7 3.5 -- -- -- 8.2 
KhAB-100 sulphur mustard-Lewisite 1.6 22.1 71.2 27.0 1.1 123.0 
KhAB-25 sulphur mustard-Lewisite 31.1 44.0 4.0 1.5 -- 80.6 
 
Chemical Artillery Shells 
 
AKhS-76 sulphur mustard  -- 62.0 629.3 6.9 -- 698.2 
AKhS-122 UD sulphur mustard  30.0 197.5 182.2 102.5 1.0 513.2 
DD  viscous Lewisite  54.3 7.5 46.0 -- -- 107.8 
UD  sulphur mustard-Lewisite -- -- -- 4.5 -- 4.5 
DD  vis. sulphur mustard-Lew. -- -- -- 20.4 2.7 23.1 
AKhS-152 UD sulphur mustard  0.6 50.7 78.5 9.0 -- 138.8 
DD  viscous Lewisite  -- 21.2 37.9 -- -- 59.1 
UD  sulphur mustard-Lewisite -- -- -- 5.0 -- 5.0 
DD  vis. sulphur mustard-Lew. -- -- -- 8.8 -- 8.8 
 
Chemical Mines 
 
M-82  sulphur mustard  -- 0.7 195.0 718.3 -- 914.0 
M-82  sulphur mustard-Lewisite 0.3 18.1 547.7 907.9 35.0 1509 
M-107  sulphur mustard-Lewisite -- 2.0 -- -- -- 2.0 
M-120  sulphur mustard-Lewisite -- -- 82.0 93.0 -- 175.0 
 
Chemical Multi-Rail Rocket Launchers [also known as Multiple Rocket Launchers or Katyusha 
Rocket Launchers] 
 
11MKh-13 sulphur mustard-Lewisite -- 48.2 35.2 13.6 -- 97.0 
 
Total     125.0 506.8 1960.1 1941.8 39.9      4573.6 
 
Source: Cited in Lev A. Fedorov, Khimishekoe Razoruzhenie Po-Russky: Dokumental’ny Roman 
[Chemical Disarmament Russian-Style: a Documentary Novel] (New Literary Review: Moscow, 2011), 
p. 26. [no documentary source provided by Fedorov]. AKhS=artillery chemical shell, DD=proximity 
fuze, KhAB=chemical air bomb, M=mine, MKh=chemical mine, UD=impact fuze. ‘Vis.’ = viscous. 
The Soviet Union did, in fact, consider the possibility that CW would be 
used and took measures to defend against such weapons.754 Fedorov estimates 
that the Soviet Union produced during the inte-World War period between 10000 
and 20000 tonnes of CW which was stored, in principle, at more than 200 
facilities.755 At the end of World War II, Soviet forces discovered on the territory 
of Germany and set aside for destruction 393,436 chemical shells of various 
calibres, 149,485 chemical air bombs, 33,0802 smoke rounds and rockets, and 
6854 tonnes of CW in various bulk storage containers.756 
                                                 
754 Zhukov (note 733). 
755 Lev A. Fedorov, Khimishekoe Razoruzhenie (note 647), p. 27. 
756 Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence, collection [fond] 233, inventory [opis’] 2311, 
folder [delo] 32, pp. 309–339. Cited in Kochubina and Lebedevsky (note 191), p. 25. 
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Finally, according to a bilingual English-Russian language Russian 
Federation MOD armaments publication, the Soviet Union ended the production 
of the following agents as follows: sarin (1982), soman (1987), VX [almost 
certainly ‘V-agent’—an isomer of VX] (1986), sulphur mustard (1957), Lewisite 
(1946), phosgene (1946), and hydrogen cyanide (1946).757 It can perhaps be 
safely assumed that the data for this resides with the Russian MOD. It is also 
possible that it is reflected in Russia’s initial (or subsequent annual) declarations 
to the OPCW. If so, then its publication in this volume may not have been 
considered to be problematic. The decision to publish may also reflect historical 
interest and may not have been considered in terms of a more skeptical national 
security perception. 
It would be useful to compare Fedorov’s information for these years 
against a 1951 declassified report prepared by the Austrian chemist and German 
Army officer Walther Hirsch for the United States following the war.758 The 
Hirsch Report was perhaps the main source of substantive information in this 
area for the NATO allies during the early years of the Cold War. 
Another source of data on the Soviet Union’s CW stockpiles at the start of 
the war (at least for the southern sector) is the type and quantity of munitions 
dumped by retreating Soviet forces into the Black Sea. Some survey work has 
been carried out in the context of ongoing concern over the possible human 
health effects of dumped munitions that could shed light on this.759 Ukraine has a 
service which periodically deals with the recovery of old munitions, including 
from former battlefields.760 Information in these areas should be sufficiently 
diagnostic to substantially revise and improve the matrix.761 
 
                                                 
757 Ed. Nikolay Spassky, The XXI Century Encyclopedia: Russia’s Arms and Technologies, 
Ordnance and Munitions, vol. 12 (‘Arms and Technologies’ Publishing House: Moscow, 2006), 
‘Chemical Ordnance’, p. 440. 
758 Hirsch (note 598). 
759 Sub-bottom profiling for obstacles, including shipwrecks and munitions, may be carried 
out as part of the pipeline survey for the oil pipeline project South Stream. A similar exercise 
was previously conducted in connection with the Nord Stream oil pipeline project in the Baltic 
Sea. See, for e.g., Nord Stream, Nord Stream Espoo Report: Key Issue Paper, Munitions: 
Conventional and Chemical (Feb. 2009), available at <https://www.nord-stream.com/press-
info/library/?category=4&q=&type=3&per_page=10&sort_documents=-title_en>, (accessed 18 
July 2013). 
760 Ukraine periodically recovers old or otherwise dangerous munitions, including from 
former battlefields. Information on such activity is, in principle, available at 
<http://www.mns.gov.ua/>, (accessed 18 July 2013). On a 2004 recovery of WW I-era chlorine-
filled artillery shells in the Ukraine, see Richard Guthrie, John Hart and Frida Kuhlau, 
‘Chemical and Biological Warfare Developments and Arms Control’, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: 
Armaments, Disarmament and International Secrity (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), p. 
615. 
761 However, for a single author to do so in a single study is not feasible. Some editorial and 
similar changes have been made to the matrix during the drafting of this manuscript. The overall 
purpose is to allow others to understand the analytical logic carried according to a hybrid ACH-
structured argument structure that supports broader qualitiative analysis. Data point-based 
statistical analysis should be carried using specialized software and by multiple analysts or 
groups. 
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Step 5. Draw Tentative Conclusions About the Relative Likelihood of 
Each Hypothesis 
 
A key question is whether information is sufficient to permit accurate or 
otherwise useful analysis. Another important point is whether one should lean 
towards the ‘worst case scenario’ or remain passive until positive proof or strong 
evidence points to one hypothesis being correct over the other(s). 
There are at least three interpretations: yes, no and ambiguous. An 
ambiguous case could be that the Red Army was not prepared for chemical 
warfare, but that large stockpiles of CW were nevertheless produced and 
available in locations beyond European border areas, including west of the Urals. 
If CW had been located in border areas, information to this effect probably 
would have been provided by German military personnel to the Western Allies 
following the end of the war. The question then hinges on how effectively the 
Soviets could have removed or disposed of CW stocks (including CW agent 
stored in bulk) before they could fall into German hands. An indication of this 
could, for example, be provided by surveys of dumped munitions in the Black 
Sea.762 Given the territorial size of the Soviet Union, it would also be useful to 
consider the extent to which German forces possessed ‘situational awareness’ of 
the materials and equipment located in their zones of nominal control and 
operation. The zone of operation was extremely large and, in many respects, in a 
continual state of partial chaos. 
The tentative conclusion drawn is that it is not possible to choose 
definitively between the two hypotheses. To do so would require remaining 
‘agnostic’ until proven otherwise, or to take a ‘worst case’ (and active) scenario 
approach. 
 
Step 6. Analyze Sensitivity of Conclusions 
 
Critical items of evidence may also serve as the ‘milestones’. The conclusion is 
that either hypothesis may be correct. ‘Thinking backwards’, the ‘crystal ball’, 
‘role playing’ and playing ‘devil’s advocate’ do not appear to be relevant to this 
case. 
The critical items of evidence include: the Hirsch and Ochnser reports, 
and stockpile numbers from Soviet archives. 
This case study is a hindsight analysis exercise. Key sources of 
information were partly based on the memory of World War II participants. This 
is true in the cases of Hirsch and Oschner who were writing their assessments for 
US military intelligence. If the Soviets were planning to engage in chemical 
warfare, many of their officials may have been reticent in advertising this in 
public. 
Definite conclusions are not possible. This probably, therefore, reflects 
sufficient sensitivity to the critical items of evidence considered. The overall 
balance of items of evidence is too uncertain.  
                                                 
762 The Baltic and White Seas, and sections of the Pacific Ocean could be similarly 
considered. On recent efforts to remediate explosive remnants of war in the Crimea, including 
dumped munitions and old munitions at the Kerch fortress, see Niels Poul Petersen and Maria 
Brandstetter, ‘Crimea’s Past Catches Up with Its Present—Protecting People from Explosive 
Remnants of War’, OECD Magazine, no. 1 (2010), pp. 20–23. 
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Step 7. Report Conclusions 
 
The two main narrative interpretations are those summarized Pozdynakov and 
Zanders. A third possibility is that CW stocks were produced in quantity but did 
not, with the exception of the odd items, fall into German hands. Paul Maddrell’s 
research is consistent with the second and third possibilities. 
 
Step 8. Identify Milestones 
 
The following milestones (also known as and understood to be indicators here) 
would clarify further consideration of the two hypotheses. 
The extent to which statements of opinion or purported fact by 
contemporaries should be accepted. 
The further availability of archival material from all relevant archives 
concerning Soviet CW planning would be helpful. In particular information that 
clarifies possible gaps between declared production (including targets) and actual 
production, whether the CW agent was filled into munitions and where they were 
stored (e.g., in the theatre of operations). Archival information that further 
clarifies the priority given to evacuating CW to rear areas or disposing of them 
by burning, land burial or dumping would also be useful. 
The potential relevance of information in the memoirs of Soviet chemical 
officers prior to and during World War II. 
Information that clarifies possible confusion over chemical capacity and 
intentions that derives from an older understanding that chemical troops were 
also responsible for the deployment of smokes and obscurants and flame 
operations. 
The further availability of contemporary information on old munitions 
recovery and surveys. 
Further clarification on the understanding of the terms ‘tactical’ and 
‘strategic’ in the inter-war Soviet understanding in particular would be useful. 
The extent to which the analysis of the hypothesis should be data driven 
versus concept driven based on inter alia the above milestones (indicators). 
Through the use of ACH today, one can conclude that the Soviet Union 
did possess a strategic CW stockpile during World War II. Prior to and during 
World War II, however, the information did not exist outside the Soviet Union to 
permit the application of ACH to reach a meaningful conclusion. 
ACH applications during the Cold War, the Cold War transition and the 
post-Cold War periods would yield distinct results with regard to any state CW 
programme. Nevertheless, a cold war intelligence mentality persists (please see 
below). 
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13 
 
 
 
A MEDIUM STATE PROGRAMME: THE CASE OF IRAQI 
CW IN THE LEAD-UP TO THE 2003 US-LED INVASION 
 
 
euer’s 8 steps are presented in the context of a medium state programme: 
Iraq. Background is structured according to Table 10.1 as part of Step 2 
(also reproduced below as Table 13.1). This is a hybrid, argument-
mapping CW application. 
 
H 
13.1. Introduction 
 
A greater political context existed with respect to whether Iraq possessed CW, 
maintained a CW programme or was developing CW in 2002-2003. During the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq employed CW against Iran and its own Kurdish 
population.763 Following the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the UN Security 
Council adopted resolution 687 (1991), which required Iraq to inter alia end its 
CW programme and to verifiably destroy its CW. The resolution also established 
UNSCOM to verify the destruction and dismantlement of the non-nuclear 
prohibited weapons and associated programmes (i.e., CBW and missiles having a 
range greater than 150 km).764 
International surprise and concern grew as the scale and scope of Iraq’s 
NBC and ballistic missile programmes, especially the extent of its nuclear 
enrichment activity, became evident.765 The principal CW agents produced by 
Iraq were cyclosarin, sarin, sulphur mustard, and tabun. UNSCOM inspectors left 
Iraq in late 1998, as a consequence of a dispute partly based on whether 
                                                 
763 Although allegations have been made that Iran used CW against Iraq, they have not been 
conclusively proven. By contrast, investigative teams sent to the region during the war by the 
UN secretary-general conclusively proved Iraqi use of CW. Iran is a party to the CWC and has 
declared a past production capability, but did not declare a CW stockpile. See Joost R. 
Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 2007). 
764 The IAEA was given primary responsibility for overseeing the nuclear weapon 
disarmament of the country. The CD was still negotiating the CWC at this time. The missile 
range limit probably was set with Israel and, perhaps, the Riyadh, in mind. According to one 
former UNSCOM official, the number was circulated by the US Department of State as part of 
the planning process. 
765 So-called natural uranium consists of 2 main isotopes in the following proportions: U-238 
(99.2 per cent) and U-235 (0.72 per cent). U-238 possesses 3 more neutrons than U-235. Of the 
two isotopes, only a an amount of uranium where the percentage of U-235 has been enriched to 
‘weapons grade’ (generally understood to be 80 per cent or higher) can sustain a fission 
reaction. The process of enrichment is costly, time consuming and has traditionally had a large 
intelligence ‘footprint’ associated with it (mainly because of the power requirements and 
centrifuge arrays—if centrifuge enrichment is being used). Power reactors generally require an 
enrichment level of 5-10 per cent. The isotopic ratios of natural uranium when mined vary 
slightly according to geographic origin. 
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UNSCOM inspectors should be allowed full access to so-called presidential sites. 
In December 1999 UNSCOM was replaced by the UNMOVIC which conducted 
its first inspections of Iraq on 27 November 2002. UNMOVIC’s mandate was 
partly informed by UN Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), which deplored 
Iraq’s failure to fully disclose all aspects of its prohibited programmes, including 
with respect to CW. 
In describing the nature of Iraqi cooperation with UNMOVIC inspectors, 
the body’s Executive Chairman Hans Blix drew a distinction between substance 
and process.766 Blix headed UNMOVIC from 1 March 2000 until 30 June 
2003.767 While Iraq did provide immediate access to all requested sites, its active 
and full cooperation was questioned. The main unresolved CW issue was the 
nature and extent of Iraq’s VX programme. Iraq maintained that it had never 
weaponized VX and had produced only limited, pilot plant-scale quantities of the 
agent. UNSCOM disputed this claim. Another major unresolved CW issue was 
the failure by Iraq to account for approximately 6500 munitions filled with about 
1000 tonnes of chemical agent. The US-led coalition forces that entered Iraq in 
March 2003 did not recover any stockpiled chemical munitions. However, they 
did recover and dispose of non-stockpiled chemical and conventional munitions. 
To be more precise, the recovery of non-stockpiled chemical munitions consisted 
of the odd leftover weapon and was not indicative of a programme by the former 
regime to retain a stock of such weapons. 
The CW disposal operations were reported to the OPCW in consultation 
with the UK and the post-Saddam Hussein government of Iraq.768 Iraq joined the 
CWC in 2009 and declared that it possessed five former CW production facilities 
and CW at the former Muthanna State Establishment (this establishment has two 
bunkers: one containing substantially destroyed CW munitions along with some 
precursor chemicals, and one containing potentially contaminated waste material 
from the destruction process. Both were sealed by UNSCOM).769 No weapons 
were placed in the bunkers that were, at the time, deemed to be too dangerous to 
store. For example, salts from hydrolysis were placed inside. The contents of the 
bunkers are now in the public domain.770 
UNMOVIC’s mandate was ended on 29 June 2007 when the UN Security 
Council adoped Resolution 1762 (2007). 
As of 2013 there have been periodic consultations between OPCW 
officials and mainly Iraqi, UK and US officials on how best to deal with what 
                                                 
766 Blix (note 337), p. 139. Blix gives Elbaradei credit for making this observation. Blix was 
the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission from March 2000-June 2003. 
767 UN, ‘UNMOVIC: Basic Facts’, <http://www.unmovic.org/>, (accessed 9 Aug. 2013). 
768 Iran publicly objected to the OPCW as to whether this was done accordance with the 
provisions of the CWC. Iran’s objection was at least a partial reflection of broader political 
tensions between it and the UK and the US (e.g., on nuclear activities within the framework of 
Iran’s NPT commitments). 
769 John Hart and Peter Clevestig, ‘Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological 
Materials’, SIPRI Yearbook 2010: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010), p. 412. 
770 Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate, ‘The Past Iraqi CW Program’, unclassified slides 
presented at British Defence Science and Technology Laboratory-sponsored conference, 13th 
International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference, Prague, 24-27 May 2010. 
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remains at the Muthanna facility.771 A major concern has been the physical 
safety of OPCW inspectors due to the continued uncertain security situation in 
the country. The OPCW has conducted at least one overflight of the location.772 
3 invasion. 
                                                
 
13.1.1. Information Sources 
 
The literature on Iraq’s pursuit of NBC weapons and longer-range ballistic 
missiles is extensive (see Table 4.2).773 This case study concerns the 
international understanding of the status of the Iraqi CW programme and activity 
just prior to the 200
Following its occupation of Iraq in 2003, the United States transferred to 
its territory at least 48,000 boxes of documents and ‘hundreds of hours of 
recorded conversations’ including ‘many’ by Saddam Hussein.774 Most of the 
UNSCOM/UNMOVIC material remains essentially sealed for up to 60 years.775 
Iraqi oil sales were initially prohibited. However, they were later 
permitted under the Oil-for-Food (OFF) Programme and Iraq conducted 
largescale oil smuggling in parallel.776 Implementation of this programme 
generated further information and consultation at the UN and elsewhere 
 
771 Duelfer, a career CIA employee, UNSCOM Deputy Executive Chairman and ISG head, 
desribes one of the bunkers in question as follows: The facility contains ‘dozens of buildings 
and bunkers, many of them built by German construction companies. At the height of the 
[1980–88] Iran-Iraq War, it was churning out mustard blister agent and sarin nerve agent around 
the clock. . . . UNSCOM, using the facilities at hand . . . destroyed 28,000 munitions, 480,000 
liters of agent, 1.8 million liters of liquid chemical precursors, and a million kilograms of solid 
precursor chemicals. Some containers and munitions were too volatile to attempt to destroy. 
They were gingerly placed in a huge bunker that reminded me of the Great Pyramid at Giza. I 
visited the storage bunker once before it was finally, and permanently, sealed. Outfitted in full 
protective gear, breathing air from scubalike tanks, and carrying a chemical detector that 
progressively blinked warnings of the lethal environmental, the Dutch team chief, Cees 
Wolterbeck, and I examined the interior with its leaking sarin rounds, barrels with toxic agents, 
and assorted contaminated equipment. It was a dark, lethal junkyard’. Duelfer (note 26), pp. 96–
97. It should be noted that UNSCOM CW technical experts do not agree with this 
characterization. 
772 John Hart, ‘Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological Materials’, SIPRI 
Yearbook 2012: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2012), p. 400. 
773 E.g. Peter Dunn, Chemical Aspects of the Gulf War: 1984-1987, Investigations by the 
United Nations (DSTO: Maribyrnong: Australia, 1987); and Hal Brands and David Palkki, 
‘Saddam, Israel, and the Bomb: Nuclear Alarmism Justified?’, International Security, vol. 36, 
no. 1 (summer 2011), pp. 133–166. 
774 US House of Representatives, The Iraqi Documents: a Glimpse into the Regime of 
Saddam Hussein, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the 
Committee on International Relations, 109th Congress, second session, serial no. 109-184 (US 
Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 6 Apr. 2006), p. 1. The focus of the hearings 
was on the thinking of the Iraqi leadership and the fate of POWs. NBC weapon programmes 
and delivery systems were not the focus of these hearings. 
775 Some controlled access is permitted in principle, including to the permanent members of 
the UN Security Council. 
776 See UN, ‘Office of the Iraq Programme’, Oil-for-Food, <http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/ 
background/index.html>, (accessed 1 Aug. 2013); and Independent Inquiry Committee into the 
United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme (‘Volcker Committee’), Management of the Oil-For-
Food Programme, 4 vols. (United Nations: New York, 7 Sep. 2005), <http://www.iic-
offp.org/>, (accessed 1 Aug. 2013). 
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regarding the intentions, activities and weapons holdings of Iraq. Although a UN 
ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) regime had no time limit, it is less 
clear how realistic this mechanism was in the minds of the drafters of UNSC 
Resolution 687 (1991). For example, could OMV, which was established by UN 
Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), be implemented until (or after) Hussein 
lost power years or decades later?777 
The verification approach taken by UNSCOM, partly based on IAEA 
practice, was a material balance approach. In other words, UNSCOM attempted 
to estimate the types and quantities of CW precursors and related equipment and 
material that was imported, how much CW Iraq produced domestically and how 
much CW was expended during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Further deductions 
were made based on verified Iraqi destruction of CW holdings. These figures 
were continuously refined through data obtained by inspections, from 
information received by various (mainly Western) companies and information 
received from (mainly Western) national intelligence services. Iraq also produced 
a series of Full, Final and Complete Declarations (FFCD), which at least one 
European technical expert seconded to UNSCOM would informally refer to as 
Full, Final and Complete Fairy Tales.778 
 
13.2. Framing the Hypotheses 
 
The main hypotheses are: Has the target of analysis stockpiled chemical weapons 
(yes or no)? 
To allow for a more meaningful analysis, the scope and focus should be 
more narrowly defined. As noted in Chapter 10, the question of 
production/stockpiling of chemical weapons is meant to inform the broader 
strategic question: Did Iraq maintain a production capability and was it secretly 
retaining CW stocks? 
This case study mainly considers a series of intelligence assessments, with 
a focus on the international understanding of Iraqi CW intentions and capabilities 
in the lead-up to the April 2003 invasion and the post-invasion intelligence 
assessments. 
Related broader questions include whether and how Iraq might have 
decided to maintain a CW programme over the medium- to longer-term. 
 
Step 1. Identify the Possible Hypotheses to be Considered 
 
The possible hypotheses are: 
1. Yes (Iraq did possess a CW stockpile in the lead-up to the April 2003 
US invasion); or 
2. No (Iraq did not possess a CW stockpile in the lead-up to the April 
2003 US invastion). 
A ‘stockpile’ is understood to be a militarily-significant quantity of CW 
suitable for tactical or strategic use in inter-state conflict. Related questions—
including development work, standby capacity and intent—are considered only 
                                                 
777 UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), paras. 10 & 12. 
778 Personal communication. 
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in as much as they contribute directly to the consideration of the two main 
hypotheses. 
 
Step 2. Make a List of Significant Evidence and Arguments For and 
Against Each Hypothesis 
 
The background for the significant evidence and arguments for and against each 
hypothesis must be provided for the main question. This background is structured 
according to Table 10.1 (reproduced here as Table 13.1). 
Table 13.1 Structure of Background Narrative to Case Studies. 
 
Political factors 
 
Definition of violation 
Intent 
 Doctrine 
 Consistent with types and quanties? 
Threat perception 
Apparent 
Actual 
Demand side factors 
Supply side factors 
 
 
Technical factors 
 
Assimilation 
Capability 
Technological stages 
Verification measures 
Onsite 
Nearsite 
Offsite 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Sufficient background for each hypothesis must be provided. The 
background should also be structured with a limited number of headers, have 
internal cohesion and be sufficiently broad to allow for a meaningful narrative 
that permits the reader to readily ascertain the connection between the logic of 
the argument and the evidence (or lack thereof). To do so, allows for further 
refinement of the analytical technique and modifications of the conclusions as 
new insight and information become available. 
The background is structured according to political and technical factors. 
The political factors considered are: (a) the definition of a CWC-defined 
violation, (b) intent, (c) threat perception (apparent and actual), (d) demand side 
factors and (e) supply side factors. The technical factors considered are: (a) CW 
assimilation and (b) ‘verification measures’ (mainly derived from the arms 
control paradigm). These political and technical factors were developed by the 
author. However, it should be noted that supply and demand side factors are part 
of the standard nuclear arms control and disarmament literature. Also variations 
of integration and assimilation of weapons systems into military doctrine and 
training have long been considered by analysts in various contexts. 
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13.3. Political Factors 
 
The international inspection and verification regime of Iraq date to the 1980-
1988 Iran-Iraq War during which Iraq used CW against Iran.779 The fact that Iraq 
was able to acquire much of its know-how and material base for its NBC and 
ballistic missile programmes from abroad prompted a number of mainly Western 
governments to consider ways to strengthen and harmonize their strategic trade 
control procedures and practice. Iraqi use of CW in the war was confirmed by the 
UN in 1984.780 The Australia Group, whose participants seek to ensure that 
material, technology and know-how is not misused for CBW purposes, held its 
first annual meeting in 1985.781 
Following the UN-sanctioned ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in the 
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, the UN imposed a verification and inspection 
regime on the country to ensure that Iraq disarmed and eliminated its associated 
programmes and infrastructure for NBC weapons and longer range missiles. The 
broader regional and international political tensions, however, remained. Despite 
the OFF programme activity, the willingness of the UN Security Council to 
maintain OMV remained in some doubt by the time George W. Bush entered 
office in 2001, partly because of a progressive worsening of humanitarian effects 
of the international sanctions in the country. 
The two main narratives on Iraqi NBC weapon and ballistic missile 
capabilities, intentions and holdings in the lead up to the April 2003 invasion 
were: 
1. the carefully-phrased, technocratic reports and statements of UNSCOM 
(then UNMOVIC), and 
2. statements informed by national intelligence that were issued mainly by 
the George W. Bush Administration and its allies (or politically 
sympathetic partners), including policy analysts and political 
commentators. 
These narratives generally failed to coincide in terms of philosophical 
approach, conclusions and policy prescriptions. A major reason for this was the 
multilateral, consensus-driven nature of the international UN-type bodies (despite 
the coercive disarmament structure put in place by UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 (1991)). The characterizations made by multilateral bodies often 
contrasted distinctly against political statements made by the US Administration. 
The latter generally presumed that Saddam Hussein was recalcitrant on his 
international commitments and was, common sense would indicate, pursuing 
such weapons (or at least would do so once the international pressure and 
focused attention were reduced). This debate was expressed in terms of what 
various intelligence information showed, suggested or demonstrated. The public 
could not know the full details because intelligence sources and methods had to 
                                                 
779 The possible use by Iran of CW has not been publicly proven. By contrast, UN Secretary-
General investigation teams did demonstrate the use of CW by Iraq. 
780 See Dunn (note 773). Dunn was one of the initial inspectors sent to the region by the UN 
Secretary-General to investigate CW use claims. 
781 AG guidelines are incorporated into EC regulation 1331/2000 (revised) which forms a 
legal basis of the EU munitions control lists. The regulation is typically revised annually to 
reflect routine legal developments within, for e.g., various treaty regimes. 
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be protected. Public reporting by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC was also more 
general than the closed briefings these bodies gave to members of the UN 
Security Council and individual member states. In short, the political 
decisionmaking for going to war was shaped by inconsistent narratives of what 
arms control verification information and intelligence analyses showed (or did 
not show), respectively. This dichotomy can, it is hypothesized, offer theoretical 
methodogical lessons when considering neoliberal institutionalism and realist IR 
theory. 
It should also be noted that a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 
687 (1991) (and the subsequent resolutions that supported the work of UNSCOM 
and UNMOVIC) does not necessarily coincide with what might be considered a 
violation of the 1993 CWC (which entered into force in 1997). In particular, the 
technical understanding of a violation by those implementing the coercive and 
verified disarming of Iraq may not be the same as the understanding of a 
violation of the CWC in which the member states of the treaty are understood to 
have equal rights and obligations unless clear evidence exists that a member state 
is obfuscating on its fundamental treaty commitments.782 For example, would 
UNSCOM inspectors have been willing to accept laboratory-scale synthesis by 
Iraq of novel CW agents for prophylactic, protective, threat evaluation and other 
CWC-permitted purposes? Moreover, regardless of the technical understanding 
by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC of permitted and non-permitted CW-related work, 
a larger political question would remain: Would the UN Security Council 
members accept an Iraq under Saddam Hussein that openly pursued defensive 
CBW programmes and activity? 
If the answer to the last question is no, then consideration of ‘types and 
quantities’ criterion of this analytical framework loses relevance (and is perhaps 
irrelevant). Similarly, any mention of CW in doctrine would be highly suspect as 
an indicator of a violation in the post-Persian Gulf War international security 
climate as this related to Iraq. 
Had Hussein been more politically astute, he could have acceded to the 
CWC once the treaty was opened for signature in January 1993. However, the 
US and others did not wish Iraq to do so until it had fully complied with UN 
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).783 
There is some reason to suppose that Iraq followed Soviet military 
doctrine on chemical weapon matters.784 If true, this could be a natural corollary 
                                                 
782 A non-fundamental (‘technical’) treaty violation, by contrast, would be the submission of 
an annual report to the OPCW several days late. 
783 It has been reported that the main reason the US successfully organized the ouster of 
former OPCW Director-General Ambassador José Bustani of Brazil was that he was attempting 
to reach out to Iraq to join the CWC through informal diplomatic channels. Marlise Simons, ‘To 
Ousted Boss, Arms Watchdog Was Seen as an Obstacle in Iraq’, New York Times, 13 Oct. 2013, 
<www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/world/to-ousted-boss-arms-watchdog-was-seen-as-an-obstacle-
in-iraq.html>, (accessed 3 Nov. 2013). 
784 Richard L. Russell, ‘Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from 
Saddam’, Middle East Journal, vol. 59, no. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 194–195. For intelligence 
analysis, all sources are considered worth noting and can serve as a basis for further 
consideration to support the purpose of the analysis. For academic analysis, by contrast, the 
focus on sources has traditionally been based on peer-reviewed publications with a view 
towards contributing further such articles. Newspapers and unsourced speculation on blogs, by 
contrast, are to be treated with caution and possibly avoided. 
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of Iraqi acquisitions of Soviet (then Russian) arms and similarities between 
Baathist Party leadership practice and that of the Soviet Union (especially during 
the leadership of Joseph Stalin).785 
 
13.3.1. Threat Perceptions 
 
Iraq perceived Iran and Israel as security threats and regional rivals (both in 
terms of Iraqi pronouncements and internal consultations). Starting with the 
1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq almost certainly considered the extent to which 
Iran was capable of defending against and employing CW.786 Iraq also viewed 
Israel as a country that it should be able to either more effectively attack or to 
deter.787 
UNMOVIC identified the following factors as shaping Iraq’s WMD 
programmes: (a) the Iran-Iraq War, and (b) the 1990 occupation of Kuwait. Iraq 
appears to have viewed chemical weapons as a means to counteract Iran’s 
numerical superiority in manpower and to blunt Iran’s debilitating human wave 
attacks.788 UNMOVIC concluded that Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait prompted an 
emphasis by the Iraqi leadership on the production and weaponization of WMD 
to prepare for the then imminent Persian Gulf War.789 
UNMOVIC also cited an anonymous letter written by a senior Iraqi 
official to Saddam Hussein as possibly forming a basis for Iraq’s rationale for 
pursuing WMD. This letter states: 
‘If our country were to obtain and develop chemical and biological 
weapons, this would be considered the best weapon of deterrence against the 
enemy in the field. 
The principle of “deterrence” is the best means of defence against the 
Zionist entity, and in this respect we suggest the following: 
a. To continue to develop the types of chemical weapons with an attempt 
to manufacture the most dangerous of these types in large quantities. 
b. To secure long-range means, “Missile carrying chemical heads” for 
reciprocal threat. 
To prepare special storage areas for chemical weapons in the Southern 
area of the region, and these areas must [be] within the range of the effectiveness 
of the current available missiles, and other means to reach the Zionist active 
targets in order to secure the surprise “thunder strike”, in using and 
accomplishing the quick reaction to deter the enemy’. 790 
 
                                                 
785 Saddam Hussein was purportedly an admirer of Stalin. 
786 Iran declared a former CW production capabity when it joined the CWC in 1997 prior to 
the treaty’s entry-into-force. 
787 UNMOVIC, Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes 
(UNMOVIC: New York, 6 Mar. 2003), p. 5, <http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/ 
documents/cluster_document.pdf>, (accessed 9 Aug. 2013). 
788 UNMOVIC (note 787), p. 6. 
789 UNMOVIC (note 787), p. 7. 
790 UNMOVIC (note 787), p. 5. 
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13.3.2. Demand and Supply Side Factors 
 
Some Western-based companies traded extensively with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq 
War in dual-purpose materials, technology, equipment and know-how that Iraq 
then used to develop its NBC weapon and ballistic missile programmes. Iraq 
established supply chains for the importation of pesticides and pesticide 
precursors to support its CW R&D and production capability. The Dutch 
businessman Frans van Anraat is currently serving a 17-year prison sentence for 
his role in selling chemical precursors to Iraq during the 1980s.791 
Iraqi demand generally drove supply. This is indicated perhaps most 
clearly by the inflated (even by comparison to other inflated prices paid by other 
states seeking to circumvent strategic trade controls at the time) prices Iraq was 
prepared to pay. The fact that money was no obstacle to weapons acquisition and 
development is also reflected by the fact that Iraq pursued multiple uranium 
enrichment options, instead of pursuing only one.792 
 
13.4. Technical Factors 
 
Iraq experienced persistent difficulties in the scale-up and stockpiling of CW. It 
had difficulty storing nerve agents in a reasonably stable form and, during the 
Iran-Iraq War, typically manufactured its nerve agents and filled them into 
munitions just prior to employment (e.g., by filling them at al Muthanna just 
prior to shipment for use in the field). It should be noted, however, that Iraq was 
perceptibly moving towards binary nerve agent munition configurations in order 
to overcome the stability/storage problem.793 
UNSCOM officials informally concluded that the country had 
manufactured 2-4 tonnes of poor quality VX. Since the removal of Saddam 
Hussein, it has since become evident that the various institutions involved in 
NBC weapons and ballistic missile programmes had to deal with numerous 
resource shortages and institutional inefficiencies, including those associated 
with an underlying fear by personnel for their physical safety and that of their 
relatives. Other inefficiencies were a consequence of secrecy, interaction with 
security services and fear of losing one’s career at the hands of higher-level 
officials (including by Saddam Hussein). CBW programme personnel therefore 
avoided issuing unfavourable progress reports which were, in fact, not 
infrequently highly optimistic.794 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC developed extensive onsite, near-site and off-
sited verification measures, including as part of OMV. The principal focus of this 
case study is examining the international CW arms control verification 
assessment of Iraq and various—mainly US—intelligence CW assessments of 
                                                 
791 Anna Wetter, Enforcing European Union Law on Exports of Dual-Use Goods (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2009), pp. 122–125. 
792 For an account of how freely funds were expended by Iraqi officials for weapons 
development and procurement, see Khidir Hamza and Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: the 
Daring Escape of the Man Who Built Iraq’s Secret Weapon (Touchstone: New York City, 
2000). 
793 Personal comunication with former UNSCOM official, Aug. 2013. 
794 Such factors may have implications for organization theory and rational actor theory, 
respectively. 
182   HART  
Iraq, as well as how they were understood at the time and were used to support 
broader strategic security and international policy objectives. 
 
Step 3. Prepare Matrices with Hypotheses 
Matrix. Stockpiling 
 
Question: Has the target (i.e., state or non-state actor) stockpiled chemical weapons? 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1 No stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=2, I=6, N/A=6] 
H2 Yes stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=12, I=2, N/A=0] 
 
        H1 H2 
 
IR1. Does target have CW technical capacity (e.g. military, medical)? 
 E.1 General publications aimed at domestic audience  (yes) - - 
 E.2 General publications aimed at domestic audience (no) C I 
 E.3 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (yes) - - 
 E.4 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (no) - - 
 E.5 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (yes) - - 
 E.6 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (no) - - 
 
IR2. Is CW mentioned in military doctrine? 
 E.1 Defence against CW in civil defence context (yes) - - 
 E.2 Defence against CW in civil defence context (no)  - - 
 E.3 Defence against CW for military personnel (yes)  N/A C 
 E.4 Defence against CW for military personnel (no)  - - 
 E.5 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) - - 
 E.6 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no)  - - 
 E.7 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) N/A C 
 E.8 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no) - - 
 
IR3. Statements and similar communications 
E.1 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (no)  - - 
 
IR4. Weight of evidence of integration of CW into military doctrine? 
 E.1 Publications indicate integration of CW (yes)  - - 
 E.2 Publications indicate integration of CW (no)  - - 
 E.3 Arms control policy statements against CW (yes)  C I 
 E.4 Arms control policy statements for CW (yes)*  I C 
 
IR5. Interest in CW activities of others? 
 E.1 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (no)  - - 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW production? 
 E.1 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (no)  - - 
 E.3 CW production facility indicators (yes)   I C 
 E.4 CW production facility indicators (no)   - - 
 E.5 CW stockpiling indicators (yes) **   I C 
 E.6 CW stockpiling indicators (no)    - - 
 E.7 Documentation of production (yes)   I C 
 E.8 Documentation of production (no)   - - 
 E.9 Documentation of stockpiling (yes)**   I C 
 E.10 Documentation of stockpiling (no)   - - 
 E.11 Availability of CW production material/equipment (yes) N/A C 
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 E.12 Availability of CW production material/equipment (no) - - 
 E.13 Availability of CW munition (yes)   I C 
 E.14 Availability of CW munition (no)   - - 
 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Heuer’s ACH matrix. C=consistent, I=inconsistent and N/A=not 
applicable, IR=information request, E=evidence. *E.g., Some parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
reserved the right to use CW if such weapons were first used against them. **The question is not a non-
sequitor in the sense that, for e.g., overhead imagery might be available that suggests such stockpiling. 
The cumulative scores for the hypotheses are: 
H1: C=2, I=6, N/A=6 
H2: C=12, I=2, N/A=0 
 
This case study reflects significant information gaps in the matrix questions. 
When both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ pairings in the evidence chain are struck through, this 
indicates the information is unavailable or uncertain to this author. 
The cumulative scoring shows that Iraq did stockpile CW in general. 
However, the evidence chain must be considered in much greater detail for the 
time period in the lead-in to the 2003 invasion. In broad terms, this should be 
done by comparing and contrasting the international verification and inspection 
results as they were understood in 2002-2003 with those of national (mainly US) 
intelligence assessments. 
Particular attention should be devoted to possible dichotomies between 
technical analyses and how their results were presented and used in public at the 
broader political and policy levels. Such dichotomies should help to elucidate the 
interests and actions of actors and institutions in the broader international peace 
and security context. 
The information considered according to the structure of this matrix is 
incomplete and not necessarily representative. The manner in which the 
questions are posed and considered, however, should be useful on its own terms 
(regardless of the conclusions or understanding reached (provisional or 
otherwise)). 
 
IR1. Does Target have CW Technical Capability (e.g., Military, Medical)? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=0 
 
Only one evidence chain is answered (or answerable) here. The author is not 
aware of any CW publications aimed at the Iraqi public at large. Without a 
positive counter-example, it is impossible to make this assertion with full 
confidence. 
Such publications aimed at an Iraqi audience would have presumably 
drawn sustained and heavy public criticism from Iran. The UN may have 
considered the matter further at the request of the Iranian delegation (e.g., at the 
UN General Assembly). 
The lack of such literature, one can assume, reflects such factors as an 
unwillingness to attract further international approbium for potentially implying 
(or inviting criticism) that Iraq expected such weapons to be used, or that the use 
of such weapons might not be unusual or otherwise out-of-the-ordinary. 
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Technical and policy documentation and guidance against CW may have 
been recovered following the US-led occupation of Iraq. This is a point for 
further inquiry and analysis. 
Perhaps the main traditional method for assessing CW technical 
capabilities of a target of analysis is by reviewing all of its scientific publications 
according to keyword lists. Such reviews, which were extensively carried out 
prior to and during World War II, would tend to reveal locations and names of 
facilities where research of interest is being conducted, possible patterns of 
research or research personnel, and the nature of such research. 
 
IR2. Is CW Mentioned in Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=2 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=2, I=0, N/A=0 
 
Two evidence chain pairings are ignored: defence against CW in a civil defence 
context, and civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures. This is because the 
author is unaware of any significant information in these two areas. 
Saddam Hussein maintained extensive recordings of his meetings, 
including an insistence that his military commanders expose his own troops to 
CW prior to their use against Iran in order to gain confidence that Iraqi forces 
could function sufficiently well in a CW contaminated environment.795 The 
UNSCOM/UNMOVIC archives reportedly contain almost 460 metres of paper 
files and 1 terabyte of electronic data.796 
 
IR3. Statements and Similar Communications 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
 
The United States and other states reportedly attempted to install surveillance 
equipment, including for communications intercepts, through UNSCOM 
inspection and verification activity.797 The United States acquired large 
quantities of Iraqi archives, including recordings by Saddam Hussein.798 
Following the April 2003 occupation of Iraq it became clear that Saddam 
Hussein and other leaders discussed CW matters. This is partly reflected in the 
                                                 
795 Personal communication with researcher who reviewed part of Saddam Hussein’s 
personal papers in the US, June 2013. On the nature of Iraqi Government papers captured by the 
US, see, for e.g., Brands and Palkki (note 773), pp. 133–166; and National Security Archive 
(George Washington University), Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI: Twenty Interviews and 
Five Conversations with ”High Value Detainee #1” in 2004, National Security Archive 
Briefing Book no. 279, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB279/index.htm>, 
(accessed 12 Aug. 2013). 
796  Nicholas Kulish, ‘End Looms for Iraq Arms Inspection Unit’, New York Times, 18 June 
2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/world/middleeast/18weapons.html?_r=0>,  
(accessed 25 July 2013). 
797 On the role of NTM and national espionage activity carried out in parallel with IAEA and 
UNSCOM verification and inspection activity, see Chapter 1 of this volume. 
798 E.g., Brands and Palkki (note 773), pp. 133–166; and National Security Archive (George 
Washington University), Saddam Hussein Talks to the FBI (note 795). 
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materials used to prosecute ‘Chemical Ali’, the commander responsible for the 
Halabja CW attacks against Iraq’s Kurdish population in 1988. 
 
IR4. Weight of Evidence of Integration of CW into Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=1, I=1, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=1, N/A=0 
 
One evidence chain pairing is omitted: publications that indicate integration of 
CW. 
In the arms control context, Iraq acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 
1931 with reservations.799 It joined the CWC in 2009. In international arms 
control fora, Iraq generally maintained positions similar to those of other Middle 
Eastern and Arab states. This was to maintain an ambiguous position on formally 
renouncing CBW until such time as Israel should agree to join all WMD arms 
control regimes, including the NPT, as part of a process for achieving a WMD 
Free Middle East. Much of the discussion on achieving a Middle East WMD 
Free Zone initiative, on the surface, is over whether there should be direct 
negotiations or preconditions. Israel usually indicates that direct negotiations are 
desirable, while Iran is opposed to talks with ‘the Zionist entity’. There are 
similar differences of position regarding whether talks should proceed with or 
without preconditions. It is unclear to what extent the positions are ‘real’ or 
merely reflect the fact that one or more states simply oppose negotiations are the 
present time. Israel has indicated that the broader regional tensions and 
differences must be addressed prior to reaching accommodation and common 
understanding on NBC weapons and ballistic missiles arms control.800 
 
IR5. Interest in CW Activities of Others? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq considered CW threats posed by Iran. Iraq 
engaged in a systematic effort to acquire NBC and ballistic missile expertise.801 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW Production? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=5, N/A=2 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=7, I=0, N/A=0 
 
                                                 
799 The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare: CBW and the Law of War, vol. 3 (note 
251), p. 158. 
800 E.g., ‘Israel, Statement by Mr Eyal Propper, Director [of] Arms Control Policy 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Seventeenth Session of the Conference of the 
States of the States Parties’, OPCW document C-17/NAT.15, 27 Nov. 2012. 
801 E.g., the Iraqi engineer Khidir Hamza describes how he purchased books on S&T in bulk 
at Foyle’s bookshop in London which the Iraqi embassy then shipped back to the country. 
Hamza and Stein (note 792). 
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The evidence chains here reflect the results of the verification and inspections 
carried out by UNSCOM and then UNMOVIC. Further detail and context was 
developed by the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and other activity carried out as part 
of the post-April 2003 occupation of Iraq. 
The understanding by technical and political actors of these evidence 
chains are the focus of addressing H1 and H2 in this case study. 
 
Step 4. Refine the Matrix 
 
Two main narratives are compared and contrasted with a view to determine ways 
to refine the matrix: the findings of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC on the one hand, 
and various national (mainly US intelligence assessments and policy statements) 
on the other hand. The findings of UNMOVIC (and by implication UNSCOM) 
enjoyed the support of some analysts and governments, including among French 
and German officials. The United States issued reports and statements, including 
on BW, derived from a source controlled by Germany code-named Curveball, as 
well as a 2002 NIE. This NIE was produced in two versions: the longer classified 
one, and a shorter public one. Fingar has observed that it was human nature for 
some in the US Government to read the shorter, public version rather than the 
full classified version.802 A September 2002 British intelligence assessment 
maintained that Iraq was capable of deploying some WMD within 45 minutes of 
an order to use them (this phrasing was later much criticized as politically-
motivated ‘sexed up’ intelligence).803 This report, which was later shown to be 
false, could be viewed as being more consistent with tactical, rather than 
strategic, use.804 The Iraqi civil engineer defector Adnan al-Haideri also provided 
CBW information prior to the 2003 invasion. He maintained that he had 
personally supervised the construction of chemical and biological weapon-related 
facilites at some 20 sites, including the Baghdad General Hospital.805 
The matrix provided in Step 3 reflects information from multiple periods, 
including the post-2003 invasion ‘intelligence failure’ investigations.806 This 
case study is thus a hindsight analysis. If it were ongoing or future-oriented, 
different matrices would be developed as new information and analyses came to 
light and were incorporated. 
                                                
ACH computer programmes could be employed to help keep track of 
large data streams with associated evidence chains, as well as for multiple 
research groups working simultaneously on the problem.807 A qualitiative-
focused summarizing approach is taken using the matrix developed for this 
 
802 Fingar (note 25), p. 104. 
803 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (The 
Stationary Office: London, 24 Sep. 2002), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_ 
east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf>, (accessed 9 Aug. 2013). The term ‘sexed up’ 
appears to originate from an anonymous UK official. There was much speculation that Tony 
Blair’s Director of Communications was at least partly responsible for the insertion of the ‘45 
minutes’ text. 
804 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. 
805 Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, Spies, Lies and the War on Terror (Zed 
Books: London, 2009). p. 57. 
806 The extent to which intelligence services, including those in the US, were wrong is 
debatable. This partly depends on the parameters of the analysis. 
807 On longitudinal studies framing, see Prunckun (note 380), p. 24. 
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study. This approach is also more appropriate for supporting higher-level 
strategic analysis by a single analyst or author. 
 
UN-sanctioned Verification and Inspection Regime of Iraq Following the 
1990-1991 Persian Gulf War 
 
As previously mentioned, UNSCOM was established by UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 (1991) and operated from 1991 to 1999 when it was replaced by 
UNMOVIC under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999). 
This development reflected the fact that UNSCOM was effectively barred from 
carrying out in-country inspections and many of the UN member states wished 
the body to be structured more closely to standard UN-type organizations (e.g., 
in terms of recruitment and management structure and practice). In the words of 
a former diplomat, UNMOVIC was more bureaucratic and was meant to provide 
a bit of ‘law and order’ to the process.808 
The modalities of the inspection regime were based on an exchange of 
letters between Iraq and the UN which was finalised on 18 May 1991. This 
included provision for the unrestricted freedom of movment of inspectors, the 
right of inspectors to examine and copy records, the right to take samples for in- 
or out-of-country analysis, and the right to conduct interviews. UNSCOM’s 
executive office was located at the UN Secretariat in New York City. UNSCOM 
also maintained a regional office in Baghdad which served as its base of 
operations for inspection activities and the extensive ongoing monitoring activity 
of Iraq. 
UNSCOM’s activity in Iraq was curtailed in 1998 over a series of disputes 
concerning access to so-called presidential sites. UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan then attempted to resolve this issue by concluding a bilateral 
memorandum of understanding in March 1998.809 This MOU is viewed by some 
as ‘the thin edge of the wedge’ that helped to undermine UNSCOM’s support 
and hastened its exit from Iraq. 
UNSCOM developed procedures to compartmentalize information partly 
in order to help ensure that the site selection for inspection was kept secret until 
the last possible moment. UNSCOM also received information from 
governments, including from intelligence services, as well as information on 
Iraq’s procurement activities that originated from banks and business firms.810 
A number of prominent scientists, such as Dr Rihab Taha (‘Dr Germ’), 
had received training outside Iraq. Partly as a result the British Foreign Office 
recently began implementing an academic technology approval scheme (ATAS) 
in which students from outside the EU who wish to undertake postgraduate study 
in some natural sciences fields for more than 6 months are vetted.811 
UNSCOM operated in Iraq over a period of more than 8 years, while 
UNMOVIC’s presence in the country was limited to 3 1/2 months. It should also 
                                                 
808 Personal communication, Apr. 2014. 
809 ‘Letter dated 25 February 1998 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the Security Council’, UN document S/1998/166, 27 Mar. 1998. 
810 E.g., Duelfer (note 26). 
811 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS)’, 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/what-we-do/services-we-deliver/atas/>, (accessed 1 Aug. 
2013). 
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be noted that UNMOVIC’s reporting referred to below was the result of 
UNMOVIC’s evaluations of the UNSCOM reports, often by staff members who 
continued on in the new organization, and was not based upon independent 
inspection activities.812 
With the exception of information from governments regarding two 
notable occasions during the summer 1991—both exclusively related to the Iraqi 
nuclear weapons programme—no ‘significant intelligence’ or information 
regarding CBW or longer-range missiles was received from governments.813 
Thus, according to a former UNSCOM official, the work of the inspectors is the 
sole reason for the success of UNSCOM which was to account fully for Iraq's 
prohibited items and to verify their destruction.814 
The information and material generated from these and other activities is 
massive and pose severe information management burdens. As previously 
mentioned, the UNSCOM/UNMOVIC archives reportedly contain almost 460 
metres of paper files and 1 terabyte of electronic data.815 The UNSCOM and 
UNMOVIC files have been transferred to the custody of the UN’s Archive and 
Records Management Section in the Department of Management where they will 
remain sealed separately from the other UN archival material for 30-60 years 
starting from 1 March 2008.816 Despite the oral histories, much of the 
understanding will be lost.817 
 
UNMOVIC’s Findings 
 
The final unresolved verification issues were contained in an UNMOVIC report 
(‘the Cluster Report’) that Blix presented to the UN Security Council in March 
2003.818 This report summarizes each weapon type as a separate ‘cluster’. The 
chemical cluster is divided according to: (a) tabun, (b) sarin and cyclosarin, (c) 
sulphur mustard, (d) VX, (e) chemical process equipment, (f) soman, (g) BZ 
analogues (psychoactive compounds).819 
VX stabilizer was found in the field in a large area and depth (this 
indicated more than gramme level production of VX).820 
UNMOVIC found a crate of unfilled 122 mm CW warheads and further 
warheads were subsequently found by both Iraqis and UNMOVIC inspectors.821 
UNMOVIC concluded that, from the mid-1970s to 1990, more than 200 
international suppliers had provided ‘major critical technology, equipment, items 
                                                 
812 Personal communication with former UNSCOM official, Nov. 2009. 
813 Personal communication with former UNSCOM official, Nov. 2009. 
814 Personal communication with former UNSCOM official, Nov. 2009. 
815  Kulish (note 796). 
816 UN, ‘Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Records and Archives of the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UN document ST/SGB/2009/12, 1 Aug. 
2009. 
817 Oral history-based studies include Jean E. Krasno and James S. Sutterlin, The United 
Nations and Iraq: Defanging the Viper (Praeger: Westport, Conn., 2003). 
818 UNMOVIC (note 787). 
819 UNMOVIC (note 787), pp. 67–94. 
820 UNMOVIC (note 787), p. 84. 
821 Blix (note 337), pp. 117–118. Colin Powell gives the warhead size as 122 mm in his 
February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council. Blix does not mention the calibre. 
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and materials that were directly used by Iraq’ for CBW and missile programmes 
and that approximately 80 international bank branches were involved in the 
delivery of associated items and material.822 Some international actors 
participated knowingly, while others were unaware of the intended purpose of 
the transaction. Iraq’s procurement became more sophisticated over time. 
UNMOVIC also concluded that more 2000 engineers, managers, scientists and 
technicians were directly involved in Iraq’s CBW and missile programmes.823 
Of the NBC weapon types, Iraq first worked on CW when the Iraqi 
Chemical Corps in 1971 began operating a laboratory-scale facility for agent 
synthesis. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War CW precursors were imported 
through the State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP). Iraq declared 
having produced 3850 tonnes of sarin, sulphur mustard, tabun, VX in 1981-
91.824 The first indication of military interest in biological agents was reportedly 
expressed by the head of Iraq’s CW programme in 1983; by 1985, the causative 
agents for anthrax and botulinum toxin had been selected as prospective BW 
agents.825 UNMOVIC concluded that the acquisition of equipment, technology 
and material was ‘critical’ to Iraq’s CBW programme, that procurement 
verification was important to uncovering concealment efforts, that the 
introduction of export licensing ‘significantly slowed’ and ‘limited’ Iraq’s 
procurement activity prior to 1991 and that Iraq demonstrated an ability to 
circumvent trade restrictions by changing its procurement techniques.826 
 
National Intelligence Assessments and Their Application for Policymaking 
 
Various intelligence assessments on Iraqi CW capabilities and holdings were 
carried out with some urgency starting in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Major 
contributions to these assessments were provided by various states including 
Germany, Israel, the UK and the United States. Their findings—and the processes by 
which these assessments were conducted and used to inform and support policy—
represented a sort of institutional ‘baggage’ having potential political implications in 
terms of the legitimacy and authority of the institutions and their findings and the 
various preferred policy outcomes of the UN member states during the review, 
assessment and debates in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
822 ‘United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, note by the 
Secretary-General, Summary of the Compendium of Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes in 
the Chemical, Biological and Missile Areas’, UN document S/2005/420, 21 June 2006, para. 93, 
p. 30. 
823 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, note by the 
Secretary-General (note 822), para. 83, p. 28. 
824 UNMOVIC, ‘Annex, Overview of the Chemical Weapon Programme of Iraq’, UN 
document S/2006/342, para. 11, p. 8. 
825 UNMOVIC, ‘Appendix, Biological Weapons Programme of Iraq (extracted from the 
compendium summary)’, UN document S/2005/545, 2005, para. 4, p. 6. 
826 UNMOVIC, ‘Annex, Iraq’s Procurement for Its Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Programmes’, UN document S/2005/742, 2005, paras. 33–6, p. 17. 
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US Assessment of the Role of CW in the Iran-Iraq War 
 
Recently partially declassified US Government intelligence assessments are 
reviewed. 
A 1988 CIA assessment released in October 2012 states: 
‘Recent fighting in northwestern Iraq has underscored the regular, 
recurring use of chemical weapons to [?] the Iran-War war and suggests 
that such activity will continue to increase. Chemical attacks on either 
country’s major cities are unlikely under current circumstances, but the 
risk is growing that smaller population centers might be attacked with 
chemical weapons. If such attacks failed to evoke international sanctions, 
the chance of chemical strikes on larger cities would increase 
significantly. [blacked out text probably consisting of 1-3 words] The 
Iraqis have the largest stockpile of chemical weapons in the region, 
including mustard and nerve agents that can be delivered by air or 
artillery strikes. [blacked out text probably consisting of about 5 
lines.]’.827 
 
Under ‘battlefield use increasing’ the assesment continues: 
‘Baghdad and Tehran apparently believe chemical weapons are tactically 
useful and effective. The increasing availabilty of chemical munitions and 
experience in their use are likely to encourage both sides to employ 
chemicals more frequently and on a wider scale.’ [blacked out word, 
followed by blacked out paragraph of perhaps 10 lines].828 
Under ‘prospects for a chemical war in the cities’, the assessment 
continues: 
‘Neither side is likely to initiate a chemical war of the cities in the near 
term. There is no evidence that either Iran or Iraq has developed chemical 
warheads for Scud missiles, but that possibility cannot be ruled out. 
Baghdad’s success in developing chemical bombs and artillery shells 
suggests it could produce a crude chemical warhead for its Scuds, and 
Tehran might have obtained foreign assistance in producing chemical 
warheads for its surface-to-surface missiles. Each side has the capability 
to conduct chemical airstrikes against major cities [black out text of 
perhaps one or two words] A strategic breakthrough by Iran in the 
ground war would be the scenario most likely to drive Iraq to chemical 
attacks on Iran’s major cities. Such attacks might provoke Iran to 
retaliate in kind against Baghdada or Ka[?]rkuk [read: Kirkuk], but 
Tehran probably would refrain from doing so initially—hoping for 
widespread international condemnation of, and possible sanctions 
against, Iraq [blacked out text consisting perhaps of one to two words] 
                                                 
827 National Intelligence Daily, DCI, Special Analysis ‘Iran-Iraq: the Chemical Warfare 
Issue’, 5 Apr. 1988 (declassfied). Available at The National Security Archive (George 
Washington University), Ed. Malcolm Byrne, US-Iran: Lessons from an Earlier War, National 
Security Archive Briefing Book no. 364, 12 Oct. 2012, document 7, 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20121012/>, (accessed 15 Oct. 2012). 
828 National Intelligence Daily (note 827). 
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Iraq probably would use chemical weapons in a battle for a major Iraqi 
city such as Al Basrah or As Sulaymanlyah [spelling?] if Baghdad 
believed Iranian forces were on the verge of taking control. Unless 
residents were evacuated or fled, large numbers of civilians could become 
victims of chemical agents. [blacked out text of perhaps one to two words] 
In the near term, civilian chemical casualties probably will rise as a result 
of the gradual increase in the frequency and intensity of chemical attacks 
on smaller cities close to major battles or military targets’ [blacked out 
text consisting of perhaps four to five words]. 829 
The CIA analysis (at least the part that is declassified) does not make a 
determination on whether Iran has used chemical weapons or intends to use such 
weapons. 
 
US Intelligence Assessment in the Lead-up to the April 2003 Invasion 
 
In September 2002 the US produced a NIE on Iraq’s ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’ which later proved to contain inaccuracies, as well as underlying 
shortcomings in terms of the processes by which it was created. The US Senate 
Intelligence Committee later concluded that the NIE’s key judgements were 
either ‘overstated’ or were ‘not supported’ by the underlying intelligence. 
Arguments in support of the NIE included the fact that Iraq had used chemical 
weapons (i.e., it had shown a willingness to use at least one of the weapon types) 
and that the country had been generally obstructionist in its conduct with 
international arms inspectors. 
 
Curveball 
 
Curveball was the code name for an Iraqi national (Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-
Janabi, also known as Ahmed Hassan Mohammed) who defected to Germany in 
1999. He described to the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) mainly biological 
weapons work he said that Iraq was conducting. The BND shared this 
information with the United States, mainly through the DIA. Following the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, it soon became clear to those both within and outside 
governments that Curveball was the principal source830 of information for the 
mobile production units for biological warfare agents in Colin Powell’s February 
2003 presentation to the UN Security Council on Iraq’s prohibited weapons 
programmes and related activity (see below). 
Although the focus of Curveball’s information was on biological 
weapons, the intelligence assessment procedures are also relevant to chemical 
weapons. This is partly because of the fact that many of the biological and 
chemical weapon development, acquisition and stockpiling pathways are similar 
or overlap. 
                                                 
829 National Intelligence Daily (note 827). 
830 According to some sources, Curveball was the sole source for the BW trailers. Others cite 
3 sources for the BW trailers. It cannot be excluded there were additional sources. Another 
question is how to confirm what sources fed into a particular assessment. The fact that other 
sources in support for the same conclusion exist in the system should be noted.  
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The existence of the mobile production units was perhaps the most 
compelling single item of evidence in Powell’s presentation to support attacking 
Iraq. However, doubts about his reliability by the BND and others were not 
properly communicated in the US evaluation and decisionmaking process in the 
lead-in to the attack. Also there were perhaps at least three sources for the mobile 
BW lab sources. According to Drogin, these sources were: Curveball, an MI6 
informant codenamed Red River and Mohammed Harith (aka al-Assaf) (an Iraqi 
intelligence major who was introduced to US military intelligence by Ahmed 
Chalabi).831 The major was also apparently a source for Vanity Fair articles.832 
In February 2002 the Iraqi National Congress and Chalabi helped to arrange a 
meeting between the major and US military intelligence officials. He stated that 
he had personally conceived the idea of developing mobile BW production 
facilities.833 However, given Chalabi’s political ambitions, any sources 
connected to or associated with him have generally been considered to be 
suspec
eball file in September 2001 
ot because of the attacks on the United States).834 
Nature of Curveball’s Information 
r Iraq would employ a functioning grain and seed facility as a 
‘docki
also displayed a familiarity with the names of many of the Iraqi scientists and 
                                                
t. 
It is unclear if or when the BND monitored Curveball’s Internet habits. 
Doing so might have revealed a checking of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports 
and statements. The BND reportedly closed the Curv
(n
 
 
Curveball also said that he spoke often with Taha, the Iraqi microbiologist 
known as ‘Dr Germ’ who obtained her doctorate from the University of 
Birmingham.835 Curveball at first focused on describing plans for mobile BW 
production facilities.836 He told of a system consisting of 3 commercial trailer 
trucks: the first section comprised 1-2 fermenters, the second section was where 
mixing occurred, and the third was for storage or preparation of the slurries for 
filling into munitions.837 At one point, Curveball stated that he helped to design 
and test these trailers.838 He alleged that a facility at Djerf al Nadaf (southeast of 
Baghdad) was a docking/filling station for these trailers.839 This raised the 
question of whethe
ng station’. 
Curveball was aware of the temperature ranges for fermenters (which 
must be cooled, especially if operated in the heat of Iraqi weather).840 Curveball 
 
831 Bob Drogin, Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Man Behind Them, the Real Reason America 
Went to War in Iraq (Ebury Press: 2007), p. 148. 
832 Drogin (note 831), p. 148. 
833 Drogin (note 831), p. 121. 
834 Drogin (note 831), p. 99. 
835 Drogin (note 831), p. 50. Taha’s course of study in the UK helped to prompt the 
establishment of the ATAS programme. 
836 Drogin (note 831), p. 50. 
837 Drogin (note 831), pp. 51–52. 
838 Drogin (note 831), p. 50. 
839 Drogin (note 831), p. 55. 
840 Drogin (note 831), p. 56. 
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technicians, many of whom UNSCOM had already determined to possess al-
Hakam affiliations (a major BW facility).841 
During his first period of debriefings, Curveball’s accounts reportedly 
shrank, rather than grew—within intelligence and security circles this is often 
considered a poor indication of a source’s reliability.842 Information provided by 
defectors often tends to deteriorate because they are generally dependent on their 
hosts to provide them the means for livelihood or remaining in the country. As 
memories fail, the stories typically become more elaborate. For example, Volker 
Foertisch (a former head of BND counter-intelligence)843 stated that defectors: 
‘typically fear they lose value. They are very dependent people. So they 
begin to exaggerate, and tell you what you want to hear. They are totally 
dependent on the people they’re talking to for their future well-being. 
They want to please their masters. Psychologically, they have to do 
something to enhance their value. So they begin to stretch the truth’.844 
Drogin further describes how intelligence services must guard against 
their handlers’ becoming advocates for their sources or inadvertently interpreting 
questionable statements from defectors.845 Intelligence services should guard 
against blackmailers, provocateurs and swindlers.846 
The BND channeled Curveball reports to the US via the DIA.847 This may 
have been partly because of longstanding tensions between the BND and CIA 
dating to the Cold War. It was the DIA that gave the source the cover name 
‘CURVE BALL’, and the Germans subsequently adopted it.848 The DIA also 
designated him a ‘blue source’ meaning that Germany did not permit direct 
access.849 Germany informed the United States that the source disliked 
Americans and did not wish to speak to them.850 
CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) had procedures to validate human 
sources (i.e., to check if they lie), while CIA Directorate of Intelligence (DI) 
analysts at the time did not generally focus on human behaviour or 
psychology.851 Curveball’s blood was checked in May 2000 for anthrax 
antibodies with negative results.852 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
841 Drogin (note 831), p. 60. 
842 Drogin (note 831), p. 87. 
843 For news articles concerning Foertisch, see Der Spiegel, <http://www.spiegel.de/thema/ 
volker_foertsch/>, (accessed 9 July 2013). 
844 Drogin (note 831), pp. 23–24. 
845 Drogin (note 831), p. 24. 
846 Drogin (note 831), p. 24. 
847 Drogin (note 831), p. 32. 
848 Drogin (note 831), p. 34. 
849 Drogin (note 831), p. 35. 
850 Drogin (note 831), p. 36. 
851 Drogin (note 831), p. 136. 
852 Drogin (note 831), pp. 70 & 147. 
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Follow-up on Curveball’s Information 
 
In the lead up to the 2003 invasion, UNMOVIC did inspect mobile food testing 
laboratories.853 In early 2003 Iraq provided UNMOVIC with a summary of 
similar truck units used by the government, including refrigerated trucks for drug 
delivery, field hospitals, mobile labs for disease analysis, and mobile kitchens.854 
In February 2003 UNMOVIC inspected Djerf al Nadaf with negative results.855 
Inspectors found 3 trailers that contained seed processing equipment.856 Swabs 
were taken and later tested using RAPID-PCR for C. botulinum, B. anthracis, F. 
tularensis and Y. pestis with negative results.857 UNMOVIC sometimes found 
that suspected missiles were actually rotating steel drums for drying corn or 
poultry sheds.858 
Following the 2003 occupation of Iraq, the United States established the 
ISG to search for NBC and longer-range ballistic missiles in the country. Headed 
first by David Kay and then Charles A. Duelfer, the group operated in 2003-2005 
and was composed mostly of US nationals. Its missions were mainly jointly 
organized by the DOD and the CIA. The total cost of the ISG was said to be 
approximately 3 billion US dollars.859 
While the ISG was working (under David Kay) the CIA sent officials to 
watch Curveball being asked questions by German handlers.860 Ultimately it was 
unclear what Curveball did (based on his own statements). He may have obtained 
some of the details from the Internet (including UNSCOM and UNMOVIC 
statements and reports).861 Although he was hired by the Chemical Engineering 
and Design Center in Iraq, he was apparently fired in 1995 for unspecified sexual 
offenses.862 
Two trailers were found and initially suspected of being BW production 
units. The first was taken by Kurdish security conducting a road check in early 
April 2003 near Mosul.863 In May 2003, a US army patrol found a second one in 
a parking lot outside the gates of the Al Kindi State Company (a missile 
production facility).864 The trailer systems also lacked containment elements. 
The CIA later issued and put onto the Internet a report on the trailers. The CIA 
characterized them as mobile BW production units. The report was not initially 
issued in a classified version. Nor was a draft passed to other agencies in the US 
intelligence community for peer-review (as was the standard practice). This may 
have reflected partly the view in Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and 
Arms Control (WINPAC) that the trailers were in fact the ‘smoking gun’ of Iraqi 
                                                 
853 Drogin (note 831), p. 169. 
854 Drogin (note 831), p. 181. 
855 Drogin (note 831), pp. 167–168 & 170–177. 
856 Drogin (note 831), p. 175. 
857 Drogin (note 831), p. 176. 
858 Drogin (note 831), p. 169. 
859 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 80. 
860 Drogin (note 831), pp. 247–248. 
861 Drogin (note 831), p. 245. 
862 Drogin (note 831), p. 240. 
863 Drogin (note 831), p. 194. 
864 Drogin (note 831), p. 196. 
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WMD.865 The trailers were not connected to BW production. The WINPAC 
group focus on BW reportedly failed to validate Curveball’s reliability prior to 
the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.866 
 
2002 US Congressional Testimony 
 
The US Congress also held hearings to consider the status of Iraq’s weapon 
holdings, international disarmament obligations and intentions. For example, in 
September 2002 Adam B. Schiff (a Democratic Party representative of 
California) stated: 
‘You also made a point, though, that the intelligence is clear about a lot of 
what Saddam Hussein is doing; and I do want to express a note 
disappointment that some of my other colleagues have alluded to with the 
information that has been shared with Members of Congress. I have 
attended the classified and non-classified briefings; and many, many of us 
feel that there was much more information that we should be receiving 
[regarding Iraq’s WMD programmes, intentions and activity]’.867 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell responded: 
‘With respect to the most recent evidence, I don’t know that there is a 
single smoking most-recent gun, although people have been reading 
stories about the aluminum tubes that shows a continued intention on the 
part of Saddam Hussein to do it. But there are many other things that may 
be going on that we don’t know about, and we do know the intention still 
remains. So it is not just what we know, it is what we don’t know that may 
be going on, because there is someone determined to try to develop this 
kind of capability that we have to keep our eyes on’.868 
 
The aluminum tubing was generally characterized by US Administration 
officials as supporting the case that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons 
programme. These tubes had been intercepted by Jordan in 2001. However, they 
were, in all likelihood, meant to serve as part of 81 mm conventional rockets. 
Richard N. Perle—at the time a Resident Scholar at the American 
Enterprise Institute—stated in his prepared remarks before the House of 
Representatives: 
‘My own view is that with all that it is simply not possible to devise an 
inspection regime on territory controlled by Saddam Hussein that can be 
effective in locating, much less eliminating his weapons of mass 
destruction. In any case, the inspection regime known as Unmovic doesn’t 
even come close: Its size, organization, management and resources are all 
inadequate for the daunting task of inspecting a country the size of France 
                                                 
865 The CIA group was, according to Drogin, sometimes referred to as the ‘geek squad’. 
866 Drogin (note 831), pp. 64–65 & 130. 
867 US Policy Toward Iraq: Administration Views, Hearings before the Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, Second Session, serial no. 
107-117 (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 19 Sep. 2002), p. 46. 
868 US Policy Toward Iraq: Administration Views (note 867), p. 47. 
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against Saddam’s determined program of concealment, deception and 
lying. 
We know, Mr. Chairman, that Saddam lies about his program to acquire 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. We know he goes to great 
lengths to conceal his activities. We know that he has used the years 
during which no inspectors were in Iraq to move everything of interest, 
with the result that the data base [i.e., information baseline] we once 
possessed, inadequate though it was, has been destroyed. We know all of 
this yet I sometimes think there are those at the United Nations who treat 
the issue not as a matter of life and death, but rather more like an episode 
of “Where in the World is Carmen San Diego [a US television learning 
programme for children]”, or an Easter egg hunt on a sunny Sunday’.869 
In January 2003 Senator Sam Brownback (a Republican Party 
representative of Kansas) asked Depty Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage: 
‘There is an article in the New York Times today talking about large 
convoys moving out of Iraq into Syria. And I guess—I am just going to 
read you this instance—or report. “For instance, the Administration today 
was still debating the credibility of intelligence about a Christmas time 
Iraqi truck convoy that some Americans analysts say could have been 
transporting weapons of mass destruction or scientists to Syria where they 
would be safely out of the United Nations inspectors’ view.” Do you have 
any either further illumination you could give us about what we know 
about movement of weapons of mass destruction out of Iraq, if you can 
identify it?’870 
Armitage responded: 
‘I would—Senator Brownback, I would say that there has been a debate in 
the administration, as I know it, in the intelligence communities, about 
how much we know about other countries perhaps receiving such things 
as missiles. I do not think—particularly, I do not think we know the 
definitive [object missing]. I saw the report you referred to, and I have 
seen other reports, and I cannot give you a level of credibility on other 
reports as to whether missiles are in other countries. Those countries to 
whom—who we have approached on this with our suspicions have 
vehemently denied, but—that is what they have done. So I cannot comment 
further’.871 
Armitage’s uncertain and rather ambiguous response almost certainly 
reflects a desire to say nothing that was factually incorrect. The phrasing of his 
response might have also reflected uncertainty or lack of knowledge of the 
                                                 
869 US Policy Toward Iraq: Administration Views (note 867), p. 9. 
870 The January 27 UNMOVIC and IAEA Reports to the UN Security Council on Inspections 
in Iraq, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 108th 
Congress, first session, (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 30 Jan. 2003), p. 34. 
871 The January 27 UNMOVIC and IAEA Reports to the UN Security Council on Inspections 
in Iraq (note 870), p. 34. 
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relevant information, a desire not to reveal intelligence sources and methods, 
and/or a wish to avoid politically awkward characterizations. 
 
The UK’s September 2002 Dossier 
 
The UK’s September dossier was heavily cited, including by US officials, to 
support the case for war. In particular, it was the source for the assertion that Iraq 
was capable of deploying WMD within 45 minutes. This time estimate is 
mentioned in four places: 
1. ‘Saddam has used chemical weapons, not only against an enemy state, 
but against his own people. Intelligence reports make clear that he sees 
the building of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would 
use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular his 
goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military 
planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an 
order to use them’.872 
2. ‘As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: ….military plans 
for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own 
Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes 
of an order to use them’.873 
3. ‘Iraq’s military forces are able to use chemical and biological 
weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place. 
The Iraq military are able to deploy these weapons within 45 minutes of a 
decision to do so’.874 
4. ‘Saddam’s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons: 
intelligence indicates that as part of Iraq’s military planning Saddam is 
willing to use chemical and biological weapons, including against his own 
Shia population. Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to 
deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to 
do so’.875 
The time estimate was later discredited as a politically-motivated phrasing 
inserted by a Blair advisor to help strengthen a sense of urgency among British 
officials and the public that it was necessary to deal with Iraq by ejecting Saddam 
Hussein from power using military force. 
 
Powell’s 5 February 2003 Presentation to the UN Security Council 
 
On 5 February 2003 US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell argued in a 
presentation to the UN Security Council that Iraq was continuing to pursue its 
WMD programmes and activities. His purpose was to provide an arms control 
                                                 
872 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (note 
803), pp. 3–4. 
873 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (note 
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874 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (note 
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verification-based rationale for the US Administration’s argument that Saddam 
Hussein should be militarily overthrown. 
With regard to CW, Powell stated Iraq had never properly accounted for 
precursors, agents and munitions including: (a) 550 sulphur mustard-filled 
artillery shells, (b) 30 000 unfilled munitions, and (c) precursor chemicals 
sufficient to manufacture up to 500 tonnes of CW agents,876 and (d) up to 6500 
unaccounted for bombs from the Iran-Iraq War. Powell also observed that Iraq 
had not admitted to producing four tonnes of VX and still denied weaponizing 
the agent (in spite of sampling and analysis results suggesting that such 
weaponization had occurred).877 Powell accused Iraq of embedding CW capacity 
in its civilian industry. He also cited May 2002 overhead imagery—referring to a 
slide in his presentation—that indicated cargo vehicle activity ‘accompanied by a 
decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons 
activity’ that was corroborated by a human intelligence source.878 
In addition to the BW trailer information (subsequently shown to be non-
BW related), Powell briefed the Council on recorded conversations of Iraqi 
officials purportedly discussing and issuing instructions for the removal of 
evidence of nerve agent possession.879 Part of the translated transcript states: 
‘Nerve agents. Stop talking about it. They are listening to us. Don’t give any 
evidence that we have these horrible agents’.880 
Blix later observed that, as he watched Powell’s presentation, the 
provenance of the tapes should be reviewed by UNMOVIC including who and 
how they had been provided to the US Government.881 
Blix also later argued that reasons for the intelligence shortcomings on 
Iraq included: (a) the United States placed too much reliance of information 
provided by defectors over the information collected and analysed by UNSCOM 
and UNMOVIC, (b) UN inspection reporting tended to be couched in cautious, 
legalistic language that officials in the US administration tended to ‘misread’ and 
to use to support ‘preconceived convictions’, and (c) a feeling of contempt by US 
Vice President Richard Bruce ‘Dick’ Cheney and many in the leadership of the 
DOD for international inspections.882 
 
Step 5. Draw Tentative Conclusions About the Relative Likelihood of 
Each Hypothesis 
 
Because this is a hindsight exercise, the relative likelihood of the 2 main 
hypotheses (i.e., Iraq possessed a CW stockpile in the lead up to the 2003 
invasion—yes or no) can be approached in terms of the intelligence failure 
analyses. The stockpiling matrix provides a common baseline for the 
                                                 
876 Powell did not specify the type of tonne (e.g., metric, long, short). 
877 Transcript of Powell’s UN Presentation, ‘Part 6: Chemical Weapons’, CNN.com, posted 5 
Feb. 2013, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.06/index.html>, 
(accessed 13 Aug. 2013). 
878 Transcript of Powell’s UN Presentation (note 877). 
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882 Blix (note 337), p. 261. 
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identification of cognitive biases and ensuring a manageable ‘audit trail’ in the 
qualitative argument mapping hybrid application of ACH. 
Numerous ‘intelligence failure’ investigations—much of it touching on 
intelligence methodology and the avoidance of cognitive biases—have been 
carried out (see Table 13.2). 
The UNMOVIC verification findings were presented in language that 
focused on statements of fact and degrees of uncertainty associated with 
unresolved arms control verification issues. Some of these issues were inherently 
unresolvable and devolved into more philosophical discussions on standards of 
proof, knowability, and what conclusions could be drawn from ambiguous 
information or the absence of ‘proof’. 
The deliberate (as opposed to inadvertent) misinterpretation of intelligence to 
support politically preferred outcomes cannot be absolutely demonstrated or 
determined in hindsight. 
 
Table 13.2 Iraqi CBRN Weapons and Ballistic Missiles Pre-2003 Intelligence Investigations. 
 
Inquiry  
 
Australia 
-Report on the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies (Flood Report)(Australia, 2004) 
<http://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013). 
 
Netherlands 
-Davids Commission Report (2010), <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/rapporten/2010/01/12/rapport-commissie-davids.html> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013). 
 
United Kingdom 
-Iraq Inquiry (‘Chilcot inquiry’) 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013). 
-Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Net Assessment (IISS: London, 9 Sep. 2002). 
-Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Assessment of the British Government (24 Sep. 2002) 
<http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/cover.htm> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013). 
-Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Butler Report) (July 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/14_07_04_butler.pdf> (accessed 8 Aug. 2013). 
 
United States 
-Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs (Oct. 2002) 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd/Iraq_Oct_2002.htm> (accessed 8 Aug. 
2013). 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
An underlying assumption behind much of the debate regarding the 
reliability of mainly Western intelligence on Iraq is that the political decision to 
invade would not have been taken had intelligence assessments more clearly 
stated that Iraq likely did not possess CBRN weapons and ballistic missiles.883 
The key CW failure of the 2002 NIE was the assessment that Iraq had 
resumed production of sulphur mustard, cyclosarin, sarin and VX and that the 
country possessed a CW stockpile totalling 100-500 tonnes.884 Thomas Fingar 
summarizes the principal hindsight failures associated with the NIE (see Table 
13.3). 
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Table 13.3 Main points from 2002 NIE that ought to have raised ‘red flags’. 
 
‘We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs’. 
‘We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programms’. 
‘We assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any’. 
‘We assess that Baghdad has begun renewed production of mustard, sarin…’. 
‘Although we have little specific information on Iraq’s CW stockpile….’. 
‘We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents….’. 
‘We have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD’. 
Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or 
CBW against the United States….’. 
‘INR’s alternate view of Iraq’s nuclear program….’. 
‘The Air Force view that Iraq was developing UAVs primarily for its reconnaissance, not for delivery of 
CBW agents….’. 
 
Source: Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford 
Security Studies, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2011), p. 105. Italicized text as 
provided by Fingar. 
Robert M. Clark faults the 2002 NIE on the following grounds: 
(a) poor problem definition, 
(b) poor evaluation of sources and evidence, 
(c) failure to consider alternate target models, 
(d) poor analytic methodogy, and 
(e) poor interaction with collectors and customers.885 
 
The problem definition was essentially one of fitting all available 
information into a WMD model often on short notice.886 Clark argues that the 
problem definition should have instead included input from economic, military, 
and political specialists not focused on the WMD model. While the US Air Force 
raised doubts as to whether the drones/UAV work was meant to deliver 
biological (and possibly chemical) warfare agents, they were not pursued by the 
intelligence community further.887 The air force did not, in fact, concur that the 
Iraqi drones in question were meant to deliver chemical or biological warfare 
agents.888 With respect to poor evaluation in generating the CW component of 
the NIE, Clark observes: 
‘Analysts relied heavily on imagery showing the presence of “Samarra 
type” tanker trucks at suspected chemical weapons (CW) facilities. The 
distinctive trucks had been associated with CW shipments in the 1980s 
and during the Gulf War. Analysts also believed that they were seeing 
increased Samarra truck activity at the sites. They apparently did not 
consider an alternative hypothesis—that the trucks might be used for 
other purposes, as turned out to be the case. And they failed to recognize 
that the more frequent[ly] observed activity of the trucks was an artifact 
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of increased imagery collection (122, 125). The trucks were simply 
observed more often because of more imagery reporting’.889 
In addition, a number of CBW human sources were suspect. One was an 
Iraqi chemist half of whose reporting was ‘absurd’.890 This source was used by 
US intelligence to conclude that Iraq had stabilized VX.891 Another human 
source stated that Iraq was producing sulphur mustard and binary nerve agents. 
But because he also reported on purported nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles and 
biological weapons developments, this should have led US intelligence to 
conclude that this source was not likely to have had access to all these 
programmes in view Iraqi security compartmentalization.892 
With respect to the failure by US intelligence to consider alternate target 
models, Clark emphasizes that alternate purposes of Iraq’s UAVs/drones should 
have been considered, and that, using Occam’s razor, analysts should have 
considered the possibility that the reason why they could not find mobile BW 
labs was because they did not exist.893 
Fingar states that the key part of the 2002 NIE (in both classified and 
unclassified versions) should have read: 
‘We judge that Iraq is reconstituting its WMD capabilities but do not 
know tthat it has done so and do not know with certainty or specificity how 
much has been reconstituted or how long it will take to complete the 
process’.894 
With respect to poor analytic methodology, Clark states that US analysts 
relied excessively on a ‘straight line’ historical extrapolation of Iraq’s WMD 
programmes and activity.895 
Finally, with respect to poor interaction with collectors and customers, 
Clark observes that analysts did not share with collectors the extent to which they 
relied on particular sources, including the above-mentioned Iraqi chemist.896 
Similarly, the customers not infrequently held the erroneous view that the 
reporting was based on more reliable sources.897 
Arguably the corollary to ‘the politicization’ of national intelligence 
estimates is the question of whether the arms control verification results of a UN-
type body can or should be understood as ‘stand alone’ findings or are 
susceptible (appropriately or inappropriately) for being employed as a ‘means to 
an end’. In this regard, Elbaradei recalls his understanding of US Administration 
views of international verification and inspection activity in the lead-up to the 
April 2003 invastion. 
                                                 
889 Clark (note 29), p. 317. 
890 Clark (note 29), p. 318. 
891 Clark (note 29), p. 318. 
892 Clark (note 29), p. 318. 
893 Clark (note 29), p. 318. 
894 Fingar (note 25), p. 105. 
895 Clark (note 29), pp. 318–319. 
896 Clark (note 29), p. 319. 
897 Clark (note 29), p. 319. 
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‘A few weeks later, with negotiations on the resolution still underway, Blix 
and I were called to a short courtesy meeting at the White House. On our 
way to meet President Bush, we had our first encounter with Vice 
President Dick Cheney. It was brief; Cheney was sitting behind his desk. 
Cheney wasted no time on small talk; he had a direct, simple message to 
convey. “The US is ready to work with the United Nations inspectors,” he 
told us, “but we are also ready to discredit the inspections in order to 
disarm Iraq.”’898 
‘Having received this warning, we proceeded to our meeting with Bush. 
Other than Condoleeza Rice and Bush’s chief of staff, Blix and I were the 
only audience. In what was more or less a monologue, Bush got right to 
the point. He asserted that he was in favor of using inspections to address 
Iraq’s WMD issues, that he would prefer a peaceful resolution of the 
international concerns about Saddam Hussein’s regime. “I’m not a 
trigger-happy Texas cowboy, with six-guns,” he quipped, sliding forward 
on his armchair, hands on his hips, to show us how a cowboy would pull 
out his pistols. On the other hand, he countered, if peaceful approaches 
were unsuccessful, he would not hesitate to lead a “coalition of the 
willing,” using military force.’899 
‘Together with our exchange with Cheney, the encounter told us clearly 
that the US administration viewed us as bit players in an operation they 
intended to control’.900 
In May 2003 Paul Wolfowitz stated that the attack on Iraq on the basis of 
WMD possession was done for bureaucratic reasons: ‘The truth is that for 
reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy we settle on 
the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass 
destruction as the core reason [for attacking Iraq]’.901 
 
Step 6. Analyze Sensitivity of Conclusions 
 
The critical items of evidence include: (a) availability of munitions, (b) 
documentation of production and (c) leadership intentions. The sensitivity of the 
conclusions to these few critical items of evidence can include: (a) ensuring that 
technical means for determining the availability of munitions does not reflect 
changes in verification methodology (e.g., increased collection or frequency of 
collection), (b) developing indicators that assist in determining whether 
documentation adequately reflects actual policy, capacities and intentions (e.g., it 
does not tell the leaderhip what it wishes to hear) and (c) actual Iraqi motivations. 
                                                 
898 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 53. 
899 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 53. 
900 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 53. 
901 US DOD, ‘Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair’, 9 
May 2003, News Transcript, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx? 
transcriptid=2594>, (accessed 13 Aug. 2013). 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES   203      
Post-invasion reactions regarding WMD capabilities, holdings and 
intentions include the following. 
General Amir al-Sa’adi speaking into camera of the German television 
station ZDF as he surrended to coalition forces on 12 April 2003 stated ‘We have 
no weapons of mass destruction, and time will bear me out’.902 
An Arabic speaking FBI agent, George Piro, interviewed Saddam 
Hussein. New York Times correspondent Tim Weiner says that six days into 
Hussein’s debriefing, Piro asked about the chemical and biological weapons and 
that Hussein responded: ‘We destroyed them. We told you. By God, if I had such 
weapons, I would have used them in the fight against the United States’.903 
According to the last UNSCOM chairman, stated that Tariq Aziz told him 
in private: ‘Of course we made biological weapons’.904 In public, however, Iraqi 
officials could not say this because such weapons were to be used against ‘the 
Persians and the Jews’.905 
 
Step 7. Report Conclusions 
 
The main conclusion is to keep separate the technical aspects of arms control 
verification and intelligence assessments from the higher-level political and 
strategic considerations.  
 
Step 8. Identify Milestones 
 
Milestones for future observation include cross-checking established conclusions 
and understandings against unprocessed archival materials with a view towards 
identifying cognitive biases, including through the consideration of counter-
intuitive, possibly ad hoc nature of Iraqi decisionmaking and implementation 
practice. 
 
13.5. Implications 
 
Lessons from the US Iraq intelligence failure include the fact that no ‘judgement’ 
from prior analyses should be assumed to remain valid, but must be reexamined 
and revalidated for each subsequent intelligence assessment (including NIEs).906 
‘Zero-based’ reviews must also taken into account whether new information has 
become available and whether it is consistent, corroborates, confirms, etc. the 
previous information.907 In particular, does the new information make alternate 
hypotheses more or less plausible?908 For example, increased activity at Iraqi 
CW facilities may reflect an increase of overhead imagery collection.909 As a 
                                                 
902 Elbaradei (note 300), p. 5. 
903 Weiner (note 350), p. 431. 
904 US Public Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Interview, Richard Butler’, Frontline, Oct. 2001, 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/butler.html>, (accessed 4 
Nov. 2013). 
905 US Public Broadcasting Corporation (note 904). 
906 Fingar (note 25), p. 82. 
907 Fingar (note 25), p. 83. 
908 Fingar (note 25), p. 83. 
909 Report of the Commission, p. 125. Cited in Clark (note 29), p. 128. 
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result of the US assessment on Iraq, George Tenet introduced a requirement that 
the head of an intelligence agency or designee must affirm the validity of the 
sources by signing a formal letter.910 
As a result of the various inquiries into whether Iraq had CBRN weapons 
or ballistic missiles prior to the 2003 Iraq War, it is now clear that Iraq 
unilaterally destroyed its CW already starting in 1991 without inviting 
international inspectors to observe their full destruction (itself a violation). It 
should also be noted that old CW munitions continued to be recovered in 
following years, including by the US-led coalition forces that invaded Iraq in 
2003. Iraq did, however, attempt to retain as much of its CW infrastructure as 
possible (it also attempted retain some key items of nuclear weapons and ballistic 
missile equipment). Iraq was also allowed to retain research facilities and 
technical experts were not required to change fields.911 
An inadequate understanding by many Western intelligence analysts of 
Iraq’s chemical infrastructure and the political culture of its government, 
institutions and people also existed. Mirroring was instead employed (implicitly 
or explicitly) to fill these and similar gaps. 
Hindsight for this case study is irrelevant. The key question is what 
reasonable inferences could have been drawn from the information available at 
the time.912 Worst-case scenario planning combined with a strong political 
preference or intention to invade Iraq occurred. 
The manner in which technical evaluations are understood and 
incorportated at the higher political and strategic level suggests a dual-dichotomy 
consisting of multilateral arms control verification being understood, structured 
and used in a manner that supports and explains aspects of neoliberal 
institutionalism IR theory, while the manner by which national intelligence is 
understood, structured and used is focused national security priorities that (in 
turn) explain and support aspects of realist IR theory. In this manner, a linkage 
can be elucidated between operational techniques, principles and practice on the 
one hand and theoretical principles and explanation at the strategic level. Further 
implications for strategic analysis and IR theory are provided in Chapter 15. 
 
                                                 
910 Fingar (note 25), p. 83. 
911 The Iraq Inquiry (‘Chilcot inquiry’), ‘Dr Hans Blix transcript’, uncorrected, p. 5, 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/48849/20100727pm-blix.pdf>, (accessed 18 July 2013). 
912 I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this point. 
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14 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY: NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
 
euer’s 8 Steps are presented in the context of non-state actor CW threats 
posed by so-called militant Islamists. Background is provided which is 
structured according to Table 10.1 as part of Step 2 (also reproduced 
below as Table 14.1). This is a hybrid, argument-mapping CW application. 
 
H 
14.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides context to the CW non-state actor threat with a focus on 
so-called Islamists. The particular case is the alleged VX production at the al-
Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan which the United States destroyed in 1998 
with cruise missiles (Operation Infinite Reach). 
 
14.1.1. Target of Analysis Definitions 
 
Non-state actors in this case are understood to mean Islamist non-state actors. 
Islamism has been defined as a ‘highly politicized version of Islam which 
maintains that Islam is in a state of conflict with the West, non-Muslims, and 
other Muslims who are seen to be insufficiently pious by Islamist ideologues’.913 
Ibrahim Karawan makes the following distinctions regarding terminology 
of militants motivated by Islam. He cautions that ‘Islamic’, ‘Islamist’ and 
‘violent groups’ are distinct from each other.914 ‘Islamic’ groups often focus on 
individual redemption, while ‘Islamist’ groups emphasize obtaining political 
power.915 Karawan categorizes militant Islamic groups (MIGs) as a subset of 
Islamists. MIGs seek to ‘eradicate existing state structures via a combative 
insurrectional approach’.916 
Various ‘Islamic arguments’ may contradict each other. Karawan believes 
that such arguments should instead be viewed more in terms of how they are 
used to reflect tensions inherent to a ‘colonial setting’ or ethnic conflict.917 He 
also argues that MIG violence ‘reflects a strong sense of urgency, emergency, 
                                                 
913 Kunal Mukherjee, ‘British Universities and Islamism’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 30, no. 
1 (2011), p. 60. 
914 Ibrahim Karawan, ‘Militant Islamist Groups (MIGs): Their Motives and Mindsets’, p. 53 
in Ed. R. Ragaini, International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies 29th 
Session (‘E. Majorana’ Centre for Scientific Culture: World Scientific: London, 2003). 
Conference proceedings; Erice, Italy; 10-15 May 2003. 
915 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
916 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
917 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
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and immediacy to act in a confrontational manner within a setting marked by 
cultural, political and economic inequality and marginalization’.918 
Further distinctions may result from Arab versus non-Arab differences or 
dichotomies, as well as ‘AQ central’ versus ‘AQ regional’ groupings. Indonesian 
Islamic variations are generally distinct (localized and regional) from those found 
in the Arabian Peninsula (e.g., a general absence of Wahhabism and Salafism). 
Taliban are distinct from al-Qaeda. For example, the British fought black-
turbined talib (students) in the 19th century.919 Pashtun codes of conduct 
(Pashtunwali) may also vary from some Islamic prescriptions or ‘standard’ 
practice. Prescribed codes of hospitality (e.g., the protection of guests—even if 
they are enemies of the group, family or individual) and blood feuds may 
originate more from tribal codes of behaviour than from Islam per se. 
Akbar Ahmed, a former Pakistani political officer to Waziristan and 
currently a Professor at American University, emphasizes the dichotomy between 
an urbanized, often Westernized and repressive centre versus a periphery 
characterized by tribal customs as more important to understanding current 
discussions on Islamic-inspired threats, the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and 
the like.920 In his recent book, however, Ahmed fails to address directly whether 
and how blood feuds or the treatment of women according to tribal codes of 
conduct should be accommodated or opposed as part of efforts by ‘the centre’ 
(and international institutions and process more generally) to engage with ‘the 
periphery’ in a respectful and constructive manner. In addition, the dichotomy 
between ‘the centre’ and ‘the periphery’ characterization implies distinctiveness 
in approaches and understanding to strategies of Jihad—violent and non-
violent—according to region (e.g., in Afghanistan, Europe, the Horn of Africa, 
the Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula). Jihad, for example, may be understood to 
be an internal, personal struggle to achieve a better understanding and practice of 
Islam. In addition, among believers, the term (and concept) of Jihad generally 
lacks any negative connotation as it often does in Western states. Such 
distinctions have often been ignored or minimized in the GWOT-conceptualized 
policy framework of the US Administration of George W. Bush. 
Scott Atran approaches the subject of Islamic-inspired violence as an 
anthropologist with field interview experience. He has also worked with US 
terrorist analysts and academics (e.g., the noted psychiatrist and former CIA case 
officer Marc Sageman). To a great extent, Atran views the Jihadi, Islamicist-
inspired violence as a function of small-group dynamics of young people who 
enjoy close and overlapping networks of family, friends, schoolmates, work 
collegues and sports teammates (usually football/soccer).921 They tend to possess 
a mix of attractions and hatreds of Western-dominated culture and norms. As 
they become older, their impulse towards violence tends to lessen. 
Laurent Murawiec views the current Islamic-inspired violence as a 
phenomenon that shares characteristics with revolutionary, gnostic 
                                                 
918 Karawan (note 914), p. 54. 
919 For a fundamental study of the Afghan campaigns, see John William Kaye, History of the 
War in Afghanistan, 2 vols. (Richard Bentley: London, 1851). The study was reissued in 1857 
in 3 vols. 
920 Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a 
Global War on Tribal Islam (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC, 2013). 
921 Atran (note 314), p. 48. 
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millenarianism that is informed by Western nihilism and exhibits certain Leninist 
qualities. He argues that this combination of characteristics is discernable in 
strains of militant Wahhabist and Salafist interpretations of Islam. This implies 
that the present-day violent Jihadi-inspired terrorism owes some of its 
background and virulence to 19th and 20th century anarchist movements.922 
Such an outlook encompasses a binary mentality of being ‘for’ or 
‘against’/‘good’ or ‘evil’, an expectation to subsume personal wishes to those of 
the communal (i.e., Islam’s Ummah) common good—as prescribed by an 
established orthodoxy, and a desire to eliminate mental resistance or deviation—
both in terms of behaviour and thought (e.g., to ‘own the souls’ and to determine 
the thought processes and views of all members of the community).923 
                                                
Arthur Koestler, an author and social commentator who witnessed many 
upheavals of the inter-World War period and knew many of the principals 
involved, famously left the Communist Party disillusioned. He argued that in 
becoming a Marxist, one joins an ‘intellectually closed system’ not unlike 
orthodox Freudianism or Catholicism. The closed system aims to explain all 
phenomena and to provide prescriptions for all human needs. Such a system 
possesses ‘elastic defences’ to counteract newly-observed facts and deprives its 
members of their willingness and ability to think critically.924 He argues that, in 
closed systems, facts are deprived of value through ‘scholastic processing’ and 
objections are invalidated by questioning the psychological motive ostensibly 
behind them. Koestler’s observations in this regard are worth expanding.925 This 
 
 
922 Laurent Murawiec, The Mind of Jihad (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 
2008). Murawiec (d. 2009) was a French neoconservative formerly affiliated with the Hudson 
Institute and the RAND Corporation. 
923 Ali A. Allawi, a former Minister of Defence and Minister of Finance in the post-Saddam 
Government who then became a senior fellow at Princeton University, cautions that the term 
ummah is more nuanced than ‘a grouping of people’ by stating that the Koran refers to 
Abraham as being an ummah in and of himself. Ali A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilization 
(Yale University Press: New Haven, Connect., 2009), p. 12. 
924 Arthur Koestler, Arrow in the Blue: an Autobiography (Collins with Hamish Hamilton, 
Ltd.: London and Glascow, 1952), pp. 230–231. 
925 Koestler states: ‘Within the closed system of Freudian thought you cannot, for instance, 
argue that for certain reasons you doubt the existence of the so-called castration complex. The 
immediate answer will be that your arguments are rationalisations of an unconscious resistance 
which betrays that you yourself have such a complex. You are caught in a vicious circle from 
which there is no logical escape. Similarly, if you are a Marxist and if you claim that Lenin’s 
order to march on Warsaw in 1920 was a mistake, it will be explained to you that you ought not 
to trust your own judgment because it is distorted by vestiges of your former petit-bourgeois 
class-consciousness’.  He further argues ‘The absence of objectivity in debate is many times 
compensated by its fervour. The disciple receives a thorough indoctrination, and an equally 
thorough training in the system’s particular method of reasoning. As a result of this training, he 
acquires a technique of argumentation which is mostly superior to that of any opponent from the 
outside. He is thoroughly acquainted with the great debates of the past between the apostles and 
the unbelievers; he is acquainted with the history of heresies and schisms; he knows the classic 
controversies between Jansenites and Jesuits, between Freud and Jung, between Lenin and 
Kautsky. Thus he recognises at once the type and attitude of his opponent, is able to classify the 
latter’s objections according to familiar categories; knows the questions and answers as though 
they were the opening variants of a chess game. The trained, “close-minded” theologian, 
psychoanalyst, or Marxist can at any time make mincemeat of his “open-minded” adversary and 
thus prove the superiority of his system to the world and to himself. This superiority enables the 
initiate of the closed system to display a patient tolerance towards the outsider. In discussion 
with pagans, patients and bourgeois reactionaries, he is calm, paternal and impressive. His 
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is because while the specifics of the philosophical, religious or political argument 
may vary, a certain underlying human inclination or behaviour may remain that 
helps to inform consideration of current non-state actor threats to international 
peace and security.926 
Some researchers and observers have argued that Islam arrogates to itself 
an expansionist exclusivity which presumes that all people will eventually adhere 
to the religion or must be subjected to secondary citizen (dhimmi) status. The 
presumption that Islam will eventually become the world’s sole religion—along 
with death to any apostates—implies that Islam is uniquely inclined to a form of 
exceptionalism and violence. 
Bernard Lewis, who enjoyed a certain political prominence as an informal 
advisor to members of the George W. Bush Administration following the 11 
September 2001 attacks, has long considered such concerns which are partly 
based on his research in Ottoman Empire archives and how the empire interacted 
with European powers.927 A somewhat parallel set of discussions have developed 
regarding the extent to which Islamic societies have been able and willing to 
adopt and to develop science and technology, and are able to access and to utilise 
the necessary knowledge base.928 ‘Periodization’ of history in traditional Islamic 
understandings is distinct from Western concepts of modernity, progress and 
positivist policy prescriptions. In particular, orthodox Islam tends to reject 
notions of ‘progress’ in cases where the latter are understood to be ‘superior’ to 
various early Islamic societies. In such cases, progress is instead often 
understood to mean a return to basic Islamic societal, cultural or religious norms. 
The positivist, neo-liberal character of the contemporary international 
system places a set of constraints and expectations on all states that is 
significantly shaped by economic development theory and practice (e.g., the 
behaviour and standards of multinational corporations and civil society, and 
various notions of modernity and progress). Thus a perceived historical-based 
‘backwardness’ of some states or societies may be partly explained by their 
affinity with or willingness to engage fully in the international system.929 
There has also been some consideration of whether a form of European 
Islamic ‘exceptionalism’ can or should develop in the sense that European 
                                                                                                                                               
superiority, his self-assurance, the radiance of his sincere belief, create a peculiar relationship 
between the guru and the pupil, between confessor and penitent, analyst and patient, between 
the militant Party member and the fascinated sympathiser, the admiring fellow-traveller’. 
Koestler (note 924), pp. 231–232. 
926 E.g., Koestler’s observations can usefully be compared (with respect to closed and open 
system thought processes) to Leopold Weiss’ autobiography (Road to Mecca). Weiss (b. 1900, 
d. 1992), an Austro-Hungarian Jew who converted to Islam, was a noted scholar and former 
Pakistani envoy to the UN. Upon his conversion he changed his name to Mohammad Asad. See 
Mohammad Asad, Vägen till Mecka [Road to Mecca] (Bonniers: Stockholm, 1956). 
927 See, for e.g., Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: the Clash Between Islam and Modernity 
in the Middle East (HarperCollins: New York City, 2002). 
928 In addition to the works of Bernard Lewis, see also Moustapha Safouan, Why Are the 
Arabs Not Free?—The Politics of Writing (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2007); and Timur 
Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2011). Safouan is a Paris-based psychoanalyst whose 
family orginated from Egypt. His father was a communist. Kuran is a Professor of economics 
and political science at Duke University. 
929 An issue of continuing relevance is reconciling the Islamic prohibition against the earning 
of interest with how international financial markets operate. 
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Muslims accept and support societal rights and obligations as a cultural and 
religious minority in a secularized broader community (e.g., to act as ‘good 
citizens’ in a manner whereby they are respectful towards and supportive of 
broader societal norms and where the broader society reciprocates 
appropriately).930 
Regarding the structure and type of al Qaeda actors, Anne Stenersen of 
FFI has adapted Bruce Hoffman’s ‘layers’ of AQ networks according to: (a) AQ 
central (i.e., Usama bin Ladin and his close circle),931 (b) AQ affiliates 
(regionally based groups), (c) AQ locals and (d) AQ sympathizers.932 It is also 
worth recalling Cronin’s observation that ‘Terrorist leaders are all amateur 
historians: historical irrelevance is the death knell of any [such] group’.933 
Finally, the difficulty of defining and applying a definition of ‘terrorism’ 
should be noted. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which forms the 
basis of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, does not define 
the term. Nor does UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which is meant 
to ensure effective and universal implementation of measures to prevent the 
proliferation of WMD. In fact, throughout its existence, the UN has been unable 
to agree a definition of terrorism despite numerous attempts. 
The US Code defines ‘international terrorism’ as: 
‘(1) the term “international terrorism” means activities that—  
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or 
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction 
of the United States or of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and  
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by 
which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to 
intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate 
or seek asylum’.934 
                                                 
930 Cédric Baylocq, ‘The Autonomisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe: Da‘Wa, 
Mixité and Non-Muslims’, pp.  149–168 in Eds. Roel Meijer and Edwin Bakker, The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Europe (Hurst & Co.: London, 2012). 
931 Bin Ladin was killed by US special forces on 2 May 2011 at a private home in 
Abbottabad, Pakistan (code named: Operation Neptune Spear). His death has presumably left 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian-born physician, as the commander of AQ. 
932 Stenersen (note 209), p. 2. 
933 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of 
Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2009), p. 105. 
934 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, <http://www.law.cornell.edu 
/uscode/text/18/2331>, (accessed 14 Aug. 2013). 
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The US Code defines ‘domestic terrorism’ as: 
‘(5)  the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that—  
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State;  
(B) appear to be intended—  
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;  
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or  
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States’.935 
Ekaterina Stepanova, of Moscow’s Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations (IMEMO), has defined terrorism as: ‘the intentional use 
or threat to use violence against civilians and non-combatants by a non-state 
(trans- or sub-national) actor in an asymmetrical confrontation in order to achieve 
political goals’.936 
In practice, however, states and analysts can (and do) dispute what 
constitutes an act of terrorism or whether a particular person or group should be 
considered to be a terrorist. Some officials, observers and analysts are concerned 
that the terrorism label not be applied to those holding political grievances as a 
means to delegitimize them (including internationally). As has been frequently 
noted, asymmetries in force capabilities sometimes result in individuals and 
groups resorting to non-standard forms of violence, including suicide attack. 
However, the legitimacy of underlying grievances should not necessarily be 
dismissed out-of-hand if the methods of violence employed are illegal, 
indiscriminate or unethical. 
 
14.1.2. AQ’s Reported Interest in Chemical Weapons 
 
A number of allegations have been made regarding Al Qaeda interest in NBC 
weapons and, if such interest and activity seems reasonably certain to exist, 
whether and how Islamic strictures may inhibit their use, including whether 
Muslims may be targeted or inadvertently killed if the primary target is deemed 
to be legitimate. The indicators on AQ capabilities and intentions regarding CW 
remain ambiguous. 
In 2001 US forces captured documents and computer files that contained 
information on chemical and biological warfare agents (e.g., a reported 1999 
activity authorized by al-Zawahiri and code named ‘the Yoghurt Project’).937 
There have also been reports of Yersinia pestis experiments by Al-Qaeda in the 
                                                 
935 Cornell University Law School (note 934). 
936 Ekaterina Stepanova, Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural 
Aspects, SIPRI Research Report no. 23 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008), p. 11. 
937 Alan Cullison, ‘Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive’, Atlantic Monthly (1 Sep. 2004), 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/09/inside-al-qaeda-s-hard-drive/303428/>, 
(accessed 18 Aug. 2013). 
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Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).938 Concern has been expressed that those responsible 
for the 2006-2007 improvised chlorine container attacks in Iraq will support anti-
Syrian government forces by introducing similar methods.939 Anwar al-Awlaqi 
(through an issue of the jihadist, glossy English-language magazine Inspire) 
reportedly stated: ‘The use of poisons or chemical and biological weapons 
against population centres is allowed and strongly recommended due to its great 
effect on the enemy’.940 
FFI researchers Hogan and Stenersen analysed discussion topics in one 
‘well-known dedicated to online training’. Of 764 threads posted on this forum in 
February 2005–December 2006: 3 per cent dealt with ideology, 5 per cent 
concerned CBRN weapons, 6 per cent concerned manual collections, 9 per cent 
concerned field skills, security and organisational matters, 23 per cent 
conventional weapons/equipment, and 42 per cent dealt with explosives.941 
In mid-2002 CNN obtained 250 tapes in Afghanistan that were part of a 
larger library of unknown size (the index system was never recovered to the best 
of my knowledge).942 CNN correspondents Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher 
categorized the tapes into nine categories: 
1. non-al Qaeda tapes (mostly from news and combat footage on 
Chechnya) and tapes created by [violent] groups in Burma, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Indonesia, Kurdistan and Yemen, 
2. tapes created for a particular reason (e.g., the demonstration of an SA-7 
intended for viewing by Mohammed Atef), 
3. al-Qaeda training and instruction tapes, 
4. al-Qaeda documentation of training, 
5. historical filming (e.g., of a meeting between al-Qaeda and Taliban 
members in about 1996), 
6. recordings of Osama bin Laden coverage in international media, 
7. tapes for distribution to al-Qaeda members and potential sympathizers 
(e.g., speeches of bin Laden for a limited distribution and ‘crusader’ type 
tapes made for a wider audience), 
8. ‘tapes made for specific purposes’, and 
9. tapes on topics on international developments the recorders were 
interested in.943 
International media items of interest included ‘avid’ coverage of the return 
of the USS Cole to the United States for repairs after having been hit in 2000 by 
                                                 
938 Nicholas Blanford, ‘Cache and Carry: Syria’s Chemical Stockpile Poses Regional Threat’, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 24, no. 9 (Sep. 2012), p. 50. 
939 Blanford (note 938), pp. 49–50. On the chlorine attacks in Iraq, see Fred Wehling, ‘A 
Toxic Cloud of Mystery: Lessons from Iraq for Deterring CBRN Terrorism’, pp. 273–298 in 
Wenger and Wilner (note 290).  
940 Blanford (note 938), p. 49. 
941 Hanna Rogan and Anne Stenersen, Jihadism Online: Al-Qaida’s Use of the Internet, 
report no. 1-08 (FFI: May 2008), unclassified, p. 4. 
942 Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher, ‘The al Qaida Tapes—What Have We Learned?’, p. 
73 in Eds. Lars Nicander and Magnus Ranstorp, Terrorism in the Information Age—New 
Frontiers? (Swedish National Defence College: Stockholm, 2004). Boettcher and Schuster are 
longserving CNN correspondents. 
943 Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher, ‘The al Qaida Tapes—What Have We Learned?’, p. 
75 in Nicander and Ranstorp (note 942). 
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suicide bomb attack in a Yemeni harbour, the ship crew’s memorial services and 
any items that appeared to confirm that the United States was unwilling to take 
casualties (e.g., that confirmed a ‘Vietnam syndrome’ aversion to taking deaths 
and casualties).944 Boettcher and Schuster place the well-known dog gassing tape 
which occurred in Afghanistan under category 8. They state that the gas was 
‘most likely by some sort of cyanide compound’ and that the experiment was 
carried out by al-Qaeda’s ‘weapons chief’ Abu Khabab.945 Boettcher and 
Schuster state: ‘A careful analysis of this tape, which was edited together from 
experiments that took place on at least two separate occasions, was that it was 
presented by Abu Khaba to bin Laden and his top lieutenants as an indication of 
what progress was being made at the Darunta camp with chemical weapons’.946 
The dog displayed hind leg twitching. The actual nature of the experiment 
remains publicly uncertain. Hydrogen cyanide is sometimes cited as the 
suspected chemical. 
In 2010 the US DNI stated: 
‘Several terrorist groups, particularly al-Qa’da, probably remain 
interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
capabilities, but not necessarily in all four of those capabilities. A number 
of the 33 US Department of State designated foreign terrorist 
organizations worldwide have previously expressed interest in one or 
more of these capabilities, mostly focusing on low-level chemicals and 
toxins. Some terrorist groups see employing (CBRN) materials as a high-
impact option for achieving their goals, as even if they do not produce 
many casualties they would have a psychological impact. We believe some 
of these terrorists aim to use these agents against Western targets, 
especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to be concerned about al-
Qai’da’s stated intent to conduct uncoventional attacks against the United 
States. While counterterrorism actions have disrupted al-Qai’da’s near-
term efforts to develop a sophisticated CBRN attack capability, we judge 
the group is still intent on its acquisition’.947 
Saifullah Paracha one of the ‘inner circle’ operatives involved in the 
planning of the 11 September 2001 attacks currently incarcerated at Guantamino 
was carrying a Casio digital diary when he was captured which contained 
‘references to military chemical warfare agents’.948 Paracha, according to US 
leaked files, also ‘discussed obtaining biological or nuclear weapons’.949 
                                                 
944 Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher, ‘The al Qaida Tapes—What Have We Learned?’, pp. 
79–80 in Nicander and Ranstorp (note 942). 
945 Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher, ‘The al Qaida Tapes—What Have We Learned?’, p. 
75 in Nicander and Ranstorp (note 942). 
946 Henry Schuster and Mike Boettcher, ‘The al Qaida Tapes—What Have We Learned?’, p. 
75 in Nicander and Ranstorp (note 942). 
947 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 
2010, pp. 6–7, <https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd-acq2010.pdf>, (accessed 25 July 2013). 
948 Scott Shane and Benjamin Weiser, ‘In Dossier, Portrait of Push for Post-9/11 Attacks’, 
New York Times, 25 Apr. 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/world/guantanamo-files-
portrait-of-push-for-post-september-11-attacks.html?_r=1&ref=global-home>, (accessed 23 
July 2013). 
949 Shane and Weiser (note 948). 
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14.1.3. The al-Shifa Case 
 
In August 1998 the US destroyed the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan 
using cruise missiles in an action codenamed Operation Infinite Reach on the 
grounds that it had produced VX on behalf of AQ.950 One person was killed (a 
watchman) and several injured. The facility was owned by a Saudi businessman 
whose assets were frozen by the United States. The owner then secured legal 
services who arranged for private sampling and analysis to be carried out. Kroll 
and Associates was hired (despite pressure from the US Government not become 
involved). The sampling and analysis study was headed by Dr Thomas D. Tullius 
who was the Chairman of the Boston University Chemistry Department.951 The 
samples were then analysed by three European laboratories with CW-related 
expertise none of which showed the presence of any CW agent or evidence of 
principal, known degradation products. Sudan cooperated in the exercise and 
chain-of-custody and a validated sampling methodology were employed. 
The stockpiling matrix-template is used. Although it may be preferable to 
label the matrix ‘production’, the covert sampling and analysis that was carried 
out was done in order to determine the presence of chemical weapons (i.e., the 
toxic fill—not delivery devices or munition bodies). It is argued that the matrix 
for determining the presence of CW or their known principal degradation 
products is justified. In particular, the ACH purpose is to determine whether VX 
was produced based on sampling and analysis of soil samples taken 
surreptitiously by agent(s) acting on behalf of the US Government. 
 
14.2. Framing the Hypotheses 
 
The main hypotheses are: Has the target of analysis stockpiled chemical weapons 
(yes or no)? 
To allow for a more meaningful analysis, the scope and focus should be 
more narrowly defined. As noted in Chapter 10, the question of 
production/stockpiling of chemical weapons is meant to inform the broader 
strategic question: Did an al-Qaeda affiliate produce VX at a facility at al-Shifa 
in Sudan? 
Since the size of the stockpile will not be the focus of the analysis, the 
question is more one of confirmation or clarification of CW production (which is 
stored in some amount and in some form at the production site—even if not 
weaponized). 
Related broader questions include: 
(a) the nature of AQ affiliated individuals and groups in chemical 
weapons, 
(b) whether such weapons are permitted by AQ and (if so) against whom 
(e.g., non-combatants, religious believers), and 
(c) the nature of CW-related consultation or cooperation between 
individuals, groups, private business and state officials and state agencies. 
 
                                                 
950 For a critical account of the action, see David Hoile, Farce Majeure: the Clinton 
Administration’s Sudan Policy, 1993-2000 (The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council: 
London, 2000). 
951 Garrett and Hart (note 108), ‘Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Factory, Al-’, pp. 188–189. 
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Step 1. Identify the Possible Hypotheses to be Considered 
 
The possible hypotheses are:  
1. Yes (EMPTA was present at the pharmaceutical facility and that this 
indicates the facility could have produced VX),952 or 
2. No (EMPTA was not present at the pharmaceutical facility).953 
The results will be presented in terms of broader strategic analysis of continued 
present-day relevance. 
 
Step 2. Make a List of Significant Evidence and Arguments For and 
Against Each Hypothesis 
 
The background for the hypotheses is structured according to Table 10.1 
(reproduced below as Table 14.1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
952 The presence of EMPTA per se does not mean that VX was produced. There are some 
organophosphorus pesticides that can leave EMPTA. Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
953 The hypothesis that President Bill Clinton wished to divert attention from a 
Congressionally-mandated investigation into whether he had had sexual relations with Monica 
Lewinsky in the Oval Office will not be considered as a hypothesis under this step. It should be 
noted that Clinton gave video taped testimony concerning this matter on 17 August and that 
Operation Infinite Reach was carried out on 20 August 1998. Christopher Hitchens is among 
those who suspected a ‘wag-the-dog’ factor at work.  The term refers to 1997 movie by that 
name which describes the successful efforts of a Hollywood mogul to create the false 
impression of a war in the Balkans in order to obscure a US President’s pecadilloes just prior to 
an election. The wagging the dog perception is of potential relevance if considered inter alia in a 
cognitive psychology context of organizational decisionmaking. 
Former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe compares the argument 
that Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks to divert attention from the Monika Lewinsky 
scandal as being ‘up there with the charge that the Jews are responsible for 9-11’. US National 
Archives, ‘Memorandum for the Record (MFR) of an interview with Walter Slocombe of the 
Department of Defense Conducted by Team 3, 12/19/2003’, 9/11 Commission Memorandum of 
Record, Record Group 148, National Archives Identifier 2610636, unrestricted, p. 4, 
<http://research.archives.gov/description/2610636>, (accessed 7 Feb. 2013). 
The career German diplomat, NATO official and convert to Islam—from Catholicism—
Murad W. Hofmann states: ‘I saw what State terrorism really means when I visited the ruins of 
the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in the middle of Khartoum, destroyed, out of the blue, by 
American cruise missiles, without a thread of evidence of the alleged chemical weapons 
production. A stunning example of ruthless imperialism in the 20th century. Yet the Sudanese 
take it with a measure of wisdom and humour, blaming Monika [sic] Lewintzky [sic], the 
Jewish lover of President Clinton, for his need to lash out’. ‘Paying my repects to the Mahdi 
(Wad Madani, 10 March 1999)’, p. 219 in Murad Wilfried Hofmann, Journey to Islam: Diary of 
a German Diplomat 1951-2000 (The Islamic Foundation: Leicester, 2001, reprinted 2002). The 
diary was first published in 1986. Murad Wilfried Hofmann (b. 1931) was a career German 
Foreign Ministry official. He was also NATO’s Information Director (1983–1987) and 
Ambassador to Algeria (1987–1990) and Morocco (1990–1994). Leopold Weiss (Muhammad 
Asad) (1900–1992) wrote in 1985 the introduction to Hofmann’s diary which consists of short 
entries concerning events in Hofmann’s life that led him to convert to Islam and which reaffirm 
his decision to do so. 
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Table 14.1 Structure of Background Narrative to Case Studies. 
 
Political factors 
 
Definition of violation 
Intent 
 Doctrine 
 Consistent with types and quanties? 
Threat perception 
Apparent 
Actual 
Demand side factors 
Supply side factors 
 
 
Technical factors 
 
Assimilation 
Capability 
Technological stages 
Verification measures 
Onsite 
Nearsite 
Offsite 
 
Source: Author compilation. 
Sufficient background for each hypothesis must be provided. The 
background should also be structured with a limited number of headers, have 
internal cohesion and be sufficiently broad to allow for a meaningful narrative 
that permits the reader to readily ascertain the connection between the logic of 
the argument and the evidence (or lack thereof). To do so, allows for further 
refinement of the analytical technique and modification of the conclusions as 
new insight and information become available. 
The background is structured according to political and technical factors. 
The political factors considered are: (a) the definition of a CWC-defined 
violation, (b) intent, (c) threat perception (apparent and actual), (d) demand side 
factors and (e) supply side factors. The technical factors considered are: (a) CW 
assimilation and (b) ‘verification measures’ (mainly derived from the arms 
control paradigm). These political and technical factors were developed by the 
author. However, it should be noted that supply and demand side factors are part 
of the standard nuclear arms control and disarmament literature.954 Also 
variations of integration and assimilation of weapons systems into military 
doctrine and training have long been considered by analysts in various contexts. 
 
14.3. Political Factors 
 
A CWC-defined violation in this context would entail the production or 
stockpiling of chemical weapons.955 To fall under CWC declaration and 
verification procedures, the state must be a party to the treaty (Sudan joined in 
                                                 
954 For a recent summary of IR-based explanations for the low number of nuclear weapons 
states, see Jacques E. C. Hymans, ‘’The Study of Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation’, 
pp. 13–37 in Potter and Mukhatzhanova (note 675). 
955 For the definition of a chemical weapon, see CWC, Article II, para. 1. 
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1999). The CWC also excludes any facility that produced CW prior to 1 January 
1946 from its definition of a chemical weapons production facility. In the al-
Shifa case, a CWC-defined violation falls mostly under ‘technical factors’(see 
‘technical factors’ below). 
Assessment of intent to acquire, develop or use CW is more problematic 
than for a traditional evaluation of a state’s military programme. Sudan was in 
the midst of a longterm counter-insurgency campaign with the predominantly 
animist and Christian south. Islamist militants, including Osama bin Laden and 
other veterans of the Afghanistan conflict with the Soviet Union, moved to the 
country and enjoyed good relations with various Sudanese officials. Bin Laden 
used his family’s business connections and money to support road building and 
other infrastructure projects in Sudan. 
The evaluation of intent therefore must encompass the policies and 
intentions of Sudan’s government, and possible divergent actions by elements of 
the Sudanese Government (e.g., on a more personal basis). Such a consideration 
must also address the still problematic question of whether al-Qaeda officials are 
strongly motivated to acquire CBRN weapons, their capacity to do so, and their 
willingness to use such weapons against Muslims, some non-Muslims, or all 
non-Muslims. A third set of issues consists of whether those al-Qaeda individuals 
and groups in Sudan had any interest in CW in particular. 
AQ’s interest in CBRN weapons has been divided into 3 periods: the 
Sudan period (1991-1996), the Afghanistan period (1996-2001) and the period 
starting after the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was toppled in November 
2001).956 In recent years the number of terrorist attacks has fallen, but grown 
more deadly.957 
Analysts are also continuing to debate whether and how violent non-state 
actors innovate and assimilate weapons or modes of attack. Those who support 
innovation argue that militants’ default position is to innovate in order to 
maximize success.958 In other words, non-state actors are pro-active. A second 
school maintains that such groups are generally reactive due to a certain natural 
conservatism.959 There may also be a link between degree of centralization and 
level of innovation. The more centralized the organization, the less innovative or 
risk prone it may be.960 
 
14.3.1. al-Qaeda Doctrine 
 
Much literature has been produced by and about AQ affiliates concerning their 
ideology and military doctrine. The bulk of the military training and doctrinal 
literature concerns the use of conventional weapons and explosives. One of the 
best developed, standard military doctrines of AQ is ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s 
                                                 
956 Stenersen (note 209), p. 6. 
957 Stenersen (note 209), p. 8. 
958 Stenersen (note 209), p. 11. 
959 Stenersen (note 209), p. 11. 
960 Stenersen (note 209), p. 12. Stenersen cites work by Mathew Evangelista that suggests 
centralized organizations are less innovative. 
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A Practical Course for Guerilla War.961 Al-Muqrin headed al-Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula branch before being killed by Saudi security forces in June 
2004. Al-Muqrin does not address suicide attack.962 He only briefly touches on 
‘weapons of mass destruction’ as part of his ‘taxonomy of wars based on military 
and human factors’. 
His taxonomy is: (a) conventional wars, (b) total wars, (c) cold wars and 
(d) unconventional (guerilla) wars.963 He considers conventional wars to be those 
conflicts where all weapons except WMD are employed. Total wars are those 
armed conflicts where: ‘unconventional weapons are used (weapons of mass 
destruction such as biological and nuclear weapons) but this type of war is 
considered unlikely because it leads to mass destruction, which could spell the 
end of all mankind’.964 
Al-Muqrin defines cold wars as ‘wars in which there is no direct combat 
between the two parties’.965 
Finally, he categorizes guerilla wars as occurring in three phases: 
Phase One: Attrition (Strategic Defence), 
Phase Two: Relative Strategic Balance (Policy of a Thousand Cuts) and 
Phase Three: Military Decision (Final Attack).966 
Al-Muqrin defines war as ‘a state of conflict that erupts between two 
communities, factions, or states, or between two individuals and, in general 
terms, between two armed camps with the purpose of achieving political, 
economic, or ideological gains or for expansionist goals’.967 
Al-Muqrin defines war objectives as: 
‘1. For the belligerent to destroy the force that is confronting him and to 
compel that force to submit to him. 
2. To eliminate the enemy opposing him and to uproot him. 
3. For self-preservation’.968 
Al-Muqrin also states that the causes of war can be divided according to 
just and unjust wars as follows: 
‘Just wars are those wars that a party or peoples deprived of power, who 
are oppressed and wronged, wage against an oppressive aggressor or a 
                                                 
961 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (Potomac Books, Inc.: Washington, DC, 2009). Translation and analysis by 
Norman Cigar. 
962 Norman Cigar, ‘Overview and Analysis’, p. 34 in Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: 
’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerilla War (note 961). 
963 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), pp. 90–91. 
964 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 90. 
965 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 90. 
966 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 94. 
967 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 89. 
968 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 89. 
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tyrannical ruler. The objective is to end injustice and aggression, and to 
fight for the sake of God to make shar’ia the law of the land and for the 
word of God to become supreme. Examples of this kind of war are the 
wars in the Land of the Two Holy Shrines [Saudi Arabia], Palestine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, Kashmir, the Philippines, and others’.969 
For Al-Muqrin: 
‘Unjust wars are those wars that unjust powers wage against the 
dispossessed. The objective is to dominate other belief systems, to replace 
the prescriptions of religious laws, to seize territory, and to plunder 
(others’) riches’.970 
The final objective under this doctrine is to achieve a worldwide caliphate 
in which all people either accept Islam as the true faith or are killed. It is less 
clear whether he realistically expected this to be achieved in his (or anyone’s) 
lifetime. 
Norman Cigar argues that the Al-Muqrin doctrine is influenced—directly 
or indirectly—by Clauswitz and Mao. Al-Muqrin’s thought is apocalyptic, binary 
(i.e., good versus evil; ‘with us’ or ‘against us’) and uncompromising in seeking 
to achieve victory, regardless of the human and societal costs (e.g., in terms of 
deaths and upheaval). The technological benefits of ‘modernity’ are secondary to 
ethical and religious correctness, and individual and societal moral well-being. 
I am not aware of any Sudanese military doctrine that is CW-relevant. 
 
14.3.2. Threat Perceptions 
 
Threat perceptions of a CW non-state actor context are similarly conflated and 
confused for various reasons, including the mix of state and non-state actors, and 
as a consequence of the tension and disassociative pressures in the region.971 The 
traditional state versus state calculation on whether one requires a CW stockpile 
is probably irrelevant in the case of Sudanese threat perceptions of military 
threats posed by others. 
One possible factor driving demand for CW is a desire to acquire an 
asymmetric military capability with actual or potential opponents. It is also 
generally postulated that this threat can be ameliorated—to an extent—through 
participation in various economic and security arrangements, including through 
the participation in multilateral arms control treaty regimes. In the case of Sudan, 
perhaps the African Union could help to play such a role. 
Had Sudan been a party to the CWC at the time of the attack, one can 
speculate whether the United States would have been inhibited from launching 
the attack. The potential damage to its position inside the arms control regime, 
                                                 
969 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 89. 
970 Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ’Abd ’Al-Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for 
Guerilla War (note 961), p. 89. 
971 It should be noted again that non-state actor in the context of this study is not meant to 
apply to civil society actors, the chemical industry, or the like. Rather it refers to individuals and 
groups disposed towards violence to meet perceived political and other objectives through 
threats and actual indiscriminate violence. 
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might have led the United States to seek clarification using the CWC’s 
provisions on consultation, clarification and fact-finding.972 Sudan would have 
been obligated to engage in a process or dialogue, though this would not 
necessarily have resulted in the granting of onsite access to inspectors. The 
conclusions drawn from such an analysis have implications for IR theory, 
including how one weighs and evaluates neoliberal institutionalism and realism. 
 
14.3.3. Demand and Supply Side Factors 
 
The implementation of so-called supply side measures (in an arms control 
context) focus on the prevention of the misuse of equipment, technology, know-
how and materials through various control and oversight mechanisms, such as 
through national munitions control lists. Demand and supply side factors may be 
understood to apply to either non-state actors themselves or the actors, agencies 
or states with which they cooperate or interact. 
 
14.4. Technical Factors 
 
With regard to the question of weapons (or weapons system assimilation), the al-
Shifa case also presents unique difficulties because of the interaction between 
state and non-state actor interests and activity. Given sufficient willingness, 
many states would have the technical capability to produce VX using their own 
resources if they chose to do so. Key questions in this regard include: whether 
external support is feasible to facilitate the process, and whether the state is able 
to produce chemical agents in sufficient quantity and purity for longer-term 
storage. 
There are approximately five production routes suitable to produce 
militarily significant quantities of VX. Distillation of VX on a largescale is 
extremely difficult. Furthermore, if more than about 1 litre of agent is produced 
one risks killing people in the surrounding area given the fact that most facilities, 
including well-equipped university laboratories, lack filtration units in their fume 
hoods. Larger scale production of VX would have required good handling 
techniques.973 
It is also worth recalling the CWC’s definition of a CW production 
facility.974 The treaty defines a CWPF as having produced CW at any time since 
1 January 1946 (the al-Shifa facility appears to have been constructed in 1992-
1996). A CWPF may include filling equipment, bulk storage containers 
(including those that are part of binary or other multi-component CW munitions) 
and loading devices. A facility is not a CWPF if it produces unspecified 
byproducts if they do not exceed 3 per cent of the total product and the facility is 
subject to declaration and inspection under the CWC.975 The timing of the 
accession appears to have been prompted by the al-Shifa attack (Sudan joined the 
                                                 
972 See CWC, Article IX. 
973 Personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
974 CWC, Article II, para. 8. 
975 Sudan deposited its instrument of ratification 30 days prior to this. CWC, Article XXI. In 
practice, the 3 per cent threshhold probably concerns production of unwanted byproducts in 
small quantities that might otherwise be declarable, such as BZ, PFIB and nitrogen mustards. 
CWC negotiators at the CD should be consulted on this matter for clarification. 
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CWC on 24 May 1999). This is consistent with the fact that Sudanese officials 
made periodic calls for investigation of the plant site, and allowed representatives 
of the facility owner to take samples. The question of how the US Government 
evaluated the facility in terms of its equipment and configuration should also be 
considered. 
It is also worth considering the potential relevance of OPCW inspection 
and verification procedures as they relate to CW production facilities and 
facilities that produce toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted (i.e., 
peaceful purposes). This includes facilities that produce toxic chemicals for 
agricultural, industrial and pharmaceutical research. It also includes the 
evaluation of CW agents listed on Schedule 1 of the CWC’s Annex on 
Chemicals (including novel) for protective purposes. It should also be reiterated 
that the chemicals listed on Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 of the Annex on 
Chemicals have legitimate peaceful applications, while those listed on Schedule 
1 are today supposed to be used essentially for CW evaluation and protective 
purposes only. 
Written material such as policy documentation, research notebooks and 
facility process control planning schedules and records of operation would, if 
available, indicate the nature of any given production (civilian or military) 
facility. 
The above context is lacking in the public analyses of the al-Shifa case 
and may have been secondary to (or absent from) the internal US Government 
evaluation and decisionmaking processes. 
 
Step 3. Prepare Matrices with Hypotheses 
 
A matrix should be prepared which has ‘diagnostic’ value (i.e., it provides 
insight and understanding that either confirms or counters the prevailing 
wisdom). 
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Matrix  Stockpiling 
 
Question: Has the target (i.e., state or non-state actor) stockpiled chemical weapons? 
 
Hypotheses: 
H1 No stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=, I=, N/A=] 
H2 Yes stockpiling of chemical weapons [C=, I=, N/A=] 
        H1 H2 
 
IR1. Does target have CW technical capacity (e.g. military, medical)? 
 E.1 General publications aimed at domestic audience  (yes) I C 
 E.2 General publications aimed at domestic audience (no) - - 
 E.3 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (yes) - - 
 E.4 Civil defence against CW policy documentation (no) C I 
 E.5 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (yes) - - 
 E.6 Civil defence against CW technical guidance (no) C I 
 
IR2. Is CW mentioned in military doctrine? 
 E.1 Defence against CW in civil defence context (yes) - - 
 E.2 Defence against CW in civil defence context (no)  C I 
 E.3 Defence against CW for military personnel (yes)  - - 
 E.4 Defence against CW for military personnel (no)  C I 
 E.5 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) - - 
 E.6 Civilian prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no) C I 
 E.7 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (yes) - - 
 E.8 Military prophylaxis and/or countermeasures (no) C I 
 
IR3. Statements and similar communications 
E.1 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (yes)  N/A C 
 E.2 Has leadership discussed CW matters? (no)  - - 
 
IR4. Weight of evidence of integration of CW into military doctrine? 
 E.1 Publications indicate integration of CW (yes)  - - 
 E.2 Publications indicate integration of CW (no)  C I 
 E.3 Arms control policy statements against CW (yes)  N/A N/A 
 E.4 Arms control policy statements for CW (yes)*  N/A N/A 
 
IR5. Interest in CW activities of others? 
 E.1 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (yes)  - - 
 E.2 Discussion of CW threats posed by others (no)  C N/A 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW production? 
 E.1 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (yes)  ? ? 
 E.2 Laboratory scale synthesis of CW agents (no)  ? ? 
 E.3 CW production facility indicators (yes)   ? ? 
 E.4 CW production facility indicators (no)   ? ? 
 E.5 CW stockpiling indicators (yes) **   ? ? 
 E.6 CW stockpiling indicators (no)    ? ? 
 E.7 Documentation of production (yes)   ? ? 
 E.8 Documentation of production (no)   ? ? 
 E.9 Documentation of stockpiling (yes)**   - - 
 E.10 Documentation of stockpiling (no)   C I 
 E.11 Availability of CW production material/equipment (yes) N/A C 
 E.12 Availability of CW production material/equipment (no) - - 
 E.13 Availability of CW munition (yes)   ? ? 
 E.14 Availability of CW munition (no)   ? ? 
 
Source: Author’s adaptation of Heuer’s ACH matrix. C=consistent, I=inconsistent and N/A=not 
applicable, IR=information request, E=evidence. *E.g., Some parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
reserved the right to use CW if such weapons were first used against them. **The question is not a non-
sequitor in the sense that, for e.g., overhead imagery might be available that suggests such stockpiling. 
222   HART  
The cumulative scores are: 
H1: C=9, I=1, N/A=4 
H2: C=3, I=8, N/A=3 
 
The matrix is not as well-suited for non-state actors as it is for state actors. 
The law enforcement nature of some of the non-state actor threat indicators can 
be better reflected through modified information request headings and associated 
evidence chains. 
 
IR1. Does Target Have CW Technical Capability (e.g., Military, Medical)? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=2, I=1, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=2, N/A=0 
 
None of the evidence chains for this information request appear to be particularly 
applicable to a non-state actor context. It is not necessary and largely irrelevant 
for an AQ affiliate to generate CW civil defence policy and technical guidelines. 
General publications aimed at the AQ audience such as Inspire and 
various blog sites do mention CW—as an occasional side topic. Threat 
pronouncements have also been issued for its opponents. 
Because the evidence chains are so few and the civil defence questions are 
largely irrelevant, the numerical results lack meaning. 
 
IR2. Is CW Mentioned in Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=4, I=0, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=0, I=4, N/A=0 
 
The evidence chains are not especially suited (or applicable) to non-state actors. 
The key irrelevant terms include civil defence, civilian and military prophylaxis, 
and military personnel. 
 
IR3. Statements and Similar Communications 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=1, N/A=0 
 
As previously mentioned, there is a general AQ literature reflecting interest and 
capabilities on CW. 
 
IR4. Weight of Evidence of Integration of CW into Military Doctrine? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=1 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=1, I=0, N/A=0 
 
Communications occur among and by leadership figures (e.g., in the AQ 
manual), and in a more decentralized space on the Internet. 
Evidence chain should be longer (a higher ‘n’) in order to achieve more 
meaningful sub-numbers. 
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IR5. Interest in CW Activities of Others? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=0 
 
There appears to be no interest in CW activity of others except inasmuch as this 
might assist AQ affiliates. AQ affiliates are not concerned with such weapons 
being used against themselves. 
 
IR6. Evidence of CW Production? 
 
The sub-score for H1 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=0 
The sub-score for H2 is: C=0, I=0, N/A=0 
 
This IR is the heart of the case study. The evidence chains offer various 
formulations and aspects of the case study. The author has not particular ‘answer’ 
to the evidence chains. Nevertheless, some key questions include the following. 
If EMPTA was present at the facility, was it produced there and (if not) where 
did it come from? Also, was VX production at this facility technically feasible? 
EMPTA is a complex molecule that is not simple to manufacture. Even if this 
form of alcohol and EMPTA were both present, what was the reaction vessel 
used? Was a suitable reaction vessel ever identified? 
 
Step 4. Refine the Matrix 
 
The two main narratives are those of the owner of the pharmaceutical facility and 
the United States, respectively, at the time of the attack.976 First, the rationale for 
the attack and the reaction by the owner and Sudan are reviewed. 
The reasons and nature of the longstanding tensions between Sudan and 
the USA should be considered. In 1993 the United States designated Sudan as a 
state sponsor of terrorism. Osama bin Ladin lived in Sudan prior to his departure 
to Afghanistan in 1996. Also Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (aka ‘the blind sheik’), 
one of the perpetrators of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York 
City, obtained at least one of his US visas in Khartoum.977 The United States also 
suspected that Iran and Sudan had facilitated an attempted assassination of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while on a visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 
                                                 
976 There has been a de facto attenuation, softening and backtracking of the US position, 
including the unfreezing of the owner’s US assets. 
977 Rahman’s travel to the USA, including the manner in which his visa applications were 
handled, are summarized in Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Washington, DC, 2004), chap. 3 (Terrorist entry and 
embedding tactics, 1993 to 2001), pp. 49–52, <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_ 
statements/index.htm>, (accessed 25 July 2013). Collected New York Times articles on Rahman 
are available at ‘Omar Abdel Rahman news’, <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 
timestopics/people/a/omar_abdel_rahman/index.html>, (accessed 25 July 2013). 
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26 June 1995.978 Another possible motivating factor for the United States is that 
gunshots had been directed at US officials in the preceding 3 years.979 
In 1996 the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 1044 in 
which it condemned the assassination attempt and called on Sudan to extradite 
without delay to Ethiopia three suspects located under its jurisdiction or control. 
On the basis of a March 1996 report by the UN Secretary-General (S/1996/179), 
the Security Council adopted resolution 1054 which inter alia imposed travel 
sanctions on Sudan. In August of that year the Security Council decided that 
states should deny aircraft permission to take off, land in or fly over their 
territories if the aircraft was registered in Sudan, or owned, leased or operated or 
substantially owned or controlled by Sudan or Sudanese public authorities.980 In 
October 1997 the USA imposed comprehensive economic, trade and financial 
sanctions on Sudan.981 
 
Rationale for the Attack 
 
In 1991 Sudan introduced a visa free travel for Muslims who wished to enter the 
country.982 This prompted a movement of former mujahedeen into the country, 
including ‘hundreds of suspected terrorists’ and bin Laden.983 
In March 1995 two of bin Laden’s associates followed a US embassy 
official in Khartoum.984 In June 1995 Egyptian militants based in Sudan 
attempted to assassinate Hosni Mubarak.985 US officials suspected that the then 
head of Sudan’s security services was complicit in the assassination plot.986 At 
about the same time, the CIA ‘reported indications that Iranian operatives in 
Sudan were conspiring to attack US officials, although nothing came of that 
threat’.987 In August 1994 Sudan turned Carlos the Jackal over to French 
authorities.988 In September 1995 Sudan ended the visa free travel for citizens of 
Arab states.989 
                                                 
978 Abdelkérim Ousman, ‘The Potential of Islamist Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, vol. 18, nos. 1-2 (fall-winter 2004), p. 
92. 
979 Tim Weiner and James Risen, ‘Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based Partly on 
Surmise’, New York Times, 21 Sep. 1998, <http://theater.nytimes.com/library/world/africa/ 
092198attack-sudan.html>, (accessed 18 Aug. 2013). 
980 United Nations Sanctions Secretariat (Department of Public Affairs), The Experience of 
the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Restrictions, paras. 43–45, 
pp. 11–12. Paper presented at Smart Sanctions, the Next Steps: Arms Embargoes and Travel 
Sanctions, Second Expert Seminar, Berlin, 3–5 Dec. 2000. Paper revised effective 25 Jan. 2001. 
981 Embassy of the United States, Khartoum, Sudan, ‘US-Sudan relations’, 
<http://sudan.usembassy.gov/ussudan_relations.html>, (accessed 3 Jan. 2012). 
982 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
983 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
984 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
985 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
986 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
987 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
988 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
989 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
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In 1996 communication between Sudan and the United States 
deteriorated.990 The US shut its embassy in Khartoum in February 1996.991 On 8 
March 1996 CIA and State Department officials reportedly met secretly with a 
Sudanese official in Washington, DC during which the US officials requested 
Sudan to turn over the names of over 200 bin Laden associates allowed into the 
country since 1994, information on Arab and Iranian opponents located in Sudan 
and the location of three Egyptians who were suspected in the plot to kill 
Mubarak.992 In May 1996 Sudan expelled bin Laden from the country at the 
request of Saudi Arabia and the USA who then returned to Afghanistan.993 
In February 1997, President Oman al-Bashir reportedly sent President 
Clinton a letter offering US intelligence and law enforcement officials to enter 
Sudan and ‘to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism’.994 
The US reportedly did not respond to the letter.995 In early 1998, Sudan made a 
similar offer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), offering the bureau to 
send a law enforcement unit to Sudan, which the FBI declined to do four months 
later in June of the same year.996 
 
The ‘Small Group’ 
 
Another set of factors is related to Washington politics. The members of the 
small group, the key US Administration decisionmakers, included Sandy Berger 
and Madeleine Albright.997 Berger and Albright were reportedly ‘convinced that 
Sudan could be making weapons for bin Laden’.998 One side (known as the 
‘isolators’) wished to isolate Sudan, while the other side wished to engage the 
country. Susan Rice, who later became assistant secretary of state for African 
affairs, was also reportedly one of the isolators.999 
According to one press report, ‘Few national security issues in Clinton’s 
presidency were handled with greater secrecy or by a smaller group of people. 
The administration was determined to avoid leaks, and that meant limiting 
deliberations to the “small group,” the president’s innermost circle’.1000 
Attempts have been made to reconstruct how ‘the small group’ operated 
and came to its decision to attack the facility.1001 It appears that various officials 
in the US government gave their views to Tim Weiner and James Risen, for 
example, who developed an ‘unusually detailed glimpse at the complexities of 
making momentous decisions on the basis of shards of information gleaned from 
telephone intercepts, spies and scientific analysis’.1002 
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The small group had several meetings. One was with President Clinton in 
the Oval Office on 12 August 1998.1003 At this meeting Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton provided Clinton with a target list at this 
meeting.1004 All the participants were reportedly in agreement that al-Shifa was 
the most suitable target on the list.1005 Clinton approved the strike on 14 
August.1006  
Following the attack one administration official reportedly stated ‘As an 
American citizen, I am not convinced of the evidence’.1007 
The US had ‘unconfirmed intelligence reports’ in about 1996 that 
indicated that ‘terrorists in Sudan were plotting’ to kill Anthony Lake.1008 Berger 
stated that the evidence for this was ‘extremely convincing’.1009  
One ‘senior intelligence official’ stated ‘I don’t have a piece of paper that 
says, in a wiring diagram’, but argued that ‘evidence plus inference’ indicates 
that bin Laden was connected to the facility.1010 In particular, US intelligence 
officials maintained that they had uncovered financial transactions between bin 
Laden and Sudan’s Military Industrial Corporation.1011 They also maintained that 
this corporation was ‘overseeing chemical weapons development’.1012 
One ‘senior [US] official’ reportedly stated ‘Al Shifa was to one degree or 
another involved in chemical weapons production. I can’t tell you whether the 
VX precursor was produced or stored there. But the plant is tied to Sudan’s 
military-industrial complex, which is tied to bin Laden’.1013 
Another US official stated ‘The decision to target Al Shifa continues a 
tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan’.1014 
The US Government reportedly did not know who owned the facility at 
the time of the attack.1015 The owner was Saudi businessman Saleh Idris, was an 
advisor to a Saudi bank.1016  
The CIA believed that Osman Sulayman was the general manager of the 
facility and that he had been deported from Saudi Arabia in about 1995 because 
of his suspected ties to bin Laden.1017 
Evidence in favour of the attack considered by the small group included: 
(a) a report from a ‘sensitive source’ that stated Osama bin Laden has 
requested ‘Sudanese officials’ to assist him to ‘obtain chemical weapons 
that could be used against US installations’;1018 
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(b) for the preceding 18 months the CIA had been analyzing the 
facility.1019 
It had obtained a soil sample from outside the facility which showed the 
presence of EMPTA.1020 
CIA director George Tenet told five members of the small group that bin 
Laden had requested Sudanese leaders approximately three years previously to 
assist him in the manufacture of ‘poison gas’ to attack US troops stationed in 
Saudi Arabia.1021 
A ‘senior [US] intelligence official’ was quoted as saying ‘Bin Laden 
directly involved himself with the Sudanese government, trying to get it to test 
poisonous gases in case they could be tried against US troops in Saudi 
Arabia’.1022 
One red flag to the USG regarding Sudan was bin Laden’s arrival in 
Khartoum in 1992. In April 1994 Saudi Arabia stripped him of his 
citizenship.1023 
One ‘senior [US] administration official’ who participated in a small 
group meeting reportedly stated ‘We believed he was deep in a hunt for weapons 
of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Was it safe to ignore that 
evidence? After very careful deliberation, it was decided, on balance, that it 
would be irresponsible of us not to attack the plant’.1024 
The context in which the small group operated was one that had 
developed over several years of ‘bitter disagreement within the administration 
about how to handle Sudan’ after the USA had shortlisted the country as a ‘state 
sponsor of terrorism’.1025 
Walter Slocombe was Under Secretary for Policy at US DoD from 
September 1994-20 January 2001. His understanding of the pharmaceutical plant 
strike was that ‘there was direct evidence linking the facilities to the VX 
precursor and whatever one thinks of that evidence, the subsequent evidence is 
that the plant was in fact controlled by someone linked to UBL’.1026 In 9/11 
Commission testimony Slocombe stated that the Monika Lewinsky scandal had 
no bearing on the Tomahawk strikes. He relates an NSC planning meeting prior 
to their recommendation that Operation Desert Fox proceed in which President 
Clinton entered the room (which was unusual). At the end of the meeting, 
Clinton said (according to Slocombe) ‘well it is no secret that the house is 
planning to impeach me today. Does anybody think that changes their [sic] 
decision one way or the other?’.1027 All responded that the scandal did not.1028 
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Reaction to the Attack 
 
In 1998 the opposition Ummah party issued a statement that called on specialized 
UN agencies to check ‘all suspicious sites and installations in Sudan, including 
the Shifa factor, which was attacked by US forces because it was suspected of 
producing material that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons’.1029 
The party was lead by former Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and was 
part of the National Democratic Alliance coalition based in Eritrea. 
One month after the attack, US officials ‘conceded they had no evidence 
directly linking bin Laden’ to the facility.1030 
 
US Court Cases 
 
The company and its owner have made at least three attempts to seek legal 
redress in US courts. The first was a ‘takings claim’ in the US Court of Federal 
Claims which was dismissed as ‘posing a nonjusticiable political question’.1031 
The second was an administrative claim against the CIA under the US Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).1032 The third claim was dismissed in March 2009 by a 
Washington, DC circuit court of appeals judicial panel which affirmed the 
dismissal of a suit against the US Government by El-Shifa Pharmaceutical 
Industries Company and Salah El Din Ahmed Mohammed Idris.1033 The circuit 
court had concluded ‘After the CIA denied the claim, plaintiffs filed this action 
against the United States under the FTCA seeking at least $50 million in 
damages for the government’s alleged negligence and trespass in carrying out the 
attack. At issue on appeal are two further claims. The plaintiffs also sought 
declaratory judgments that the statements linking them to “Osama bin Laden, 
international terrorist organizations and the production of chemical weapons” 
were false and that the government’s refusal to compensate them for the attack 
violated the law of nations. The district court granted the government’s motion to 
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding 
that sovereign immunity barred all plaintiff’s claims. El-Shifa Pharm Indus. Co. 
v. United States, 402 F.Supp.2d 267, 270-73 (D.D.C.2005). The court also noted 
that the complaint “likely present[ed] a nonjusticiable political question.” Id. at 
276. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter the judgment with respect to their claims for 
equitable relief, which the district court denied. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. 
United States No. 01-731 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2007). 
                                                 
1029 Anonymous, ‘Sudanese Opposition for UN Probe into “Suspicious Sites”’, BBC 
Monitoring Newsfile, 21 Aug. 1998. BBC Monitoring Newsfile translation of MENA news 
agency (Egypt), (accessed via ProQuest database, Jan. 2012). 
1030 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1031 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) cited 
in ‘DC Circuit Finds Political Questions, Dismisses Sudan Pharmaceutical Plant Bombing Suit 
Reviewed Work(s)’, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 103, no. 2 (Apr. 2009), p. 
336. 
1032 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (2000) in ‘DC Circuit Finds Political Questions, Dismisses Sudan 
Pharmaceutical Plant Bombing Suit Reviewed Work(s)’ (note 1031), p. 336. 
1033 El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, No. 07-5174 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 27, 2009), 
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On appeal, plaintiffs challenge only the dismissal of their claims for 
equitable relief for defamation and under the law of nations. They restrict their 
defamation claim to statements about Idris and their law of nations claim to the 
refusal to pay compensation for the attack’.1034  
The DC circuit rejected the damages claim stating ‘President Clinton, in 
his capacity of Commander-in-Chief, fired missiles at a target of his choosing 
pursuant to a military objective he had determined was in the national interest. 
Under the Constitution, this decision is immune from judicial review. 
Although plaintiffs attempt to distance their law of nations and defamation 
claims from the nonjusticiable question of why the President ordered the missile 
strike, both claims nonetheless present questions “inextricably intertwined” with 
the underlying decision to attack the El-Shifa pharmaceutical plant. Plaintiffs’ 
law of nations claim asserts that under customary international law a state must 
compensate a foreign national for the unjustified destruction of property. 
Plaintiffs allege the United States violated this principle by failing to compensate 
them for the destruction of their plant. In passing judgment on this claim, the 
district court could not avoid becoming arbiter of the President’s battlefield 
actions and would need to determine whether his decision to bomb the plant was 
justified. 
The basic facts of the case as presently understood are summarized by a 
2009 United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
decision which chose to ‘treat the factual allegations in the complaint as true’ 
because it was asked to review a grant of motion by the US Government to 
dismiss the case.1035 One can assume that the basic facts as laid out in this 
decision do not contradict the fundamentals of what occurred. In August 1998 
Osama bin Laden-directed network bombed the US embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania. Several days later the United States destroyed the pharmaceutical 
facility. President Clinton publicly stated that the facility was terrorist ‘base of 
operation’ that was ‘associated with the bin Laden network’. US Administration 
officials stated they believed (a) bin Laden financed the facility, (b) the facility 
was owned by the Sudan Military Industrial Complex Corporation, (c) the 
facility produced no commercial products, (d) the facility was ‘involved’ in the 
production of CW.1036 The US Government stated that a soil sample taken from 
the facility contained EMPTA. The company and its owner argue that the US 
was incorrect on each point.1037 
The US Government’s position with respect to the legal proceedings 
brought on behalf of the owner has been that the case ‘presents a nonjusticiable 
                                                 
1034 Unpublished opinion (‘slip opinion’) cited in ‘DC Circuit Finds Political Questions, 
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political question’.1038 The plaintiffs attempted to distance their case from the 
nonjusticiable question by attempting to base their argument on the law of 
nations and defamation claims.1039 However, the circuit court decided the 
questions raised are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the underlying [executive or 
political] decision to attack the facility.1040 The law of nations argument is based 
on customary international law which obliges a state to compensate a foreign 
national for the ‘unjustified destruction of property’.1041 The circuit court 
decided that to agree to apply customary international law in this manner would 
effectively make the court the ‘arbiter of the President’s battlefield actions’ and 
that it would have to ‘determine whether his decision to bomb the plant was 
justified’ and, in particular, whether the plant was a CW facility and, by 
extension to act as a ‘forum for second guessing the merits of [US] foreign policy 
and national security decisions.1042 
The company and owner argued: 
‘Administration officials incorrectly stated the claim that Osama bin 
Laden financed the plant, that the plant was owned by the Sudan Military 
Industrial Complex Corporation, made no products for commercial use, 
and was involved in the production of chemical weapons, all justifications 
given for striking the plant. Even after Administration officials learned 
that their initial justifications were incorrect, they offered a new false 
explanation that described Idris (the owner of the plant) as a friend and 
supporter of terrorists by involvement in money laundering and 
representing Osama bin Laden’s interests in Sudan’.1043 
Sampling and Analysis Issues 
 
The focus on refining the matrix should be on sampling and analysis. The 
samples obtained by the United States that served as a basis of the attack were 
taken surreptitiously and appear not have been analysed at the US’s principal 
CW analytical facilities—operated by the Army. Rather the sampling and 
analysis was carried out (and perhaps on behalf of) the CIA.1044 It is unclear 
whether internationally validated sampling and analysis protocols were employed 
(or possible). The United States maintained that its analysis of these samples 
showed the presence of O-ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid (EMPTA). The 
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analysis arranged by Dr Tullius, however, appears not to support this conclusion. 
The United States progressively became more equivocal in its statements 
regarding whether the owner or the facility was engaged in any CW-related 
activity. Eventually the United States unfroze the owner’s assets without 
admitting guilt or liability. The owner continued to pursue legal proceedings 
against the United States through at least 2009 (see above). 
Chairman of Kroll Consulting for Europe and the Middle East Tommy 
Helsby observed that Kroll accepted a contract by the owner of Al-Shifa to 
investigate whether the facility had produced chemical weapons. ‘I don’t think 
the US government was very happy about, but as a big US company, we were 
comfortable with it. A little company could have done it and not worried about 
the fallout from criticism by the US government, but then their name would not 
have carried the weight ours did when we submitted our report’.1045 
It should also be noted that the United States decision was taken in a 
broader context of political tension between it and the Sudanese government, 
strong US concern regarding suspected ties between al-Qaeda members 
(including Osama bin Laden) and Sudanese officials, and possible links between 
al-Qaeda members and Iraqi officials. A US intelligence community assessment 
judged the facility to be carrying out CW-activity. However, the Department of 
State’s INR did not agree.1046 Most of the information about this case comes 
from media reports. Many (or even all) of the so-called ‘small-group’ of Clinton 
Administration advisors appear to have had non-technical and non-scientific 
backgrounds. 
Authoritative public information regarding the role of Kroll and 
Associates, and Dr Tullius remains insufficient. One can speculate that some of 
the classified internal US Government archives presumably provide a more or 
less complete picture of these events and their implications for intelligence 
analysis. Nevertheless is it also possible that organizational preferences and 
personality conflicts skew the conclusions of some of this documentation. Even 
after all relevant documentation is declassified several decades hence, it is 
probably safe to conclude that some aspects will be lost to history. This is 
because written records do not fully reflect all discussions and interactions. 
Conversely, post-action analyses may reflect hindsight biases. 
The New York Times was quoted as saying that ‘the crucial soil sample’ 
was taken not from the facility itself, but approximately 20 meters away from 
across an access road and that the sampling had been carried out in December 
1997—approximately 4 months prior to Saleh Sidris purchased the factory.1047 
At the UN General Assembly on 30 September 1999 the Sudanese 
Foreign Minister called for the UN to send a fact-finding mission to the site.1048 
Prior to the attack the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) concluded that the evidence linking al-Shifa to UBL and CW 
was weak.1049 
                                                 
1045 Anonymous, ‘Kroll’, Spears Indices, Sep. 2008, <http://www.spearswms.com/spears-
indices/security-index/546/kroll.thtml>, (accessed 2 June 2013). 
1046 Anonymous, ‘Albright and Top Aide Killed Critical Report’ (note 1044). 
1047 Anonymous, ‘News Chronology’, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 46 (Dec. 1999), p. 
37. 
1048 Anonymous, ‘News Chronology’ (note 1047), p. 31. 
1049 Anonymous, ‘News Chronology’ (note 1047), p. 37. 
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According to one press report, US officials were not certain if the EMPTA 
was manufactured at the facility, stored there or shipped through the facility.1050 
This report, however, does not include the possibility that the soil sample 
analysis yielded a false positive result. 
 
Step 5. Draw Tentative Conclusisons About the Relative Likelihood of 
Each Hypothesis 
 
A key question is whether information is sufficient to permit accurate or 
otherwise useful ananlysis. Another important point is whether one should lean 
towards the ‘worst case scenario’ or remain passive until positive proof or strong 
evidence points to one hypothesis being correct over the other(s). 
This facility was constructed with the assistance of Western firms and 
onsite technical support staff. At least one of these technical support personnel 
strongly disagreed that the facility was producing VX or even had the technical 
capability to produce it. The facility was configured for as a mixing and 
packaging plant. It would be useful to clarify whether the United States did check 
with such officials prior to taking the decision to attack. A member of a UN 
peacekeeping unit in Sudan visited the al-Shifa site and took photos of a 
medicine box, an amoxonil bottle, as well as the remains of the facility and 
missiles.1051 
 
Step 6. Analyze Sensitvity of Conclusions 
 
Critical items of evidence may also serve as the ‘milestones’. The conclusion is 
that either hypothesis may be correct. ‘Thinking backwards’, the ‘crystal ball’, 
‘role playing’ and playing ‘devil’s advocate’ do not appear to be relevant to this 
case. 
Critical items include: Were the samples spiked by parties unknown (if so, 
how and why)? Also are there Western assumptions of steps a programme might 
take that are not necessarily applicable to all actors? 
Several thought patterns are apparent. Those who opposed the strikes have 
tended to emphasize the role of validated sampling and analysis protocols. Those 
who supported the strikes have emphasized the importance of the totality of the 
information, including from human sources. 
 
Step 7. Report Conclusions 
 
According to Toby Gati, ‘Shortly after I left government, the Clinton 
administration bombed the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in 1998. 
This proved to be a mistake. I had read an independent analysis that showed it 
was a mistake. This separate analysis was offered to the US government and to 
the intelligence community, but they refused to take it. They did not want to look 
                                                 
1050 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1051 Yannick Lemieux, ‘The Al-Shifa Pharmaceutical Factory’, <http://ptaff.ca/al-
shifa/?lang=en_CA>, (accessed 25 July 2013). Blog entry. The author appears to be a Canadian 
military officer who was posted to Sudan by the UN in 2005.  
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at it, did not want to analyze it, did not want to have anything to do with it’.1052 
Gati, who was the former US National Security Council (NSC) Senior Director 
of Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasian Affairs and worked as an Assistant Secretary of 
State for INR at the Department of State in 1993-1997, may be referring to a 
report that was sub-contracted by Kroll Associates.1053 
Milt Bearden, who worked as CIA station chief in Sudan in the mid-
1980s, stated ‘Look, if you’ve got intelligence sources that matters to protect, 
don’t worry about it. Bite the bullet, lay the intelligence on the table’. And ‘If 
you’ve got to move somebody up for safety, do that, but lay it on the table now. 
Let us see it. This is not going to go away. The doubts are not just lingering, 
they’re growing’.1054 
The US Department of State Sudan embassy website, as of January 2012, 
refers to the 1998 attack as follows: ‘In August 1998, in the wake of the East 
Africa Embassy bombings, the US launched cruise missile strikes against 
Khartoum’.1055 No further context is provided. 
 
Step 8. Identify Milestones 
 
The further declassification and release of information by Kroll Associates, 
Sudan and the US Government constitute, in a sense, ‘milestones’. 
In January 1996 the CIA reportedly formally withdrew over 100 reports 
on Sudan, many of which dealt with threats against US nationals in Sudan, after 
concluding that they were based on information provided by a single source who 
had provided the agency with false information.1056 This occurred shortly after 
the US had withdrawn many (perhaps all) of its diplomats and intelligence 
officials from the country.1057 This included shutting down the CIA station in 
Sudan.1058 According to one press report, ‘In late 1995, the CIA realized that a 
foreign male agent who had warned repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to US 
diplomats, spies and their children in Khartoum was fabricating information’.1059 
A second CIA source warned in 1995 that Lake was targeted for assassination by 
‘terrorists based in Sudan’.1060 Following the report, Lake reportedly moved to 
the Blair House and then to an undisclosed location for safety.1061 One Clinton 
administration official stated that ‘The threat to Tony Lake had a chilling effect 
                                                 
1052 Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Richard Goldstone, Toby Gati, M. E. ‘Spike’ Bowman, 
Douglas Feith and Kevin Whitelaw, ‘Intelligence and the Use of Force in the War on 
Terrorism’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), vol. 
98 (31 Mar.-3Apr. 2004), p. 152. 
1053 Elizabeth Rindskopf-Parker, Richard Goldstone, Toby Gati, M. E. ‘Spike’ Bowman, 
Douglas Feith and Kevin Whitelaw (note 1052), p. 148. 
1054 Oriana Zill, ‘The Controversial US Retaliatory Missile Strikes’, PBS Frontline, 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/retaliation.html>, 
(accessed 3 Jan. 2012). 
1055 Embassy of the United States, Khartoum, Sudan, ‘US-Sudan Relations’ (note 981). 
1056 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1057 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1058 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1059 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1060 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1061 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
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on the National Security Council’.1062 However, the source of the assassination 
threat was not ‘verified or corroborated’.1063 The possibility that such personal 
threats may have had on White House deliberations should be noted. 
 
14.5. Implications 
 
One question regarding response strategies to al-Qaeda is whether to modify 
policy if some individuals act against ‘official’ al-Qaeda policy. For example, if 
it is determined that al-Qaeda policy is not to engage in certain types of activities, 
and a person claiming to be acting on behalf of al-Qaeda does engage in such 
types of activity anyway. 
A differentiation challenge for AQ exists in the sense that external 
communication and response strategies are not necessarily consistent with those 
necessary (or perceived to be necessary) to maintain internal ideological 
coherence. 
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger told PBS Frontline ‘Well, I 
believe we had solid knowledge that this facility was associated with chemical 
weapons’.1064 The day following the strike he was quoted as saying the facility 
was ‘producing chemical weapons’.1065 
The US news investigative organization Frontline identified two major 
problems with the US case. ‘First, a test on a soil sample that the administration 
says proves the plant was involved in chemical weapons production is, according 
to many experts, inconclusive. The chemical which was found, Empta, is a 
precursor to create nerve gas. But, experts say, Empta breaks down quickly and 
can be confused with other less harmful chemicals. Despite repeated tests by 
others, including lawyers for the plant owner, there have been no independent 
confirmations of the US government’s soil test’.1066 Frontline went on ‘Secondly, 
the Clinton administration has failed to demonstrate a solid financial link 
between the plant and bin Laden. They initially claimed that the plant was owned 
by the Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation, yet the plant had actually been 
sold to a Saudi millionaire, Saleh Idris, several months before the attack. The 
private investigative firm of Kroll and Associates has found no solid financial 
link between bin Laden and Idris’.1067 
According to one estimate, the facility produced more than half of the 
country’s human and veterinary medicines, including drugs against cholera, 
malaria and tularemia.1068 People involved in the construction of the plant 
included a UK engineer from Hexham, England. He helped to construct and 
equip the facility and worked there as a technical manager for 4 years and who 
claimed that the facility did not have the equipment necessary to produce VX. 
The engineer was subsequently interviewed by UK television that also showed 
                                                 
1062 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1063 Weiner and Risen (note 979). 
1064 Zill (note 1054). 
1065 Zill (note 1054). 
1066 Zill (note 1054). 
1067 Zill (note 1054). 
1068 Ousman (note 978), p. 96. Ousman does not provide any source for this information. 
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footage of some of the equipment.1069 Implications for strategic analysis and IR 
theory are provided in Chapter 15. 
                                                 
1069 Sean Gabb, ‘International Terrorism and Sudan: a Brief Discussion’, The Sudan 
Foundation (1997), <http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/fact004htm> (dead link). Ousman (note 
978), ref. 128. Gabb, a former director of the Sudan Foundation, is a British libertarian. The 
website is delinked. His personal website is <http://www.seangabb.co.uk/>, (accessed 25 July 
2013). Also personal communication, Sep. 2013. 
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15 
 
 
 
TOWARDS A STRATEGIC THEORETICAL 
APPLICATION OF ACH IN THE ASSESSMENT OF 
POTENTIAL CHEMICAL WARFARE ACTIVITIES IN 
ARMS CONTROL AND INTELLIGENCE STUDIES 
 
 
his study considers whether the application of a hybrid, qualitative and 
CW-focused formulation of ACH directed towards arms control 
verification and intelligence practice can inform a strategic and defence 
analysis, including with respect to neoliberal institutionalism and realism. As 
previously mentioned, ACH tends to focus on procedure, process and technique, 
rather than on achieving a broader understanding of the behaviour of states and 
policies to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. This reflects 
a continued gap between intelligence practice and academic theory.1070 
T 
The case study results are summarized. Then the variation of ACH as 
developed by this study is considered in terms of the research questions posed 
earlier: 
(a) the motivations of actors to pursue CW programmes and activities, 
(b) the relevance of the present study for strategic and defence studies, 
(c) ways to integrate ACH into arms control verification, and 
(d) the identification of major elements of a strategic theoretical 
application of ACH in arms control verification and intelligence 
analysis.1071 
In so doing, the gap between intelligence art and academic theory is 
narrowed. 
 
15.1. Case Study Results 
 
ACH has been applied to three case studies that demonstrate operational aspects 
of intelligence analysis and arms control verification. Important linkages to 
policymaking, including for international peace and security, have been 
highlighted. All are hindsight analyses having continued analytical—including 
theoretical—relevance. The explanatory and predictive capacity of this model is 
tested against three case studies. Major attributes and analytical implications 
include the following. 
1. Soviet case study. This is a classical strategic military intelligence 
analysis application. It is a traditional intelligence ‘mystery’1072 that later helped 
to inform strategic nuclear force analyses and IR deterrence theory. 
                                                 
1070 Marrin (note 19). 
1071 See Chapter 1. 
1072 See Table 6.5. 
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Contemporary relevance for analytical techniques includes the role of cognitive 
biases, and lessons-learned during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. 
2. Iraq case study. This is a ‘non-standard’ arms control verification case 
(i.e., multilateral arms control in a non-cooperative environment backed by 
implicit—sometimes explicit—threat of military force).1073 It is of historical, and 
contemporary analytical relevance. It has elements of both an intelligence 
‘mystery’ and ‘puzzle’.1074 It presents two distinct CW assessment processes: a 
state-based intelligence process that took a mainly worst-case scenario approach 
(within the context of a broader preferred political policy preference to attack 
Iraq) versus a more legally-nuanced and politically ambiguous scenario 
assessment process (with a potential attendant risk of the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ of acceptable reporting being generated). The former assessment 
process was driven to an extent by the classical ‘cost of failure’ and ‘no time’ 
factors that are often encountered in intelligence assessments production.1075 
Fingar observes that while worst-case scenario planning in intelligence 
estimates is appropriate for military planning purposes, it can be 
counterproductive when applied to ‘nonmilitary issues’.1076 He cites the 2002 US 
NIE on Iraq as an example where the worst case scenario approach was 
counterproductive because the context in which the main question to be 
addressed was posed (‘What do we know about Saddam’s WMD capabilities and 
intentions?’) was, in practice, transformed into a military capabilities question 
due to the political atmosphere of Washington at the time which was one of 
preparing for war.1077 Thus, for example, unless the probability that Iraq had 
chemical weapons was zero, it was difficult for the US intelligence community to 
minimize or exclude the possibility of their existence or use against US 
forces.1078 
3. Non-state actor case study. This is a law enforcement target and 
military intelligence case within the context of what, during the Administration 
of George W. Bush, became the US-led global war on terror (GWOT) policy 
context. The case has more the character of an intelligence mystery. As with the 
Iraq case study, it exhibits the dichotomy between inconsistent and potentially 
competing—in terms of purpose and narrative—assessments by state intelligence 
services and multilateral arms control verification assessments, respectively. The 
national intelligence assessments were perhaps mainly predicated on the 
assumption that an adversary must be defeated, while the multilateral arms 
control verification process would have been at least partly informed by a desire 
by the international legal regime (with support or opposition of some states) to 
bring a targeted state’s behaviour into compliance with international law (after 
first confirming the non-compliance). 
The al-Shifa case was also a non-standard intelligence target in that a mix 
of state and non-state actors were looked at in the assessment process. In a 
somewhat similar manner to Iraq, the verification task was heavily informed by 
                                                 
1073 The two other main cases are Germany in the post-World War I period, and the 2013 
developments regarding the internationally verified destruction of CW in Syria. 
1074 See Table 6.5. 
1075 Ben-Israel (note 407). 
1076 Fingar (note 25), p. 72. 
1077 Fingar (note 25), pp. 73–74. 
1078 Fingar (note 25), p. 74. 
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sampling and analysis (which ought not be be susceptible to misinterpretation 
motivated by political preferances, but was also not the sole basis for the net US 
assessment) having longer-term relevance to both national intelligence and 
multilateral arms control verification. As with Iraq, this case displays an 
interaction between various international actors where CW production is alleged. 
Two key questions in this regard include the extent to which arms control 
regimes (such as the UN Secretary-General investigative mechanism, and the 
OPCW) can or should be engaged. How, for example, can or should national 
security priorities shape or prevent such engagement? More generally how can 
national, regional and international security priorities interact with arms control 
regimes and other international legal norms in the consideration of whether and 
how to use military force? 
Assessments for all three cases have almost certainly been occasionally 
hampered by a lack of understanding of organizational and national cultures. All 
arms control verification and national intelligence assessments are subject to 
varying degrees of uncertainty in the absence of a ‘smoking gun’ proving non-
compliance.1079 
 
15.2. Motivations 
 
This study provides no clear insight into motivations of states and non-state 
actors to acquire or use chemical weapons. This suggests the hybrid form of 
ACH presented here is not suited to addressing this question. It rather provides a 
structured method to achieve iterative improvements in understanding of a state 
or non-state actor’s capabilities and intentions. 
It also assists in providing a better understanding of the specific types of 
threats posed by non-state actors. Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner observe, for 
example, that in order to improve understanding of whether and how terrorism 
can be deterred requires inter alia ‘mapping the interaction effects between the 
processes of deterrence and terrorism’.1080 This is because the ‘logic of 
terrorism’ and that of traditional deterrence are distinct. Deterrence of non-state 
actors is only one pillar of overarching counter-terrorism strategies. There may 
be trade-offs between, and feedback loops and various other interactions among 
the pillars as the overarching strategy is implemented.1081 A CW application of 
ACH can, in principle, help to inform analyses of how such pillars might be best 
carried out for various non-state actors who contemplate the use or threat of use 
of such weapons. Such an application of ACH could also help to inform the 
nature of the interaction effects between the logic of terrorism and the logic of 
traditional deterrence (the latter being mostly done in the Cold War nuclear 
weapons context).1082 
                                                
The incentives for states to pursue offensive CW programmes continue to 
shrink. This is partly reflected by the fact that the CWC currently has 190 
 
1079 Allan S. Krass, Verification: How Much is Enough? (Taylor & Francis: London, 1985). 
1080 Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, ‘Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward’, p. 315 in 
Wenger and Wilner (note 290). 
1081 Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, ‘Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward’, p. 315 in 
Wenger and Wilner (note 290). 
1082 Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, ‘Deterring Terrorism: Moving Forward’, p. 315 in 
Wenger and Wilner (note 290). 
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member states all of whom—in the view of the membership overall—are largely 
in good standing of their treaty obligations.1083 More specifically, CWC 
implementation has resulted in one initially undeclared stockpile being declared 
by Libya (following quiet pressure by other CWC States Parties), an 
internationally unsuspected stockpile being subsequently declared by Albania (at 
a half-forgotten storage site constructed by the previous regime), and a number of 
informal consultations among the member states that have generally been 
satisfactory to the parties concerned regarding the completeness and accuracy of 
declarations made to the OPCW. More generally, CW are usually viewed as 
obsolete and unethical for inclusion (overtly or otherwise) in states’ military 
doctrines. 
In addition, ‘new wars’ tend to be mobile and dispersed. As such, the type 
of CW agents of interest and associated doctrine could be closer to the 
requirements of special forces operations (which may not require ‘lethal’ agents). 
Some states have contemplated eliminating their military forces altogether in 
favour of upgraded police units, while other states have, in effect, militarized 
their police units in terms of equipment and training.1084 
More broadly, the main future focus of ACH with respect to states should, 
in practice, be on the potential risk that some states may attempt to retain a 
standby offensive CW programme or that S&T developments will result in the 
development of non-standard chemical and/or biological warfare agents. ACH is 
well-suited to these analytical tasks in that it assists in clarifying the various 
ambiguities associated with distinguishing defence and offensive programmes 
and activity, respectively. This partly assumes that the matrices are reasonably 
comprehensive and manageable for either a single analyst or larger cooperating 
groups of analysts. 
John Hirst argues that states are more likely to obey international norms 
and regulations and that they are the ‘main vehicles for political accountability’ 
and the ‘principal means whereby international agencies can be supervised’.1085 
He also argues that the state donates legitimacy upwards and downwards, 
including to UN-type organizations and their associated legal regimes (which 
possess normative behavioural objectives both stated and de facto or 
implicit).1086 Efforts by states to engage in deterrence or behaviour modification 
against non-state actors may have limited effect in view of the fact that the 
international legal system has been developed and implemented in an inter-state 
context. Nevertheless, efforts made within the multilateral arms control and 
strategic trade controls context have devoted much attention since 2001 to trying 
to ensure that international legal obligations are effectively implemented, 
including with respect to non-state and transnational actors. 
 
                                                 
1083 Two longstanding relevant points here is the distinction between a technical and 
fundamental treaty violation, and whether a single serious violation is sufficient to 
fundamentally undermine the treaty regime. 
1084 See, for e.g., Georg Mader, ‘Defence Minister: Austrian Military Unaffordable’, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly (2 Apr. 2014), p. 16. 
1085 Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 21st Century (Polity Press: 2001 (reprinted 2004), 
Oxford), p. 132. 
1086 Hirst (note 1085), p. 133. 
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15.2.1. Addressing Religously-inspired Non-state Actor Threats in the 
Context of the Third Case Study 
 
The principal ideological point with which to counteract militant Islamism is on 
religious legitimacy. Saudi Arabia maintains such a programme in its prison 
population. The reading of novels and philosophy can also undermine strict 
Wahhabists’ faith. The latter because, as Salafists themselves state, philosophy 
‘does not accept the overriding authority of God and His law’.1087 For example, 
in 1993 Mansour Al-Nogaidan was released under a Saudi pardon after serving 
less than 2 years of a 16-year sentence for the bombing of a video shop. He 
reluctantly agreed to look at a book offered to him by his half-brother: 
Construction of the Arab Mind, by Mohamed Abid Al-Jabiri. Al-Jabiri, of the Al-
Azhar religious university in Cairo, compares the Koran with philosophical ideas 
from classical Greek and Persian philosophical works.1088 
Salman Rushdie has characterized ‘fundamentalist Islam’ as ‘highly-
politicized, very radical interpretation of Islam’.1089 The rhetoric must be 
counter-acted by the Muslims as well as the means of dissemination, including 
the indoctrination from madrassas whom Rushdie has labeled ‘the seedbed’. 
Terrorist main players are generally middle class (not poor or ‘uneducated’ per 
se).1090 Atran argues that violent Islamic-inspired groups have tended to become 
less educated over time. 
Some efforts to assess CW threats posed by non-state actors is based on 
analysis of Internet traffic, including attempts to uncover social networks. Non-
state actors are often decentralized. This includes attempts to identify key 
players, who are often lower level such as drivers and guides. Low-level people 
may be prominent in social networks because of the degree of their 
‘connectiveness’. Attempts have been made to discover the ‘structural 
signatures’ that indicate the degree of ‘connectiveness’ of group participants. 
This includes tracking short phone calls sent just prior to or just after an 
operation is taken.1091 
The Internet has facilitated the Islamist recruitment, strategy development 
and attack planning. It should be noted that some Islamic authorities have issued 
fatwas against the use of the Internet at all.1092 However, the Internet is also a 
powerful (and perhaps overlooked) tool of surveillance. It can allow 
governments, companies and individuals to probe widely and deeply into the 
actual and possible political views and habits of individuals (e.g., expenditure, 
travel, associations). The Internet also provides AQ-sympathizers an opportunity 
to challenge the orthodoxy of the leading figures of the movement. The Internet 
is allowing individuals to more easily and systematically review all the major 
(and minor) strands of Islamic jurisprudence and historical events. This poses a 
challenge, in particular for separating religious commands contained in the Koran 
                                                 
1087 Lacy (note 1023), p. 175. 
1088 Lacy (note 1023), pp. 174–175. 
1089 Salman Rushdie, Interview by Allan Gregg (Oct. 2002),  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_LdgehMw3r4>, minute 7.27,  (accessed 8 July 2013). 
1090 Rushdie (note 1089), minute 11:00. 
1091 ‘Untangling the Social Web’ (note 231), p. 13. 
1092 Anonymous, ‘Islam and Technology: the Online Ummah’, Economist, vol. 404, no. 8798 
(18–24 Aug. 2012), p. 47. 
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and the Hadith from tradition (i.e., practice), to established religious 
authority.1093 
One possible (proxy) indicator of a shift away from violent extremism is 
the degree to which alchohol is accepted or even religiously sanctioned.1094 
Another proxy indicator for this could be the nature and extent of alchoholism in 
Muslim majority countries. 
Finally, Omand provides an illustrative list of the type of protected but 
unclassified information that can be useful to those investigating non-state actors 
(see Table 15.1). 
Table 15.1 Relevant data type for the evaluation of non-state actor threats 
 
-The identities, and aliases, of those suspected of supporting or engaging in terrorism and their past 
personal history and criminal record. 
-Biometric details identifying the root identity of terrorist suspects. 
-The location of terrorist suspects. 
-Their patterns of behaviour and association. 
-The aspirations and operational planning of suspected terrorists. 
-Their modus operandi for attacks. 
-Their counter-surveillance understanding and measures they take. 
-The movements of suspected terrorists. 
-The logistics, training and financing of their networks. 
-Uncovering their target reconnaissance and target selection. 
-Recruitment and communication activities including active use of the internet. 
-The belief systems of terrorist groups. 
-The attitudes and policies of other relevant countries. 
-Mutations, developments and fissures in the threat. 
 
Source: David Omand, Securing the State (Hurst & Company: London, 2010), p. 29. 
15.3. Relevance for Strategic and Defence Studies 
 
ACH must contribute to interpretation and generalization of data.1095 ACH 
should also ideally permit the development of useful hypotheses, as well as the 
testing of generalizations (as social science should permit more broadly). 
A fundamental methodological difficulty in the social sciences is the 
dichotomy between ‘individualizing’ versus ‘generalizing’. The generalizing 
principles are progressively undermined as one more closely evaluates specific 
cases. Therefore, intervening variables must increasingly be added to the analysis 
as one ‘drills down’ into the specifics of case studies. Adding such variables—
which function as caveats to the general ‘principle’ or ‘law’ being developed—
undermines the ‘generalizability’ of the analysis at the higher strategic or 
theoretical level. When academics and government analysts work with the same 
information (i.e., the existence of classified information does not result in the two 
communities using different data sets or information bases), this dichotomy of 
                                                 
1093 Anonymous, ‘Islam and Technology: the Online Ummah’ (note 1092), p. 47. 
1094 For a summary of alcohol consumption patterns, alcholism and the potential 
acceptability of drinking beer and hard spirits in Muslim majority, see Anonymous, ‘Islam and 
Alchohol: Tipsy Taboo’, Economist, vol. 404, no. 8798 (18–24 Aug. 2012), p. 48. 
1095 The importance of interpretation and generalization are emphasized by Knorr in his 
discussion about the perceived lack of relevance of the social sciences in the [US] intelligence 
community in the early 1960s. Knorr (note 6), p. 12. 
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individualizing and generalizing is perhaps the principal reason for the gap 
between intelligence practice (and relevance) and academic research. 
Thus, Marrin observes: 
‘Even though the benefits of these kinds of structured analytic techniques 
have yet to be proven, and many analysts do not use them for a variety of 
different reasons, teaching these structured methods could be beneficial 
since having a structured approach to assessing a problem is better than 
no structure at all. In terms of teaching, there is value to familiarizing 
analysts and future analysts with the rudimentary science of the field. But 
it is also important to take a step back and ask how structured intelligence 
analysis should be, and whether or not that structure will actually lead to 
improved analysis. While there may be benefits to the teaching of 
structured analytic techniques, in terms of practice or application the 
approach should be more circumspect. In particular, mandating use of 
structured methods is problematic given the general intuitive approach 
that analysts use and the relative pausity of data showing that structured 
techniques would improve accuracy. Instead, more time, money, and effort 
should be devoted to developing the capacity to evaluate the utility of 
these approaches rather than just to developing, teaching, or using 
them’.1096 
Conversely, any principles (or ‘laws’) developed at the higher strategic or 
theoretical level tend to lose their applicability or relevance when (or if) they are 
applied to actual cases so as to reflect operational aspects of the intelligence 
cycle and the like. 
Giovanni Sartori recommends that this problem of relating universals to 
particulars be addressed by organizing categories of the analysis along a ‘ladder 
of abstraction’ which connects upward aggregation and downward 
specification.1097 This results in an inverse relationship between two types of 
concepts: those which are mainly characterized by connotation (intension) and 
those that are mainly characterized by denotation (extension).1098 At the strategic 
or theoretical level, the characteristics and properties of the concepts should be 
reduced. The analysis at the case study level should, by contrast, be ‘contextually 
adequate’.1099 
In a similar vein, Knorr states: ‘While the social scientist forms general 
hypotheses about classes of events, the intelligence officer must form particular 
hypotheses about a concrete stream of events’.1100 For the intelligence context, 
Knorr cites four characteristics of theoretical work in the social sciences that are 
directly relevant to intelligence requirements: 
                                                 
1096 Marrin (note 19), pp. 79–80. 
1097 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, p. 159 in Eds. David Collier and John 
Gerring, Concepts and Method in Social Science: the Tradition of Giovanni Sartori (Routledge: 
London, 2009). 
1098 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, p. 160 in Collier and Gerring (note 
1097). 
1099 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, p. 160 in Collier and Gerring (note 
1097). 
1100 Knorr (note 6), p. 26. 
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(a) the interpretation of data seeks to replace intuition and ‘common 
sense’ with new and ‘more sophisticated’ concepts and tested hypotheses, 
(b) the social scientist engages in prediction when he or she attempts to 
state and explain why two or more variables are necessarily associated, 
(c) the social scientist begins by observing actual events, selecting 
variables of interest and which (if successful) are ‘critical’ in explaining a 
large number of variables in a class of events, and 
(d) resorting to the abstract increases the generalizibility of the analysis 
but often at a cost of making it less useful to policymakers and 
intelligence officers.1101 
ACH acts as such a ‘ladder of abstraction’—both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. It also adds ‘contextual adequacy’ to the case studies. 
 
15.4. Integration of ACH into Arms Control Verification 
 
A key factor to the possible integration of any intelligence assessment 
methodology is its political acceptability in the multilateral arms control and 
disarmament context. To an extent, this sensitivity can be met through the use of 
alternate terminology. To suggest this implies avoiding explicit discussion of 
national intelligence and such terms must probably be avoided. The acceptability 
of such a methodology is also dependent on how such a system is introduced 
within this environment procedurally. Its application could, for example, be 
employed for background information and training purposes, while analyses of 
actual cases could be produced under the responsibility of individual member 
states subject to a secretariat validation or review process. 
Acceptability of analytical techniques and how they are used to inform 
higher-level geopolitical analysis within international treaty regimes is also a 
function of implementation practice. The former ACDA legal advisor Thomas 
Graham Jr. argues: 
‘Under generally accepted rules of international law on treaty 
implementation, treaties are interpreted on the basis of the language of 
the text, and where the treaty language is ambiguous the treaty language 
should be understood as reflected by the practice of the parties in 
implementing the treaty, referred to as “subsequent practice.” Recourse 
can be had to the negotiating record only on a secondary basis to help 
clear up issues that the treaty text and subsequent practice do not resolve. 
Subsequent practice under international law is considered far more 
authoritative than the negotiating history, since practice reflects the 
understanding of [the] states as they carry out their obligations, while all 
negotiating records are by their nature somewhat confusing. As the ebb 
and flow of the discussion goes on, different people record this or that in 
their own way’.1102 
Graham also supports the position that under international legal rules, 
treaties are ‘interpreted on the basis of plain meaning of the text in light of any 
                                                 
1101 Knorr (note 6), pp. 13–16. 
1102 Graham Jr. (note 284), pp. 152–153. 
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subsequent practice’.1103 Within the CWC context, a dichotomy exists between 
those who refer to the intent of the drafters of the treaty and those who largely 
dismiss this by arguing the treaty should be read ‘as is’. In practice, which 
position a delegation takes partly depends on its negotiating position or preferred 
outcome. Usually a delegation’s position is informed to a great extent by a desire 
to limit the cost, scope and level of intrusiveness of the treaty regime. 
Finally, the matrices should also be modified partly with a view to 
addressing deterrence of non-state actor questions. Evaluations of state behaviour 
have long been provided within a framework grand military strategy or 
international relations theory. Evaluations of non-state actors (who may or may 
not interact with state actors—officially or unofficially) are more the domain of 
cognitive psychology and the study of predicting human decisionmaking, 
including on the basis of brain science.1104 
 
15.5. Towards a Strategic Theoretical Application 
 
For a theory to have strategic relevance, it must explain a unit’s behavior. The 
standard categories (or ‘images’) in political science are the individual, the state 
and the international system. Analysis on the ‘individual unit’ focuses on 
discovering the cause of events among individuals or small groups with decision-
making power or influence over decision-making. Carried to its logical 
conclusion, great leaders shape world events. Analyses that focus on the state 
seek to find causes for events within the nature of the states. Systemic-level 
analyses seek to find causes for events from inter alia the role and actions of 
states and their interrelationships within the international system. If truly 
successful, the analytical framework that is attempting to earn the title ‘theory’ 
should have predictive power. Linking operational-level detail with strategic 
analysis is desirable for weapon systems analysis in a strategic and defence 
studies context. A good theory should fit the facts as they are understood and 
may be said to be successful when new information or facts (as they become 
available) do not contradict it (ACH is explicitly structured to do this). A theory 
becomes accepted if it explains or facilitates understanding of existing facts or 
developments. An additional (but non-essential) criterion for a theory to be 
successful is if it is predictive of new facts or developments. 
 
15.5.1. Intelligence Theory and Praxis 
 
Intelligence officials must concern themselves with the details of events and 
cases, and attempt to make specific predictions regarding particular events or 
developments.1105 Social scientists, by contrast, are more apt to concern 
themselves with discovering and testing a limited number of variables that are 
more broadly generalizable (such variables therefore possess inherently less 
predictive value in any particular circumstance).1106 Knorr also observes that 
                                                 
1103 Graham Jr. (note 284), p. 160. 
1104 E.g., through through the neurophysiological study of brain function, including through 
MRI mapping. 
1105 Knorr (note 6), pp. 16–17. 
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there is some justice to the observation that historians and intelligence officers 
are both ‘confronted with continuous gradations of facts and possibilities’ and 
seek to achieve a ‘contextual approach’ that appreciates ‘the flow of events in 
their wholeness’.1107 This is in contrast to various forms of reductionism 
whereby greater significance can sometimes be attached to the parts of the whole 
while losing sight of their cumulative or overall significance. Practitioners of the 
natural and engineering sciences not infrequently exhibit the latter 
characteristics. 
Knorr also observes that both historians and intelligence officers must 
derive meaning from incomplete (and even unknowable) information.1108 
Simultaneously, Knorr argues that the work of social scientists is also relevant 
partly because of their focus on developing and using indicators for the purpose 
of inference in order to explain developments and their interaction, such as 
economic conditions and social stability.1109 He also reiterates the potential 
relevance to intelligence practitioners of employing medical procedure decision 
flow charts as a mechanism by which it has been shown that mistakes even by 
leading physicians and nurses can be significantly reduced.1110 Some social 
science indicators are of immediate utility to intelligence practioners in and of 
themselves (e.g., economic indices and opinion polls).1111 
Two dichotomies in intelligence analysis are tactical versus strategic and 
puzzle versus mystery.1112 Mysteries include numbers of tanks or classified 
economic data. Many international policy questions, by contrast, can be called 
mysteries because they depend on understanding the intention of others (which is 
often problematic) or have no particular ‘answer’ because the questions are so 
broad, fundamental or geopolitical in nature. Such questions include: Will North 
Korea adhere to a nuclear agreement with the United States and will China 
continue its rapid economic growth or fragment?1113 Treverton suggests that 
while solving puzzles in the Cold War era depended greatly on the collection of 
secret information, attempting to come to grips with (or to clarify) mysteries 
depends more on achieving a proper understanding of open information.1114  
Treverton also cautions that, for many intelligence analysts, if the 
information is not on the computer it does not exist.1115 To illustrate, he notes 
that the CIA’s Office of Trans-National Security, Trade and Technology not 
infrequently yielded analyses that were inferior to private sector economic 
                                                 
1107 Knorr (note 6), p. 17. 
1108 Knorr (note 6), p. 19. 
1109 Knorr (note 6), p. 20. 
1110 Knorr (note 6), p. 27. 
1111 Knorr (note 6), p. 22. 
1112 Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, p. 125 in Goodman, 
Treverton and Zelikow (note 20). 
1113 The questions, with minor modification, are given as examples by Treverton. See 
Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, p. 107 in Goodman, Treverton 
and Zelikow (note 20). 
1114 Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, pp. 107–108 in 
Goodman, Treverton and Zelikow (note 20). 
1115 Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, p. 110 in Goodman, 
Treverton and Zelikow (note 20). 
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reporting.1116 Treverton also observes that, in the traditional US Cold War 
context, ‘conventional wisdom assumed that intelligence should not get too close 
to policy lest it be “politicized”—that is, have its detached objectivity tainted by 
the stakes of policy and policy makers….intelligence pays little price for 
irrelevance. It does, by contrast, pay a price for “politicization,” for being seen to 
cross—or be pushed—across the line from objectivity to argument, for “joining 
the policy team.”’1117 
NIEs are ‘the most authoritative judgements’ of the US intelligence 
community.1118 Fingar cautions that NIEs are not predictions, but rather more 
meant to flag (offer ‘signposts’) that will help policy and decisionmakers to 
understand the nature and course developments and main trends (‘trajectories’) in 
order possibly ‘reinforce, stall, or deflect’ changes.1119 Fingar also observes that 
NIEs are distinct from academic studies. NIEs attempt to explain what might 
occur ‘under partially or largely unknown conditions’, while academic studies 
employ historical data where outcomes are known.1120 
Intelligence estimates typically do not explain why the ‘consensus’ 
conclusions are valid. Jervis notes that estimates generally contain assertions, 
rather than evidence-based arguments and that ‘Often it is only their inherent 
plausibility that would lead one to accept the conclusions’.1121 
Finally, there are limits to which analysts can identify and determine a 
variety of problematic aspects of human attitudes and behaviour including: (a) 
what constitutes logical or rational action, and (b) whether and to what extent 
historical events are ‘deterministic’ in the consideration of current trends and 
prediction. It should also be noted that intelligence failures are public, while the 
successes are generally not made public.1122 
 
15.5.2. Security Dilemma and Security Deficit 
 
Security requirements and threat perceptions can be considered in terms of a 
‘security dilemma’ which has been characterized as the ‘perennial dilemma of 
world politics’ and defined as ‘the irresolvable uncertainty state B faces when 
interpreting state A’s weapons acquisition programme’—including whether the 
programme is ‘defensive’ or ‘offensive’.1123 Internal political requirements and 
one’s own capabilities and intentions may not be driven by a desire to determine 
State A’s intentions and capabilities. For example, State B may consider the 
possible benefits to itself in declaring State A’s programme to be offensive or 
                                                 
1116 Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, p. 110 in Goodman, 
Treverton and Zelikow (note 20). 
1117 Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Intelligence Since the Cold War’s End’, pp. 121–122 in 
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1119 Fingar (note 25), p. 74. 
1120 Fingar (note 25), p. 75. 
1121 Jervis (note 399), p. 47. 
1122 John F. Kennedy told Allen Dulles ‘Your successes are unheralded, your failures are 
trumpeted’. Dulles (note 90), p. 5. 
1123 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Identity/Security’, p. 85 in Ed. J. Peter Burgess, The Routledge Handbook 
of New Security Studies (Abingdon, Oxon, United Kingdom, 2010). 
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defensive, thus signalling, for example, that it does not fear State A’s 
programme. 
The logic of the Cold War arms race was for State B to assume that the 
other state’s programmes were offensive. It therefore begins or accelerates its 
own corresponding (or ‘functionally equivalent’) weapon programme which, in 
turn, eventually results in greater insecurity for both states.1124 Schelling and 
Halperin have also observed, in a bilateral arms control context, that ‘Limitations 
on particular weapons may enhance each side’s interest in the other’s research 
and development of new weapons’.1125 
Today the security calculus has more variables partly because of the 
possible role of non-state actors and a blurring of technical signatures associated 
with traditional state military programmes. Some programmes are more 
straightforward than others. Interpretation is too frequently influenced by the 
worst-case scenario approach only. 
Various attempts have also been made to recharacterize ideological 
convictions or descriptions of processes affecting the formation of ‘identity 
perceptions’ in order to circumvent the security dilemma or at least to begin to 
frame the discussion in a manner which can be put into practical effect. The 
operational goal would be to limit or prevent processes of reactive weapon 
system acquisition. Such efforts focus on definitions of terms whose significance 
at the operational level is often unclear and perhaps irrelevant.1126 
Other factors related to security dilemma considerations include force 
structure, industrial structure and the incorporation of weapon systems into 
military doctrine and the degree to which command and control can be utilised to 
implement political and military objectives.1127 
 
15.5.3. The Overall Role of Intelligence Cold War Assessments of Soviet 
CW Stockpile 
 
The ongoing periodic assessment of Soviet World War II CW capabilities and 
intentions helped to inform the consideration of the proper role of nuclear 
deterrence during the Cold War. 
Maddrell states that German chemical warfare experts—probably Hirsch 
and Ochsner—on Soviet doctrine that continued to be relied on until Oleg 
Penkovsky was recruited.1128 Col. Oleg Vladimirovich Penkovsky, a well-
connected officer in the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Chief 
                                                 
1124 Since the 1960s, Julian Perry Robinson and, more recently, Jean Pascal Zanders have 
incorporated variations of the concept of functional equivalence in a chemical and biological 
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from Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York City, 
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1127 For a review of the security dilemma literature and a framework for applying it outside a 
traditional interstate context, see Paul Roe, ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as 
a “Tragedy”?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 2 (1999), pp. 183–202. 
1128 JS/JTIC(49)70, ‘Russian Chemical Warfare Equipment’, 7/9/1949, DEFE 41/150; Capt. 
Hogwood, MI10B Conference 1952, DEFE 41/126. As cited by Maddrell (note 129), p. 24. 
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Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, worked for the UK and US 
intelligence in the early 1960s.1129 He played a key role in informing the UK and 
US of Soviet capabilities and intentions during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In 
April 1961 he travelled the UK as head of a trade mission during which time SIS 
and CIA officers debriefed him.1130 Penkovsky was arrested in late 1962 and was 
executed in 1963.1131 Most of his revelations are summarized in The Penkovsky 
Papers (1966). His contribution on the chemical side is not so well-known and 
forms a very small part of the work. Declassified transcripts of his meetings with 
the British and US intelligence in the UK are available via a US academic library 
system digitial declassified documents database. 
The US understood Soviet strategic and tactical military doctrine on 
nuclear and chemical weapons in the 1960s to be linked. A 1969 NIE discusses 
doctrine linkages and overlap between these two weapon types only (i.e., 
radiological and biological weapon discussion is absent in the assessment).1132 
This NIE also stated ‘Although CW was not used during World War II, the 
Soviets had an ample supply of chemical munitions and required no assistance in 
this respect from their allies’.1133 It also estimated the Soviet CW stockpile to be 
‘on the order of 275,000 tons, but there is recent evidence which suggests that 
this figure may be high’.1134 The recent evidence may have come from 
Penkovsky. The NIE estimate also perhaps includes munition weight. Since the 
opening of signature of the CWC and its entry into force, the estimates states 
have provided have usually been for agent weight only. This gives a lower and 
therefore more politically acceptable figure. It is also what the CWC requires. 
The Soviet delegation to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) also tabled 
an official paper on the results of the 1987 confidence-building visit to Shikhany 
and associated literature. In 1987 the Soviets hosted more than 130 
representatives from 45 countries at Shikhany.1135 Some argued that the CW 
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YOGA. 
1130 Stephen Twigge, Edward Hampshire and Graham Macklin, British Intelligence: Secrets, 
Spies and Sources (The National Archives: Kew, United Kingdom, 2008), p. 99. 
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Viktor Suvurov, Aquarium: the Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy (Hamish 
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R. Schlesinger), Spycraft: the Secret History of the CIA’s Spytechs from Communism to Al-
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1132 Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities, NIE report no. 11-11-69 (CIA: 13 
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1133 Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities (note 1132), p. 1. This assessment 
presumably reflects the UK and US consultation on CW-related matters, including any possible 
requests by the Soviet side for assistance under, for example, the Lend Lease cooperation 
framework. 
1134 Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities (note 1132), p. 5. 
1135 ‘Letter dated 16 December 1987 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a working 
paper entitled “Information on the presentation at the Shikhany military facility of standard 
chemical munitions and of technology for the destruction of chemical weapons at a mobile 
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displayed were not state-of-the-art and that no binary or multi-component CW 
munitions were displayed.1136 The Soviet Union did not declare binary CW to 
the OPCW when it acceded to the CWC. 
                                                                                                                                              
In general, in the context of Western monitoring of Soviet weapons 
research during the Cold War, the US military and industrial R&D analyst 
Russell J. Bowen has argued that, provided the USSR only possessed ‘limited 
numbers of key weapons technologists and related specialists’, it should have 
been possible ‘to trace certain aspects of complex weapons development 
programs through such individuals. Thus, personalities and technical 
communications are much more important to weapons development than to the 
production phase, where the predominance of managerial personnel and 
administrative communications provide greater opportunity for disguising the 
nature of an operation’.1137 Bowen also observed that the ‘quite practical nature’ 
of work carried out by Soviet design bureaus required them to work closely with 
a wide range of organizations, as opposed to research institutes that focused on 
‘theoretical and applied-research aspects of over-all [weapon] systems’.1138 This 
is because research institutes tended to focus on paper studies and preliminary 
laboratory work.1139 
Bowen also observed that, because information was the ‘lifeblood’ of 
military R&D, any understanding of how the Soviet ‘information centers’ were 
utilised by facilities and personnel could, in principle, serve as a check on 
weapons development work—at least in a theoretical arms control verification 
context.1140 Finally, in a Cold War arms control context at least, any verification 
regime that was capable of evaluating the role of the various R&D coordinating 
 
unit”’, Conference on Disarmament document CD/789, 16 Dec. 1987, p. 1. See also ‘Shikany: 
Confidence-Building Step’, Soviet Military Review, Nov. 1987 (in English); and Anonymous, 
An Important Confidence-building Step: Foreign Observers Visit the Shikhany Military Area in 
the Soviet Union (Novosti Press Agency Publishing House: Moscow, 1988) (in English). 
1136 Nancy Cooper, Fred Koleman and Richard Sanza, ‘Candor in the Kremlin: the Soviets 
Signal that They are Ready for a New Deal on Chemical Weapons’, Newsweek, vol. 110, no. 16, 
19 Oct. 1987, pp. 18–19. 
1137 Russell J. Bowen, ‘Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms 
Control Inspection’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 1963) p. 445; in Ed. 
J. David Singer, Weapons Management in World Politics: Proceedings of the Internationl Arms 
Control Symposium, December 1962, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 17–20 Dec. 1962. At the time, 
Bowen was a research chemical engineer employed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. trained in 
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1138 Russell J. Bowen, ‘Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms 
Control Inspection’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 1963) p. 445 in 
Singer (note 1137). 
1139 Russell J. Bowen, ‘Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms 
Control Inspection’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 1963) pp. 445–446 
in Singer (note 1137). 
1140 Russell J. Bowen, ‘Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms 
Control Inspection’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep. 1963) p. 446 in 
Singer (note 1137). 
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bodies would also be helpful in clarifying the nature and purpose of weapons-
related work.1141 
More broadly, Michael Herman, who served as a Senior Analyst in the 
UK’s Government Communications Headquarters in 1952-87 with secondments 
to the Cabinet office and Ministry of Defence, provides some insight into 
Western efforts to understand Soviet threats during the Cold War in general and 
the relation between capabilities and intentions in particular. He observes: 
‘Soviet military capabilities, including production, logistics and similar 
factors, were in principle knowable. But there was still a dearth of hard 
facts and the uncertainty of the analytic ones. Moreover, the important 
Western interest was often in the future rather than the present: what 
would the next Soviet weapons be, and when would they appear? Since 
there was rarely any firm evidence, answers drew on guesses about the 
adversary’s intentions, often indeed on what his reaction might be to 
American plans. Would the USSR react to President Kennedy’s nuclear 
programme of the early 1960s by seeking nuclear supremacy, parity or 
something less? Intentions in turn went back to capabilities: surely the 
size and composition of Soviet forces must be a good pointer to the 
regime’s objectives? Deductions on the two were mutually reinforcing. 
Intelligence had the status of Keeper of the Threat, but this remained a 
mental construct with a lot of conjecture to it’.1142 
A study on Soviet military technological challenges issued by a panel of 
US academics and government officials characterized the Soviet chemical and 
biological warfare threat as follows: 
‘The Soviet Union has a substantial chemical warfare capability in its 
army units. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have long been 
interested in biological agents and vaccine defenses against them. The 
United States is demonstrating in Vietnam that defoliants and anticrop 
chemicals can be effective. There is room for considerable improvement in 
such areas of chemical and biological warfare as nonlethal and 
incapacitating agents, antipersonnel chemicals and antichemical agents 
and lethal types of agents. 
A strong attitude exists in the United States that escalation from use of 
nonlethal to lethal chemical and biological agents could too easily occur, 
and hence that the United States should not develop them. No such 
attitude toward research and development in chemical and biological 
warfare, however, has been manifested in the Soviet Union. To the 
contrary, the Soviets have maintained an aggressive program and have 
conducted maneuvers which simulated defense against biological and 
chemical agents. They seem to have permitted the Egyptians to use 
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chemicals in the Yemen war, and might have done the same in the Israeli 
conflict if reports that the Eygptians had large stocks of chemical agents 
for use against the Isrealis are true’.1143 
The same panel outlined the difficulties faced by US policy makers when 
attempting to ensure that Soviet S&T developments did not give the Soviet 
Union an advantage as follows: 
‘To pursue the potential military application of each and every promising 
scientific and technlogical theory or development within the adversary’s 
capability would be impossible [for the United States], but to limit oneself 
only to those that one believes the potential enemy might find attractive 
would be too risky. To escape from the dilemma the policy maker must put 
priority on long lead time items in the most important fields, carefully 
considering the risks of delay and faulty decision making. At the same 
time, he must continue to build an expanding base of technology that can 
both advance our own capabilities for new systems and reduce reaction 
time when a new weapon actually appears in the arsenal of the potential 
enemy. He must constantly look for military applications the potential 
enemy may not have recognized or may have failed to pursue. All of these 
investments must be compared against the expected value of other 
investments in new intelligence systems that might increase our warning 
time concerning progress on the other side’.1144 
15.5.4. IR Theory 
 
A CW application of ACH can be utilized as a ‘ladder of abstraction’ for the 
elucidation of intelligence and arms control verification assessment processes 
and relevance, respectively. Two IR schools in particular are flagged: neoliberal 
institutionalism and realism. 
Realism is characterized by: (a) States are the principal unit of political 
organization, (b) the state enjoys a monopoly on the use of force, and (c) 
international law recognizes the legal and moral authority of states as the 
legitimate actors for performing internal and external security functions.1145 
Realists also believe that the world is fundamentally characterized by anarchy. 
Neoliberal institutionalism has been defined as: ‘A world in which actors 
other than states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy 
of issues does not exist and in which force is an ineffective instrument of 
policy’.1146 
                                                 
1143 Center for Strategic Studies, The Soviet Military Technological Challenge, Special 
Report series no. 6 (Georgetown University: Washington, DC, Sep. 1967), p. 76. The members 
of the panel were Admiral (ret.) Arleigh Burke, Harold M. Agnew, Robert D. Crane, John Ford, 
Bernard A. Schriever, Cornelius D. Sullivan, Arthur G. Trudeau, Richard J. Whalen and 
Thomas W. Wolfe. 
1144 Center for Strategic Studies (note 1143), p. 96. 
1145 Edward A. Kolodziej, Security and International Relations (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2005), p. 128. 
1146 Robert Koehane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Little, Brown: Boston, Mass., 1977), cited in Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, 
International Relations: the Basics (Routledge: London, 2007), p. 72. 
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Several points can be made with respect to the consideration of the 
potential higher-level relevance of CW assessments in IR theory in general and 
these two schools in particular. 
One question is whether the United States would have attacked the al-
Shifa facility had Sudan been a member of the CWC. Had Sudan been a party to 
the treaty, would the national threat assessment process been modified to take 
into account the existing arms control verification structures and procedures that 
the United States utilises to support CWC implementation in general? Would the 
INR dissent to the NIE on al-Shifa been afforded greater weight? Would 
sampling and analysis questions been given greater consideration by the ‘small 
group’? What would have been the political costs of a US attack in terms its 
influence and engagement in the CWC regime? A theoretical counter-factual 
thought experiment is to ask whether the United States would have felt 
sufficiently confident in its CW assessment had Sudan already been a member of 
the CWC. Would the United States have been prepared, for example, to damage 
its moral and legal authority and political influence within the CWC regime and 
elsewhere by unilaterally attacking another State Party without first attempted to 
utilize the Convention’s provisions (either pro forma or with serious intent) on 
consultation, clarification and fact-finding? 
An underlying geopolitical theme to the debate on the content, 
methodology and meaning of assessments of Iraqi CW in the lead up to the 2003 
US-led invasion can also be seen in terms of neoliberal institutionalism (as 
reflected in by multilateral arms control assessments) and realism (as reflected 
through state intelligence assesssments according to state-defined national 
interests). As mentioned previously, it has been reported (most recently in 2013) 
that the main reason the US successfully organized the ouster of former OPCW 
Director-General Ambassador José Bustani of Brazil was that he was attempting 
to reach out to Iraq to join the CWC through informal diplomatic channels.1147 
In summary, the application and refinement of a CW-focused ACH can be 
used as a means in a ‘ladder of abstraction’ that informs security and defence 
policy (e.g., through schools of the neoliberal institionalism and realism) as it 
relates to strategies and policies for defeating and/or manipulating the behaviour 
of state and non-state actors. 
                                                 
1147 Simons (note 783). 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETING HYPOTHESES   255      
 
16 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
his study provides a systematic consideration of selected academic fields 
and operational practice relevant to arms control verification and 
intelligence studies. In particular, it develops a unique variation of an 
established cognitive psychology-based counter-factual method taken from 
intelligence operational art in order to analyse, explain and facilitate the 
prediction of CW acquisition, development, production and stockpiling. In so 
doing, this study helps to narrow the gap between arms control verification and 
intelligence practice for CW in particular and weapons acquisition and use more 
generally.1148 It also places intelligence operational art on a more secure 
theoretical academic foundation in the CW-related context, partly by providing a 
useful basis for the understanding of the operational- and strategic-level analysis 
of CW threat assessments and appropriate policy responses. It shifts ACH 
practice closer to theoretical international relations models with respect to 
higher-level strategic and defence analysis, and IR theory as it relates to WMD-
related international peace and security questions. It does so partly by suggesting 
that a corollary exists between the role played by national intelligence 
requirements, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, that played by arms 
control verification. In particular, the information taskings for both weapon-
specific arms control verification and national intelligence overlap to a great 
extent. However, the priorities and perceived political acceptability for arms 
control verification and intelligence assessments are distinct and, in many 
respects, opposed to each other. For example, an arms control assessment carried 
out within a multilateral legal regime tends to possess greater overall 
international credibility and weight so long as it is done in a professional 
technical manner whose findings then inform the subsequent political and legal 
considerations. National based intelligence assessments are, as a rule, necessarily 
kept secret to protect sources and methods and are also more likely to be 
questioned on the grounds that the conclusions support national policy. 
Nevertheless, the information taskings should, on the basis of their respective 
technical requirements, yield similar outcomes. While in practice this does not 
necessarily occur, the gap can perhaps be narrowed on the basis of better 
operational-level understanding of how such assessments should ideally be 
carried out.1149 National intelligence-driven processes, procedures and purposes 
can perhaps be better described at the strategic level by realism IR theory, while 
those for arms control verification can perhaps be better described by neoliberal 
institutionalism. 
T 
                                                 
1148 Marrin (note 19). 
1149 E.g., in the case of the attack on al-Shifa and the international understanding of Iraq’s 
CW programme and holdings prior to the 2003 US-led invasion. 
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The matrices and the ACH application can be improved and further 
adapted in a number of respects. This includes further consideration of the extent 
to which they are suited for analysing and assessing facilities where toxic 
chemicals and their precursors are absent (e.g., where base research is conducted 
using computer modeling). Further consideration should also be given to linking 
IR requests and evidence chains to various proliferation pathway models. The 
timescale for production may not correspond to that of  traditional state CW 
programmes. Military doctrine-related issues should also be further considered 
with respect to the motivations of individuals and groups.1150 Related broader 
questions include the extent to which evidence should be equally weighted given 
the fact that some has greater diagnostic value, how to better account for 
deception, the extent to which a worst-case scenario approach is counter-
productive or harmful, how the reliability of underlying information can be better 
flagged in estimates, and whether and how ACH can be applied  meaningfully to 
more than two hypotheses at a time. 
The purpose and operation (including overlap) between national 
intelligence and arms control verification should also be further considered. The 
audiences, objectives and political contexts for both, while related, are distinct. In 
particular, standards for what constitutes ‘reasonable doubt’ or ‘reasonable 
effort’ to satisfy a verification or assessment process can differ substantially.1151 
The processes for structuring and implementing national intelligence are fairly 
well-developed in the literature.1152 For multilateral arms control verification, 
however, the situation is less clear. Reasons include the fact that delegations 
from many states interact with each other in a mainly diplomatic setting that 
entails the sending and receiving of political signals. As such, controversial 
topics (including the use of the word ‘intelligence’) tend to be referred to 
somewhat allusively or not at all. While it is permissible (and desirable) to define 
and implement effective verification methodologies in the abstract, their actual 
implementation can be complicated by an ill-defined and variable relationship 
with national intelligence bodies under the rubric of NTM. Another distinction 
between the requirements and expectations of national intelligence, on the one 
hand, and multilateral arms control verification, on the other hand, is the fact that 
information used for the latter purpose can be (and is) restricted as a matter of 
policy (e.g., to support the drafting of an inspection mandate, and with respect to 
‘managed access’ provisions for onsite inspections by OPCW inspectors). The 
validity and independence of multilateral arms control verification must not be 
undermined by improper relationships with national intelligence processes and 
priorities (e.g., by ‘piggy-backing’ collection operations). The former must be 
impartial and correct, regardless of the broader political sensitivities and 
preferred political interpretations and outcomes. The relationship between 
national intelligence and multilateral arms control need not necessarily be viewed 
as a ‘one-way’ or ‘two-way’ street. It instead may have its own variable logic 
informed by the particular political and technical circumstances associated with a 
given case. Given the political will and proper formulation, such issues (e.g., 
                                                 
1150 However problematic this might be in some respects. 
1151 I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this. 
1152 Caveats, such as language and great power perspectives, should be kept in mind. 
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military and security services doctrine) could perhaps be more fully considered 
by the OPCW and others under the rubric of effective national implementation. 
Areas for future research also include: (a) the carrying out of comparative 
studies by different authors on the same analytical themes and using both ACH 
and other SATs, and (b) the further development and validation of generalized 
diagnostic factors for evaluating the acquisition, development, production and 
stockpiling of a given weapon system, while taking due regard of indicators from 
the security and defence acquisition literature. 
Such evaluations can assist the consideration of what verification data 
actually mean and how technical and scientific findings relate to the question of 
treaty compliance by states and the resulting implications for the strength of the 
rule-of-law at the inter- and intra-state levels, as well as for strategic and defence 
studies in general. 
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ANNEXE A. DEFINITIONS AND TERMS 
 
This section consolidates key definitions of terms used in the study. They are meant to 
be authoritative, but not necessarily definitive. 
 ‘Activity’. Activity and programme are distinct concepts that inform any analysis of 
the intent of work carried out in the chemical field. Activity can occur in the absence of 
overall coordination and in the absence of policy guidance or contrary to policy (stated 
or implied). It may consist of the actions of an individual (authorized or not).1153 
‘Assess’. The US intelligence community uses this term routinely in NIEs, statements 
and private briefings to the President and Congress. 
‘Assessment’. The US DoD has defined this term as ‘1. Analysis of the security, 
effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 2. Judgment 
of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or 
“agents”’.1154 In the security and defence field, the term has been defined as ‘Part of the 
intelligence process whereby an analyst determines the reliability or validity of a piece 
of information. An assessment could also be a statement resulting from this 
process’.1155 
‘Biological weapon’. A biological weapon can be understood to consist of one or 
more of three elements: the toxic fill, munition body and/or specialized devices and 
equipment designed to be used to deliver the fill or munition body. The parties to the 
BTWC ‘undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or 
otherwise acquire or retain: 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever 
their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification 
for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 2. Weapons, equipment or 
means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed 
conflict’.1156 Some biological and chemical warfare-related actitivies overlap. Some 
agents, such as toxins, are covered by both the BTWC and CWC. The development of 
some biochemicals may blur the distinction between chemical and biological warfare in 
future. Both the BTWC and CWC prohibitions against biological and chemical warfare 
embody a general purpose criterion (GPC). 
‘Capability’. Capability may be defined as ‘power or ability in general, whether 
physical or mental: capacity’.1157 Capability, capacity and ability are essentially 
synonomous in the CW evaluation context.  
‘Chemical weapon’. The internationally accepted definition of a chemical weapon is 
provided in the CWC. The internationally accepted definition of a biological weapon is 
provided in the BTWC. A chemical weapon defined by the CWC, means the following, 
together or separately:  
(a) toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent 
with such purposes; 
                                                 
1153 For a consideration of such distinctions in the biodefence context, see Roger Roffey, 
John Hart and Frida Kuhlau, ‘Crucial guidance: a code of conduct for biodefense scientists’, 
Arms Control Today, vol. 36, no. 7 (Sep. 2006), pp. 17–20. 
1154 DoD, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS publication no. 1 (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff: Washington, DC, 3 Sep. 1974), pp. 36–37 (unclassified). 
1155 Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Larry V. Buel, Words and Arms: a Dictionary of Security and 
Defense Terms with Supplemental Data (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1979), p. 13. 
1156 BTWC, Article I. 
1157 The Oxford English Dictionary (note 398), vol. II, C, p. 88. 
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(b) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through 
the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which 
would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; 
(c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the 
employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b).1158 Jean Pascal 
Zanders has compiled 27 definitions of ‘chemical warfare’.1159 
‘Chemical weapon production facility’. The CWC defines such a facility as: (a) 
Means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was 
designed, constructed or used at any time since 1 January 1946; (i) As part of the state 
in the production of chemicals (“final technological stage”) where the material flows 
would contain, when the equipment is in operation: (1) Any chemical listed in Schedule 
1 in the Annex on Chemicals; or (2) Any other chemical that has no use, above 1 tonne 
per year on the territory of a State Party or in any other place under the jurisdiction or 
control of a State Party, for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, but can be 
used for chemical weapons purposes; or (ii) For filling chemical weapons, including 
inter alia, the filling of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk 
storage containers; the filling of chemicals into containers that form part of assembled 
binary munitions and devices or into chemical submunitions that form part of assembled 
unitary munitions and devices, and the loading of the containers and chemical 
submunitions into the respective munitions and devices; 
(b) Does not mean: (i) Any facility having a production capacity for synthesis of 
chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne; (ii) Any facility in 
which a chemical specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was produced as an unavoidable 
by-product of activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, provided that 
the chemical does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product and that the facility is 
subject to declaration and inspection under the Annex on Implementation and 
Verification (hereinafter referred to as “Verification Annex”); or (iii) The single small-
scale facility for the production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention as referred to in Part VI of the Verification 
Annex’.1160 
Definitions, including this one, were negotiated in a broader context. For example, 
prior to the entry into force of the CWC, one delegation proposed narrowing the scope 
of this particular definition. It did so by referring to the phrase: ‘Means any equipment, 
as well as any building housing such equipment’ [emphasis added]. Because the word 
‘housing’ is in the present tense, some facilities could, in principle, be excluded from 
declarations by States Parties to the OPCW. The delegation took this position at least 
partly as a negotiation point in order to obtain flexibility on ensuring that proposals to 
convert former CWPFs would be granted by the organization (as originally drafted by 
treaty negotiators in Geneva, such conversion was meant to be the exception, not the 
norm). 
‘Confirmation bias’. Kahneman observes ‘The operations of associative memory 
contribute to a general confirmation bias [italicized in original]…A deliberate search for 
confirming evidence, known as positive test strategy [italicized in original], is also how 
System 2 tests a hypothesis. [This strategy]…seek[s] data that are likely to be 
compatible with the beliefs [people] currently hold’.1161 Scientific method, by contrast, 
seeks to refute hypotheses or to treat knowledge as provisional. 
                                                 
1158 CWC, Article II, para. 1. 
1159 Zanders (note 696) pp. 315–327. 
1160 CWC, Article II, para. 8. 
1161 Kahneman (note 26), p. 81. 
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‘Data mining’. Data mining, Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) or 
Knowledge-Discovery and Data Mining refers to automated searches of large volumes 
of data for patterns. A variety of computational theories and tools have been developed 
in order derive meaning from the data and to extract the meaning in a usable format. 
Techniques to uncover patterns include association, classification and clustering. The 
Internet contains a number of sites where ‘knowledge discovery’ resources are 
compiled.1162 
‘Defensive’. The term may be defined as ‘1. Having the quality of defending against 
attack or injury; serving for defence; protective; 2. Made, formed, or carried on for the 
purpose of defence: opposed to offensive (=aggressive); 3. Of or belonging to 
defence’.1163 Within the context of chemical warfare, a defensive activity or 
programme is defined as work carried out to protect against the use of such weapons. 
Defensive measures against chemical warfare do not include the use of such weapons. 
                                                
‘Doctrine’. The US term ‘doctrine’ has been defined as ‘Fundamental principles by 
which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national 
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application’.1164 
The Soviet term ‘military doctrine’ (voyennaya dotrina) has been defined as ‘A 
system of views held in a state at a given specific time on the essence, aims, and 
character of possible future war; on the preparations of the nationa and it’s armed forces 
for such a war; and on ways of conducting it’.1165 Voyennay doktrina ‘has two closely 
interrelated sides—sociopolitical and military-technical. Its directives govern all 
activities of the military and unify the views of military personnel in the solution of the 
present day tasks’.1166 
‘Estimate’. Estimate refers essentially to an intelligence evaluation. The term may be 
defined as ‘An approximate judgement based on considerations of probability, 
respecting the number, amount, magnitude, or position of anything; the quantity 
assigned by such a judgement’.1167 In an intelligence context the term has been defined 
as ‘best-effort attempts to interpret, explain, and anticipate on the basis of imperfect 
knowledge of capabilities, intentions, and many other critical variables’.1168 
‘General Purpose Criterion’. Both the BTWC and CWC prohibitions against 
biological and chemical warfare embody a general purpose criterion (GPC) whereby all 
toxic chemicals and their precursors as well as biological substances are prohibited 
except where for permitted purposes. The phrasing of the GPC, which is part of the 
conventions’ language of on prohibited activity, is the mechanism by which the 
prohibitions against chemical and biological warfare is made comprehensive. The GPC 
does not permit legal exclusions through questions on definition or categories. It also 
allows the conventions to capture future scientific and technological developments, 
including non-traditional agents. The weakness of the GPC is that states can still dispute 
definitions through legal and political argument. However, without the GPC, such 
 
1162 Marcus P. Zillman, ‘Knowledge Discovery Resources 2010—An Internet MiniGuide 
Annotated Link Compilation’, LLRX.com [Law and Technology Resources for Legal 
Professionals], 7 May 2010, <http://www.llrx.com/features/knowledgediscovery2010.htm>, 
(accessed 12 May 2013). 
1163 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. III, D-E (note 398), p. 132. 
1164 Comparative Lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology, report no. PB89-
125553 (BDM Corp.: McLean, Virginia, 1988), p. 462. Prepared for Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS), Washington, DC (unclassified). 
1165 Comparative Lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology (note 1164), p. 462. 
1166 Comparative Lexicon of US-Soviet Military Technical Terminology (note 1164), p. 462. 
1167 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. III, D-E (note 398), p. 302. 
1168 Fingar (note 25), p. 103. 
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disputes would be worse. Within the context of the CWC, the GPC must also be 
considered in terms of whether toxic chemicals and their precursors are being used in 
‘types and quantities’ consistent with CWC-permitted activities. This is an issue of 
fundamental importance to any assessment of suspected chemical warfare programmes 
and will be considered below in general terms of the ACH matrix system and with 
respect to each of the case studies. Although this may appear to be a somewhat obscure 
legal or definitional question, it should become much easier to appreciate when 
considered in the context of the case studies. 
‘Indicator’. The term has been defined in a military context as ‘an item of 
information which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy to adopt or 
reject a course of action’.1169 
‘Intelligence’. Intelligence has been defined as ‘The product resulting from the 
collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all information 
concerning one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas which is immediately or 
potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and 
operations’.1170 It may be understood to mean information collected by states or 
institutions to inform policy decisions, including for national defence. It is often 
classified in order to protect sources and methods of collection. Treverton distinguishes 
‘data’ from ‘information’. Data is unprocessed, while information has been transformed 
into a form that is usable (e.g. through analysis or disaggregation of random data points. 
Allen Dulles stated that incoming intelligence consists of three categories: (a) daily and 
hourly handling of current intelligence, (b) researching intelligence on a given topic of 
interest to policy makers (‘basic intelligence’) and (c) the preparation of an intelligence 
assessment.1171 Marrin observes that the definition of intelligence broadly driven by 
whether it is military technological versus civilian strategic in nature. 
‘Intelligence failure’. Jervis distinguishes two types of intelligence failure. One is a 
‘mismatch between the estimates and what later information reveals’.1172 Another type 
of intelligence failure is ‘a falling short’ of what one would ‘expect from good 
intelligence’.1173 Jervis argues that the first type of intelligence failure is not 
particularly relevant because intelligence estimates are frequently incorrect and events 
will eventually make this clear. The second type of failure is of great importance 
because this is where technique and expertise play an important role in ensuring that the 
best possible analysis is produced. The second type of failure may result from missed 
opportunities to collect information or whether the available information was properly 
utilised.1174 In short they consist of distinctions between the quality of information and 
analysis, respectively.1175 
‘Intent’. For CW assessment purposes, the term may be defined as being resolved to 
undertake an action. Assessing intent may ultimately depend on access to internal policy 
documentation. This assumes the policy is in fact written down (there are examples of 
where attempts are made to keep the policy formulation and dissemination verbal only) 
and what is written reflects the actual policy. 
                                                 
1169 DIA, Terms & Definitions of Interest for DoD Counterintelligence Professionals (Office 
of Counterintelligence (DXC): 2 May 2011), p. GL-88 (unclassified), 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf>, (accessed 12 May 2013). 
1170 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (note 1154), p. 175. 
1171 Dulles (note 90), p. 156. 
1172 Jervis (note 399), p. 2. 
1173 Jervis (note 399), p. 2. 
1174 Jervis (note 399), p. 17. 
1175 Jervis (note 399), pp. 2–3. 
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‘Islamist’. See Militant Islamic Group. 
‘Judge’. As a transitive verb used in the CW assessment context, the term may be 
understood to mean ‘To pronounce an opinion upon, to criticize; esp. to pronounce an 
adverse opinion upon, to condemn, censure’.1176 The US intelligence community 
defines ‘judge’ in a distinct manner. 
‘Key component’. The CWC defines a ‘key component’ of binary or 
multicomponent systems as ‘The precursor which plays the most important role in 
determining the toxic properties of the final product and reacts rapidly with other 
chemicals in the binary or multicomponent system’.1177 Krutzsch and Trapp observe 
that the CWC’s phrasing of ‘key component’ is not strictly speaking scientific because, 
in many cases, it is imposssible to assign a key toxic property of a chemical to a single 
structural element.1178 For organophosphorus nerve agents, the chemical donating the 
phosphorus atom will probably be considered to be the key precursor.1179 Krutzsch and 
Trapp observe that a sulphur donating chemical is required in order to manufacture 
sulphur mustard.1180 However, a chlorinating agent (donor) is also required and, 
although the sulphur donating chemical may be designated as the key precursor by 
States Parties to the CWC, key chlorinating agents may also be considered to be ‘key 
precursors’ within the transfer control context, including through the implementation of 
Australia Group (AG) guidelines.1181 Krutzsch and Trapp also observe that the term 
‘reacts rapidly’ can be problematic if one considers specific cases and argue that the 
term has ‘no definitory function at all’. This is partly because a chemical reaction 
requires at least two chemicals (not just the ‘key precursor’). If a binary or 
multicomponent CW system does not react with sufficient speed, the weapon system is 
dysfunctional.1182 One might also add that the rapidity is also not quantified. (See 
‘precursor’). 
‘Meta Data’ has been defined as ‘structured information that describes, explains, 
locates, or otherwise makes it easier to retrieve, use, or manage an information resource. 
Metadata is often called data about data or information about information’.1183 
‘Methodology’ is broadly understood to mean the key concepts, principles and 
procedures necessary in order to reach a reasoned and balanced understanding of the 
target of analysis. Such an understanding must encompass a ‘spectrum of certainty’ in 
terms of what is known and what can be known or might become known about a given 
programme or activity. There are numerous overlapping factors and considerations 
connected to the derivation and use of information. An attempt is made to 
systematically review them with reference to examples is contained in a general 
background chapter. The case studies and three areas of methodological focus are 
considered in then greater detail. In order to understand how a methodology can be 
                                                 
1176 The Oxford English Dictionary, vol. V, H-K (note 398), p. 618. 
1177 CWC, Article II, para. 4. 
1178 A possible exception is the phosphorus methyl group (P-CH3) present in VX and V-
agent. This bond is partly responsible for the human toxicity effect of the chemical and tends to 
remain intact in various degradation products. See also Chapter 2 of this volume. 
1179 Walter Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1994), p. 33. 
1180 Krutzsch and Trapp (note 1179), p. 33. 
1181 See Australia Group, ‘Export Control List: Chemical Weapons Precursors’, 
<http://www.australiagroup.net/en/precursors.html>, (accessed 5 Aug. 2014). 
1182 Krutzsch and Trapp (note 1179), p. 33. 
1183 National Information Standards Organization (NISO), Understanding Metadata (NISO: 
Bethesda, Maryland, 2004), p. 1, <http://www.niso.org/publications/press/Understanding 
Metadata.pdf>, (accessed 12 May 2013). 
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implemented one must also understand the nature of the actors carrying out the analysis, 
the definition and characteristics of prohibited activities and legal and analytical 
standards of ‘proof’. An analyst’s understanding may be influenced by organizational 
factors. It may also be affected by a lack of understanding of political processes by 
which information is progressively refined and used, ignorance of historical precedents, 
ignorance of science and technology, and ignorance of the role of compartmentalization 
of information and personal interaction. Nor should cultural, language and political 
imperatives should be overlooked. 
‘Military science’. Military sciences is equivalent to krigsvetenskap. It has been 
defined as: ‘study of the conduct of warfare and the strategic, tactical, and logistical 
principles relating to it’.1184 The modern principles of war (i.e. contemporary military 
sciences) include: 
‘military objective or aim; offensive action; unity of command; mass or concentration 
of power; simplicity; manoeuvre or disposition of forces; economy of forces; security; 
and surprise. The application of these principles in a wide variety of combat situations is 
the central focus of military science. …The development of mathematical game theory 
and computers has facilitated the development of elaborate models of warfare to aid in 
the study of potential wars’.1185 One Soviet definition of military art is: ‘The theory and 
practice of preparation for and conduct of military operations on land, sea and in 
air’.1186 The Soviet Union considered ‘military art’ (voennoe iskusstvo) to be a part of 
‘military sciences’ (voennaya nauka).1187 Military sciences may be said to encompass 
threat assessments and the development and implementation of military and other 
defensive measures to counter identified threats. 
The term has also been defined by Pokrovsky, an influential Soviet scientific expert 
and officer who achieved the rank of General, as the following. 
‘Military science is that system of knowledge which is necessary under 
contemporary conditions for the preparation of the defense of the country and 
for the conduct of war as a whole. It embraces those problems of the military art 
which are concerned with direct armed conflict and with the means of securing 
victory. In addition to solving the problems of military art—and also of military 
organization, armament, and preparation—military sciences also studies the 
total of the socio-political, the economic, the morale, and the other factors 
influencing military affairs as a whole. Thus military science goes far beyond 
the limits of problems directly connected with military technology. But, precisely 
for this reason, military science is able to serve as the foundation for evaluating 
individual fields of military technology and for evauluating all the sciences on 
which that technology is based. Only on the basis of military science is it 
possible to establish the inter-relation of the various forms of military 
technology, showing the way to a harmonious combination of its various forms 
and to its most effective employment in combat’.1188 
                                                 
 
1184 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 8, 15th edition (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.: 
Chicago, 1985), ‘military science’, p. 129. 
1185 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (note 1184), p. 129. 
1186 Eds. N. V. Ogarkov, et al., Voenny Entsiklopedichesky Slovar’ (Military Publisher: 
Moscow, 1984), p. 140. Volume issued by the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of 
Defence of the USSR. Ogarkov was Marshal of the Soviet Union. A post-1972 Soviet biological 
weapon programme was informally referred to as ‘The System’ or ‘Ogarkov’s System’. 
1187 Ogarkov (note 1186), p. 140. 
1188 Georgy I. Pokrovsky, Science and Technology in Contemporary War, translated and 
annotated by Raymond L. Garthoff (Atlantic Books, Stevens & Sons, Ltd.: London, 1959), p. 
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‘Militant Islamic Group’. Ibrahim Karawan argues for the following distinctions 
regarding terminology of militants motivated by Islam. He argues that ‘Islamic’, 
‘Islamist’ and ‘violent groups’ not be lumped together.1189 He states that ‘Islamic’ 
groups often focus on individual redemption, while ‘Islamist’ groups emphasize 
obtaining political power.1190 He further states that militant Islamic groups (MIGs) are 
a subset of Islamists and that MIGs seek to ‘eradicate existing state structures via a 
combative insurrectional approach’.1191 Karawan also states that various ‘Islamic 
arguments’ can be contradictory to each other and that such arguments should be 
viewed more in terms of how they are used to reflect tensions inherent to a ‘colonial 
setting’ or ethnic conflict.1192 Karawan observes that MIG violence ‘reflects a strong 
sense of urgency, emergency, and immediacy to act in a confrontational manner within 
a setting marked by cultural, political and economic inequality and marginalization’.1193 
Further distinctions may result from Arab versus non-Arab differences or 
dichotomies, and ‘AQ central’ versus ‘AQ regional’ groupings. Akbar Ahmed, a former 
Pakistani political officer to Waziristan and currently a Professor at American 
University, emphasizes the dichotomy between the urbanized, often Westernized and 
repressive centre versus the periphery characterized by tribal customs as more important 
to understanding current discussions on Islamicly-inspired threats, the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), and the like.1194 
‘Mirror Imaging’. This occurs when those carrying out the analysis ‘acted as though 
the opponent would [have] use[d] a “rational” decision-making process, as they defined 
“rational”’.1195 [emphasis by Clark] 
‘Mystery’ has been defined as ‘highly desirable information concerning intentions 
not yet crystallized into decisions or predictions of the outcome of events that have not 
yet taken place’.1196 There is a view that intelligence services should undertake to 
discover and assess secrets only and that they should not attempt to make judgements 
concerning mysteries. The dichotomy here is similar to that of a technical secretariat 
which is tasked to determine the technical basis for possible noncompliance with an 
arms control and disarmament agreement, while the member states are supposed to 
determine whether the party is in compliance. In practice, the distinction can become 
blurred. This was shown by the controversy surrounding the US decision to attack Iraq 
in 2003 based on its assessment of Iraq’s NBC weapon and ballistic missile 
programmes and holdings. It is also evident in the work of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and possibly the OPCW. 
‘National technical means’ is a term that arose from nuclear arms control 
negotiations between the Soviet Union and United States. It initially referred to 
overhead imagery and signals intelligence for verification purposes.1197 The two sides 
                                                                                                                                               
162. Originally published as pamphlet by the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of 
Political and Scientific Knowledge (Moscow: Znanie Press, Oct. 1957). 
1189 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
1190 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
1191 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
1192 Karawan (note 914), p. 53. 
1193 Karawan (note 914), p. 54. 
1194 Ahmed (note 920). 
1195 Clark (note 29), p. 250. 
1196 Omand (note 13), p. 46. 
1197 Thomas Graham Jr. who served for 15 years as the General Counsel for the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) provides first hand information on how NTM came 
about during US-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations in the 1960s. Graham Jr. (note 284), 
p. 37.  
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agreed not to encrypt telemetry during test flights of ballistic missiles and to leave open 
silo doors when satellites passed over to allow the other side to determine whether the 
silo was empty. Today it is generally understood to mean all information available to a 
state, including that derived from intelligence. It is also sometimes used as a synomym 
for intelligence. 
‘Offensive’. A chemical warfare programme is offensive where a policy exists that 
envisages the use of chemical weapons (either as a first strike or retaliatory purposes). 
In the CWC context, an offensive chemical weapon programme or activity is any that 
seeks to employ such weapons as ‘a method of warfare’ or to ‘cause death or other 
harm’ directly through the properties of toxic chemicals or their precursors. 
‘Open source intelligence’. ‘Open source information has traditionally meant 
published material that is publicly available—newspapers, books, and 
periodicals…Today [open source intelligence] includes much more than traditional 
published sources. Large volumes of imagery, for example, are becoming publicly 
available from commercial imaging satellites. Commercial databases hold vast 
quantities of economic data that are available for the price of a subscription. All fit the 
open source category, though they are not published in the traditional sense’.1198 
‘Precursor’. The CWC defines a precursor as ‘Any chemical reactant which takes 
part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a toxic chemical. This 
includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system’.1199 (see 
‘key component’). 
The CWC requires that any precursor that has been manufactured into order to be 
used the manufacture of a chemical weapon must be destroyed. In CW assessments, 
ambiguity may arise over whether the intent behind the production of a precursor was: 
(a) to form part of a standby capacity for CW production, (b) to be used to manufacture 
and stockpile CW or (c) to be used for peaceful purposes (i.e. civilian purposes or CW 
protective purposes). 
‘Production capability’. A CW production capability implies a standby capacity 
only and that production and stockpiling are not occurring. It also implies that the 
infrastructure for largescale production is in place (e.g., through the conversion of dual-
purpose chemical facilities, the existence of CW quality control mechanisms, the 
existence of munitions filling facilities and the like).  
‘Production capacity’. For traditional CW threat assessment purposes, the 
cumulative annual production capacity for a major state military should be in the 
thousands of tonnes. A single CW production facility meant to support the filling of 
munitions in military significant quantities should be a minimum of 500 tonnes/year. 
‘Programme’. Programmes and activities are distinct. A programme is understood to 
mean an organized set of activities to achieve a desired goal (capability, weapon system 
development or production, etc.). 
If CW agent development and testing is occurring at a small scale for protective 
evaluation purposes, the activity is probably not a violation of the CWC (if declared in 
accordance with the relevant provisions).1200 If the programme elements are broken up 
(i.e., many or all of the elements do not know how their activity fits into the overall 
programme) or if the programme consists of developing and supporting a standby 
breakout capacity, the programme would be prohibited. Largescale production and 
testing of single purpose CW munitions would indicate the programme is offensive. 
However, where the line separating defensive and offensive CW programmes can, in 
                                                 
1198 Clark (note 29), p. 91. 
1199 CWC, Article II, para. 3. 
1200 See, for e.g., CWC, Verification Annex, Part VI. 
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practice, be unclear or politically contentious. The non-state actor CW context further 
complicates consideration of this distinction. 
‘Scientific intelligence’ has been defined as ‘intelligence of research projects, 
scientific ideas, or capabilities’, including future weapons.1201 
‘Secret’. Restrictions on access to information, data or analysis are inter alia meant to 
protect intelligence sources and methods.1202 The imposition of such restrictions may 
be done for political or technical reasons. For example, delicate negotiations between 
states could be undermined by the release of certain types of information on their status. 
Technical specifications for weapons systems may be deemed too sensitive to make 
public (e.g., nuclear warhead design parameters). Secrecy may also be driven by 
organizational or institutional imperatives. Those with access to such information may 
become more ‘privileged’ in their interactions with other institutions, including in terms 
of the individual’s sense of self worth. 
‘Sensemaking’. The term has been defined to include inter alia: ‘Sensemaking goes 
beyond analysis, a disaggregative process, and also beyond synthesis, which 
meaningfully integrates factors relevant to an issue. It includes an interpretation of the 
results of that analysis and synthesis. It is sometimes referred to as an approach to creat- 
ing situational awareness “in situations of uncertainty’.1203 
‘Structured analytical techniques’. Structured analytical techniques ‘usually guide 
the [intelligence] analyst in thinking about a problem rather than provide the analyst 
with a definitive answer as one might expect from a method. Structured analytical 
techniques in general, however, do form a methodology—a set of principles and 
procedures for qualitative analysis of the kinds of uncertainties that intelligence analysts 
must deal with on a daily basis’.1204 A diagram of structured analytical techniques is 
provided by Heuer and Pherson.1205 
‘Taxonomy’. In the intelligence studies context, Robert M. Clark has defined the 
term as ‘a classification system in which objects are arranged into natural or related 
groups based on some factor common to each object in the group’.1206 Taxonomies 
may reflect policy-making level or operational-level intelligence taskings or information 
requests.1207 
‘Technical intelligence’ has been defined as ‘intelligence of weapons in being, 
whether at the planning stage or in production’.1208 Thus, once the weapon is created, 
the intelligence becomes ‘technical intelligence’.1209 
‘Terrorism’. There is no universally agreed definition of ‘terrorism’.1210 The US 
Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of force and 
                                                 
1201 Based on ‘Preliminary notes for Dr Blount’, 29/7/1949, DEFE 40/26. Cited by Maddrell 
(note 129), p. 1. 
1202 Clark (note 29), p. 171. 
1203 Moore (note 414), p. xxxv. 
1204 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), p. 4. 
1205 Heuer Jr. and Pherson (note 5), back cover. 
1206 Clark (note 29), p. 28. 
1207 Clark (note 29), p. 28. 
1208 Based on ‘Preliminary Notes for Dr Blount’, 29/7/1949, DEFE 40/26. Cited by Maddrell 
(note 129), p. 1. 
1209 Based on ‘Preliminary notes for Dr Blount’, 29/7/1949, DEFE 40/26. Cited by Maddrell 
(note 129), p. 1. 
1210 Walter Laqueur, ‘Appendix: Toward a Definition, or Humpty Dumpty and the Problem 
of Terrorism’, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (Continuum: New York 
City, 2004), pp. 232–238. 
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violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’.1211 
‘Theory’. Heuer defines theory as ‘a generalization based on the study of many 
examples of some phenomenon. It specifies that when a given set of conditions arises, 
certain other conditions will follow either with certainty or with some degree of 
probability. In other words, conclusions are judged to follow from a set of conditions 
and a finding that these conditions apply in the specific case being analyzed’.1212 
‘Threat’. Much confusion and uncertainty in threat perceptions and threat 
assessments arise from how this term is defined and applied in practice. Oftentimes it is 
broadly understood to mean a combination of capability and intention. In the absence of 
clear understanding of intention, analysts may approach a threat assessment by carrying 
out a worst case scenario. This entails systematically maximizing estimates of 
capabilities. For non-state actor threat assesments agreeing the intention to use CBRN 
weapons remains a topic of some debate. Some analysts take this as a given. Others are 
more sceptical. Similarly, there are two schools of thought on the capabilities of non-
state actors. Some point to the case of Aum Shinrikyo which had more than 1 billion 
euro worth of resources at its disposal and carried out field testing and scale up studies 
for chemical and biological warfare, but with decidedly poor overall results. Milton 
Leitenberg has argued that although ‘threat’ has been used to refer to agents, tools and 
technologies that could potentially be used to cause harm, it should instead only be 
understood to mean ‘an entity that has the intent and capability to cause harm’.1213 
‘Toxic chemical’ is defined by the CWC as: ‘Any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or 
permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of 
their origin or their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced 
in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere. (For the purpose of implementing this 
Convention, toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of 
verification measures are listed in the Schedules contained in the Annex on 
Chemicals.)’.1214 
‘Toxic industrial chemical’ has been defined as having an LCt50 (lethal 
concentration for half of those exposed) of less than 100 000 mg-min/m3 and being 
produced in amounts of over 30 tonnes annually at any given facility.1215 
‘Types and quantities’. When the CWC was negotiated, the term referred to 
militarily significant quantities of toxic chemicals (i.e., the amount of agent that can 
affect a conflict among two armies in the field). This is reflected in the CWC’s 
production ranges and capacities (e.g., above 1 tonne).1216 In the non-state actor threat 
context and in view of S&T developments in chemistry and the life sciences, the term 
has lost some of its relevance. 
‘Weapon of Mass Destruction’. W. Seth Carus has collected more than 40 
definitions of WMD which falls under five main categories: (a) nuclear, biologial and 
                                                 
1211 National Institute of Justice (US Department of Justice), <http://www.nij.gov/topics/ 
crime/terrorism/>, (accessed 12 May 2013). 
1212 Heuer, Jr. (note 427), p. 34. 
1213 Personal communication with Milton Leitenberg, 2010. 
1214 CWC, Article II, para. 2. 
1215 Sun and Ong (note 549), p. 9. 
1216 This is reflected by the phrasing in the CWC’s definition of a chemical weapon which 
inter alia consists of ‘Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with 
such purposes’ [emphasis added]. CWC, article II, para. 1(a). 
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chemical (NBC) weapons, (b) chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons 
(CBRN), (c) CBRN and high explosive (CBRNE) weapons, (d) weapons that cause 
massive destruction or which kill large numbers of people and do not necessarily 
include (or exclude) CBRN, and (e) weapons of mass destruction or effect, possibly 
including CBRNE and other means of causing mass disruption, such as 
cyberattacks’.1217 
 
                                                 
1217 W. Seth Carus, Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Occasional Paper no. 4 
(Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University Press: 
Washington, DC, Jan. 2006), p. 7. 
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ANNEXE B. UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’S GUIDELINES 
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED CBW USE 
 
 
Table B.1 The UN Secretary General’s mechanism guidelines for the conduct of interviews 
 
Interviews may be an important element of a fact finding mission. Therefore, ample consideration should 
be given the need for and the modalities of interviews in the planning of a mission. Such planning should 
consider the involvement and consent of the Member State receiving the investigation. Any 
questionnaires employed should be directly related to the investigation of alleged use of CBT weapons. 
Applicable epidemiological, medical, veterinary medical, and other questionnaires have been developed 
by relevant international organizations.  
 
During pre-mission planning, the expert(s) should work from those models to tailor a questionnaire to the 
circumstances at hand, as indicated in Appendix A.  
Interviews should be conducted to elicit information pertinent to the investigation and with consideration 
to tailoring interview techniques to reflect cultural factors that might otherwise inhibit eliciting of useful 
information. Interview roles and responsibilities should be assigned with, at a minimum, the designation 
of which team member will serve as the lead interviewer and which team member will record comments.  
 
Investigators should ask unambiguous questions. They should refrain as far as possible from leading 
witnesses or victims and should leave them to say what they saw, heard or felt. Interviews should be 
conducted with openness to the possibility that the interview may reveal unexpected information. In such 
instances, the interviewer should ask follow-up questions appropriate to develop possible investigative 
leads.  
 
The witnesses/victims should be asked to illustrate their account by drawing a sketch map of the area of 
the incident and, if possible, diagramming any munitions and/or devices and markings on those items.  
 
All interviews should be recorded. The investigation team will inform all interviewees that it will handle 
all interview data in a confidential manner. 
 
Source: ‘Appendix IX, Interviewing of witnesses/victims’, 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/appendicies/IX/>, (accessed 2 
Jan. 2011). 
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Table B.2 The UN Secretary General’s pre-mission planning guidelines 
 
When the Secretary-General decides to initiate an investigation of the alleged use of CBT weapons, pre-
mission planning should immediately be initiated. Pre-mission planning includes a variety of activities.  
 
The Secretary-General should convene expert(s) to assess the health, safety, and security risks that the 
team could reasonably anticipate during the mission based on the information provided by the requesting 
state (see Appendix 1) and all sources of pertinent, data available to the Secretary-General. As new data 
becomes available, the state requesting the investigation should update the information that it provides to 
the Secretary-General. The investigating team should reassess the health, safety, and security risks as it 
arrives at the investigation site and periodically throughout the mission.  
 
 
The expert(s) should also develop a mission plan that consists of several elements, including the 
following: 
a sample collection and analysis plan;  
an interview plan;  
resource requirements;  
logistics plan, and,  
command and control plan.  
 
The sampling plan. Specific to the alleged event, the expert(s) should articulate the appropriate measures 
to establish whether CBT' weapons have been used. The expert(s) should work out the details of the 
sampling plan in consultation with the laboratories likely to perform the sample analysis. The sampling 
plan should include: 
the sample collection strategy and techniques to be used, including sampling from locations 
where the agent might naturally concentrate;  
the amount of samples to be collected, based on available guidelines for sampling and in 
consultation with laboratories likely to perform sample analysis;  
the materials and storage conditions, including packing for shipment, necessary to preserve the 
integrity of samples during storage and transportation;  
analysis methods to be employed;  
identification of samples previously taken by other authorities and organizations and 
consideration of how such samples might factor into the investigation; and,  
consideration of any special requirements for chain of custody, shipment of samples, including 
initiation of clearances with carriers and the Member State(s) involved.  
 
This sampling plan should be refined once the team is on location. 
 
The interview plan. During the pre-mission planning process, the expert(s) should create an interview 
plan specific to the circumstances known from the risk assessment. Working from medical, 
epidemiological, and other (e.g., veterinary) questionnaires developed by relevant international 
organizations, the experts should tailor interview questionnaires (See Appendix IX.). 
 
Resource requirements and logistics. Based on the risk assessment and the mission plan, the expert(s) 
should make several recommendations to the Secretary-General regarding the resources required for the 
upcoming mission: 
the type and number of experts appropriate for the investigation;  
the type and amount of equipment required to ensure the health and safety of the team and to enable the 
anticipated investigatory tasks; and,  
the type and number of laboratories selected to perform sample analysis.  
 
As the Secretary-General selects and assembles the investigation team, the expert(s) should plan the 
appropriate medical support for the team and consider whether any additional training is required for the 
mission location. The expert(s) should also plan for the interpretation needs for witness and medical 
interviews and other investigation activities.  
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To support the team's deployment to the field, the following activities will be necessary:  
signing of relevant agreements by experts to be deployed;  
fitting of personal protective equipment;  
personnel travel planning, including passports and visas;  
arrangements for the transport of the equipment required for the investigation; and,  
if appropriate, additional training.  
 
Among other factors pertinent to the conduct of the investigation, the Secretary-General will want to 
establish with the receiving Member State the proper assurances that the equipment and personnel for the 
investigation mission will be cleared for entry into, movement within, and exit from the Member State. 
The Secretary-General will also want to seek the cooperation of the receiving Member State in facilitating 
the investigation team's communications while in country either by: 1) identifying acceptable radio 
frequencies or, 2) providing communication means for the investigation team. 
 
Organization of the investigating team. Clear command and control is essential to the efficiency and 
success of an investigatory mission. Command and control principles should be set during the pre-
mission planning process and clearly understood among the investigative team to establish authority, 
responsibility, and accountability among team members. Among other things, command and control 
principles should clarify: 
rules of the investigation, including permissible and non-permissible activities;  
chain of command;  
specific functions and tasks of various team members;  
channels of communication;  
agreed protocols for tasks; and,  
the agreed priority and schedule for tasks.  
 
The expert(s) may recommend that an individual be identified and designated to manage the collection, 
chain of custody, storage, and transport of samples. 
 
The Secretary-General will designate a team leader for this investigation mission. Unless another team 
member is authorized to function in this capacity, the team leader will be the point of contact for 
interaction with United Nations Headquarters and host authorities.  
 
Pre-planning should be accomplished in a time-efficient manner in order to be able to deploy an 
investigative team promptly. 
 
Source: ‘Appendix A, Pre-mission planning’, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-
General_Mechanism/appendicies/A/>, (accessed 2 Jan. 2011). 
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Table B.3 The UN Secretary General’s mechanism guidelines for the reporting of 
investigations activities 
 
The investigation team should file a report that elaborates its activities, the evidence found, and the team's 
findings. The report could be modeled on the format that follows, adjusted as needed. 
Executive summary 
Pre-investigation activities 
Investigation activities 
Findings 
Appendices: 
Data from state requesting investigation 
Terms of reference (e.g., authorizing letter) 
Administrative data 
Investigation location 
Team personnel 
Non-destructive evaluation 
List of samples taken 
List of other evidence collected 
By the investigative team 
Obtained from other authorities or relevant international organizations 
Results of analysis and clinical diagnostics 
Sample analysis: laboratory 1 
Sample analysis: laboratory 2 
Sample analysis: laboratory 3 (if necessary) 
Records of interviews conducted 
List of medical investigation activities 
Summary, clinical data on patients Epidemiological investigation report 
Breakdown of medical cases examined 
List of plant and animal investigation activities 
Data summary regarding affected plants, animals Epidemiological investigation report 
Breakdown of cases examined 
Record of chain of custody activities 
Record of tags and seals 
Should there be individual opinion(s) differing from the majority of investigators, they should be 
reflected in the investigative report. 
 
Source: ‘Appendix C, Report of investigation activities’, 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/appendicies/C/>, (accessed 2 
January 2011). 
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Table B.4 UN Secretary General’s guidelines for type of information to be provided in 
reporting possible use of CBT weapons 
 
The request for an investigation of an alleged use of CBT weapons to be submitted to the Secretary-
General should describe the basis for the request, including as far as possible the following information:  
1. Description of the trigger(s) of suspicion of alleged use of CBT weapons (e.g., outbreak of non-
endemic disease, specific event), including the date, time, and subsequent timeline of events related to the 
alleged use  
2. Tentative conclusion regarding alleged attack and, if possible and/or desirable, identification of 
possible perpetrator 
3. Identification of the location 
(a) location name 
(b) geographic (GPS) co-ordinates 
(c) in relation to another known location (by direction and distance) 
4. Characteristics of the site(s) 
(a) military (type) 
(b) civil (city, rural area, town, buildings affected) 
(c) nature of the terrain (relief, vegetation) 
(d) accessibility of the site 
5. Meteorological conditions 
6. Methods of dissemination used 
(a) weapons: 
(i) aerial bombs 
(ii) rockets 
(iii) artillery 
(iv) spray devices 
(v) others 
(b) animal and arthropod vectors 
(c) others (e.g., air, food, water) 
7. Extent of the weapons used 
(a) surface(s) affected 
(b) number and duration of weapons used 
8. Characteristics of the possible CBT agent 
(a) preliminary identification 
(b) type, consistency, and persistency of contamination 
(i) contamination of equipment and buildings 
(c) formulation 
(d) transmissibility 
9. Effects on humans 
(a) estimated number of fatalities 
(b) number of victims 
(i) hospitalized 
(ii) other 
(c) signs and symptoms 
(i) at the time of the attack 
(ii) delayed onset 
(d) epidemiological data 
(e) treatments and/or other countermeasures used 
(f) response to treatments and/or countermeasures 
10. Effects on animals 
(a) signs and symptoms 
(b) epidemiological data 
(c) treatments and/or other countermeasures used 
(d) response to treatments and/or countermeasures 
11. Effects on vegetation and crops 
(a) signs of contamination 
(b) signs and symptoms 
(c) epidemiological data 
(d) treatments and/or other countermeasures used 
(e) response to treatments and/or countermeasures 
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12. Samples 
(a) types of samples identified in situ, including any unexploded munitions or remnants of 
munitions 
(b) types of samples analyzed 
(c) results of available analyses 
(d) types of samples accompanying the report 
(e) documentation system for the sampling process 
13. Request for medical assistance, and the nature of such assistance 
14. Request for technical assistance (detection, decontamination etc.) 
15. If the requesting state and the receiving state are the same, for planning purposes, indication of the 
modalities and assistance available to support an investigation: 
(a) logistics 
(i) transportation 
(ii) housing 
(iii) food/water 
(iv) utilities 
(b) medical support: 
(i) for collection of clinical samples 
(ii) for the investigation team 
(c) sample storage 
(i) secure storage location 
(ii) refrigeration 
(d) interpreters 
(e) expertise in dangerous good packaging, transport 
(f) point of entry or other suggested safe routes of access for the team to the investigation site(s) 
(g) 24-hour point of contact, including telephone, e-mail, and facsimile. 
 
Source: ‘Appendix I, Types of information to be provided as available by a Member State to the 
Secretary-General in reporting the possible use of chemical, biological, or toxin (CBT) weapons’, 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/appendicies/I/>, (accessed 2 
January 2011). 
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ANNEXE C. SELECTED TOXIC INDUSTRIAL 
CHEMICALS (TICS) 
 
 
Table C.1 Common TICs according to toxicity and CAS no. 
 
High    Medium    Low 
 
Ammonia  Acetone cyanohydrin  Allyl isothiocyanate 
 (7664-41-7)  (75-86-5)   (57-06-7) 
Arsine   Acrolein    Arsenic trichloride 
 (7784-42)  (107-02-8)   (7784-34-1) 
Boron trichloride  Acrylonitrile   Bromine 
 (10294-34-5)  (107-13-1)   (7726-95-6) 
Boron trifluoride  Allyl alcohol   Bromine chloride 
 (7637-07-2)  (107-18-6)   (13863-41-7) 
Carbon disulphide Allylamine   Bromine pentafluoride 
 (75-15-0)  (107-11-9)   (7789-30-2) 
Chlorine   Allyl chlorocarbonate  Bromine trifluoride 
 (7782-50-5)  (2937-50-0)   (7787-71-5) 
Diborane  Boron tribromide   Carbonyl fluoride 
 (19287-45-7)  (10294-33-4)   (353-50-4) 
Ethylene oxide  Carbon monoxide  Chlorine pentafluoride 
 (75-21-8)  (630-08-0)   (13637-63-3) 
Fluorine   Carbonyl sulphide  Chlorine trifluoride 
 (7782-41-4)  (463-58-1)   (7790-91-2) 
Formaldehyde  Chloroacetone   Chloroacetaldehyde 
 (50-00-0)  (78-95-5)   (107-20-0) 
Hydrogen bromide Chloroacetonitrile  Chloroacetyl chloride 
 (10035-10-6)  (7790-94-5)   (79-04-9) 
Hydrogen chloride Chlorosulphonic acid  Crotonaldehyde 
 (7647-01-0)  (7790-94-5)   (123-73-9) 
Hydrogen cyanide Diketene   Cyanogen chloride 
 (74-90-8)  (674-82-8)   (506-77-4) 
Hydrogen fluoride 1,2-Dimethylhydrazine  Dimethyl sulphate 
 (7664-39-3)  (540-73-8)   (77-78-1) 
Hydrogen sulphide Ethylene dibromide  Diphenylmethane-4,4’- 
 (7783-0604)  (106-93-4)   diisocyanate 
        (101-68-8) 
Fuming nitric acid Hydrogen selenide  Ethyl chloroformate 
 (7697-37-2)  (7783-07-5)   (541-41-3) 
Phosgene  Methanesulphonyl chloride Ethyl chlorothioformate 
 (75-44-5)  (124-63-0)   (2941-64-2) 
Phosphorus trichloride Methyl bromide   Ethyl phosphonothioic 
 (7719-12-2)  (74-83-9)   dichloride 
        (993-43-1) 
Sulphur dioxide  Methyl chloroformate  Ethyl phosphonic dichloride 
 (7446-09-5)  (79-22-1)   (1066-50-8) 
Sulphuric acid  Methyl chlorosilane  Ethyleneimine 
 (7664-93-9)  (993-00-0)   (151-56-4) 
Tungsten hexafluoride Methyl hydrazine   Hexachlorocyclopentadiene 
 (7783-82-6)  (60-34-4)   (77-47-4) 
   Methyl isocyanate  Hydrogen iodine 
    (624-83-9)   (10034-85-2) 
   Methyl mercaptan  Iron pentacarbonyl 
    (74-93-1)   (13463-40-6) 
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   Nitrogen dioxide   Isobutyl chloroformate 
    (10102-44-0)   (543-27-1) 
   Phosphine   Isopropyl chloroformate 
    (7803-51-2)   (108-23-6) 
   Phosphorus oxychloride  Isopropyl isocyanate 
    (10025-87-3)   (1795-48-8) 
   Phosphorus pentafluoride  n-Butyl chloroformate 
    (7647-19-0)   (592-34-7) 
   Selenium hexafluoride  n-Butyl isocyanate 
    (7783-79-1)   (111-36-4) 
   Silicon tetrafluoride  Nitric oxide 
    (7783-61-1)   (10102-43-9) 
   Stibine    n-Propyl chloroformate 
    (7803-52-3)   (109-61-5) 
   Sulphur trioxide   Parathion 
    (7446-11-9)   (56-38-2) 
   Sulphuryl fluoride  Perchloromethyl mercaptan 
    (2699-79-8)   (594-42-3) 
   Tellurium hexafluride  sec-Butyl chloroformate 
    (7783-80-4)   (17462-58-7) 
   n-Octyl mercaptan  tert-Butyl isocyante 
    (111-88-6)   (1609-86-5) 
   Titanium tetrachloride  Tetraethyl lead 
    (7550-45-0)   (78-00-2) 
   Trichloroacetyl chloride  Tetraethyl pyroposphate 
    (76-02-8)   (107-49-3) 
   Trifluoroacetyl chloride  Tetramethyl lead 
    (354-32-5)   (75-74-1) 
       Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate 
        (584-84-9) 
       Toluene 2,6-diisocyanate 
        (91-08-7) 
 
Source: US Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration, ‘Toxic industrial 
chemicals (TICs)’, <http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/emergencypreparedness/guides/chemical.html>, 
(accessed 26 May 2013). 
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